SherbazKhanMazari

SherbazKhanMazari

Reproducedby

SaniH.Panhwar

AJOURNEYTO

DISILLUSIONMENT

SherbazKhanMazari

AstoldtoShehryarKhanMazari

Reproducedby:

SaniH.Panhwar(2021)

Contents

Dedication      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      1

Foreword      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      2

Introduction:TribalBackground      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      3

EarlyYears      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      18

1950s-YearsofDisastrousIntrigues      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      38

TheAyubKhanRegime      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      82

The1970ElectionsandtheirTragicAftermath      ..      ..      ..      ..      125

EntryoftheCivilianMartialLawAdministrator      ..      ..      ..      ..      173

BalochistanandtheUDF      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      206

BhuttoattheHeightofhisPower      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      247

PNAandtheFateful1977Elections      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      289

ZiaulHaqandtheRevivalofMartialLaw      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      330

MRDandOpposingZia’sMartialLaw      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      370

FinalYearsinPolitics      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      414

Epilogue      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      451

Glossary      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      461

Dedication

TothepeopleofPakistan-leaderless and betrayed

Foreword

At a gathering of journalists sometime ago, afriend of mine and I were asked to write ourmemoirs.Thereasoncitedwasthatthebothofushadfirst-handknowledgeof many of the events that had taken place in our country over the years. My friend, whoisknownforhiscolorfulexuberance,wrylycommentedthathedidnotindulge in writing fiction. According to him all the autobiographies written so far in Pakistan had largelybeenexercisesin’fiction’.Whilemyfriendiswell-knownformakingbarbed quipsatconventionalbeliefs,hishumorousasidesoftencontainalarge measure oftruth.

So,Ihavemadeeveryattempttobeashonestandcandidashumanlypossible.Iwill allowthereadertobethejudgeofmyefforts.Likeallmemoirs,however,thereisa degreeofself-indulgenceinvolved.Itisintheverynatureofmytribalinheritanceto highlight my family history and heritage which I have done in the Introduction of this book. The reader is, of course, welcome to skip these details.

This book has been researched and written for me by my son Shehryar from the mass of personal detail that I provided him. Over the past two years he has spent many hours holdingdiscussionswithme,poringovermydiaries,scrapbooksofnewspaper clippings, correspondence and files of press statements, interviews and other written materialswhileIwasconstantlyavailableforverificationofanyfactordetail.His finishedworkhasbeencloselyvettedbyme,chapterbychapter.Theviewsand opinions expressed here are my own.

IamgratefultoMaisoonHusseinandTabindaVahidyfortheirprodigiouseffortin collating material for me about my experience during the Bhutto years. I would like to thankTyabaHabib,whowaswiselychosenbytheOxfordUniversityPresstobethe editorofthemanuscript.Herpatienceanddiligenceoverthepasttwoyearsweremore than exemplary.

Finally, itwould beremissofme nottoacknowledge forty-sixyearsofunderstanding anddevotedsupportgiventomebymywifeSouriya.Duringmypoliticalyearsshehad to endure many inconveniences, including having her house turned into a sub-jail onseveralinstancesandonoccasionhavinghadtocopewithofficiallysponsored armedintruders.MentionshouldalsobemadeofmysonsSherazam,Shehryarand Sher Afzal as they have been unquestioningly loyal to me throughout.

INTRODUCTION

TribalBackground

The Mazaris are among one of the oldest tribes of the Baloch, and their history is closely linkedtothehistoryoftheraceitself.1Inatribalculturelineagecountsforeverything, and one’s roots are inextricably linked with the present. Heritage invariably, and often invisibly,shapesandformsthecontoursofone’slife.

TheearliesthistoricalreferencetotheBalochwasmadebytheByzantinehistorian ProcopiuswhoplacedtheminthevicinityoftheCaucasusmountainsinthesixth century AD. The poet Firdausi also alludes tothem livingon the mountainous northern bordersofthePersianEmpireduringthereignofthefirstSassanianKingArdashirI (Artaxerxes)whodiedinAD241.Subsequently,inthelatterhalfofthesixthcentury thePersianKingNaushirvan(Chosroes),accordingtotheShahnama,attackedthe mountainstrongholdoftheBalochandcameclosetoannihilatingthem;somethree hundred years later in the 900s, we find mention of them in history as holding sway in thePersianprovince ofKirman.AroundAD1041theBalochwereforciblyexpelled fromtherebythenewSeljukrulersofIranandtheymigratedfurthereastfromKirman to Seistan and settled there.

In the, early part of the thirteenth century, Mir Jalal Khan, the last ruler of all the Baloch,ledthefinalmassmigrationoftheBalochfromSeistantoKechMakran.Balochoral historystatesthattheMazariswereoneoftheoriginalbolaks(ortribes)ruledbyMir JalalKhan.2AsaresultofthedisputeoverthesuccessioncausedbyMirJalalKhan’s death, the race split with different tribes following each of the ruler’s four sons. TheMazaris along with some other Baloch tribes followed the eldest son Rind who left Kech MakranandheadednorthwardstowardsthevicinityofSibi.ThustheMazaribecame one of the Rind tribes and formed part of what later became known as the Rind Confederacy.SimilarlyasizeablebodyofBalochleftKechMakranundertheleadership of Lashar Khan, Mir Jalal Khan’s second son. These Baloch would consequently become known as Lashari Baloch.

Hoth,JalalKhan’syoungestson,remainedatKechMakranandruledovertheBaloch whohadchosentoremaintherewithhim.Heismydirectpaternalancestorthrough

1Mazariderivesfrom’Mazar’,theBalochwordfortiger.Mazarimeans‘thetiger’soffspring’:M.Longworth Dames,The Baluch Race, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1907, p. 18.

2TheBalochracethencomprisedforty-fourtribesorbolaks(fromtheTurkiskwordfor’abandofmen’).The legitimacy of all Baloch depends upon their ability to prove their lineage from these originalbolaks.

hisgreat-grandsonSahak.3SahaksettledinSindhsometimeinthelatefifteenthcentury inthetownofKashmorwhereheestablishedhimselfasaninfluential personofgood repute.Atthat timethe MazaritribewassettledintheBhambhorehills(inpresent-day Marri-Bugtiarea)undertheleadershipofBizan.TheMazariSirdarwasexperiencing difficultiesrulinghisturbulenttribe.BizaninvitedSahakandafterconsultingtheheads ofthevariousMazariclansandinrecognitionofSahak’shighbornBalochlineage, offeredhimtheSirdariofthetribe.Sahakacceptedtheofferandcementedhisbondsby marryingBizan’sonlydaughter.Eversincethenmyfamily,thedirectdescendantsof Sahak, have been the Sirdarsof the Mazari tribe for the past five hundred years.

In1555alargebodyofBalochaccompaniedHumayuntoDelhitohelpwresthisthrone backfromtheheirsofSherShahSuri.4AfterthesuccessfulrestorationoftheMeghan dynastyonthebattlefieldofPanipat,thegratefulMughalgavejagirstotheBaloch combatants. Many small settlements of Balochexist, eventothisday, inpartsof Punjab and elsewhere, in areas not normally associated with the Baloch. Over a period of four hundredandmoreyears,allthesescatteredBalochsettlementsgraduallylosttheir language and culture ties, thereby abandoning their tribal identity. Unlike many of the otherBalochtribes,apartfromasmallsectionsettledinJhang,theMazarischoseto leave the plains and return to their home in the hills of Balochis’tan and continue with theirtraditionalnomadicexistence.Overhalfacentury laterAin-i-Akbari,the noted sixteenthcenturyhistoricalwork,mentionsthemasresidinginthemountainsnearSibi andreferstotheirabilitytoraise1000cavalrymenandpraisesthequalityoftheirhorses.5

DuringAkbar’stimetheMughalsgaineddirectcontrolofSindhandJahangirconquered Kandhar by 1607. However, despite the Mughal rule its writ was not always stronginthemountainoustribalareabetweentheplainsofSindhanddistantKandhar. In theMazhar-i-Shahjani, Mir Yusuf Mirak, the Mughal historian of Sindh, describes the region of Sibi, where the Mazaris were then based, by stating: ’If the [Mughal] army is strong,therevenueadministrationisalsogood;butifthearmyisweak,therevenueis alsoslender...Inshort,Sibiissurroundedbynumerousnomadictribes.[And]ifa braveandresourcefulpersonisappointedthere,hewillfindamplechancesof exhibiting his valour’.6The Mughal administration was primarily engaged in collecting revenue for Delhi. Day to day administration was largely left to the chiefs of the various tribes,providingofcoursethatnoneoftherevenue-richsettledareawasinterferedwith.

3My ancestor Sahak had a brother named Punnu, who achieved lasting folklore fame as a result of his romanticentanglement with Sassi. Both Sahak and Punnu were the sons of Mir Ali, ruler of Kech Makran.

4SirDenzilIbbetson,PunjabCastes,1883,(ReprintedbySang-e-MPublications,Lahore,1994).

5Abu’l Fazl Allami,Ain-i-Akbari, volume II, translated from Persian by H. S.Jarrett, Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1949, p. 339.

6M.Saleem Akhtar,SindUndertheMughuls,(TranslationofthesecondhalfofYusufMirak’sMazhar-i-Shahjahani), National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1990, p. 151-2.

SettledinthemountainoustractsnearSibiandinkeepingwiththeirwarlikenature,the Mazaristravelledgreatdistancestocarryoutraids,whichattimestookthemasfar westwardsasKalatandatothertimessouthwardsintolowerSindh.HenryPottinger statedthatinthe1600stheGovernorofKalat(whoserulewasthenconfinedonlyto Jhalawan hills and Mastung valleys) was

… atlengthobliged toinvitetohisaid themountainshepherdswiththeir leader, againsttheencroachmentsofahordeofdepredatorsfromthewesternpartsof Mooltan, Shikarpoor, and Upper Sinde, who headed by an Uffghan chief, with a fewofhisfollowers,andaRindBelooche tribe stillfamousforitsrobberies, calledtheMuzarees,infestedthewholecountry,andeventhreatenedtoattack the seat of government.7

These’mountainshepherds’whowereinvitedtoassisttherulerweretheKumbrani Brauhis;theirchief,KumbarKhanBrauhi,wasthedirectancestorofthelaterAhmedzai KhansofKalat.ThisaccountstggeststhattheMazarishadanindirecthandin establishing the Ahmedzai dynasty at Kalat.

TheirraidstooktheMazarisfarsouthaswell.Inthemid-sixteenthcentury,aMagsi ChiefnamedNindavhavingbeendrivenoutbytheChandiyahs,aBalochtribe,then settled in the Mughal District of Sehwan, took refugewith the Mazaris and sought their help.TheMazarilushkarswentsouthtoSehwanandattackedtheChandiyahs.Inthe resultingbattle boththeMazari and theChandiyahSirdarswere slain.Coincidentally, theMughalhistorianYusufMirak,writinginthosetimes,suggestedthatonewayof subduingthetroublesomeChandiyahsofSehwanwastoforcethemtoleavetheir native land and ’take up residence in the region of Siwi and Gajabah’, where, according to him, ’the nomads of those parts, who entertain an instinctive hostility towards these wretches,willdestroyandruinthem’.8Quitepossiblythe’nomads’YusufMirakwas referring to were the Mazaris.

Inthefollowinggenerationscountlessbattleswerefought,andmanyachieflosthis life. It was not uncommon for the Sirdars to die in battle. A part of the Sirdar’s dutyinvolvedheadinghistribeintobattle.Unlikemoderndaygenerals,theSirdarhadto leadbyexample.Inthismannertheygainedtherespectandloyaltyoftheirtribesmen and bound the tribe around them.

AfterAurangzeb’sdeaththeMughalempirefellintodecayasrivalclaimantsfoughtit outforthethrone.Therewasalengthyperiodofconfusionandstrife.Taking advantageofthechangedcircumstancesbythe1720stheMazarisoccupiedthefertile

7LieutenantHenryPottinger,TravelsinBeloochistanandSinde,LongmanLondon,1816,p.276.

8M.SaleemAkhtar,SindUndertheMughuls,op.cit.

riverfedsouthernplainsintheareanearpresent-dayRajanpur.Overacenturylater whentheBritish begandocumentinglandownership,theMazari chief’sownershipof theMazariTumanwouldbelegallyrecognizedandenteredinthelandregisterasbeing based on ’the right of conquest’.9

AfterNadirShah’sassassinationAhmedShahAbdaliestablishedhimselfinKabulasthekingofAfghanistan.Later,inrecognitionofNasirKhanBrauhi’sactiveparticipation in the defeat of theMarathasin the Third battle of Panipat, Ahmed Shah bestowed a jagir on the Khan of Kalat in 1758. Thejagir consisted of a land grant which includedShalkot (modernday Quetta) andthe HarrandDaji areawhichlay to the north oftheMazariborder.10WhiletheMazariscontinuedtomaintaintheirindependence fromalloutsiders,theKhanofKalat,hadbythistimemanagedtoconquerthe neighbouringMarriand Bugtiterritories.He nowendeavoredtoimposehisauthority ontheMazarisaswell.TheKhan’sforcestookpossessionoftheplainsanddrovethe Mazarisbacktothemountains.InthebattlethattookplaceGulsherKhan,the Sirdarof the Mazaris, was killed by the Brauhi army of Kalat. The tribe was confined to the hills andreducedtogreathardshipuntilGulsher’ssonandsuccessor,ShahAliKhan, gathered all his men and attacked the Brauhi camp at Kashmor and successfully drove out the invaders.

A fewyearslater,during the SirdariofHamalKhanin,the Kalatiforcesmade yet another attemptto annex the Mazari country. The Brauhi army was this time aided by theBugtisundertheirSirdarBivaraghI. MirHamal and hismenattacked thecombined Brauhi Bugti force which ’was completely routed and [the two Kalati generals], Mihan Khanand SanjarKhan, werekilled’.11Thatended thelastattempt bytheKhans of Kalat to interfere with Mazari independence.

AftertheforceddepartureoftheKalatiBrauhis,MirHamalKhanperceivedthewisdom of aligning himself with the neighboring Talpur Mirs of Sindh. Accordingly, in1791, Mir Hamal Khan formed an alliance with Mir Sohrab Khan, the Talpur Amir of Khairpur and a formal treaty was entered into whereby the Mazari territory would join Sindh as an autonomous territory. In return the Talpurs pledged to defend the Mazarisfromallfutureinvasions.UnderthesametreatyMirHamalretainedcompletecontrol of the administration and revenues of the Mazari area. A historian of the later Britishperiodwouldacknowledgethat’thoughnominallysubjecttotheAmeersofSindh[the

9TheexactwordingintheRojhanTehsillandrecordsreadsbazaria-e-shamsheer(byrightofthesword).

10When theKhan of Kalatrefusedto accept the giftofjagir,Ahmed ShahAbdali pressed uponhim to accept itasa ’shawl’ for his mother, hence the original name of Shalkot. Later it became more commonly known as Kot. From Kot, during the British period, it became Kwetta and then finally Quetta.

11Griffin and Massey,Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore. 1909, vol. II, p. 337.

Mazaris]weretoounrulyto beamenableto control’.12SoontheMazariswereplunged intolargelysuccessfulbattlesagainsttheBugtis.Drishaks,Gurchanis,andLegharis before the appearance of a more formidable enemy.

In 1819, the new ruler of Punjab, Maharaja Ranj it Singh annexed Dera Ghazi Khan, but despitethechangedcircumstancestheMazariscontinued’tocarrytheirdepredations alike intoSindh, Lahore and Bahawalpur’.13In 1834 the Mazari made raidsona nearby SikhfortressandattackedMithankot,lootingtheSikh-heldtown.In1835alargeSikh armyretaliatedbyinvadingtheMazariterritoryanddevastatingthecountryside. Angered,theMazarisavengedthemselvesbyattackingMithankotonceagain.K. Thairani,anIndianhistorian,writingabout1835commentsthatthe’predatorytribeof Mazaris,notoriousfortheirlawlesshabitsandinhabiting anoman’slandbetween Punjab and Sind, ... carried outdaring raidsintothe Maharajah’sterritory’.14MohanLai Kashmiri,awell-knowntravelerandBritishscoutwhovisitedRojhaninearly1836, mentionsthattheMazarishadafightingforceof12,000againsttheSikhs,athirdof whichcouldberaisedatanyonetime.15ShortlyafterMohanLai’svisittheSikh GovernorandPrinceKharakSingh(Ranjit’sson)ledaSikharmyandinvadedthe Mazariterritory.ThistimetheycapturedRojhan,theMazaritribalseat.Twomonths latertheSikhscapturedtheMazari fortatKin,inflictingheavy losses.TheSirdar,Mir BahramKhanandhismenwereforcedtotakeshelterinthenearbyhills.InMarch1837 SirAlexanderBurnesmentionsachancemeetingwithMirBahramKhanattheCourtof theMirsofKhairpuranddescribeshimas’evidentlyamanofsenseandjudgement’, buthecriticizestheMazarisfortheir’plunderingdisposition’and referstothemas’the piratesoftheIndus’.16TheBritishhadastrategicinterestincontrollingtheIndusand theMazariswere regardedasanunnecessaryobstacle intheBritishpursuitofthispolicy.

On the intervention ofthe Talpur Amirs of Sindh peace was made according to which MirBahramKhanandhisMazariswereforcedtoacknowledgethesupremacyofthe Sikhruler.MirBahramvisitedtheDurbaratLahoreonRanjitSingh’sinvitationand methim.Laterinthesameyear(1837)the Mazari’swereinopenrebelliondesperately trying to shake off the foreign Sikh yoke. MirBahram Khan had gathered his tribesmen alongwithMaulviNasiruddeenwhohadbeensentbyhisuncle,thefamousghazi, AhmedShahBehrelvitohelpfighttheSikhinvaders.17Thecomparativelysophisticated Sikh army, with its trained cavalry and modern artillery which was manned by Punjabi MuslimsandcommandedbyAbdurRehman, provedtobetoopowerful.Defeatedonce

12MuhammadYasin,’TheMazarisofSind’,HistoricalSocietyPaper,1939(citedin:SindhObserved,editedby Mubarik Ali, Gautam Publishers, Lahore, 1993, p. 276).

13Ibid.

14KalaThairani,BritishPoliticalMissionstoSind,IndusPublication,Karachi1981,p.86.

15MohanLai,TravelsinPunjab,AfghanistanandTurkistan,W.H.AllenandCo.,London,1846.p.426.

16SirAlexanderBurnes,Cabool,London,1841,pp.47-8.

17BehrelviwaslaterbetrayedbyaYusufzaiandkilledbytheSikhsatBalakoy.

more, the Mazari forces suffered heavy casualties. The Sikhs recaptured Rojhan and this timeburntittotheground.WhenRanjitSinghheardofthevictory,accordingtohis courtchroniclerSohanLaiSuri,heorderedthedischargeoftheLahoreTopkhanaguns in celebration.18

MirBahramKhan,whowasabraveandtragicfigureinmyfamilyhistory,dieda brokenmansoonafter.HewassucceededbyhissonMirDostAH.Soonafterhis accession, Mir Dost Ali once more broke into open revolt against the Sikhs. He attacked RojhanhopingtorecaptureitbutGovernorSahwanMaimarchedagainsthiminforce andtheMazariswereforcedtoretire.ItwasonlyafterSahwanMai’sdeathin1844that asemblanceofpeacereturnedtotheMazariterritory.TheDiwan’ssonandsuccessor, MulRaj,wishingtostrengthenhispositionagainsthisrivals,soughtMirDostAli’s supportbymaking peace withtheMazaris.

It was during Mir Dost Ali’s time that Mir Sher Muhammad, the last remaining Talpur Mir, took refuge with the Mazaris after the British defeated him at the battle of Dabo in 1843, which sealed the fate of Sindh. He spent several months as a guest with Mir Dost Ali in Rojhan before departing for the Sikh Durbar at Lahore.As a gesture of affection forhisguestMirDostAlinamedhisonlyson,mygrandfather-whowasbornshortly afterwards-SherMuhammad.MirSherMuhammadfatheredtwosons,oneofwhom was my father, but unfortunately he died at a relatively young age.

BythetimetheBritishtookoverthePunjabtheMazarishadsufferedmuchatthehands of the Sikh army. Most of their countryside had beendevastated, their towns of Rojhan and Kin burnt and leveled and much more importantly, they had lost a large number of theirfightingmen.Accordingtotribalballadsonly144menremainedunscathedina tribewhosewarriorshadnumberedintheirthousands.MirDostAli,mygreat- grandfather, had himself been severely wounded in one of the battles. At one stage his wounds wereso critical that itwas widelyreported that he wasdead. WhenMohan Lai heard these reports he lamented. This young man was the most clever, civil, brave and sober in disposition among the whole tribe of the Mazaris’.19Sadly, Mir Dost Ali Khan spentthe remainderof hislifeinagonyfromwoundsthatneverhealed properly. Inmy childhood,Iwasoftentoldthathisbody wascoveredwithamassofswordscars. Accordingtomygrandmother,MirDostAliKhanalsohadamusketballembedded under his skin near his collarbone. As a little child, she told me, she would play with it while she sat on her uncle’s lap.

BedriddenasaresultoftheseinjuriesMirDostAliwithdrewfrompubliclifeand passedonthemanagementofthetribetohisyoungerbrother,NawabImamBuksh Khan.InthefourdecadesthatImamBukshKhandirectedtheaffairsofhistribehis

18SohanLalSuri, Umdat-ut-Tawarikh, (translatedfromPersiantoEnglishby V.S.Suri), S.ChandandCo., Delhi, 1961, p. 392.

19HariRamGupta,LifeandWorkofMohanLaiKashmiri,Minerva,1943,p.93.

name became a beaconfar and wide.He was much admired by the British. While it is fashionableinthetwentiethcenturytocondemnanyonewhomaintainedgoodterms withtheBritish,nooneshouldbejudgedinhistoryoutsidethecontextof hisowntime. ImamBukshKhanhadinheritedamuchweakenedanddepletedtribewhichhadunlikemanyothersbravelysufferedmuchatthehandsofthe Sikhs.Toreviveand prosper in peacewas essentialin theinterestof the tribe.

***

InrecenttimestherehasbeenanoticeabletrendamongmodernPunjabicommentators tocriticizetheImperialBritishrulewithoutmakinganyreferencetothebarbaric severityofthedaysoftheSikhaShahi.UnliketheBritishtheSikhshadactively proscribed the freedom of worship for the Muslims of the Punjab; theazaanwas banned andtheeatingofbeefwas punishablebydeath.Furthermore,thousandsofMuslim Punjabi girls were subjected to sexual servitude by the Sikhs. In Lahore the Badshahi mosque was turned into an arsenal (then known as theBaroodkhana), and Emperor Jahangir’sTombwasusedasastable.TheMuslimsregardedtheSikhsrulersofPunjab ascrueloppressors.ItisalsolikelythatthevastnumberofMuslimsofthosetimes would have openly welcomed the arrival of the British into the Punjab. As a recenthistorian stated:

TheMuslimshadsufferedpersecutionandoppressionundertheSikhrule. Therefore,theyregardedthe British,assaviourswhohadprovide themwith security, safety and protection.20

TomanyMuslimstheBritishhadarrivedasliberatorsastheybroughtanendtothe dreadedreignofSikhaShahi.AlienstheBritishmayhavebeenbuttheywerelooked uponasbeingAhle KitabtothemajorityofMuslimsofthosedays.Moreimportantly, Muslim girls of Lahore were now safe again, mosques were no longer violated, and the azuan was once more heard from the minarets of Punjab.

ItisanembarrassingfactofhistoryforthePunjabiMuslimstorecallthe ease with whichtheyacceptedthedominationofPunjabbytheSikhs.Withafewnotable exceptions theMuslims ofPunjab were exceptionally quick to servetheir new masters loyallyandeventotheextentof takinguparmsagainstotherMuslimstohelpservethe interestsoftheirnewSikhrulers.Amongthenotableexceptions,nonewasmore outstanding then Nawab Muzaffar Khan Sadozai, the Afghan Governor of Multan. His greatvalourisworthyofremembrance.Between1802and1817theNawabrepulsed sevenattacksonMultanbytheSikhs.In1818facing defeatinthe eighthandfinal attack, the brave white-bearded Nawab, and his sons found themselves surrounded by alargepartyofSikhs.Scorningsurrender,theNawabandhissonsdemandedtheright

20ZarinaSalamat,ThePunjabinthe1920s,RoyalBookCompany,Karachi1997,p.8.

to die in combat with swords in their hands. Instead the Sikhs shot them down from a safe distance, killing the Nawab and five of his sons.

While central Punjab yielded easily to the Sikh yoke there were those suchas theSials ofJhangandtheKharralswhoputupbraveresistancebeforebeingoverwhelmedby theinvaders.IntheDeraGhaziKhanareatheBalochtribesofKhosaandGurchanis courageouslyfoughtagainsttheSikhs,whileothers,includingtheLegharisco-operated withthem.TheGurchaniSirdar,BijarKhan,provedaworthyfoeoftheSikhs.According to Griffin, ’he became a terror of the country up to Multan’.21Sadly, when he waseventuallycaughtbytheSikhstheyhandedhimovertotheLeghariswhoslew BijarKhanoutsidethegatesofMultan.ItwasSirdarKauraKhanKhosaandhismen whodefeatedthe Sikhs,capturingDeraGhaziKhanin1848.Whenthe Britishrook possessionofDeraGhaziKhantheoldBalochalliesoftheSikhswereamongthefirstto pledge their loyalties to the new masters.

Thereisanamusinganecdotetoldaboutawell-knownMuslimadministratorof western Punjab during the Sikh rule, whose area of governance once extended from RawalpindiandJhelumandwentallthewaysouthtoDeraIsmailKhanandBannu.22One evening the retired gentleman heard an unusual sound emanating from his village. Surprised by its intensity the elderly gentleman cupped his ear and barked at one of his retainers’What’sthat?What’sthatpeculiarsoundIhear?’Bemusedthemanreplied withastutter,’Sir,that’stheaazan.’YouknowtheSikhrulehasended.TheBritishhave

allowedtheaazantobeheardoncemore.’Theoldmanstaredathimsullenlyand

snapped back, ’Of course you bloody fool I know theSikh rule is over’, he said. ’But Iam still alive! Surely the villagers could have respected my feelings’.

***

Imam Buksh Khan was a visionary. He was the first to recognize that the constant and anarchic inter-tribal warfare among the Baloch was a source of great weakness for the whole race. He workedhardto bring about peace amongthe warring tribes but atthe sametimekeptaswordhandytoensurejusticeprevailed.InMassey’sChiefsand Families of Note in the Punjab, he is referred to with much praise.

He has never allowed self-interest or partisanship to stand in the way of justice, andthegeneralrecognitionofhisintegrityhasgivenhimenormousinfluence notonlywiththeBilochis ingenerally,butamongallclassesofthepopulation, MussalmanandHindu.Crimeisseverelydealtwithandgoodorderenforced,hiswordbeinglawtohispeople,whohaveentirefaithinhisjusticeEvery

21GriffinandMassey,ChiefsandFamiliesofNoteinthePunjab,vol.II,op.cit.,p.364.

22TheretiredgovernorwasMalikFatehKhanTiwana,whodiedin1848.

aspectofhischaracterisadmirable,hisbearing;ofkindlyandsympatheticways: gentle in disposition; butin purpose and action as strong asiron.23

TheBritishweregratefultoNawabImamBukshKhanforhishelpinresolvingthe Khan of Kalat’s dispute with his ownBrauhichiefs inthe 1870s.Imam BukshKhan also usedhisconsiderableinfluenceoverneighboringBalochtribestotheirlongerterm benefit.HeperseveredupontheMarriandBugtitomaintainpeacefulrelationswiththe British.HealsohelpedresolveasuccessiondisputeamongtheLegharisovertheir TumandariandintheJirgadecisionexiledtherivalclaimantsfromChoti.More importantlyforImamBukshKhan,heusheredinaperiodofpeaceandjusticewhich the Mazari tribe had not known after manydecades of warfare. It is this last actof his whichheshouldberememberedfor.borninintoanerawheretheMazariswerenot onlyatwarwithalltheirneighborsbuthadtakenonthepowerfulSikhKingdomof Punjab,heleftbehindhimalegacyofpeaceandformidablejusticetothose towhom he owedhisloyalty,histribe.Despitecriticismmadeofhimbysomepresent-dayself- stylednationalists,ImamBukshKhantowersoverotherBalochfiguresofhisperiod, unlikemanypastandpresentSirdarsheservedhistribeloyallyandputtheirinterest aboveallelse.NotsurprisinglytheBritishchosetohonorhimonseveraloccasions. ImamBukshKhanwasthePresidentoftheInter-ProvincialTribalJirgaofBaloch SirdarsandalsoamemberoftheLegislativeCouncilofPunjab.24In1888hewasgivenaknighthood.

OnamorepersonallevelI haveotherreasonstoadmireImam BukshKhan, whowas alsomy great-grandfather, ashisdaughter wasmy paternal grandmother. On Mir Dost Ali’sdeaththeSirdarinominallypassedontohisson,mygrandfatherMirSher Muhammad Khan, who wasnot only ImamBuksh Khan’s nephew but his son-in-law as well.DespiteBritisheffortstothecontrary,ImamBukshKhanrefusedtoacceptthe Sirdariformallyforhimself.LateronthedeathofMirSherMuhammadKhanin1883 ImamBukshrecognizedMirSherMuhammadKhan’sson,thesixyear-oldMirDost Muhammad Khan, as the next Mazari Sirdar. During thisperiod ImamBuksh Khan was atthepeak of hispowerand wielded considerableinfluencefarbeyond theboundaries oftheMazaricountry.HecouldeasilyhavewithheldtheSirdarifromhisdaughter’ssonDostMuhammadandkeptitforhisownmale heirs,acommonenoughdesire among the Baloch. But this was not acceptable for a just and noble man such as him.

***

Originally the Baloch tribal society was more democratic in structure. Strict rules of primogeniture did not always apply. If an eldest son was not equipped with leadership qualities,thentheseniorsofthetribeoftenoptedforsomeoneelsewithinhisfamily

23An extract from the 1st edition of Massey’sChiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab, (cited in:Gazetteer of the Dera Ghazi Khan District 1893-97, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1898 , p. 75).

24ThiswaswhenboththeDelhiareaandtheNWFPwerepartofPunjab.

whowasjudged tobemore ableand competent.Unfortunately, theseearlier practices changedwiththepassageoftime.Today,Sirdarireflectsmanyoftheuglyfeaturesof feudalism rather than the more open mores of a tribal society. The modern Sirdardoes notsitonakilimlaidonthegroundinthetraditionalmanner,surroundedwithhis tribesmen,insteadhepercheshimselfonaraisedchairimposinghisauthorityonthe peopleseatedonthefloor.Ratherthanleadhisfollowersbysettingexamplesof bravery,fortitudeandjustice,hismoderncounterpartoftendisplayshisopulentwealth and arrogance as a mark of his superiority.

ThereisamarkedabsenceofabusewordsinBalochi.Perhapstheworstinsultavailable in the Baloch language is that of calling someone a ’coward’ or threatening ’to pull his beardoff.’Naturallythesetermsonlyappliedtomen.ThetraditionalBalochattitude towards women is one of great respect. Even in rage, a mail could not lay a hand on a woman, while any act of molestation or assault was regarded as the most abhorrent of crimes and punishable by death. During battle it was customary for the womenfolk’ to tend to the wounded and offer water to thewarring parties without favor. They could wanderamongthefightingmenwithoutfear.Duringinternecinebloodfeudsitwas oftenwomenwhowouldmakepeacebygoingbareheadedtotheirfamilyrivalsand plead for reconciliation. According toBalochcustom noman canrefusearequest made byawomanwhoapproacheshimwithherhead uncovered. Onceherdemand hasbeen metitisincumbentuponthe patriarchofthe rivalfactionto’restore’the woman’s dignitybyplacing asariordupattaover her head before sheisreturned to her family.

Normallywomenhadnoroletoplayinatribalsocietyotherthanadomesticrole within the confines of her family. There are of course exceptions to every rule. My grandmother Jannat Begum was an extraordinary exception. My grandfather, Mir Sher MuhammaddiedatanearlyageleavingJannatBegumwidowedattheageoftwenty four.Sheprovedtobeaparticularlycapablelady.Heradvicewasoftensoughtbyher own father, Nawab Imam Buksh Khan who visited her daily. This practice was later continuedbyherbrotherNawabBahramKhanwhomethereverymorningforbreakfast.

Mygrandmotherran anopen kitchen daily,orlungar,wherefoodwas providedto all thosewho came.Mealswerealso providedbyherto allthestudentsat thelocalschool, the inmates of Rojhan jail, the patients and their attendants at the local hospital.25She maintainedalistofneedyanddeservingpeopletowhommoneywasregularly distributedwhosenameswereconstantlybeingenteredonalist.Asawidowshe refusedtomaintainpurdah,insistingthatbyrightofherbeingaSirdar’swifeall tribesmen were her children and she their mother. She held her own durbar and settled many of the disputes herself.

25Thelungarcontinued for nearlyninety yearsuntil the LandReformsof1959shrank thelandholdingsof the Chieffamily.

Amorelastinglegacyofhersarethedurbarhall(Mirri),themosque,thefamilytombs andguesthousesthatshehadconstructed.CraftsmenwerebroughtoverfromMultan andAjmerto buildthese buildings.The workin the durbarhall,with its beautifully paintedwoodenceilings,istilltoday-overahundredandtwentyyearslaterapleasure to behold.In fact Nawab Shahbaz Khan Bugtiwas so impressedby the MazariSirdar’s Mirri that he asked his friend Nawab Bahrain Khan’s assistance in constructing one for himself at Dera Bivaragh (as Dera Bugti was then called). Local craftsmen from RojhanwerethenselectedandlatersenttobuildadurbarhallfortheBugtichief.

Alongwithwomen,youngchildrenandmembersofminoritycommunitiesalsoenjoyedfullprotection.Hinduswereconsideredamanatandhadtheprotectionofthe wholetribe.Consequently, any actofviolenceagainstanon-Muslimwould beregarded as an insult and avenged by the tribe. Baloch boys under the age of twelve wore ankle lengthcholos.Thispreventedthemfrombecominginnocentvictimsofanyongoing vendetta.Itwasonlywhentheyreachedthirteenthattheywereallowedtodonshalwarsand carry swords.

Unfortunatelymanyoftheseproudtraditionshavebeenleftbythewayside.Mostof theblamelieswiththerecentSirdarsandthepoorexamplessetbythem.TheBritish practiceofbestowingtitlesandwealthuponthemhaddonemuchtocorrupttheirtribal ideals.Insteadofmaintainingtheirpositionsbytheconstantcareandwelfareoftheir people theyinsteadbegantovie forpowerandpatronage fromthe rulers.Modern educationinsteadofinstillingthenotionsofjusticeanddemocracyhascreatedachasm betweentheprivileged and non-privileged. Thepracticesof feudalismhavetakenover. TheyoungerSirdarsoftodaytendtobemoreintolerantanddespoticthanthe untutored Sirdars of yesteryear whowerefamiliar with tribal codes of behavior. These educatedSirdarsareinclinedtoforcefullysubjugatetheirtribesmenunnecessarily,not understanding thatthe moretheybrutalize theirpeople the lessinfluence theywill have over them in the future.

***

TheBritishshrewdlyadoptedtheoldMughalmethodologywhenitcametodealing with the Baloch Sirdars. Earlier the Mughals had devised a special policy when it came to dealing with Baloch tribes and their chiefs. As a historian noted:

Oncetheimperial[Mughal]governmenthad exactedmilitaryserviceormoney fromtheBalochchiefs,itleftthemfreetomanagetheirinternalaffairsasthey wished.TheBalochpopulationneverwentagainsttheirtriballaws.No complaintsmadetotheImperial CourtbythesubjectsofanyBalochchief areon

record. They were free to levy cesses and duties on trade passing through their territories at rates fixed by themselves.26

DespitehisgoodrelationshipwiththeBritish,NawabImamBukshKhankepthis independencefromthemthroughout.AlargepartoftheMazaricountryremained outsidethejurisdictionoftheBritishrulersandwasdesignatedastribalareawhere onlyjirgalawscouldapply.EveninthesettledareatheNawabretainedmagisterial powersandadministeredtheaffairsofthetribeindependently.DuringthefirstHur uprising in Sindh the Nawab exercised his independence and refused a British request to provide a Mazarilushkarto suppress the movement despite offers of wealth. Instead itwashisfriendtheBugtiChief,NawabShahbazKhan,wholatersentfivehundred horsemen under his son Mehrab Khan to fight the Hurs. The Bugti chief was rewarded by the British who presented him with thirty-five thousand acres of rich fertile land in Sangar, which until the discovery of natural gas at Sui, remained the mainstay of Bugtiwealth.

Nawab Sir Imam Buksh Khan died in 1903. The British recognized his eldest son Nawab Bahram Khan as his successor to thejagir. His sister’s son, my paternal uncle, Mir Dost Muhammad Khan continued to be the nominal Turnandar and Sirdar of the Mazaris. Undoubtedly,BahramKhanwasanotherremarkableman.Whilenotquiteinthe unique class of his father, Nawab Bahram Khan made a considerable impact in his ownway.AformermemberoftheIndianPoliticalService,SirTerenceCreaghCoen,writing in1971aboutthenorthwestfrontierofBritishIndiastatedthat’[ImamBukshKhan] and his son were two of the greatest of all frontier chiefs’.27The subsequent 1909 editionofChiefs and Families of Note in the Punjabalso described the younger Nawab in similar praiseworthy terms:

NawabSirBahramKhanhaswonaprestigeinhisTumanandintheneighboringdistrictsinnodegreeinferiortothatwhichhisfatherenjoyed.His services are sought outside his Tuman and in other districts in the settlement of tribalandintertribaldisputes:theJacobabadauthoritiesregularlyinvitehimto attendtheirJirgas.Hekeepshimselfwellintouchwiththeworldaffairsand neverspareshimselfintheworkoftheTumanwhichhehascompletelyinhand.28

From 1908 onwards Bahram Khan was President of the Punjab Chiefs Association and by1910hewasamemberof thePunjabLegislativeCouncil. HewasmadeKnightof the BritishEmpire (KBE)in1913andsix yearslater,in1919,he wasnominatedtothe Council of State at Delhi. Edwin Montagu states in his book that Bahram Khan was one ofthepeopleheconsultedduringhisofficialvisitasSecretaryofStateforIndiatoDelhi

26ProfessorHumairaFaizDasti,Multan,AProvinceoftheMughalEmpire(1525-1751),RoyalBookCompany, Karachi, 1998, p. 249.

27TerenceCreaghCoen,TheIndianPoliticalService,ChattoandWindus,London,1971,p.154.

28GriffinandMassey,ChiefsandFamiliesofNoteinthePunjab,Vol.II,op.cit.,p.339.

in1917,beforehelpingframewhatlaterbecameknownastheMontagu-Chelmsford Reforms. He described BahramKhan as’afine old Balochi,whocould notspeak a word of English’ and had to use the services of aninterpreter to communicate with him.29

During his lifetime Bahram Khan held several noteworthy offices. He was the LifePresident of the Interprovincial Chief sJirga at Fort Munro which was responsible for settling all Baloch inter-tribal disputes. Thisjirga convened twice a year and dealt withcases of dispute between different tribes, often involving more than one province. The memberswereall tribalchiefsandtheirdecisions,like decisionofa superiorcourt, formedprecedentsandweretreatedwithgreatrespect.Othermembersincluded Sirdarsofthe Baluchistantribes,suchas theBugtis,Marris,Khetran,andthePathan tribes,aswellastheDeraGhaziKhantribes,suchastheKhosas,Legharis,Gurchanis, and Drishaks, among others.

Bahram Khan encouraged the younger men of his family to obtain good education and leadusefullives.AmonghisnephewsMajorHamidullahKhan,anAligarhgraduate, obtainedaKing’sCommissionintheBalochRegiment.Anothernephew,Wali Muhammad,joinedtheRailways.Therewereothersinthefamily whoenteredthe provincial civil service; one even joined the police.

AfterthedeathofmygrandmotherandtowardstheendofhislifeNawabBahram Khan andmyuncle,MirDost MuhammadKhan enteredinto aprotracteddispute.My uncle who was the nominal Tumandar and the traditional head of the tribe resented thefactthatasthetribalchiefhehadnosourceoffundsotherthanthestipendhandedout to him by his maternal uncle, Nawab Bahram Khan, who remained trustee of the Chief family’s property.

DuringatriptoLahorewhilevisitingsomeofhisnephewswhowerestudyingat Aitchison College he met Maulvi Karamat Ali, who happened to be an Assistant House Master at the College.Impressed by Maulvi Karamat Ali he invited him to become his privatesecretarytosuperviseacivilcourtcasemyunclehadbroughtagainstNawab BahramKhan.MaulviKaramatAlideclinedashe hadalready acceptedanofferto becomeatutortotherulerofBahawalpurandinsteadsuggestedChoudhryRahmatAli,whowasthenemployedasatutorattheschoolandwhoisnowbetterremembered for having coined the name ’Pakistan’.

In Lahore Mir Dost Muhammad Khan provided his new Private Secretary with a well- furnishedbungalowcompletewithdomesticstaffandasalaryofsevenhundred rupees.Thismonthlysalary,accordingtoChoudhryRahmatAli’sbiographer,was’a handsomeamountinthosedays’.30Itwassufficientto allowhim toattain’alifestyleof

29EdwinMontagu.AnIndianDiary,Heinemann,London,1930,p.50.

30K.K.Aziz,RahmatAli:ABiography,Vanguard,Lahore,1987,p.9.

an upper middle-class bachelor ... He became a member of the Lahore Association club andmadeexpensivepurchases:anewHumberbicycle,aneighteen-caratgold wristwatchandothergoodthingsoflife’.31ForhisfrequentvisitstoRojhanmyuncle builthimaspacioushouse onan openplot of land, whichevento thisdayisreferred to in Rojhan as ’the Secretary House’.

Rahmat Ali is remembered by those who knew him at Rojhan to be a rather serious man lackingasenseofhumor.HewasastrongadvocateofPan-Islamismandevenmanaged toconvertoneofmyfamilymembers,whowasagraduatefromtheMuslimUniversity atAligarhandasupporteroftheIndianCongress,tothecauseofPan-Islamism. Choudhry Rahmat Ali stayed often at Rojhan between 1919 and 1928. Mir DostMuhammadKhanwonhiscasein1929.AsK.K.Aziz,RahmatAli’sbiographerstates, ’Oncethecasewasover,thegratefulMazarichiefpaidRahmatAliaverylargeamount ofmoneyasappreciationofhisservices’.32RahmatAliwasthenabletotravelto EnglandandcompletehiseducationatCambridgeUniversity.

PakistanowesagreatdealtotheearlyvisionariesofaMuslimStateinthesubcontinent. RahmatAliwasaheadofhistime.WhenheapproachedtheIndiandelegatesforthe 1930-1931RoundTableConferenceatLondontheyscoffedathisviewsandregarded himanidealisticdreamer.Muchlaterin1948hevisitedPakistan.Iwasstillatschool buthe metwithmy brotherandothermembersofmy family presentinLahore at Faletti’sHotelwherehewasstaying.Bythenhehadbecomeabitterman.Duringhis visittothecountrythathehadnamed and dreamedof manyyears ago,he was being hounded at every turn by the CID and was deliberately made to feel unwelcome by the Government of the day. He accused the leaders of the Pakistan Movement of indulging in a sell-out. Dispirited, he leftfor England never to return. He died there in 1951.

OnNawabSirBahramKhan’sdeathin1923,myuncleNawabMirDostMuhammad KhanwasrecognizedasthesoleandparamountchiefoftheMazaris.Hewastodie within a decade and is largely remembered as the MirSakhi. My uncle’s generosity and charityreachedlegendaryproportions.Therearemanystoriesrecountingtheexcesses of his generosity, and I should perhaps relate one.Once while riding on horseback, he wasapproachedbyafakirwhosaidthathehadtravelledagreatdistancetobenefit from the Mir’s generosity. My uncle asked the fakir what would satisfy his needs. The fakir pointedtowardsthe horse thatmy uncle wasriding.The Mir promptly gotoff and handedthereinstothefakir.Whenoneofhisescortsdutifullytriedtoremovethesolid silversaddle,stirrupsandthestringsofheavysilverenamellednecklacesaroundthe horse’sthroatMirDostMuhammadangrilywavedhimawayandinsistedthatitallnowbelongedtothefakir.Notsurprisinglyonhisdeathheleftaheavilyindebted

31Ibid.,p.10.

32Ibid.,p. 25 and note 43 on p. 2. According to some sourcesRahmat Ali waspaid an honorarium of Rs200,000 - a huge amount for those days - by Mir Dost Muhammad Khan.

estate.Ashediedwithoutissue,hisbrother,myfather,MirMuradBukshKhan- succeeded him to the Sirdari.

Myfather’sSirdarilastedforonlyayear.Hediedin1933whenIwasjusttwoanda half years old. The British government took charge of us and our property,and in anofficialdurbarceremonythePunjabGovernorrecognizedmyeldestbrother,MirBalakhSherastheTurnandaroftheMazaris.Soonafter,theysoughttoappointasarbarah(regent) tumandar. The provincial administration took meticulous care in their selection,seekingtoappointthebestcandidate,keepinginmindthetribalcultureand its sensitivities. Three members of my family offered themselves as candidates for thesarbarahposition and all three were rejected. One applicant, though educated and competent,was rejectedbecause he sporteda solar hat,smokeda pipe and was considered to be somewhat of apukkahsahib. Another candidate, who was a seniormemberofthefamily,wasexcludedbecausehehadbeenheldresponsibleforordering the murder of the husband of his mistress, as a result of which he had earlier been dismissed from the position of a magistrate. The third candidate who hadbeen refusedwasacousinofmine.Thoughwell-educated,hewasconsideredtobealibertine. HavingrejectedalltheapplicantsthegovernmentchoseKhanBahadurRahimyarKhan,whohadnotevenputhisnameforwardfortheposition.RahimyarKhannot only lived in accordance with tribal traditions, he was known to be honest, upright andjust. He was also made a magistrate and appointed as a member of the interprovincialtribaljirga.DuringtheminorityofmybrothersandI,RahimyarKhanmanagedthe tribal affairs in our stead. Our property was placed under the management of KhanBahadur Aurangzeb Khan, a Punjab civil service officer, who reported directly to theDistrictDeputyCommissioner,whowasourofficialguardian.

CHAPTER1

EarlyYears

Sadly, I have no memory of my mother or father. My mother died at the young age of twenty-two,whenIwasjustayearold.Ayearlatermyfatherdied.Followingthe common practiceof tribaltradition,shortlyaftermybirthIwas sentofftoawet-nurse. Muraddan was a camel breeder's wife and I lived with her and her family in a reed hut (geydan)forthe firstyearofmy life.They livedanomadiclifenearthefoothillsofthe Suleiman Range.

After my mother's death I was taken from Muraddan and put inthe care of Sabhai who livedinRojhanandbelongedtoacommunityofformerslaves,andwhoseancestors had once been slaves in my family. Sabhai was childless, and doted on me. Many years later she helped in raising my sons Sherazam, Shehryar and Sher Afzal at Karachi, and remained in my service and care until she died in 1972.

We were afamily of six-threebrothers and three sisters. As orphans wewereall wards ofcourt.OurofficialguardianwastheDeputyCommissioneratDeraGhaziKhan. DeputyCommissionerscameandwent,buttherewereoneortwowhotookgreat personal interest in our welfare. Of these, George Abell, who was posted to Dera Ghazi Khanduring1939-41,wasanexceptionalguardian.Heplayedaprominentrolein determining our future.I continued to keep in touchwith him over the years. Later in 1949whenIvisitedhiminLondon,hehadbeenknighted,andwasadirectorofthe Bank of England.33

The British paid particular attention to our education. They insisted that my two older sistersbesenttoLahorefortheirschooling.Thiscausedquiteafuroreamongstthe tribalelderswho werehorrifiedbythethoughtoftheirSirdar'sdaughters beingsent awayfromhometoaforeignplace.Anxioustoavoidunrest,andsensitiveastheywere to tribal customs, the British relented and sent instead a governess to Rojhan for theireducation.

WhenIturnedsevenIjoinedmybrothersatQueenMary'sCollege,Lahore.Itwas,in fact,largelyagirl'sschool,andonlyacceptedboysuptotheageoften.AtQueen

33Ayearlater,in1950,hebecameGovernor oftheBankofEngland.

Mary's,undertheguidanceofthePrincipal,MissWinifredCox,greatemphasiswas placed uponturning theyoung boysof thelanded aristocracy intolittlegentlemen. The boysowed alottotheolder girlswhomweaddressedpolitely asbhainjee. Conservative families still refrained from sending their daughters to school, and as a result, the girls atQueenMary'scame fromthe more enlightenedandmostly urbanfamiliesofthe Punjab.Thesebhainjeestaughtustorecitethekalimaandinstructedusonnamaz.This initial trainingby thebhainjeestaughtusatayoungagetorespectthefemalesex,and mademedevelopamoreliberaloutlookandrespecttheeffortsofwomenwhohad tried to achieve emancipation within our closed society.

IstillfondlyrememberalargenumberofthegirlswhowereatQueenMary'sduring mydaysthere.AmongthemwereAllamaIqbal'sdaughterMuneera(betterknownas Bano); Nazi and Sylvie, the daughters of the distinguished civil servant G. Moinuddin, and their cousin Nighat, who was later married to the much-respected Admiral Ahsan, wasthereaswell.Amongtheprincelyfamilies,wehaddaughtersoftherulersof Patiala, Karputhala, Jind, and Nabha, the Sikh states of East Punjab. Also present were the daughters of Sir Sikander Hayat (Tahira and Ismat), Sir Liaquat Hayat (Samina), Sir Feroz Khan Noon (Asmat),34Sir Syed MaratabAh (Sitwat,as wellas hisniece Parveen), and Mian Muhammad Khan (Attiya and her two sisters). There were many other such youngladies,toomanytoenumeratehere, allofwhomIfondlyrecallasthebhainjeesof my childhood.

Among the boys who were my contemporaries there, was the son of the Amir of Bahawalpur.Others includedZulfikar and Iftikhar Bokharifrom Shah Jeewna,and Saifullah Magsi who was the sole representative from Balochistan. The boys wererestrictedtoaseparateboardinghouseandatthe'mature'ageoftenmostofuswere sentawaytoAitchisonCollegeat Lahore.

I joined Aitchison in January 1941. Originally founded in 1886, it was set up as Chiefs CollegewiththesoleaimofprovidingeducationtothesonsofthePunjabprincely rulingfamilies.AfewdecadeslateritwasmadelesselitistbythethenPrincipal,Mr. Barry, who opened admission to boys from wealthy and reputable business and professionalfamilies.ShortlyaftermyarrivalatAitchison,theschoolcelebrateda specialevent:itsstudentshadfinallyexceededtwohundred!Aholidaywasdeclared.

The roll call at Aitchison then consisted largely of the children of privileged families of those days. Along with the contingent of boys from QueenMary'sCollege who I have alreadymentioned,we alsohadthe sonsofthe rulersofBahawalpur,Patiala, Karputhala,Khairpur,Jind,NabhaandChamba.Lahorewasrepresentedbythe QizalbashesandtheBaghbanpuraMians.Therewasalsoalargegroupofboysfrom ruralPunjab'slandedgentry.FromFerozpurthereweretheMamdots;fromShahpur

34Subsequently, Feroze Khan Noon, along with a number of other knighted Muslim League leaders including Nawab Jamal Khan Leghari and Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, voluntarily surrendered their titles on the direct instructions of Mr. Jinnah.

theTiwanasandtheNoons;fromMultanwehadtheQureshis,KhakwanisandGillanis.ThosefrommyhomedistrictofD.G.Khanincludedalargenumberof Legharis(includingFarooq,wholaterwentontobecomePresidentofPakistan)aswell as my good friend Zulfiqar Ali Khosa, the orphaned heir to the Khosa tumandari. Fromother parts of the Punjab we had the Sials from Jhang, the Syeds from Shergarh, theIsakhelsandKalabaghAwansfromMianwali,theHayatsfromWah,thesonsofthe chiefsoftheGhakkarandJanjuatribes,andthesonofthePirofMakhud.Fromthe NWFPwehadtheHotiboysandtheKhanofMardan'ssons(MirAfzalandAziz Sarfaraz) and the»Wali of Swat's son. From Balochistan we had Akbar Bugti and hisbrother Ahmed Nawaz, Khair Buksh Marri and a number of young Jamalis. Sindh was representedbymyfriendsAliMuradofKhairpur,MushtaqandNaseemAbdulKadir, andtheiryoungerbrotherIrshad(theirfather,whomIlatercametoknowwell, remained the Dewan of Junagadh State virtually up to Partition when he is said to have nominatedhisdeputy,NaibDewanSirShahNawazBhutto,ashissuccessor).Among theestablishedurban familiesofLahoretherewasmydearfriendAsadAli,thesonof Syed Amjad Ali, who remained one of my closest friends until his death in early 1999.Apart fromtheMuslimboystherewasalso ofcourseanextremelylargegroupofSikh boys who all left after Partition.

Pre-Partition Aitchison had a mixture of boys of different religions and races. At school we had amosque, a gurdwaraand atemple, and despite thedifferentbeliefs,there was nohostilityamongtheboyswhatsoever.Weweresimplyyoung,energeticboyswho studiedandplayedtogether,andmadefriendseasilyregardlessofreligiousdifferences. SportsweretakenveryseriouslyatAitchison.Thereweresomeexcellentathletesand sportsmen in my days. Boys like Nazar Tiwana, Rambir Singh Bajwa, and Rai Singh of Patiala, performed wonders on the school's athletic and playing fields. Even the Baloch boys shared some sporting success. My contemporary, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, displayed remarkabletalentsasacricketer, dazzling everyonewithhisability. Clearly, hehad the makingsofaninternationaltestcricketer,ifhehadonlychosentopursuethesport further.Hiselderbrother,Akbar,excelledatwaterpoloandtheshotput.Mytwo brothers, Balakh Sher and Sher Jan, were talented swimmers and members of the First Eleven hockey team. I was later captain of the school swimming and water polo teams, and was quite proud when we beat our rivals at Government College and F. C. Collegein the annual collegiate competitions.

It was perhaps not a coincidence that Khair Buksh Marri, Akbar Bugti, and his younger brother Ahmed Nawaz, werethere at Aitchison along with my brothers and I. Wewere all wardsof the court, and had been sent there about the same time. TheMarris, Bugtis and Mazaris were all large Baloch tribes who shared contiguous boundaries and had a long history of tribal rivalry.Not surprisingly, due to their geographical location on the cuspofthreeprovinces,theMazaris,unlikeotherBalochtribesofDeraGhaziKhan,hadmaintainedawhollyBalochtribalcharacter.ItwasfarsightedoftheBritishtobring

togetherthefutureleadersofthesetribesunderoneroofsotheycouldforgelinksand try to overlook past hostilities.

KhairBukshandIsharedthesamedormitory,soIgottoknowhimwell.Hewasshy andwithdrawn,butextremelyfondofclothes.Hewouldoftenstudyhisfaceinthe mirrorfromallangles,andwasknowntobesomewhatofanarcissist.Thecinemawas anobsessionwithhim,aswaseverythingconnectedwithAmerica.Later,hewent through a transformation and became deeply religious. An intense pacifist, he would remove insects from his path so that neither he nor anyone else would step upon them. Strangely,hestartedpartiallyundoingthestitchingonhisshalwarsandkameezes.All this left those who knew him from his school days quite unprepared for his eventualchange into a firebrand Marxist.

Akbar Bugti was of an altogether different mettle.Flamboyant and talkative,he would constantly be spinning colourful yarns -whether there was any truth in them, we were neverquitesure -buthe held usallenthralledby hisstories.Later onhe developed a heightenedsenseofmachismoandbeganpickingfightswhereverhecould,makinghim a hero in the eyes of the younger lads, in particular the Baloch boys.

In1942myguardian,GeorgeAbell,decidedtosendmetoamorerigorous establishment. He chose for me the cadet school at Dehra Doon. The school was more formallyknownasthePrinceofWalesRoyalIndianMilitaryCollege(RIMC).Ithad been inaugurated in 1922 during a visit to India by the then Prince of Wales, who later abdicatedhisthroneasEdwardVIII.PreviouslyithadbeenknownastheImperial Cadet Corps,andcateredfor a fewdozen ruling princes.The recommissionedschool aimed to prepare its students for the Indian Military Academy, and in some cases, for Sandhurst.Itsselectionpanelconsistedofthegovernorsofvariousprovinces,andit was not always easy to get admission. At the relatively young age of eleven, I was interviewed by the Governor of Punjab along with some members of the ProvincialCabinet,includingSirKhizerHayatTiwana.Theselectionpanelfocusedalmostentirely onfamilybackground.Myapplicationwasmetwithapproval,andIwassentoffto Dehra Doon.

IclearlyrecallthedayIleftSimlabytrainaccompaniedbyMrs.FlorenceFrisk,my Englishgoverness.WereachedourdestinationonthefirstdayofAugust1942.At DehraDoonIwasgreetedbyAjitSinghShergilofPatiala,whomIalreadyknewashe andhissistershadbeenwithmeatQueenMary's.RIMCwastotallydifferentfrom what I had become accustomed to at Aitchison, The school was divided originally intothree sections (as opposed to houses): Kitchener, Roberts, and Rawlinson. A new section called Wavell was added at the commencement of the Second World War cateringexpresslyforthesonsofBritishofficersservinginIndiaandtheeasternfront.The cadets were headed by the Cadet Captain, and each section was led by a sectioncommanderandhisteamofNCOs.Theschoolwaslargelyrunbythisteamofsenior

cadets.Theinspectionparades,the kitparades,physicaltraining classes,sportsand generaldisciplinewereentirelysupervisedbytheseseniorcadets-theteachers generallyrestrictingthemselvestoacademics.OurprincipalwasMr.Scott,a distinguishedlookinggentleman.Thenthereweretheseniormasters-Phillipsof Kitchener; Allen of Roberts; Pritchard, whom I remember as a bad-tempered tyrant, of Rawlinson; Berkeley, an Oxford Cricket Blue, of Wavell.35

IjoinedtheKitchenersection.AmongtheoldboysofthissectionwasGeneralFazle HaqwhoremainedadearfriendofminerightuntilhistragicdeathinOctober1991.36ThelivingconditionsofthecadetswerequiteSpartan.Thegroundsconsistedof playingfields,theadministrativeblock,theclassroomblock,andtheparadeground. The dining room and the anterooms were impressive. During weekdays every evening therewasaparadeinwhichallthecadetsparticipateddressedintheirmilitary uniforms.Sportswereverymuchpartofthedailycurriculum.Wehadasplendid cricketpavilion,butIwasaboxingfanandtookupthegamewithgreatenthusiasm.

I was one of the few who opted out of joining the armed Mannock, a veteran of the First WorldWarwhoworeapatchononeeyehavinglostitduringthewar.'CadetMazari,' hesnappedatme,'Inoticeaquestioninglookappearsinyoureyeseverytimeanorder isissued.Idon'tcareforitall.'HethensaiddirelythatifIjoinedthearmyIwould either make it to the very top, or be court-martialled! Being court-martialled is not somethingonecantakelightly.InhindsightIthinkmydecisionwasaverywiseone! So,thesewere my formativeand impressionable years.

Myfirstbreakwithrigidconformitywasattheageoffifteen.Whenthepolitical campaignscommencedforthe1946elections,IwasinRojhanonChristmasvacations from RIMC. A member of my family was contesting on a Unionist Party ticket, and all myrelatives,includingmyelderbrotherthetumandar,wereactivelycanvassingfor him. I was the sole exception. Enamoured by the vision being espoused by Mr Jinnah, I wenttothedurbarhallandraisedthegreenstarandcrescentflagoftheMuslimLeague ontheflagpole,anddeclaredmyopensupportforMr.Jinnah'scandidate.FormyactionIwasseverelyreprimandedbytheDistrictCommissioner,DenizelBryon.37He warned thatasaminorand awardof Court, Icould notactively participateinpolitics. I wasthreatened withcancellationof mymonthlyallowance. Theissueresolved itself by my return to RIMC at the end of the vacations. Much to my delight and to my family's chagrin, the MuslimLeague candidate won the elections from Dera Ghazi Khan district. My firstindirectminorforayintopoliticshadestablishedmy reputationwithinmy family as a renegade.

35OurEnglishteacher,Mr.Catchpole,latertookupateachingpostinPakistanandbecameverywell-known during his years here.

36SahibzadaYakubKhan,andgeneralsAzam,YusufAfridi(Joe)andwerealsoourseniorsinthissection.

37Inthemid-fiftiesDenizelBryoncametoPakistanasaUKtradecommissioner.

Due to the impact that the armed forces have had on the history, of Pakistan, a number of cadets at RIMC later became household names. But that should not detract from the distinctionsomeofthemachievedintheircareers.Ihavealreadymentionedsomeof the old cadets of Kitchener section-among them also was General Azam, General Yusuf, GeneralYakubKhan,andGeneralAhmedJamal.FromRawlinsonsectionthosewho came into distinction were Air Marshals Asghar Khan and Nur Khan,38General Sharma (Chiefofthe IndianArmy),AirChiefMarshalSuri(Chiefofthe IndianAirForce), General Sadiq Abbasi and his three brothers, and Lieut. P. S. Bhagat who won the first Victoria Cross that was awarded to an Indianin the Second World War. Shehryar Khan of Bhopal, who later served as the Foreign Secretary was also a member of Rawlinson. His mother Begum Abida Sultana, once visited RIMC wearing a felt hat and smoking a pipe,muchtotheamazementoftheboys.TherosteratRobertsincludedSafdarRashid, son of the first Chief Justice of Pakistan, Generals Gul Hassan,39Naseerullah Babar and HariSingh,theMaharajKumarofJodhpur.MybestfriendatRIMCwasJagatSingh Bhatti of Jasalmer.

On 14 August 1947 I organized all the Muslim cadets in Kitchener section to march pastour school administrative block holding aloft an improvised Pakistani flag. Shortly afterwards I was hauled up before our adjutant who demanded an explanation for our indulgenceinpolitics.ThoughIndependencehadnotyettakenplace(DehraDoon beinginIndia),Ipointedouttohimthatwewerecelebratingthebirthofournew nationacrosstheborderwhichhadalreadycomeintoexistenceafewhoursearlier.To his credit, the adjutant smiled and withdrew the charge of 'indulging in polities' laidagainstus.Apartfrommyself,these'rebellious'marchersincludedgeneralsAhmed KamalandAlamJanMasood,andAirVice-MarshalSadruddin.

Along with a number of other Muslims, I was forced to quitRIMC in October 1947. The riotshadstartedbythen.TheonesresponsibleforthemayheminDehraDoonwere someoftheembitteredSikhandHindurefugeeswhohadbeenforcedtofleefromwhat had become Pakistani Punjab. Attempts had been made to attack the school. One night weweresuddenlywokenupandtoldtoquicklygatherourbareessentials.After bidding emotionalfarewellstoourHinduandSikh fellowcadets,we left Dehra Doon along with the Muslim cadets from the nearby Indian Military Academy. We had little knowledgethenthatourdeparturewasgoingtobepermanent.Astherewerefearsthat we might be attacked, we were taken by road to Saharanpur under an armed escort of Gurkhasoldiers. FromSaharanpur wewereflowndirectlytoLahore. MajorTikkaKhan and Captain Bilgrami, both of whom who later became generals, were in charge of the evacuation.Later,thesameTikkaKhanbecamestuckwiththesobriquetof'TheButcher of Bengal' afterthe horribledebacle of1971.

38AirMarshalAsgharKhanwasthefirstPakistanichiefoftheairforce.AirMarshalNurKhanwashissuccessor.

39Gul Hassan succeededGeneral Yahya Khan as the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army after the debacle in EastPakistan.

FromLahoreImademyownwaytoRojhan,ourtribalheadquarters.ThereI discovered that though the minorities in Rojhan had been protected, the same did notapplytothoseofsomeofthesurroundingvillages.RecentrefugeesfromEastPunjab hadincitedthelocalstoattackandburnHinduhomes.Inapopulationofabouta hundred thousand people there numbered some ten thousand non-Muslims, mostlyHindus.To helpprevent furtherbloodshedI,thenayoungmanofseventeen,tookto riding around at night with an escort of armed men to give protection to these hapless people.IcontinuedwiththispracticeeverynightforthreemonthsuntilalltheHindus had been evacuated.

AsachildIwouldoccasionallyaccompanyservantswhentheywenttothebazaarto buyfruitandotheritems.OnedayIsawanagedpoverty-strickenman,obviouslya Muslim,sittingcrouchedontheground whileaHindu,standingabovehim, carefully pouredwaterintotheman'scuppedhands.Iwasbaffledbythesight.Myattendant explained that the poor man had obviously been thirsty, and his Hindu benefactor, not wantingto'pollute'hisutensils,wasprovidingthewaterandthemanwasforcedto drink from his hands. TheHindu was taking great care whilepouring thewater fearing that an inadvertent splash on his clothes would contaminate him. Even as a child I felt outrageattheunjustnessofthisact.LaterasImaturedIwassaddenedtonotethat these caste prejudices had been adopted by the Muslims as well.

InRojhan,inthepre-Partitiondays,thenon-Muslims,mostlyHindus,werevery influentialdespitetheirsmallnumbers.Mostofthemweretradersandshopkeepers, andduetotheneartotalilliteracyofthetribesmenandotherMuslims,anumberof thembecamemunshisandmanagersofourfamilyestates.Amajorcauseofantagonism among the two communities related to economic disparity. Of the four hundred shops in the area, all but two were owned by non-Muslims. The Hindubaniyaextended goods oncreditwhichthenhadtoberepaidwithinterest.Itwascommonpracticeforthe Hindustoobtainsuretyintheformofgoldandsilverornaments.Nowtheywere evacuating,andtheyrefusedtoreturnthepledgedornamentsuntiltheyhadbeen repaid in full. The tribesmen and others feared that the Hindus would leave with their ornaments, and threatened to attack them. Faced with this new problem I called ajirgawhichwasattendedbytheeldersofallthecommunities.Itwasdecidedthata goldsmithwouldweigheachornamentandextractpreciousmetaltothevalueofthe sum owed by each party without taking interest into account.

The Hindus weregreatlyrelieved by the decision, as by now they had begun to fear for theirlives.Theypressedmetoacceptgiftsinappreciation,whichIdeclined.Ilater learntthatontheirwaytoRajanpurfromRojhan,thelocalpoliceinstigatedamobof hoodlumswhoattackedtheircaravan-whichwasironicallybeingescortedbya detachmentofGurkha-ontheborder,killingaboutadozenpeople,andplundering part of their caravan.

Wesoonlearntthatsevenyounggirlshadalsobeenabductedbythemarauders,and takenawaytoremoteareas.Alongwithaforceoffifteenarmedmen,wesetoffin searchofthem.Wefoundthemanddeliveredthempersonallytotheirfamiliesin Rajanpur.Icannotforgetthe lookintheireyeswhentheywerereunitedwiththeir families, as they had lost all hope of seeing each other again.

A few weeks later, in one of the more remote villages, I noticed a young girl at a stream fillingpotswithwater.Sheworetraditionaltribalclothes,butdidnotlooklikea Baloch. When I asked her a question in Balochi, tears streamed from her eyes, and she began to tremble. An older Baloch woman appeared and began to remonstrate with me.Shesaidthegirlwasherdaughter-in-lawandinsistedthatevenachiefhadnorightto talkdirectlytoayoungBalochgirlofhistribe.Irefusedtobudge,andaskedthe womantotellher'daughter-in-law'totalktome.Thewomantriedtoputmeoffby sayingthatthegirlwasmentallydisturbed,andtheshockofbeingaddressedbya strangemanhadfurtherupsetherbalance!Buttheyounggirlfellatmyfeetand begged me in Seraiki (the language spoken by the local Hindus), 'Save me from these animals.' She was barely fifteen years old.

Transcendingbarriersofreligionandrace,thesegestureswereremembered.During myfirstvisittoIndiaafterPartition,alargenumberofHindusfromtheMazariarea andD.G.Khandistrictwelcomedmywife andIinDelhiwithgreatwarmthand affection.TheyledusinaprocessionfortymilesfromDelhitoPalval,whereafew hundredpeoplehadcollected.Iwasgreatlytouchedbytheirsentimentswhenthey coveredmewithgarlandsanddeliveredspeechesrecallingmyeffortsinrecovering their daughters and providing protection to their families.

Almosthalfacenturylater,mywifeandIonceagainvisitedIndiaandstayedatthe residence of the Pakistani High Commissioner in Delhi. There had been some mention in the Indian Press about my visit, and about half a dozen of these people turned up to seemedespiterestrictionsplacedbytheintelligenceservicesaroundtheresidence.

***

Inthespringof1948,whileI wasatRojhannewsreachedme ofoppressionbeing carried out in Kashmir at the behest of Maharaja Hari Singh, who had unjustly enteredatreatyaccedingthestatetoIndia.Beingseventeenyearsofageandfilledwith youthfulfervor,IresolvedtoparticipateintheliberationofKashmirandbeganto collectvolunteerstojoinme.WhenmylegalguardianthelocalDC,anEnglishman namedJohnBiggsDavison,40came toknowofmy venture heurgedme nottogo. Diplomatically,he confidedtome that'the jihadwasnotallthatitwassupposedtobe'.

40SirJohnBiggs-DavisonlaterbecameaBritishMemberofParliament.In1916hevisitedPakistanwitha delegation of UK Parliamentarians. Over lunch he reminisced with much humor aboutmy youthful zeal in 1948

I supposed that his advice was the result of 'fatherly' concern, so I paid no heed and proceededtotheborderwithmysmallbandofarmedMazaritribesmen.Attheborder I was stopped by Pakistani officials who told me in clear-cut terms that I would not be allowed to cross into Kashmir. It became apparent they believed that we were intent on partaking in the plunder that was taking place across the border.It was here that Ireceived the bitter news of the true state of affairs in Kashmir. As the Pakistani Foreign Ministerofthosedayswouldlatersay'Thetribesmenofthefrontier,everreadytolend ahandwherever therewastrouble anda chanceofplunder,poured into Kashmirand soon had the Maharaja's forces on the run'.41Instead of capitalizing on their success and pushingtowardsSrinagar,thetribalinvasionsoondissipatedintoafrenzyoflooting andrapinecarriedoutundertheguiseofMal-e-Ghanimat,muchtotheembarrassment ofthePakistanigovernment.Strictbordercontrolshadnowbeenputintoplaceto prevent further mayhem. Stuck at the border I also came to learn that the campaign in KashmirwasprovingtobeadisasterastheKashmiriMuslimshadbeguntoturn against Pakistan because of their bitter experience at the hands of the wild tribesmen.42ChastenedandverydisillusionedImademywayquietlybacktoRojhan.

After a gap of six years, I rejoined Aitchison College in 1948. Despite changes broughtabout by Mr. Barry in the 1930s, the college retained its aura of elitism. The sprawling grounds,thesuperbcollectionofbuildings,playingfieldsandthecricketpavilion wouldbedifficulttomatcheveninthebestofschoolsanywhereintheworld.Someof theseniorboarderswereprovidedwithprivateroomswithattachedbathrooms.We wereallowedourownservants,andcouldkeepourownhorsesandsyces.Theschool also providedan excellent stable of horses for riding andfieldsports under the supervision of an impressive looking risaldar sahib who was responsible for teaching horsemanship to the boys. It was not surprising that Aitchison maintained an extremely highstandardinridingandtherelatedsportoftent-pegging.

During my days Mr. Gwyn was the school principal and Khan Anwar Sikander was the headmaster.Inmylastyear,asIwastheschoolprefect,thePrincipalallowedmea rather rare dispensation making me the envy of most of the school boys. I was given the special privilege to use a car, but on condition that I would not drive it within the boundariesoftheschool.Thecar,a1948Chevroletconvertible,wouldbedriven through the front gate by my driver, and after leaving the compound, I would take thewheel.

IrecallthethenprimeministerLiaquatAli Khanvisitingtheschoolin1949toseehis son,Ashraf.Hisvisittookplacewithoutanydisplayofprotocoltherewerenoout- riders,fussorprotocol.Later,whenGovernor-GeneralKhwajaNazimuddinvisitedthe

41MuhammadZafrullaKhan,ServantofGod,UnwinBrothers,UK,1983,p.150.

42OperationGibraltar(1965):notonlydidtheKashmirislargelyfailcollaborateorcooperatewithourguerrilla force but there were instances where Pakistani-led insurgents were even handed over to the Indianmilitary.

schoolasachiefguesttoattendoneofthecollegefunctions, itwasasimplewelcome devoid of pomp and ceremony.

SirGeorgeAbellwhohadleftIndiaafterservingasprivatesecretarytotheViceroy LordWavell,keptintouchwithme,andsuggestedthatIvisitEngland-whichwas recoveringfromtheSecondWorldWarandselectauniversitytocompletemy education.ThoughIhadnotcompletedmyHSC,atSirGeorge'ssuggestion,Ileftfor Englandinthe summer of1949.I spenta number of enjoyableweeksthere, andvisited the universitiesofCambridge andOxford.I spentseveralweekendsatSirGeorge's countryhomeatHatfieldwithhisfamily. OnourwaybacktoLondon,hetookmetothe Bank ofEnglandwhere he showedme the undergroundgoldvaults.Itwasan edifying experience tobetaken onaprivate tourofwhatwasoncethemostpowerful financial institution in the world.

SirGeorgeinsistedthatImakeanextensiveroadtourofBritain.Onhis recommendationIwentbycartotheLakeDistrict,andfurthernorthtoEdinburghand theScottishHighlands,finallystoppingatJohnO'Groats.Later,oncemoreathisurging,Itravelledextensivelyinthebeautifulcountrysideinthesoutherncounties; fromKentintheeastIjourneyedleisurelybyroadwestwards,eventuallyreaching Land's End. I recall with some amusement my former guardian telling me to avoidBrightonasitwas'quitevulgarandnotasuitablesortoftownforgentlemen';instead, he suggested Torquay as an appropriate seaside venue. Sir George proved to be a marvelousmentor.Hesentmyintroductionstoanumberofhisfriendsallover England who invited me to stay at their homes during my travels. Despite the severe rationing,whichhadcarriedoverfromthewar,theEnglishhospitalitywasgenerous.

UndertheBritishrulethetribalareaofthedistrictenjoyedthesamerightsand privilegesasthetribalareasoftheNWFPandtheMarri-BugtiareaofBalochistan. Legally,theseareashadneverbeenconstitutionallypartofthe BritishEmpire,andinsteadhadbeenadministeredsomewhatlooselyunderanagencysystem.In1946-47asaresultoftalksbetweentheKhanofKalatandBalochSirdars,seriousconsideration had been given to the possibility of the Marri-Bugti tribal area and the D. G. Khan tribal areaunitingwithKalattoformanewBalochprovince.AfterthecreationofPakistan theprevioussystemcontinuedwiththegovernorofPunjabactingastheAgenttothe Governor-General (previously it had been to the Viceroy) for the D. G. Khan tribal area. Surprisingly,underlawthetribalareaofD.G.Khancontinuedlegallytobeseparate andnotapartofPakistan.Asconstitutionalmoveswerebeingmadetoaddressthis legal lacuna, Nawab Jamal Khan Leghari strongly advocated that the D. G. Khan tribal areaunitewiththeMarri-BugtitribalareaandjoinBalochistan.JamalKhanwas supportedbythreeothertumandarsofthearea.43Myelderbrother,MirBalakhSher,

43Jamal Khan was given a mandate by His Highness Mir Ahmed Yar Khan. Khan of Kalat, Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti TumandarandSirdarDodaKhan,SarbarahTumandaroftheMarritribetonegotiatewiththeBritishGovernment

whosoonbecamethe PresidentoftheInter-ProvincialJirga,wasprevaileduponby seniorPunjab officialdomtoopposeJamal Khanon thisissueand optforPunjab. Itwas a closely contested dispute, but in the end the views of officialdom carried the day, and byaslimmajorityoftumandars,ensuredthatthetribalareastayedwithinthe boundaries of Punjab.

In December 1949 an important event took place for the Baloch of Dera Ghazi Khandistrict.AtajirgaheldatD.G.Khan,theBalochtumandarsandtribalelders unanimously passed a resolution whereby the tribal area joined Pakistan. In a ceremony officiated by Governor-General Khwaja Nazimuddin, and the Punjab governor, SirdarAbdur Rab Nishtar, the tribal area officially became part of Pakistan. In return, the GovernmentofPakistanpromisedtoabidebytheexistingsystemunderwhichthe tribalareaenjoyedaspecialstatus.Eventodaythereisanabsenceofpolice,taxation andtherequirementforrestrictiononcarryingofarmsintheD.G.Khantribalarea (andnowwiththecreationofanewdistrict,theRajanpurtribalareaaswell).Instead the area continues to follow the British practice of being administered by a political assistantandaforce oflocallyrecruitedBorderMilitaryPolice.

***

AftercompletingmyHSCatAitchison,insteadofpursuinghigherstudies,Igotinvolvedin tribalaffairs,andleft for Rojhan.As a youngman brimming with idealism,IthoughtIwould trytobring aboutapositivechange.I wasconcernedthatthetribal society of the Mazariswasrapidly being transformed into a feudal society, and wanted to check this insidious growth. It was a highly ambitious task for one as young as I, but youth is never in short supply of excessive confidence.

Forsomeitisdifficulttodistinguishbetweentribalismandfeudalism.Inatribal culture, societybindsitsmembers, includingthechief and hisfamily, touphold itslaws andtraditions;thechiefisfirstamongequalsanddependssolelyontheloyaltyand support of his tribesmen. He has no coercive authority to subjugate them. On the other hand,in afeudalsociety itislandandwealth andofficialpatronagethatgivesaperson

^preeminenceinhisarea,whichhethenusestosubjugatethelocalpopulace.

Balochculturestressesimportanceonthreebasicvalues:honour,valourandchivalry. BytraditionaBalochismeanttovaluehishonouraboveallelseincludinghisownlife; he is expected to be courageous and display fortitude, and show generosity of spirit and large-heartedness. It is a Sirdar's primary duty to set an example to his men by abiding strictly to the Baloch code of honor. It was not at all unusual for Sirdars to die in battle whileleadingtheirpeople,astribalhonorwouldbeatstake.Thecodeofbravery

ontheir behalftoform anewBalochprovince. NawabJamal KhanLeghariwasthegrandfather of PresidentFarooqLeghari.

imposed a duty on them to lead from the front and expose themselves to the opposing force.Chivalrousbehaviormeantaheightenedrespectforwomenandtheweak,as theywereregardedasbeingdefenseless,andacodeofhospitalityunderwhichthecare for those seeking asylum was elevated to the status of a sacred duty.

There isaninteresting historicalincidentwhichillustratesthe effectofthe chivalric codeontheBaloch.In 1543asthe exiled EmperorHumayun wasforlornly wandering towardsKandharwithhispitifultroopofmenandwomen,heenteredintotheterritory of the Magsis and set up camp in the chief's village. The Magsi Sirdar was absent at the time.Humayun'sfrightenedsister,Gul-BadanBegum,describestheMagsisinher Humayun-Namaas'savageBiluchiswhosespeechisthetongueoftheghoulsofthe waste'.Bythenextmorning, Humayunand hismenrealizedthattheywereprisoners asthe tribesmenrefusedtoallowthemtoleave until their chiefsreturn.Late thatnight the Magsi chief arrived and met with Humayun. He showed the Mughal thefarmanthat hehadreceivedfromHumayun'sbrothersMirzaKamran,rulerofKandahar,andMirza Askari, requesting him to imprison the ousted Emperor and deliver him to them inreturnforagenerousreward.TheMagsichiefadmittedtoHumayunthathehad plannedtoattackhimandhispartyofmenwiththeintentionofcapturinghim.But now that Humayun hadchosen to camp at hishome village hewas nolongeran enemy, but had become by Baloch tradition, his honoured guest. Gul-Badan Begum writes that the MagsiSirdartoldHumayun'...nowIwillsacrifice mylifeandthe livesofmyfamily,Ihavefiveorsixsons,foryourMajesty'shead,orratherforonehairofit.Go whereyouwish.Godprotectyou!'IftheMagsichief hadnotbeen loyaltotheBaloch code, the history of Mughal India might have been dramatically altered.

The rapaciousness of feudalism has done much in recent years to erode thenobility of thetribalcode.WhenIwasthirteen,anincidenttookplacethatexposedtheforceof feudal brutality to my youthful mind. Mybrothers and I had been invited to a shikarby a family elder. He owned eighty thousand acres, which after my brothers and my land holdings,madehimthenextbiggestlandownerinthearea.EarlyonemorningIwas wokenupbythenoiseofraisedvoices.IwentoutsideandcaughtsightofanelderlyJuth^44(thenamebywhichallthenon-Balochwereunfortunatelyreferredto)being pulled by his beard and being beaten by the staff of my relative. I saw the family elder sittingnearby,watching.Notbeingabletohelpmyself,Ishoutedout,'Whyareyou doing this? Isn't he human?' My relative told his men to stop the punishment, but then added,'Afterallitismyproperty.ThrowtheJuthoutofhishouse.'ShortlyafterwardsI

learntthattheJuth'sonlycrimewasthathehaddefaultedonsomepaymentduetothe

landowner.

IreturnedtoRojhaninJanuary1951butIfoundIcouldnotstayatthetribal headquartersformorethanafewdays.Thefeudalmentalitythathadbeguntoprevail

44Juthsweretheoriginalinhabitantsofthearea,andthetonguetheyswasJuthgali(otherwiseknownasSeraiki).

within my family was more than I could bear. So, I packed a handful of belongings and crossed the river on horseback taking one of the old wooden boat ferries. Arriving at Sonmiani I set up camp. Sonmiani was lush green and, what is more, at a distance from Rojhan.WithinayearIbegantheconstructionofmyhousethere.Itwasdesignedon theplansofBalochfortsofold.ItwashereatSonmianithatIsettleddowntowhat wouldturnouttobemy shortstintasatribal chief.

The election campaign of 1951 provided a shocking eye-opener. A non-Baloch, whose familyhadearliersettledatRojhan,stoodforelectionsopenlyopposingtheSirdar family'scandidate.Intheelectionshewasbadlydefeatedandevenlosthisdeposit.But he was not forgiven as he hadbeen accusedofallegedly making disparaging remarks abouttheSirdar'sfamilyduring,J;hecampaign.Afewweekslater'hewassetupona fewmileoutofRojhan.Tohumiliatehim,anattemptwasmadetocuthisnoseoff. Duringthestrugglethatensued,theattackersbungledandcuthislipsandtongueoff as well! The unfortunate man bled to death.Such was the fateof anyonewho dared to incur the wrath of the Sirdar family.

The Sirdar family owned hundreds of thousands of acres of land, of which some 330,000 acreswereowneddirectlybymybrothersandmeinthesettledarea.Thisdidnot includeourlands inthetribalarea,SindhandKhanewal.The landsinthesettledarea were managed under a perniciousmahaldarisystem. All the property was divided into a number ofmahalseach with its own manager, themahaldar. Thesemahaldarsweredemigodsoftheirareas,oftenterrorizingthelocalpeasantrywithbeatingsandtheuse ofstockswhichboundtheirhandsandfeet.Thehorsesofthelocalswereoftenseized by themahaldarfor police use, and goats and chickens would be forcibly taken from the peasantrytofeedlocalofficialdomaswellasthemahaldar'sguests.Thepoor sharecropperwouldgetathirdofhisharvestedcrop.Theremainderofthecropwould be divided into the landowner's share and the aptly called 'non-ploughing shareholder's share'.Thesenon-ploughingshareholderswerethemiddlemenwhoobtaineda substantialshareof theharvest for little orno contributionwhatsoever.

OnmyarrivalatSonmianithefirstthingIdidwastoabolishtheiniquitousfeudal practice. The sharecroppers on my farmlands got a two-thirds share thereafter. Local notablesandotherswhohadbecomeusedtotheirmiddlemensharecomplained bitterlybut Irefusedto compromise.Iamgladto statethat mytwo brotherssupported me in putting an end to this gross injustice.

Theotherissuewhichcausedmemuchgriefwasthepracticeofsyahkaari,thetribal customofvengefulkillingofadulterers.Whatmadeitevenmoreintolerablewasthe factonoccasionasimpleunprovenaccusationwasdeemedtobeanexcusesufficient for an act of cold-blooded murder. I recall a vivid incident which took place in the mid- 1950swhichillustratesthehorror ofthistragicpractice.NabiBuksh,thenayoungman inhisearlytwenties,confessedtomethathehadkilledhiswifeandwishedtoturn

himself in. His wife had only been a young girl of sixteen. According to Nabi Buksh, he had recentlybeentaunted and accused ofbeing acuckold.Ithad notbeenthefirsttime thishad happened, and thistimeevenhismother and sistershad beguntoechosimilar insults. This last tauntproved to be thefinal straw for Nabi Buksh. He felt he was left with little choice but to safeguard his honor. He went directly to his wife and told her what he had to do. By this stage of his tale, tears had begun to roll down Nabi Buksh's cheeks. His young teenage wife had insisted on saying her prayers. When she finished sheraisedtheHolyKoranand staringdirectlyintohiseyessaid,'BythisHoly BookI am innocent!' It was already nightfall. Without further ado, his wife walked in the dark ahead of him until they reached the riverside. On the riverbank she knelt and lowered herheadonthedampearthandutteredthewords,'Doitnow!'NabiBukshloweredhis axe on her neck, killing her. He then threw her body into the river.

Thetribalcodecannotbrookdishonor.Anenragedmother-in-law,arebuffedadmirer, or an ordinary ill-wisher could easily point an accusing finger against a helpless womanandcondemnhertodeath.Intheheatofthemomentsyahkaarihadresultedinthe deaths of countless wives, sisters, and on occasions, even mothers. The man accused of adulterywasalsosubjecttoasimilarDraconianpunishment.Unprincipledmenhave beenknowntosettlescoresbymakingaccusationsattheirrivals,resultingintheir deaths,aswellasthedeathsofinnocentwomen.There haveevenbeen instanceswhen thehusbandhasusedthisasapretexttogetridofanunattractiveandquarrelsome wife. At times women are used as victims; this pretext is used to eliminate and murder someonewithwhomonehasa disputeoran enmity.

Forthewomenaccusedofsyahkaaritherecouldonlybeoneescape,andthatwasto seek protection at the home of the tribal chief. According to tribal code, the chiefs homewassacrosanct,andonceshereacheditsconfines,shecameunderhisprotection,and noonecouldinterfere.OvertheyearsIgaveprotectiontomanyofthesewomen- innocent or otherwise. Along with providing protection came the responsibility of eventuallymarryingthemofftosuitablehusbands.Thesuccessfulsuitornotonlyhad- tobeareliablemanofgoodcharacter,buttopreventbloodshed,healsohadtobelong toadifferentMazariclanandliveatadistancefromherprevioushusband'sfamily.

As one of the tribal chiefs of the area (along with my two brothers, the eldest being the paramountchief)Ididmybesttochangethiscruelpractice,butinatribalsociety ancienttraditionsarenevereasytoalter.Despitemyutmosteffortsthetribesmen refusedto listen. 'Wearenotbeghairath', wastheirstockrejoinder. Thetribal systemcan attimespresentanunwaveringmonolithwhichrefusestobudgewithchangingtimes. Thesystemofsyahkaarimayhavepossiblyworkedasadeterrentintimespast,butit hasnoplaceinmoderntimes.Itssolelong-termantidoteiseducation.Onlyeducation can serve to broaden cultural horizons and with passage of time help eradicate practices that have no place in the present.

Despitethestiffresistanceofthetribalelders,Iwasabletomakesomeinroadsand convincethemtoaltersomeoftheirways.Insyahkaarithedishonoredhusband'sfamily hadtheadditionalrighttodemandanewbridefromtheadulterer'sfamily.Oftento furtheravengethe dishonor, thisyoung girl wasmadetosuffer needlessphysical and mental punishment by hernew in-laws. It was a cruel and unjust retribution as the girl wouldbeunderthecompletemercyofhernewhusband'sfamily.Iwasableto convince theelders that insuch instances itwould be more appropriate to acceptcash indemnities rather than demand young brides. With much reluctance this practice was slowly accepted. Today, this is much more common.

***

InSonmianiIbuiltasmallschoolwithaplaygroundandencouragedthepeopletosendtheirchildrenthere.Thenon-BalochJuthsreadilyagreed,butIhaddifficulty convincingtheBalochtribesmen.Havinglittlefaithineducation,theypreferredtolet their sons herd their livestock and continue with the old traditions. So, to entice them I openedboardingfacilitieswithfreemeals,booksandclothesforchildrenofthevery poor.TheschoolfunctionedforthirtyyearsuntilIwasabletoconvincethegovernment to set up a High School there. It is the duty of a Sirdar to look after his people, after all,if he does not do so who else will.

IalsotriedtosetupmedicalfacilitiesforthepeopleatSonmiani,butmetwithlittle success.ManyyearslaterIreceivedhelpfromthestrangestofquarters.In1978whileI was visiting Lahore, the Governor of Punjab, General Sarvar Khan, invited me to lunch. TheGovernorinformedmethathehadbeendirectedbyhissuperior,GeneralZiaul Haq, then the Chief Martial Law Administrator, to meet with me. Then, in the presence of three of my schoolmates from RIMC (including General Ahmed Jamal), I was offered asanctionfor asugar mill. Itappeared thatthesugar mill sanctionhadbeenpreviously awarded to Ashiq Mazari, but Sarvar Khan indicated that as Ashiq Mazari owed a large sumofmoneytothegovernment,theadministrationwasnolongerpleasedwithhim and had withdrawn the sanction.45

Astonished by this offer, I declined as quickly and politely as I could, and said, 'I have enoughdifficultymanagingthe smallpieceofagriculturallandIamnowleftwith. Withoutmoneyandexperience,howdoyouexpectmetorunasugarmill?'Sarvar Khandidnotbudge.Heinsistedthatthegovernmentwouldeasily findmeasuitable Chiniotibusinessmantomanagethemill;'...someonewhoknowstheropes',wasthe governor'sexpression.Andtheshortageofcapital,hestated,wouldpresentlittle problem. 'Loans will easily be arranged', he said much to my discomfort.

45To my mind the real reason for change of heart on the government’s was related to Ashiq Mazari’s decision to join the People’s Party. Much earlier during General Yahya’s martial law, Ashiq Mazari had been one of the 303 senior civil servants who had been dismissed from service on charges of corruption.

Leftwithlittlechoice,Imadeamorebluntrefusal.GeneralSarvarKhanaskedmeto reconsiderbecause,asheinformedme,mybrother,MirBalakhSher,hispoliticalally Nasrullah Drishak, and Begum Afifa Mamdot had jointly approached him for the same sugarmillsanction.Isuggestedtothegovernorthatitwouldalsobeamistaketoaward thesugarmillsanctiontothesepartiesastheyknewaslittleaboutthebusinessasIdid. Isuggestedthat itwouldbebetterforthefarmersoftheDeraGhazi KhatiDistrictifthe sanctionwasgiventoacompetentpartywhowouldhelpimprovethelong-term economy of the region.

Thoughthesugarmillsanctionwaslatergiventomybrotherinmy'financialwell- being'did notendthere.A coupleof years laterthenewGovernorof Punjab, General Jillani, sent a message asking me to meet him. By this time Zia had elevated himself to the Presidency.During our meeting GeneralJillani candidly confidedthatthe President had directedhim tooffer mewhatever help Irequired. Couchedin such general termsI foundtheofferacceptable.IsaidIrequiredforSonmianiapukkahroad,electricity,a rural health centre, high schools and a public call office.

General Jillani replied withsome surprise. 'Butyoudon'tlive there!'he said.Indeed,by then I had more or less shifted to Karachi. But I had always felt indebted to the people of Sonmiani and told General Jillani so. Withsome reluctance the General agreed to my demands,butontheconditionthatI donatethelandrequiredforthese facilities.I readilyagreedtohiscondition,anddonatedtheland.Shortlyafterwards,truetohis word, General Jillani fulfilled his commitment. Sonmiani got two schools, one each for boysandgirls,aruralhealthunit,amacadamizedroad,andthevillagewasfinallyelectrified.

OnmyarrivalinSonmiani,1951,itwasanisolatedvillage,withoutproperroadsor electricity.WhenIbroughtmycarthere,peopletravelledformilestoseeit.Itwasa noveltyinthatarea- achalneyvalimachine. ItwastothisplacethatIbroughtmybride, Souriya, in January 1953 shortly after we were married. She was eighteen and the only sister of my Aitchison classmate, Iftikhar Ahmed, whose family had settled in the State of Hyderabad Deccan in India. He had earlier been at Doon's School and Partition had forcedhimtojoinAitchison.HismotherandsisterhadfollowedhimtoPakistanshortlyafterthearmyactioninHyderabad,andtookupresidenceinKarachi.Ican safely say that marrying Souriya was one of the wisest decisions I made.

Elevenmonthslater,lessthanaweekafterthebirthofmyeldestsonSherazam,I travelledtoDeraBugtiandmarriedthedaughterofthelateNawabSirMehrabKhan, the Bugti Chief. This subsequent second marriage had been arranged some years previously. I had little choice in the matter and was bound by tribal code to honor a commitment made by my family to the Bugti Chief. Such inter-tribal weddings were consideredimportantinestablishinggoodrelationshipsbetweenrivaltribes.An ancestorofmine,NawabSirImamBukshKhan,hadmarriedthesisteroftheMarri

Sirdarinthe1870s.DuringthosedaystheMarrisandtheBugtiswerethepremier BalochtribeinwesternBalochistanwhiletheMazaris.andtheLegharisoccupieda similar position among the Baloch in Dera Jat.46In my case the Mazaris and Bugtis hadbeenwarringwitheachotherforovertwohundredyears.Itwasthoughtjudiciousthat alinkbeestablishedbetweenthefamiliesofthetwochiefs.UnderBalochlawa betrothalisas bindingasthe wedding itself.Onceagirlispledgedby herfamily she cannot be given to anyone else. Any breach of the arrangement is counted as a grave dishonourtotheaggrievedfamilyandisunthinkableinSirdarfamilies.

Before I marriedSouriyaI toldherofmy existing commitmenttothe Bugtifamily. Despite the liberal education that she had received at Mehboobia School in Hyderabad Deccan, she accepted the situation. Now, after more than forty years of marriage, I still appreciate her devoted support then. She has won my undying respect and love. Many peopleinthesemoderntimesmightfindour situationdifficulttounderstand,butlifeis fullofdilemmasandweallhavetoresolveissueswithintheconstraintsthatare imposed on us.

***

DespitetheeventsinmylifeIwaskeptbusyinSonmianitryingtousherinchanges. Under the feudalmahaldarisystem, with the assistance of the local police the staff of the landholdershadcreatedanatmosphereofrepressionamongthepopulace.Noone couldopposetherepresentativesofthelandlords,andthepoliceoftenoperated withoutpropercontrols.Acceptingbribes,thepolicewouldfrequentlyimplicate innocentpeopleincrimestheyhadnotcommitted.Therewaslittlerecourseforthose who wished for justice.

I decidedtoreinforce andresurrectthe traditionaljirgasystem.A tribalchiefisthe traditionalarbitratorofalldisputes.Exercisingmytribalauthority,Isetupacommittee ofelders.Thoseinvolvedindisputescouldselecttribaleldersacceptabletobothparties who would then resolve conflicts arising from ownership of grazing land, water rights, murder,cattletheftandotherissues.Consideringthepartialityofthepolice,sucha system had its advantages in a society where the people were too poor to hire lawyers andindependentlyapproachcourtsforjustice.Besides,thevastdistancesinvolvedin travelling to the tehsil headquarters at Rajanpur, which lay across the Indus, made the officialjudicialprocessexceedinglyonerousforthepoor.Thiswasanentirelyvoluntary systemandverysoonmostdisputeswerebeingresolvedinternallywithinthetribe without recourse to outside parties.

46In1907when NWFP wascreatedfrompart of the original provincePunjab,DistrictDeraJat wassplitinto three districts - Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu going to NWFP and Dera Ghazi Khan remaining within Punjab.

Cattle theft and robberies were not uncommon in the area. A number of the tribesmenwereexpertcattlethieves.Noonebotheredreportingtheftstothepoliceastheyhad littlefaithinthem.Underthejirgasystem,Iundertooktoeliminatethesecrimes,and had the thieves tracked down and ensured that all stolen property was returned. No coercion was evernecessary.In thosedays theauraofchiefdom was sufficient in itself, andusuallythethieveswouldconfesstheircrimesoncetheywerebroughtin.They wouldbefinedandpunishedintheprescribedtribalfashion.Iwaspleasedbythefact that within a year or two of my arrival, occurrences of theft virtually vanished from thearea.

Notsurprisingly,thelocalpoliceandadministrationdidnotapproveofmyactions. Theirsourceofadditionalincomehadbeguntodryupcompletely.Soontheybegan dispatchingadversereportsofmetotheirsuperiors.EventhelocalSuperintendentof Policewhooftencomplimentedme onimprovingthelocallawandordersituation, joinedthelistofmycritics.TheflowofcriticalreportseventuallyreachedtheChief MinisterofPunjab,NawabMuzaffarQizilbash.Finally,onedayIwasservedwitha Notice of Offence. I had been accused of trying to run 'a parallel government'.

IthadbeenreportedtothegovernmentatLahorethatIdidnotrecognizethe government, and insisted on running my local area as an independent Sirdar by forcibly preventing people from going to the police or to the courts. In 1954 a Committee ofEnquirywassetupbytheProvincialGovernment.TheEnquiryTeamwasheadedby thelocalDC,ZahoorAzhar,awell-knownCSPofficer,andincludedaSuperintendentofPolicefromMianwali,OmarKhanNiazi.ThoughOmarKhanwasknowntobeamanofintegrity,hewasputinadifficultposition.Asapoliceofficer,hefeltcompelled to back his colleagues (the originators of the complaint) and prevent an erosion in theirauthority.

OneofthecaseslaidbeforetheEnquiryTeaminvolvedasyahkaarimurder.The incidenthadtakenplacewhileIwasononeofmyregulartoursofthearea.Iwould oftenvisitfar-flungareasonhorsebackwitharetinueoffiftyorsixtytribesmenand make camp near isolated settlements and meet with the people. On this occasion I had made camp in the remotekutcha ilakabetween the two main channels of the Indus. I was woken up in the middle of the night by a messenger from Sirdar Ghaus Buksh Khan, an elderly relative of mine, and the second largest landholder in the area. He sent me a handwritten note informing me that a man and a married woman had been killed as aresultofsyah kaari.GhausBukshKhanaskedmetorequestthemurderedman'sfather nottofileamurdercomplaintwiththepolice.ThoughthefatherwasGhausBuksh Khan's tenant, Ghaus Bnksh Khan felt that my authority as a tribal chief would carrygreater weight.

Isentamessengerimmediatelytothedeceased'sfatheraskinghimtocomeandseeme. Theelderlymanwithaflowingwhitebeardarrivedatdawn.Itsoonbecameobvious

that he had not heard of his son's death, and Ihad to break the painful news to him. He pulled the end of his beard into his mouth and clamped his teeth tightly on it. His fists clenchedandhischeeksquivered,butherefusedtogivewaytotears.TheBalochare expected to bear pain stoically. A few minutes later after he composed himself, turned tomedry-eyedandsaid,'Isthis whyyouhavecalled me?'Inodded. Hethenpraisedhis son and said that he would examine the facts of the allegedsyah kaari, and if he felt his son had been unjustly killed he would avenge his death.

AshewasleavingItoldhimaboutSirdarGhausBukshKhan'snote.Astheoldman couldnotread,Iexplainedthecontents ofthe messagetohim.ThenItoldhimthatasit was he who had lost a son, I would leave it to his own better judgment to decide what course of action he ought to take.

Evidence was presented to the Enquiry Team that I had prevented relatives of fiveseparatesyah kaarivictims from filing complaints with the police.In fact these murdershadallbeenhushedupasaresultofpaymentsbeingmadetothepolicebythefamilies of the parties involved. Now I was being made answerable for the concealment of these crimes. Much to my astonishment, Omar Khan made reference to a letter sent to theDeputy Commissioner by Ghaus Buksh Khan complaining about me. This letter was producedinevidenceagainst me.Inacasewherehehimselfhadrequestedmyhelp, GhausBukshKhannowaccusedmeofpreventingthevictim'sfatherfromfilinga murder complaint! Suddenly it was clear to me that it was not just the police and the administrationwhohadbeendispleasedbymyrecentactionsatSonmiani,big landlords such as Ghaus Buksh Khan had also begun to resent the erosion of theirauthority.

Tomy goodfortune,people whohadbeenforcibly compelledtoappearbefore the EnquiryTeamtogiveevidenceagainstme,refusedtocapitulate.Despitegreat pressure,whichevenincludedphysicalbeatings,therewerenowitnessesagainstme. Finally, they dragged in the old man whose son had been murdered. When asked about hisson'smurder,the oldman,whoknewby thenthathissonhadbeenhackedto piecesanddumpedintotheIndus,deniedhisdeath.Hemaintainedthathissonwasnotquiterightintheheadandwaspronetowanderoff,goingmissingfordaysand sometimesmonths. Heinsisted that oneday hissonwould turn up. In themeantimehe askedtheEnquiryTeamnottousehimtomakeunfoundedaccusationsagainsthis Sirdar.Hiswordswere,'IfyouhaveenmitywithmySirdarandwanttosettlescores with him, then do it yourself. Do not use me'.

InSeptember 1954,duetothe lack of evidence and the honesty andintegrity ofZahoor AzharandOmarKhan,theEnquiryTeamclearedmeofallcharges.Thelocal administration,withthecollaborationofSomemembersofmyfamily,hadfailedin theirdeterminedattempttopreventmefrombringingaboutchangeintheMazariarea.

Iwasnotquitetwenty-fourwhenIwasacquittedoftheseriouschargeofrunning'a parallelgovernment' to theGovernment ofPakistan.

CHAPTER2

1950s-YearsofDisastrousIntrigues

IfirstvisitedKarachiinMarch1949attheageofeighteen,littleknowingthatinyearsto come the city would become my home town. During my last years at Aitchison while I wascompletingmyALevels(orHigherSeniorCambridgeasitwasknownthen),Akbar Bugtireturned toLahoretoattendaPakistanCivilService(CSP)course.While Akbarwasthere,heinvitedmetoQuettaforashootduringmyschoolholidays.In thosedaystherewasnodirectairlinkbetweenthetwocities.Thetwoofusflewto KarachitocatchtheconnectingflighttoQuetta.Whenwearrivedattheportcitywe discoveredthatitwasvirtuallyimpossibletogetaccommodationatthelocalhotels.The newcapitalofPakistanhadattractedahostofforeignmissionswhohadyettofind properaccommodation,withtheresultthatboththePalaceandtheBeachLuxury hotels^47werefilledtocapacitywithmembersofthediplomaticcorps-high commissioners,ambassadorsandtheirstaff.AkbarBugtiandIwereleftwithlittle choice but to make do with whatever accommodation we could lay our hands on. After alongdrivefromtheairport,weeventuallyobtainedroomsatarun-down establishmentatSaddar.Thatnight,findingourbedsinfestedwith,bedbugs,we walked out into the street, hired a cycle-rickshaw and headed for Clifton believing that theseabreezewouldprotectusfromanexpectedonslaughtofmosquitoes.Crossing theCliftonBridgeontowhatthenweretheoutskirtsofthecity,wecollapsedontwo cementbenches andfellasleep.Earlyinthe morningwewerewokenbyapolicepatrol. After we sleepily produced our credentials - which consisted of nothing more than our airline tickets to Quetta - the police leftus alone. Thatwas my introduction to Karachi.

Karachi was then a city blessed with cleanliness and was free from crime. The city was largelyacreationoftheBritishwhohadtakenadvantageofthenaturalharbourand built an army cantonment as part of their strategic requirements for the northwesternzone of their Indian Empire. Unlike the other major cities of Pakistan, it had remarkably little history.Before the British conquest in1838,it hadbeen ruledby the Talpurs of Sindh.In1838ColonelPottinger,theBritishResidentofSindh,hadinterceptedletters sent bytheTalpurAmirs to theShah ofPersiain which theSindhis had madetheir hostility to the unwarranted British interference in their affairs quite clear. Pottinger became convinced that the British influence on 'the Ameers hereafter must be throughtheir fears'.48He accordingly advised the Governor-General that a treaty would only be enteredintobytheTalpursonceBritishtroopssetfootonSindhisoil.Thepresenceof

47TheonlygoodqualityhotelsinKarachiin1949.

48ParliamentaryPapers-A.Burnes&OthersonaMissiontoSind,p.1citedin:C.L.Marriwalla,BritishPolicy towards Sind up to the First Afghan War 1839, 1947 (Reprinted by Indus Publications 1982), p. 105.

the soldiers would render 'the Ameers to beamenable to our demands'.49British ships carryingtroopsanchoredoffManoraIslandattheentrancetotheKarachiharbouron theeveningof1February1839.Nextmorning,underaflagoftruce,aBritishofficer wasrowedtoshore where he presentedthekilladarademandforanunconditional surrender of the fort atManora. When thedemand was rejected, British troops landed near the fort and a further demand was made for the surrender. Thekilladarrequested for time to consult his superior, the Governor of Karachi, but Admiral Maitland, on his flagshiptheH.M.S.Wellesley,insistedonallowingonlyfifteenminutesforsurrender. Withinminutesoftheexpiryofthatperiod,theWellesleyopenedfireonthefort, blowing away itssouthernface.Shortlyafterwards inabloodlesstakeover, theBritish troopsplantedtheirensignonthe highwallsofthefort.Thusbeganthe firstincidentof Britishoccupation of the geographical entitywhich waslater tobecome Pakistan.

Thepre-BritishwalledtownofKarachi(namedaftertheBalochtribeofKulachi) occupiedanareaofonlythirty-fiveacres.Thefortifiedtownhadtwogateways- Mithadar, whichledtothefreshwater ofthe Lyari stream,and Kharadar,whichfaced the brackishsaltwater of the sea.The ActingAdjutantof the invading troopsdescribed thescenein1838:'Thetownisexcessivelydirty,andtheinhabitantsgenerallyaremost squalidlookingsetofwretches.ThegreatmajorityareHindoos.Thehousesare generallymud-builtandflat-roofed;ontopofthemarewickerventilatorsfacingthe sea,whichperformthedouble dutyofwindsailandskylight'.50Beyondthewalled confinesofthetowntherewasanextensivesuburbborderingthebanksoftheLyari River,whichcontainedasmany,housesasthetownitself.In1839,accordingtoa CaptainS.V.W.Hart,thetotalpopulationwas13,850,outofwhichtherewere'9,000 Hindoosand4,850Mahomedans'.MostoftheHindusweretradersand'manyofthe Hindoomerchantswereverywealthy'.51TheMuslimsofpre-BritishKarachiconsisted ofBaloch,Jokiahs,MohanasandJuths.Thetownthenservedasthecommercialseaport forSindhandcarriedtradewithBombay,theMalabarcoast,Muscat,andthePersian Gulf. Itsexportsincluded 'fleece, wool, sharkfins,dried fruits, dyes, leather, silk goods', butthemainexportwasopium.52Itsprincipalimportswere'sugar,spices,British cloths,grains,wood,brass,steel,tin,etc.'53Historyalsorecordsthattherewasan extensive trade inslavesaswell.These unfortunate people were classifiedintotwo groups:theHubsheesofEthiopiaandtheSiddeesfromotherpartsofAfrica.54The

49Ibid.

50Captain J. Martin B. Neill,Recollections of Four Years Service in the East with H.M. 40th Regiment, London, IOLR, Cat. no. T 5009, 1845.

51Citedin:AlexanderF.Baillie,Kurrachee:Past,PresentandFuture,London,1890,p.29.

52In 1839, exports from Karachi amounted to Rs. 2,146,625 of which Rs. 1,600,000 was by export of opium which cameby camelsfrom Rajputana and wasshipped to thePortuguese port of Daman,where it wasthen re-exported to China. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

53Captain J. Martin B. Neill,Recollections of Four Years Service in the East with H. M. 40th Regiments, op. cit., pp.28-29.

54AlexanderF.Baillie,op.cit.,p.35.

descendantsoftheseforcedimmigrantscontinuetobepartofthecity'slifeacentury and a half later.

TheearlierKarachiwaslargelyeradicatedbytheBritish.Asalltheprevious constructionhadbeenmadeofdriedmud-eventhelargefortconstructedbythe Talpurs on Manora Island to defend the harbour was of adobe - it made it all the more easyfortheBritishtoconstructtheirnewcantonmentcity.ThearrivaloftheBritishwas soonfollowedbyahostofnewcommunities.Theyconsistedoftradingclasseswho cateredprimarily tothe British,aswellasotherswhowere attractedsimplybythe commercialstabilityofKarachiduetothepresenceoftheBritish.Thesenewer immigrantsincludedParsees,Bohras,KhojasandMemons.Karachi'sdevelopment largely began under Bartle Frere who was appointed Commissioner of Sindh at the age ofthirty-fivein1851.It wasFrerewho decidedthatKarachioughttobecometheport for Punjab (which then included both the NWFP and Delhi) thereby bypassing Calcutta andBombay.Aftera marinesurveytheport wascompleted,and by1858 workbegan onarailwayfromKarachitoKotri.Newroadswerealsoconstructedthroughoutthe provincewithproper brick bridgestocircumventthecanalsystem.Frere wasthefirst tointroducetheEuropeanconceptofpostagestampsinIndia bythe introductionofa stampbearingthewords'ScindeDistrictDawk'.Hewasinstrumentalinintroducing theArabicscriptfortheSindhilanguagewhichhaduntilthenremainedanoraland unwrittenlanguage.Manybuildings,includingschools,courtroomsandotherofficial structures,wereconstructedduringhisshorttermofoffice.Karachiowesagreat deal toFrere.Whenheleftin1859tobecometheGovernoroftheBombayPresidency,his services to the city were recognized by the building of Frere Hall which was opened in1865.

Bymid-twentiethcentury,Karachi'sleadingcommercialhouseswereownedmostlyby Parsees, Hindus and a handful of Muslims. As Muslims were averse to providing pork andalcoholandtheHindustobeefandleathergoods,theParseesachievedavirtual monopolyinprovisioningtheBritishcolonialpopulation.ThetradingclassesofBohras, Khojas and Memons now made up the entire Muslim middle class of Karachi, if not of thewholeprovince.Towardsthecity'swesternboundarytherewerepocketsofBrauhi, BalochandMakranivillages.Thingssoonchangedwiththe creationofPakistan.In 1947Karachibecamethecapitalofthenewnation.By1949therewasalargepresence of Muslim refugees from India, but their numbers were not as large as they later came tobe.KarachibecametheonlycosmopolitancityinPakistan.Thestreetswereclean,the shops looked inviting and the people were full of pride for their new country.

In 1949 Karachi was still tiny in comparison with the modern city of today. Its eastern boundary was delineated by the Napier Barracks. Drigh Road continued towards theairportsurroundedbyopenlanduntiltheDrighairforcebasesevenorsomilesaway inthesouth,thecitylimitsterminatedjustpasttheCliftonBridge.Pastthebridgethe dirtroadleadingtoCliftonwouldoftenbecoveredbywaterathightide;thetidalsea

water would carry over as far as the racecourse.Even Queens Road carried a deserted look, withtherailwaygodownsononesideand, withtheexceptionof asetofbuildings called the Intelligence School, a wide open space bounding the mangrove creek onthe otherside.ThenorthwesternlimitswerereachedatSoldierBazaarontheothersideof BunderRoad.Evenventuring,asAkbarBugtiandIdid,toSandspit(untilthenIhad neverseenthesea)meanthiringaboatatKeamari—thebridge acrossthecreek to Sandspithad yettobebuilt. Flyingoutof Karachi wasalsoquitedifferentinthosedays. AfewmonthslaterthatsameyearIreturnedbrieflytoKarachitocatchaflightfor London. I had the option of catching the flying boat service leaving from Korangi Creek ortakingaBOACConstellationfromtheinternationalairport.Astheflyingboatservicewasagreatdealslower,inreachingitsdestinationsI decidedontheConstellation.

Itheabsenceofregionalflightservicesalotofjourneyingwasdonebyroad.Therewas anarrowcarpetedroadfromKarachiwhichcontinuedonfromDrighRoadtowards Thattaand onwardstoKotri (theGhulamMuhammad Barragenear Hyderabad had yet tobecompleted) and fromtheretoSukkur. Thiswas ofcoursethenthemain national roadway. During the hot months of summer, in the absence of air-conditioning, all our driving wasdoneatnighttime.Therewasverylittletrafficandvirtuallynotrucksas goodswerestillsentbytrain.DuringthejourneytoSonmiani,whichnormallytook nine hours or so, I would rarely encounter more than half a dozen cars and a dozen or sotrucks.OnoneoccasionthecarIwastravellinginbrokedown,nearHyderabadin theearlyhoursofthemorning.Itwasseveralhoursuntilanothervehicleappeared. Luckily ithappenedtobe atractor,ararityinthosedays,whichthenhelpedtow,the cartoHyderabadforrepairs.Andquiteunlikethepresentroute,itwassparsely populated, with great stretches of tranquil wilderness and open spaces dominating the countryside.Thefewtownsonecameacrossweresmallandhadyettoacquirethe uncontrolledsqualoroftoday.Travellinginthe1950swasmoreleisurelyandtiffin- carriers were still very much in vogue. Journeys would often be broken for tea stops at thelocalirrigationresthouseswhichwerewell-staffedandofferedcomfortablestops for road-weary travelers.

WithtimeIbecamemorefamiliarwithKarachi.Ihadanumberofschoolfriendsthere andamongthemwasIftikharAhmedwhosefamilyhadmovedfromHyderabadin IndiasoonafterPartition.HisparentsstayedatthenewlyopenedMetropoleHotel, whichhadquicklyestablisheditselfasoneofthecentersofentertainmentinthecity alongwiththeneighboringPalaceHotel.Therestaurantsofthesetwohotelswere packedeacheveningwiththecity'selite.Dinnerjacketswerederigueurforthemen, and the ladies were fashionably dressed in silk saris, with the more daring wearing sleevelessblouses.Therewerecabaretshowsandlivebandsprovidingthelatestmusic of the times and the hotel guests danced till the late hours of the night. Alcohol was of coursefreelyandabundantlyavailable.Themenwhohaduntilrecentlybeen accustomedtotheliberalcultureoftheBritishRajhadlittleofthedoublestandardsthat

wereeventuallytofollow. Karachi had alsobeguntoattractvisitorsfromotherpartsof Pakistanwhonowflockedintosavourthesocialdelightsofferedbythenewly blossoming cosmopolitan city.

The elite that developed at Karachi in those early years was select in number. Virtually everyone knew each other. There were the senior bureaucrats such as Iskander Mirza, AbbasKhalilee,OsmanAli(andhisvivaciouswife,Nuchchi)andM.A.Baig.Military officers were represented by the likes of General (Joe) Yusuf, General Raza and Air Commodore Maqbool Rab. Representing the business community were people such as Yusuf Chinoy, Munir of Hyesons, Yusuf and Mahmood Haroon and the leading Parsee families, such as the Dinshaws, Kandawallas and the Cowasjees. There were of coursemanyothers,amongthemwasthevastdiplomaticcorpsthenstationedatKarachi.

Cabaretshowswereapopulariteminthe1950s.Singers,bellydancersandbands would regularly fly in from Havana, Beirut and Cairo and would appear at Le Gourmet inthePalaceHotel.LeGourmetwasthemostpopularnightclub.Diplomatsand younger members of the social set would gather there every night to dance the foxtrot, samba,rumbaorwhatevertooktheirfancy.Seniorpoliticianoftheday,H.S. Suhrawardy,whoenjoyeddancing,wouldoftenattendthesegatherings.Themilitary would alsojoinin. Irememberoncespotting aninebriated BrigadierYahyaKhan(later General and eventually President) sitting atacorner tableenjoying himself. Among the youngersettoregularlyfrequentLeGourmetduringthe1950swere,amongothers,my brotherMirBalakhSher,andmybrothers-in-lawIftikharAhmedandAhmedNawaz Bugti.Unliketodaytheyoungersethadanopportunity toenjoy themselvesopenly without offending other sections of the community.

Anothertraditionofthe 1950swere the elevensesatthe ShehzanonVictoriaRoad. MembersofthemoreidleyoungersetwouldcongregatetotheShehzanformorning tea and pastries. The restaurant did a roaring trade during lunch, and followed it by a busysessionprovidingafternoonteastoitswell-heeledcustomers.Thearrivalofthe Inter-ContinentalHotelinthemid-sixtiesunfortunatelybroughtShehzan'spopularity toa close. Thelureof anewlyopened fivestarhotel, withitsDemitassecoffeebar, Cafe SuroorandChandniLounge,providedtoostrongacompetition,andShehzanslowly sank in its wake.

Shoppingwasamucheasierpastimefortheshoppersofthefiftiesandearlysixties. There was little traffic and car parking posed no difficulty in the major shopping area of Elphinstone and Victoria Roads. English Cold Storage provided all sorts of foods and refreshments.ShafiqSonsofferedawiderangeofhouseholdware.Hadyn'scateredfor the musical tastes of everyone, both in the form of records as well as pianos which once usedto bemadeonthepremises.TheadjoiningBliss&Co.,thechemists,soldawide rangeofpharmaceuticalproducts.Perfumesandtoiletrieswerealsoavailableat Queen's(runbythecharmingRamMehtani)locatedattheRockCourtonVictoria

Road. For saddlery and quality leather goods there was Jafferjee's. Kashmir Emporium wasapopularplacetoobtaintheexoticKashmirigift.Andforthediscerningmale dresser there was, of course, HamidTailors,who insisted upon choosing his customers selectively. Movies could be seen at the Palace, Capitol and Paradise cinemas. Guns and ammunition could be obtained from Pioneer Arms, Buksh Ellahi or Dossul's. For book lovers, such as myself, there were a host of book shops: Paramount, Greenich, Thomas &Thomas,Pak-AmericanCommercialandMackwin's.Fortheavidbibliophilethere wastheenterprisingSafdarMehdi,whowouldbringpilesofbooksstrappedonhis bicycle to the homesof customers. He specialized in rare volumes on the subcontinent which he obtained by sniffing about among older book collections in other parts of the city.AmongmyfewrivalsfortheserarebookswasZulfikarAliBhutto.Mehdinever hadanyqualmsaboutplayingonecustomeragainsttheother.OnedayImanagedto pick up a valuable volume which had been annotated by the redoubtable General John Jacob. The book had alsobeen keenly sought by Bhutto. Years later Bhutto would often ruefully remind me of his regret on missing out on purchase of that particular book.

NotallKarachivenueswereopenforthenewPakistanielite.TheSindClubresistedthe changebroughtaboutbyIndependence,andstubbornlymaintainedits'Europeans only'policy.Finallyin1952andonlyafterIskanderMirza,theDefenceSecretary, threatenedtocloseitdown,didtheclubrelentitsracialbias.Inearly1959Iwaselected whenmynamewasproposedbyIshaatHabibullahandsecondedbySyedWajidAli. OtherswhojoinedtheSindClubataboutthistimeincludedBrigadier'Hesky'Baig, ZulfikarAliBhutto,UsmanAli,GeneralLatifandSafdarRashid.Duringthoseearly years of my membership I recall the club atmosphere as being exceedingly formal. Yet intheBritishtraditionitcametorepresentahomeawayfromhome,despitethefact that a dinner jacket was compulsory for menin the evenings, and that club rules were strictlyappliedwithoutexception.Overtheyears,someofthesestandardshavebeen relaxed, but in some cases not all for the better.

In the earlier years there used to be aclub rule which used to irk mesomewhat. Despitetheintroductionof'native'members,'nativedress'continuedtobefrowneduponby the club for many years. I had made my feelings about this known to members of the managingcommittee.Irecallthegenial,gentlemanly,butpukkaIshaatHabibullah replyingthatnativedresswouldbeallowed intheclub'overmydeadbody'. Therule came to an inglorious end when in 1972 during the days of Z. A. Bhutto's 'awami' government,theclubinvitedRasoolBuksh Talpur,GovernorofSindh,to a commemorative function. The governor duly arrived at the club dressed in a crumpled khaddarshalwar katneez, wearing open leather sandals. The embarrassed club seniors, including the genteel Ishaat Habibullah, realized that either they had to turf the hapless governor off the club premises, or amend the rules. The idea of maintaining double standards was an anathema to these gentlemen. Accordingly, the rules were altered and national dress worn with asherwanior a formal waistcoat, finally became an acceptable dress on the club's premises.

Bylate 1953my wifeandIreturnedtoKarachiafteralongacclimatizationstayat Sonmiani. Souriya had, much to her credit, not only become well-versed with all things tribal,buthadalsolearnttospeak Balochi.We rentedahouse inPECHS,nearthe NurseryareaofKarachi,whereSouriyastayedwithmytwosonsSherazamand Shehryarwhile IregularlycommutedbetweenKarachiandmytribalhomeland.With hindsightIcanregardthatperiodastheblissfulyearsofKarachi.Inthe1950slocal industryandbusinesseswereboomingwithfinancialsuccess.Peoplewanderedaround the city at all hours of the day and night feeling totally safe. The cinemas were filled to capacityaspeoplehadtimetoenjoytheirleisurehours.Thecity wasthenrapidly becominganamicablemeltingpotofdifferentethnicgroups.Themuhajirscontinuedto flockfromacrosstheborder.SoontheywerejoinedbythePathanlaborerswhocamein vastnumberstotakepartintheconstructionboomwhichwassoontoalterthecity beyondrecognition.Themajorityofthecity'sskilledlaborcamefromthePunjab. Otherssoonfollowed,includingbusinessmenfromalloverthecountrykeento participateintheexpandingwealthofferedbythefastgrowingcity.Itrapidly transformedKarachi,makingitanamalgamofallthediverseculturesthatexistedin Pakistan.Tothe majority ofitsinhabitantsallseemedwellwiththeirnewcountry. EveryonewasproudofPakistanandexpectedthefuturetoblossomforthemaswellas fortheircountry.Manyliveshadbeenlostandmanysacrificeshadbeenmadeto achieveaseparatehomelandfortheMuslimmajorityareasofthesubcontinent,butit was felt that it had been well worth the cost. But unknown to most of us, even then in those earliest of days of our good fortune when the future looked the brightest to all of us,darkcloudshadalreadybeguntogatherandloom-albeitunnoticed-highabove. The cause ofthisfuture gloomwashiddenfromusby patrioticblandishmentsand otherformsofartificialself-concealments,butthe damage hadbegun.Behindthose high-sounding politicalutterancesissuedfromabove itnowseemsobviousthatthe cankerousrothadby thenalreadybeguntosetin.Thecause ofourmisfortune,as always, could be found in the selfish obsessions of our national leadership.

Thereisnoquestionthatthe desireforaseparateMuslimentityarosefromagreatfear amongtheMuslimsthattheywouldbeswampedbytheHindus.Thedifferences between the Muslims and Hindus were deep and pervasive. The two-hundred-year old BritishpresencehadlargelyfinishedthepowerthattheMuslimshadoncepossessedby theirdominationofthesubcontinentforcenturies.Greatlyoutnumbered, theMuslims fearedthattheywouldtotallybe engulfedby the Hindupopulation.Thisnotunjustifiedfear,ledtotheriseoftheMuslimLeagueunderthecapablehandsofthe Quaid-i-Azam, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah. But one fact that is constantly overlooked, is thatthisfearlargelytookhold inprovinceswheretheHindupopulationwasdominant. IntheprovincesofBritishIndiawherethe Muslimmajorityprevailed,there wasa generalabsence ofthisfear.Itwasaroundthese areasthatthe future Pakistanwas eventuallytobebuilt.Ironically,itwasinthesesameareasthatthe MuslimLeaguewas politically at its weakest.

Inthe1937provincialelectionstheMuslimLeaguemanagedtojoinacoalition government in Bengal. It won no seats in Sindh and the NWFP. Punjab brought in only twoseatsforthe League,andeventhenone ofthetwosuccessfulcandidates,Raja GhazanfarAli,ontheverydayofbeingelected,shiftedhisallegiancetotheUnionist Party after being offered a parliamentary secretaryship. Clearly, in the area that was to later become Pakistan, only Bengal showed a degree of sympathy towards the MuslimLeague.

Since attaining its status as a separate province in 1936, Sindh was beset with rivalries among rising new personalities. The rural gentry had largely remained uneducated andhadtoagreatextentabdicatedtheirleadershiprole.Theyhadbeenreplacedbythe newly educated semi-urbanized middle-classes who were mostly lawyers from the provincialtowns.Despitethesechangesthereremainedtwodominantpoliticalblocs: the Baloch Mir group and the Syed group, representing the interests of the manypirfamilies of the province. According to the census of 1901, some twenty-three percent of Sindhi Muslims were Baloch^55and their leaders held the largest estates ii. the province.The Syed group, which was much smaller in number, had great support from thepirfamiliesandtheirmureedsorfollowers dueto theircontrolofreligiousshrines.

The province of Sindh was created on 1 April 1936 under the Government of India Act 1935,and'disunity andfactionalism[became]thehallmarksofMuslimpolitics throughoutthedecadeofProvincialAutonomy'.56The1937electionsrevealedtheclear dominance oftheruralelite oflargelandholders,clanleadersandpirs.Urban politicianssuchasAbdullahHaroon(thenleaderofhisSindhUnitedParty)suffered defeat in Karachi at the hands of Allah Buksh Gabol, who had the support of the urban BalochMirvotingblocinLyari.AnotherdefeatedpoliticianwasShahNawazBhutto.HewasbeateninLarkanabyAbdulMajidSindhi,theleaderofhisownSindhAzad Party.Bhutto'sdefeatpartlystemmedfromthefactthattheBhuttofamilyhead, Wadero Nabi Buksh, had opposed him.

In1937thefirstgovernmentofSindhwasformedunderthechiefministershipof GhulamHussainHidayatullah,leaderofhisownSindhMuslimParty.Hehad managedtogainthevitalsupportoftheMirbloc.Asaresult,mostofhisministers werefromtheBalochgroup,suchasMirBandehAliTalpur,MirMuhammadKhan Chandio and Allah Buksh Gabol. Their rival Syed group consisted of G. M. Syed, Miran MuhammadShah,MuhammadAliShah,GhulamHyderShahandKhairShah.The firstSindhAssemblywasmarkedbyamyriadoffloor-crossingsandconstantshifting

55GazetteeroftheProvinceofSind,1907,p.154.

56IanTalbot,ProvincialPoliticsandthePakistanMovement,OxfordUniversityPress,Karachi,1990,p.39.

of alliances, in which party loyalties counted for nothing.57The only notable consistent factor among all the prevailing chaos was theimportance of thetwo solid Mirand Syedblocs.

By March1938,politicalcombinationshadrunoutforHidayatullah,andhe hadto resigninfavorof AllahBukshSoomro. Indirectlythisproved awindfall forthefortunes of Muslim League.Many politicians, unhappy with the stateof affairs, now joined the League - these included Abdullah Haroon, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Bandeh Ali TalpurandG.M.Syed.HoweverwiththeexceptionofHaroon(whoseemedtohave beengenuinelymotivatedagainstSoomro'spro-Congressleanings),mostofthenew entrantsjoinedasaresultoffactionalrivalriesinthestruggleforoffice.Hidayatullah and theMirblocweremotivated byrevengeand achancetoregainthegovernment.G.

M.Syed,whoprofessedtorepresentinterestsoftheSindhiharis,orzamindarswas

greatly angered by the Soomro government's proposal to increase land revenue assessmentsintheSukkurBarragearea.58Withintenmonthsthefragilityofthe League's new strength was exposed. In January 1939 Hidayatullah - resenting Haroon's ascendency to League presidentship - deserted the Muslim League, taking the Mir blocwithhim.HebecameaministerinAllahBukshSoomro'sgovernment.Unfortunately for these defectors, the Soomro government collapsed in March 1940 due to serious communal violence in Sukkur district.

In1940,theLeagueatKhuro'sprompting,agreedtodissolveitsAssemblypartyand combinedwiththeHinduIndependentstoformtheNationalistParty.Thenaccepting BandehAliTalpuraspremier,toobtaintheMirbloc'ssupport,itformedanew coalitiongovernment.Thisunorthodoxmaneuverhadbeenmadesimplytoattain office.Mr.JinnahandhisnowstalwartSindhLeaguepresident,AbdullahHaroon, initiallydisagreedwithKhuro'sscheme,butlatertheyreluctantlyconcurred.Their fearsweresoonjustifiedastheLeague'sAssemblymembersbeganflagrantly disobeyingtheAll-IndiaMuslimLeague'sdirectives.Mr.JinnahvisitedKarachiin December1940only tofindthathisministerswere more interestedinenjoying the prerequisites of power and office than advancing the cause of the League and Pakistan. ForcedtoaccepttherealitiesofruralpowerinSindhpolitics,Mr.Jinnahnevertheless managedtoexertasemblanceofcontrolbymakingtheministersstepdownfromoffice inMarch1941.WhenBandehAliTalpur'sgovernmentcametoanend,Soomroonce morebecamethepremier. Later,endeavoringtopleasetheCongressHighCommand, he renounced the award of OBE and title of Khan Bahadur given to him by the British. Displeased with Soomro's behaviour, the governor asked him to resign.

57The Sindh Muslim Party of Hidayatullah had won only four seats in elections. When it became clear that Hidayatullah was the British governor’s favorite for the post of chief minister, a further twenty-four Assembly members joined his party, largely at the expense of Maroon’s Sindh United Party.

58IanTalbot,op.cit.,p.41.

HidayatullahoncemorejumpedshipandrejoinedtheMuslimLeague.Thedeathof AbdullahHarooninMay1942seemedtohaveremovedhisobjectionstotheLeague. Having returned to the party, he wasby October 1942 heading the new Muslim League government. Hidayatullah managed to hang on to the post of premier till 1946, despite the many schemes hatched by other League members to get rid of him. On Mr. Jinnah's insistencethatservingministerscouldnotsimultaneouslyholdorganizationalofficesin theLeague,Khuro,Haroon'ssuccessor,hadbeenmadetoresigntheparty presidentship.HewasnowreplacedbyG.M.Syed.AsHidayatullahhadcarriedthe MirblocwithhimintotheAssembly,thepartynowhadanindomitableleaderofthe rivalSyedblocaspartypresident.G. M.SyedwassupportedbyMuhammadHashim Gazdar,aKarachipoliticianwhowasabitterrivaloftheyoungerHaroons.Thenew partypresidentnowbeganavociferouscampaigntounseatHidayatullah.DespiteG.

M.Syed'sclaimtoupholdtheinterestsoftheharis,andcriticismofthegovernment's

tardinessininstitutingagrarianreform,hisearlierhostilereactiontothereassessment of land revenue in Sukkur was quite revealing. He was now simply playing his part in thetraditionalstrugglebetweenMirsandSyeds-landreformsandrightsoftheharisweresimplyappropriateweaponstobrowbeattheMirbloc'slargeland-owningclasses. It had the added appeal of attracting supportfrom theindigenous Sindhis to theSyed bloc in their political battle against their Baloch rivals.

TheLeague'sinternalconflict(Mirblocvs.Syedbloc)becameincreasinglybitter.InJuly 1944 G. M. Syed, asparty president, unsuccessfully called uponthe League ministersto resign.BynowG.M.SyedcontrolledtheLeagueCouncilandWorkingCommittee, havingdisqualifiedallbrancheswhichhadbackedhisopponents.TheLeaguehad irrevocablysplitbetweentheSyedandMirfactions,leadingtofarcicalsituationsaswas demonstratedinthe1944by-electionsatShikarpurcausedbythemurderofAllah Buksh Soomro.59Hidayatullah wanted his son, Anwar, to contest on the League ticket, butthepartyparliamentaryboard, dominatedby G.M.Syed'smen, gavetheticketto theirownnominee.TheLeague'sdisunityensuredthatanoutsidecandidate-Moula Buksh Soomro, the murdered man's brother - won. By 1945 G. M. Syed was intriguing withMoulaBukshSoomrotobringdownthegovernment.HidayatullahpreemptedG.

M.Syed'splotbywinningoverSoomrobyawardinghimaministership.AsSoomrowasnotaLeaguemember,acrisisensued.Mr.Jinnahhadtostepinbyfirst reprimandingG.M.Syedforcausingthecrisis,andtheninstructingHidayatullahto sack Soomro if he did not join the League.

TheobsessivequestforpowerandintrigueamongtheSindhipoliticiansmadethe principledMr.Jinnahquitecontemptuousofthem.In1945theBritishgovernorof SindhreportedtotheViceroythat'Jinnahdislikesthemall. Heoncetoldmehecould buythelotofthemforfivelakhofrupees,towhichIrepliedIcoulddoitalot

59Khuro was arrested in the Allah Buksh Soomro murder case. He was later acquitted, but not quite exonerated. Interestingly, on his release it i said that Yusuf Haroon garlanded him with gold sovereigns.

cheaper'.60ToovercomethestrugglethathadbrokenoutforLeagueticketsforthe1946 elections,Mr.Jinnahcobbledtogetheraseven-memberparliamentaryboard.Withina shortwhiletheboardsplitbetweentwogroups:amajoritybelongingtothe Hidayatullah-Khuro-Mir grouping, and a minority supporting its chairman, G. M. Syed. Outnumbered,G.M.Syedsimplyadjournedtheboard,whichthenpromptedthe frustratedMr.Jinnahtosuspenditsoperations.LiaquatAliKhanwassenttoKarachi whereheconvenedameetingoftheLeague'scentralparliamentarycommitteewhich foundG.M.Syed'sadjournmentunconstitutional.The rebelliousG.M.Syedthenheld ameetingofhisProvincialLeagueCouncilwhichcarriedano-confidencemotion againstLiaquatAliKhanandhiscommittee.Totally fedupwiththesituation,Mr. JinnahvisitedKarachiandpersonallyplacedtheresponsibilityofselectingLeague electioncandidatesinthehandsofthecentralparliamentaryboard.Theboard eventuallynominatedcandidatesfavorabletoHidayatullah,therebyinfuriatingG.M. Syedandhisbloc.G.M.SyednowinsistedinputtinguptheSyedblocnomineesas rivalstotheLeague'sofficialcandidates.Leftwithlittlechoice,theLeagueexpelledG.

M.Syedfromitsmembership.Therecalcitrantpoliticiantookanumberofmenfrom theSyedblocwithhim,includingMuhammadAliShah,SyedKhairShahandPir Bahadur Shah of Hala, and some suggest, also Rs. 50,000 of League funds.

The outcome of the elections was mixed. Despite winning twenty-eight out of the thirty- four Muslim seats, the Muslim League was threatened by the success of the Syed group which had formed an opportunistic partnership with the Congress and other Hinduleaders, and claimed to have twenty-nine members. Governor Mudie insisted that the largest party be first given an opportunity to form a government. The Muslim League government of Hidayatullah precariously managed to last until early September 1946.61The governor then dissolved the Assembly and ordered fresh elections. By the time the elections took place in December 1946, Partition appeared inevitable. This time the Syed blocwascrushedwithonlyoneofitsmembersgettingelected.62Thevictoryhadbeen woninthenameofPakistan,butitwasaninescapablefactthatPakistanmeantlittleto theSindhileadersatthetimeofPartition.Theyweresingularlyconcernedwith winning office at the expense of all else, and had used the Muslim League simply as avehiclefortheir ownambitions. ThecrushingdefeatoftheSyedblocserved onlyto further aggravate G. M. Syed's obsessive hostility towards Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League's concept of Pakistan.

InPunjabthe1937electionsbroughtaboutagreatvictoryfortheUnionistParty.The party was aloose coalitionof Muslim, Hinduand Sikhlandholders. It had won seventy- three outof theseventy-five rural Muslim seats, and a total of ninety-nine seatsoutof

60DowtoWavell,20September1945,L/P&J/5/261IndiaOfficeRecords,citedinIanTalbot,op.cit.,p.50.

61DuringthisperioditwasrumoredthatKhurowasintriguingwiththeoppositionCongressPartytodepose Hidayatullahand take over as premier Ayesha Jalal, TheSoleSpokesman,CambridgeUniversityPress 1985, p. 219.62K. S. Khoso was the solitary successful Syed bloc candidate.

anAssemblyof175 seats.63Theresultwasasevereembarrassmentforthe League.To rectifythesituationMrJinnahentered intoapactwiththeleaderoftheUnionists,Sir SikanderHayatKhan.UnderthepactSirSikanderagreedtoadviseallMuslimmembersoftheUnionistPartytojointheMuslimLeague.TheywouldformaPunjab MuslimAssemblyPartywhichwouldbesubjecttotherulesoftheCentraland Provincial Parliamentary Boards of the League. But the agreement would not affect the continuationofthe governmentwhichwouldretainitsUnionistname andidentity. UnderthisstrangearrangementbothSikanderandMr.Jinnahbenefited.SirSikander assumedtotalcontroloverthePunjabLeague.ForMr.JinnahobtainingUnionist supportmeantastrongboostforthe MuslimLeague'sstandinginAll-Indiapolitics after the party's disastrous showing in the Indian Provincial Elections.

DuringthefollowingyearsUnionistcontrolledtomanycomplaintsaboutthe stultification of the League's politics.64The advent of the Second World War led to army recruitmentandrequisitioningandrationingofgrainwhichweakenedtheUnion Party'spopularity.AtthesametimeKhizerHayatTiwana,thenewUnionistpremier, was facing challenges from his party leadership.65Mr. Jinnah took advantage of the situationtoconfrontTiwanawithLeaguediscontentment.Theirtalksendedina hopeless state of disagreement which eventually led to Tiwana's expulsion from theLeague in May 1944. Within a few months a large number of Unionists who were dissatisfied with Tiwana expressed their loyalty to the League.66By the end of 1944 the Leaguehadtwenty-sevenmembersinthePunjabAssembly.

Pre-Partition Punjab remained in the hands of the Unionist Party until almost the very lastmomentbeforeIndependence.IttookthecollapseoftheSimlaConferenceinJuly 1945fortherealizationtodawnontheMuslimlandholdersthattheirpartywasno longercapableofsafeguardingtheirinterests.Bytheendof1945therewasalarge-scale defectionofMuslimlandlordsfromtheUnionistPartytotheMuslimLeague.The changeofmoodwassodramaticthattheUnionistleaderKhizerHayatTiwanawas abandonedby evensome ofhisownkinsmen.Atthe 1946provincialelections,the Leaguemadetremendousgains.Thekeytoitssuccesslaywiththelandlordsandthe political clout they wielded. The League obtained seventy-five out of eighty-six Muslim seats,butremainedshortofamajority inthe 175-strong Assembly andfounditself unabletoformacoalition.Intheend,SirKhizerwhosepartymanagedapaltry eighteenseatsformedaUnionistcoalitionwiththeCongressandtheAkaliSikhs.In

63Other successful Muslim candidates (in the 1937 elections) include i) Two from the Muslim League: Raja Ghazanfar Ali - who soon after getting elected defected to the Unionists - and Malik Barkat Ali. ii) Two from the Congress: Mian Iftikharuddin of Baghbanpura and Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain of Ludhiana.

64One example: Mr. Jinnah was asked, ’How could the Punjab League grow if its leader [Nawab of Mamdot] refused to allow Primary League branches to be established on his Ferozepore estate?’ Khan Rabb Nawaz toJinnah, 25 March 1943, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, File 379/41 NAP.

65Mir Maqbool Mahmood, Nawab Muzaffar Khan and Shaukat Hayat are said to have had ambitions for the chiefministership.

66ForemostamongthemwereShaukatHayat,MumtazDaultana,MiaAbdulAzizandSheikhSadiqHussain.

March1947,facedwiththerealitiesoftheimpendingpartitionofPunjab,Tiwanahad little choice but to resign.

ThenewPunjabMuslimLeaguegovernmentwhichcameinitsplacewasweakfrom theonset.ThepersonalrivalriesofFerozKhanNoon,MumtazDaultanaandNawab IftikharMamdojrosetothesurfaceevenbeforeIndependence.Thecorestrengthofthe vitalizedPunjabMuslimLeagueremainedwiththelandlords,whoseremarkable capacityforpoliticalaccommodationwasnotorious.Suchexpediencywashardlythe firm footing the Muslim League required to build its long-term foundations in Punjab.

Inadministering theNWFPtheBritishhad enlisted thehelpof theleading Khansof the areatomaintaintheirpower.InreturnforofficialpatronagetheKhansusedtheir traditionalauthoritytohelpkeepthepeace.Bythe1920stheKhanshadbegunto increasinglyrelyonBritishbackingattheexpenseoftraditionalauthority,which sufferedindecline.Theynowfacedagrowingchallengetotheirleadershipfromthe smaller Khans in their areas. It was the younger members of the smaller Khan families whoweretoprovidetheleadershipoftheFrontierCongressandKhudaiKhidmatgar Movement. IntimeeventheBritishcametorealizethattheirover-relianceonthelarge Khans had created conditions which led the popularity of the Congress movement, by alienatingtherivalsmallerKhansandblockinghopesofthetenantsforagrarianreform.67

The 1919 Khilafat Movement of the Indian Muslims - a reaction to the harsh conditions imposed on the Turkish Sultan at the end of the First World War - had a major impact onNWFP'spolitics.TheCongressParty'ssupportfortheKhilafatcampaigncreateda feelingof cooperation between the largelyHindu based political party and the Frontier Muslims.ThecoreoftheCongress-linkedKhudaiKhidmatgarMovementwere MuslimswhohadsupportedtheKhilafatMovementandrosetoprominencewithit. Notable among them were the brothers, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr Khan Sahib. Ghaffar Khan and Syed Qasim Shah formed the Afghan Jirga in 1929, calling for social andeconomicreformattheexpenseofthepro-BritishlargerKhans,andsoughttoassist theCongressinitsbidforIndependence.Volunteersofthisorganizationwerecalled KhudaiKhidmatgars,whowearingtheirredshirtswereassignedtovariousvillages. The 1930 Civil Disobedience campaign in Peshawar and its violent suppression known as the Kissakhwani Bazaar Massacre (which led to over one hundred dead) eventually led to the merger between the Afghan Jirga and the Congress. The officially condoned violenceexacerbatedtheanti-Britishfeelings andgaverisetotheincreased popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgars. This movementsoon eclipsed its parent body, the Afghan Jirga.DespitethemergerbetweentheCongressandtheKhudaiKhidmatgars,they remainedinessencetwoseparateorganizations.TheKhudaiKhidmatgarsstayed mainlyconcernedwithparochialPathaninterestsanditsorganizationcontinuedto

67S.Rittenburg,TheIndependenceMovementinIndia’sNorth-WestFrontierProvince,Columbia,1977,p.107.

dependonthefactionsthatmadeuptraditionalPathanpolitics.Significantly,the leadershipof this movementwas provided by men from the smaller Khan families. The pro-BritishlargerKhanswereclearlyopposedtotheKhudaiKhidmatgars.andmany later turned to Muslim League for protection.

TwoearlierattemptstoformtheMuslimLeagueintheNWFPhadfailed.In1936when Mr.JinnahvisitedtheareatoformaParliamentaryBoardtofightelections,the weakness of the League was revealed - of the eighteen men chosen by Mr. Jinnah, six promptlydesertedandjoinedtheCongress.Onlytwoofthemweresuccessfullyelected in the end. But these two men had refused to contest as League candidates and chose instead to stand as Azad Party members. The 1937 elections brought about a Congress- KhudaiKhidmatgarsgovernmentofNWFPwhichlastedtill1939whenitsleader,Dr Khan Sahib, resigned at the behest of Congress Party national leadership, who were protesting at the Viceroy's unilateral declaration of war against the Axis powers without bothering to consult the central legislature at Delhi.

It was not however until 1943 - with many of the Congress members of the legislative assembly in jail - that the NWFP Muslim League was able to take advantage and form a governmentunderAurangzebKhanofGandapur.WithtenCongressitememberslockedup,thechiefministermanagedtoscrapetogethertwenty-twomemberstoform the government. These members included a number of independent Khans who joinedonly after being offered the prospect of rich government pickings, and not because they supported the League's political philosophy. During its two year period in office,Aurangzeb Khan's government became notorious for its corruption. By the time the government came to an end in March 1945, the NWFP Muslim League was internally dividedandpoorlyorganizedtofacethe1946elections.Despitethefactthatthe provincecontainedahigherpercentageofMuslimsthananyotherprovinceinIndia, the League fared badly in the 1946 elections. It won a mere seventeen seats to the Congress'sthirtyoutofatotaloffiftyseats.DrKhanSahibformedhisgovernment which was to last till only a few days after Independence. By 1947 events outside theNWFP altered the local political landscape. The massacres of Muslims in Bombay, Biharand Calcutta swung the public mood away from the idea of inclusion with India. With Punjab's decision for Pakistan becoming a foregone conclusion, the geographical 'disconnection' made the concept of inclusion even more remote for the province's Congress.Acceptingthenew realities,thesudden demand forPakhtunistanmadeat BannubyAbdulGhaffarKhancanbeseenasalogicalconclusionoftheFrontier Congress'earlierchampioningofPathaninterestsandculture.Itwasmade,however, only three weeks before the referendum in which the Frontier Congress saw their defeat pre-ordained.TheBritishGovernor,SirOlafCaroe,hadearlierfearedatotaloutbreak ofviolence,andhadpressedDelhifornewelections.

InApril1947MountbattenhadtouredNWFPtoseetheproblemforhimself.Hehad soondecideduponareferendumtodeterminetheprovince'sfuture.Fearinga

precedentfortheBalkanizationofIndia,theBritishrefusedtoofferareferendum containingthethirdoptionofPakhtunistan.Theproposedreferendumwouldonlyoffertwochoices:inclusionwithPakistanorinclusionwithIndia.Inspiteofrealizing thehopelessnessofitssituation,theFrontierCongressadamantlyinsistedon demandingtheoptionofPakhtunistan.FacedwithMountbatten'stwooption referendum,theNWFPCongressgovernmentorderedaboycott.Despitetheboycott, the ninety-nine percentsupportgiventoPakistaninthe referendumterminally weakenedDrKhanSahib'sgovernment.AtthetimeofIndependencetheNWFPMuslimLeaguehadcomeunderthenewleadershipoftheturncoatAbdulQayum Khan(whohad beenDeputy Leaderof the CongressintheCentralAssembly until he desertedhispartyjustdaysbeforetheannouncementofthe1946elections).Hehad alreadybegunimplementingschemesthroughwhichheplannedtooverthrowhis former colleagues in government.

BalochistanwasthemostpoliticallybackwardpartofMuslimIndia.Itwasstilldivided in three distinct areas (British Balochistan, Kalat and the Marri-Bugti Tribal Area) andruledbytheAgenttotheGovernor-General,morecommonlyreferredtoastheAGG. The Muslim League was largely a one-man band consisting of a non-practicing Quetta lawyer, Qazi Isa. Isa made it abundantly clear that though he believed in the League's platform,he wouldnot abide the presenceofany otherparty office holderotherthan those appointed by himself. He wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan telling him that if other office holderswereappointed,he'...wouldatoncecreateanOpposition,whichwouldnotbe an opposition to the cause, but to the personage so appointed'.68Despite Isa producing a twenty-five page Constitution for the Balochistan League, it remained a paperorganization. Objections were made to the fact that not only almost all the members of Provincial League Council came from just Quetta, but also that they were all Isa's hand- pickednominees-includedamongthemwereUsmanJogezaiandthebrothers,Nabi BukshandQadirBukshZehri, whowere localthekadarsorcontractors.Asaresultofan All-India Muslim League Committee's tour of NWFP which revealed a total state of dissatisfaction with the provincial party's affairs, Qazi Isa managed to get himselfentrustedwiththejobofoverhaulingtheNWFPLeagueorganization.Hisactivitiesin theNWFPsoonledtowidespreadcriticismbysomeoftheLeaguersintheprovince. Onememberwentevensofarastosuggestthat'QaziIsawasmisleadingMr.Jinnah aboutthestrengthoftheLeagueandhadhardlystirredfromtheluxuryofDean'sHotel inPeshawarwhenhewassupposedtobeorganizingtheLeague'.69Eventuallyfaced withseriousdiscontentmentagainsthimfromhisownprovince,Isawasforcedto waivehisclaimtobeBaluchistan'sLeaguerepresentativebythetimeofthe1946 Cabinet Mission Plan. Despite attempts to prove to the contrary, at the time of Partition BalochistancontinuedtobedominatedbytribalallegianceswhichespousedBalochand

68Qazi Muhammad Isa to Liaquat Ali Khan, 16 June 1939, Balochistan Muslim League 1939-44, Vol. 293,Freedom Movement Archives, Karachi University, cited in Ian Talbot,op. cit.,p. 118.

69Ghulam Rab Khan to Jinnah. 29 August 1945, Shamsul Hasan Collections NWFP, 1:58, cited in Ian Talbot,ibid., p.15.

PashtoonnationalismasopposedtoanIndianorPakistanione.Atthetimeof Pakistan's creation in Balochistan. theLeaguewith the exception of Quetta,was largelynonexistent.

In Bengal the Muslim League's results in the 1937 elections were superior to any other Muslim majority area. It won thirty-nine seats. Though Congress remained the singlelargestparty,theLeaguesuccessfullyformedacoalitiongovernmentunderFazlulHaq of the Krishak Praja Party (which had won thirty-six seats) and some of the forty-two independentMuslimmembers.Thecoalitionlastedtill1941whenFazlulHaqbroke awayandformedanewcoalitiongovernmentwiththesupportofHinduelementsin the House. By 1943, the Muslim League strengthened by desertions from other parties, managed to form a government under Khwaja Nazimuddin. Despite intense politicalrivalrybetweenNazimuddinandSuhrawardy,theBengalLeaguetriumphedinthe 1946provincialelectionswinning115oftheMuslimseats,receivingninety-fivepercent of the urban vote and eighty-four percent of the rural vote. The Bengali Muslims were briefly unified under the banner of the Muslim League on the eve of Partition before the Leagueitselfsplitintotwo.Suhrawardyheadedthe'unionists'whoworkedtobring about a united independent Bengal, and opposed the 'divisionists' who believed in itspartition.

AfterPartitiontheMuslimLeaguenowfacedthedauntingrealityofhavinglittle genuinesupportinthepoliticalleadershipofthewesternprovinceswhichmadeupthe newstate.The firststepinthatdirectionwasmade byMr.Jinnaheightdaysafter assuming office asthe Governor-Generalofthe newnation.He dismissedDrKhan Sahib's government in the NWFP. At the time of the referendum in the NWFP, Dr Khan SahibhadpromisedtoresignifthereferendumwentinfavourofPakistan.Whenthe referendumhadgoneoverwhelminglyforNWFP'sinclusionwithPakistan,DrKhan Sahibwentbackonhisword.Mr.JinnahhadthenrequestedtheViceroytodismiss Khan Sahib'sCongressgovernment, but Mountbatten found itdifficulttogoagainstthe wishesoftheIndianCongress.Clearly,ontheformationofPakistan,Mr.JinnahwasleftwithlittlechoicebuttoinsistthatDrKhanSahibkeeptohiswordhowever unwillingly.Unfortunatelythemanchosentoleadthenewgovernmentwasnone other than the turncoat Abdul Qayum Khan who had until recently been a 'loyal'Congressite. Qayum further betrayed his previous party by arranging the desertion of seven Khudai Khidmatgar members of the provincial assembly to the NWFP Muslim League(thereby belyingtheKhudaiKhidmatgar'sproudclaimtoprincipledpolitics).Thisincident undoubtedlyrevealsthatpoliticalturncoats(earlyexamplesofthecurrentlotas)werea popularcommodityeven during theshortperiod whenMr.Jinnahwas atthehelm of our country's affairs.

Provincialpoliticaluncertaintiescontinuedtoprevail.Itwouldbenaivetobelievethat atthatmomentousjunctureofournation'shistory,thenaturalexpedienttemperament ofourpoliticianswouldcease,albeitbriefly,inreverenceoftheoccasion.Withthe

honorableexceptionofourfoundingfatherMr.Jinnah,andperhapsahandfulofhis acolytes,thepoliticiansofthenewPakistanhadsettheireyesontheirpersonal agendas. The new central government based at Karachi was very quickly at odds with manyoftheprovincialleaderships.InSindhwithinsevenmonthsamajorrowbroke outbetweentheMuslimLeaguechiefminister,Khuro,andtheGovernor,Ghulam HussainHidayatullah,overtheallocationofprovincialministries.WithMr.Jinnah's blessingKhurowasdismissed.70PirIllahiBukshwasmadechief ministerbutonlyafter hepledgedloyaltytothecentre.ThispoliticalconflictbetweentheMuslimLeague leadership at the Centre and the provincial politicians continued to bedevil the politics of the day until eventually the League itself was eclipsed by a new force.

The death of Mr. Jinnah was to prove to be a near fatal blowfor the Muslim League and agreatlosstothenationasawhole.DeprivedofhispersontheLeagueprovedtobe less than a sum of its parts, though it managed to stumble along for another few years undertheleadershipofLiaquatAliKhan.InEastPakistantheMuslimLeaguesoonsplit into two when the Central Government insisted on appointing Nurul Amin as the chiefminister.ThedisenchantedmembersbrokeawayandjoinedSuhrawardy's AwamiLeague.EarlierevenMr.JinnahhadmisreadthefeelingsoftheBengaliMuslims by declaring Urdu as the official language of the new nation.

InPunjabMamdot'sgovernmenthadbecomerivenwithinternalrivalries.Shaukat Hayat and Daultana, both ministers, had threatened to resign amidst complaints againstthe chief minister. Mr. Jinnah summoned the three to Karachi to patch up their quarrels.Ten days after their return to Lahore they were openly bickering again. They were re- summonedto Karachibut to no avail.DaultanaandHayat bothresigned inMay 1948. After Mr. Jinnah's death the rivalry flared up again. This time the Centre supported Daultana.LiaquatAliKhanvisitedLahoreandprevaileduponMamdottomakepeace with Daultana and accommodate him in his Cabinet. Soon after the Prime Minister's departure,Mamdotwaspersuadedbyhisadviserstochangehismind.Heditheredfor amonthbeforegoingtoKarachiinOctober1948whereheinformedLiaquatAliKhan of his refusal to take Daultana. Enraged, Daultana went onthe warpath, and within amonth he arranged, with the Centre's help, to get himself elected as president of the Provincial League. He immediately began efforts to have Mamdot dismissed from chief ministership. The political war led to near administrative anarchy as the members of the PunjabAssemblybecameawareoftheirnewlyfoundimportance.

InthemorningtwoorthreeMLAswouldgangupandmeet[Mamdot]to demandthetransferofsomedeputycommissionerorsomedistrict superintendentofpolicetheydislikedandifMamdotrefusedtheywould

70In April 1948 the differences among the Sindh Cabinet became a scandal Mr. Jinnah requested a report from Governor Hidayatullah on the situation and then gave Khuro an opportunity to reply to the charges made against him. Not satisfied with Khuro’s answers, he directed the governor to dismiss Khuro and appoint a tribunal to investigate charges made again him.

threaten to leave him and join the rival camp. This would be followed by a telegraphic transfer order. In the evening, four or five other MLAs would catch [Mamdot] and ask him to cancel the transfer orders, also threatening to join the other side if he refused. Then orders cancelling the transfer would be issued. This createdachaoticsituation.Whenthechiefsecretaryprotested,[Mamdot's] friendsadvisedhimtotransferthechiefsecretaryashewasDaultana'sman.71

InthemeantimeGovernorMudiehadbecometotallydisenchantedwithMamdot's ministry and demanded its dismissal.72

InJanuary1949,LiaquatAliKhanusedtheservicesofthenewGovernor-General, KhwajaNazimuddin,andgottheGovernorofPunjabtodissolvethePunjablegislature and take over the reigns of power. This was seen in Punjab as an attempt by the Urdu- speaking refugee politicians to weaken Punjab as a political force. This was further exacerbatedbyafeelingthatthegovernmentatKarachiwasreluctanttopromote Punjabi civil servants or offer them key postings within the central government andcentral civil service. This general swell of ill feeling in the Punjab led to even Mamdot'srival,Daultana,condemningtheCentralgovernment'sinterventioninPunjabipolitics.It was this building of hatred for the Centre which would create serious problems for Liaquat Ali Khan.

ThetruetragedylayinthefactthattheleadershipoftheoriginalMuslimLeaguehad nopoliticalbaseinwhatbecamePakistan.TheywereUrdu-speakersandhadcometo the new country as refugees. Mr. Jinnah's death had to a large extent politically isolated them.EvenpowerfulindividualssuchasLiaquatAliKhanhadnopoliticalsupporton the ground, nor did they have constituencies from which they could get themselves re- elected.Facedwithhostileprovincestheychosetoexercisepowerthroughthe Executive. Under the Government of India Act 1935, powers were heavily weighted infavoroftheCentralgovernment.TheActalsogavetheGovernor-Generalspecial powers to enforce the will of the Centre. These powers were of course meant to be exercised only as a means of last resort in exceptional circumstances. Unfortunately that wasnotthecaseinourearlyhistory,andthesepowerswereusedonlytoofrequently. Thebasicsofdemocracyinthenewnationwereignoredforthesimpleexpedienceof self-preservation. Governor's rule in a province meant rule by the bureaucracy. This remedy was resorted to even where elections or inter-play of party politics to resolve a crisiswouldhavebeenthepropercourseinthedemocratictradition.Withthepassage oftime,deprivedofmoralsupportwhichcomesfromdirectelections,theMuslim Leaguehighcommandbegantoloseitsrepresentativestatusanditsclaimtosupport from the masses.

71SyedNurAhmed.FromMartialLawtoMartialLaw,Vanguard,1985,p.299.

72Mamdot had been accused of disposing of the abandoned property of Hindus and Sikhs (who had fled to India) on the corrupt basis of politic patronage.

The weakness of thecentral government wasfurther reflected in the factthatPakistan continued to be bereft of a Constitution. In comparison, the Indians had prepared their ConstitutionbyNovember1949,andpromulgateditearlyinthefollowingyear.The enactmentofthePublicRepresentativeOfficersDisqualificationActof1949(PRODA) tosubdueandpunishrecalcitrantpoliticians, wasareflectionofthegeneraldisregard towards the notions of a democratic state. Sadly, Liaquat Ali Khan continued to equate the MuslimLeague withthe nation.Itmighthave servedhimwellduring the pre- Independencedays,butafailuretotolerateandappreciatetheroleoftheOppositionat such an early stage of our nationhood was afateful error. He further compounded the errorbyremainingthePresidentoftheMuslimLeaguedespiteholdingtheofficeof primeminister.Thisdualchargestemmedfromhisownpoliticalinsecurities.Itseta badprecedentforthe power-obsessedleadersthatfollowed.These are mistakesfor which we continue to pay to this very day.

The heavy reliance by the Executive on the central bureaucracy could not help butpoliticize the bureaucrats. The ensuing power struggles between the Centre and the provincesdeeplydamagedthedevelopmentofaproperpoliticalprocess.AstheLeaguebegantoloseitsholdovertheaffairsofthecountry,thebureaucracyandthe army - more disciplined and organized bodies - began asserting their power. Soon a complexinterplayofpoliticians,bureaucratsandgeneralsbegantotakehold.The elected representatives were by tradition answerable to Parliament. The real power now begantorestwiththestateandarmyofficialswhowerenotaccountabletoanyone. These state of affairs directly led to the eventual rise of unscrupulous bureaucrats like GhulamMuhammadandIskanderMirza,andambitiousgeneralssuchasAyubKhan. So,asearlyasLiaquatAliKhan'stime,democracyhadbeendoomedinPakistan.

Liaquat Ali Khan paid a tragic price for his follies when he was assassinated in October 1951. The fact that the alleged assassin was accompanied by his young son when he was saidtohavecommittedthecrime,rousedmanyasuspicion.Hissubsequentdeathat the hands of a policeman (who was later promoted) moments after the assassination,addedfurtherfueltochargeofconspiracy.Itwasacommonlyheldbeliefatthattime that Liaquat Ali Khan's murder had been schemed by a coterie of senior Punjabi bureaucratsledbyGhulamMuhammad,whohadbeenthefinanceministerinLiaquat Ali Khan's Cabinet.

WithintheMuslimLeaguethere had beenseriousinter-wing differences. InLiaquatAli Khan'sCabinetitselfthesedifferenceshadledtotheemergenceoftwogroups.The Punjab group was represented by Ghulam Muhammad, and the East Pakistan group by Fazal-ur-Rehman.AfterLiaquatAliKhan'sdeath,accordingtoYusufHaroon,Sirdar AbdurRabNishtar,whowasconsideredby manytobethelegitimateheirtoLiaquat Ali Khan, had already beenchosentobecome theprimeminister by theMuslimLeague highcommand.NishtarwasfearedforhisindependenceandforcefulnessbythePunjab group,andaconspiracywasquicklyenteredintothwartthismove.ThePunjab

groupplacatedtheEastPakistangroupbyagreeingtoanarrangementbywhicha Punjabiwouldbecomegovernor-generalandaBengali,theprimeminister.Thegentle butineffectiveNazimuddinwasmadetostepdownandbecometheprimeminister, andtheMachiavellianbureaucratGhulamMuhammad,wasmadethegovernor-general.Theseconspiratorialchangesinthehighcommandsetadangeroustrendfor thefuture.The normalprinciples ofsuccessionwereignoredandParliament was rendered irrelevant in these important matters. The precedent that was created was that powerful groups could impose their will on a hapless country and avoid all proper constitutional procedure in doing so.

TheConstituentAssemblywasmadeupofmemberselectedindirectlyin1947bythe membersofthepre-Independenceprovincialassemblies.Therewasinessenceonlyone partyintheAssembly,theMuslimLeague.Theonlyoppositionthereforecamefrom within, intheshapeof differentgroups.East Pakistan,whichhada largerpopulation, demandedthisrealitybereflected inademocraticsystem.Punjab,whichhadbynow begunitsdominanceintheWestandwasheavilyrepresentedinthearmedservices and the bureaucracy, feared this democratic logic which would involve a sharing of its authorityandprivileges.Thegrowingbusinessclasses,largelythenbasedinKarachi, were also fearful of Bengali economic control and future dominance.Notsurprisingly, this conflict came to predominate the affairs of the Constituent Assembly.

In 1949 the Bengal Muslim League had adopted a resolution demanding full provincial autonomyinallmattersexceptdefenceandforeignaffairs.IntheConstituentAssembly the Bengali group was in a dominant position, having thirty-three out of sixty Muslim Leaguemembers.TheopposinggrouphaditsmainstrengthinGhulamMuhammad, whointurnreliedonthepowerofthearmyandthefullsupportofthebureaucracy. Eventuallythevestedinterestsofthebureaucratic-militarycomplex,aidedby compliantpoliticians,wouldsucceedinimposingitsview.Theintegrationofthe provincesofWestPakistanintoOneUnit,andtheforciblecreationofparitywiththe easternwing,wasitsfavoredsolution.Thus,theleadingroleofthepoliticianended withLiaquatAliKhan'sdeath.Afterhimbegantheperiodoftheascendant bureaucracy,whichwouldlastuntilOctober1958whenthemilitaryseizedcontrolfrom its partner in complicity.

InJanuary1951thefirstPakistanicommander-in-chiefofthearmywasselected;hewas GeneralMuhammadAyubKhan,Twomoreseniorofficerswhohadbeentippedforthatpositionhadunluckilydiedinaplanecrashin1949.FromtheonsetAyubKhan viewedpoliticianswithcontempt,andwillinglyenteredintoanalliancewiththecivil bureaucracy based upon mutual convenience. Within two months of attaining his new office, he was responsible for crushing what later came to be known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy.Itwasanattemptbyseniormilitaryofficers -thefirstinaseriesof many whichweretofollowwhobelieved intheir own'superiorabilities'andtheirapparent right to overthrow an elected government and rule in its stead.

Withthepoliticiansbeingpushedintothebackgroundbyruleofthebureaucracyunder GhulamMuhammad, the country wassubjected tonew levelsof political chicanery and degeneracy.Politicalinfighting andintrigue continuedtodominatethe western provinceswhileBengalfulminatedvociferouslyagainstwhatitbelievedwasan attemptbytheCentretosubordinateitsmajoritypopulationtothewillofWest Pakistan.Inthenextfouryears,threefurtherprovincialgovernmentswouldbe dismissedby the Centre: twobyimpositionsof governor rule and onedismissedby the imposition of martial law.

In Punjab the Centre administered the province after theimposition of Governor's rule foratwenty-seven-monthperioduntilMarch1951,whenanewgovernmentwas formed as a result of provincial elections. By this time a number of League leaders had lefttheparty.By1950MamdothadlaunchedhisJinnahLeague.OtherssuchasMian IftikharuddinandShaukatHayat^73hadformedtheAzadPakistanParty.ThePunjab MuslimLeague,nowheaded by Daultana,proposedinitsmanifestosweeping radical reformsfavoringtheruraldowntroddenagainstthemightoftheentrenched zamindars.TheOpposition,whichwasanuneasyalliancebetweenMamdot'sJinnah League,Suhrawardy'sAwamiLeagueandMaulanaMaudoodi'sJamaati-Islamiwere unable to agree to counter theLeague's manifesto with an imaginative and convincing programme.Daultana'spoliticalexpediencycametotheforewhenthemajorityofparty ticketswereissuedtomembersofthelandedgentry-theverypeoplehisruralreforms weremeanttobetargeting.Outof191seats,theMuslimLeaguecaptured140on electionnight,lateritsnumberswere increasedto153asanumberofindependent membershurriedlyjoinedthenewgovernment.Amidstsuspicionsoffraud,the League'sresoundingsuccessplacedDaultanainastrongposition.HisCabinet consistedwhollyoflandlordswithoneexceptionwhowasthoughttobeanonentity. The radical rural reforms were now, not surprisingly, completely watered down.

Despite the timidness of the Punjab government's eventual rural reforms, thezamindarscontinued to bitterly oppose them. Their resistance led to a partial withholding of wheat fromtheurbanareas.Facedwithwheatshortages,andcombinedwithagrowing acrimonytowardstheCentre-foritssupposedbiasagainstPunjabis-theurbanclasses ofthePunjabwerebecomingincreasinglyresentful.Usingthis opportunityto emerge from their post-Partition political obscurity, the Ahrarsa - a religious group which until recentlyhadopposedthecreationofPakistanandreviledMr.Jinnahasthe'Kafir-i- Azam' - staged a political come-back. Their demand to declare the Ahmedis as non-Muslims had proven appeal to the religious orthodoxies of the people and soon gained widespreadsupport.TheAhrarsmembershipwassaidbysometobenomorethan 1064^74buttheirimmenseimpactsupportstheviewthatDaultanaalsoencouragedthe

73ShaukatHayatKhanwastoreturntotheMuslimLeagueafewyearlater.

74AyeshaJalal,TheStateofMartialRule,VanguardBooks,1990,p.citingTheMunirReport,p.52.

movement, using it to browbeat the Centre to submit to Punjab's economic and constitutional demands. In July 1952 the Punjab League passed a resolution firmly supportingtheanti-Ahmedimovementbyavoteof264to8.InFebruary1953the Centre decided to arrest the prominent leaders of the Ahrar movement, a move which causedPunjabtogoupinflames.EncouragedbythePunjabgovernment,whowished toweakenthecentralgovernment,theorthodoxfuryspreadtoKarachiandotherparts of the country. Angered crowds vented their rage at Ahmedis in places as far distant as Quetta.InMarch1953martiallawwasdeclaredinLahoreunderthecommandof GeneralAzamwhichbroughtabouttheendofDaultana'sgovernment.FerozKhan Noonwasappointedasthenew chief minister.

InBengaltheCentre'sinsistenceonappointingNurulAminaschiefministerhad alreadysplittheBengali League. Further mistrustof the Centre had ledtoa unanimous feeling amongallpoliticalparties(includingtheBengaliMuslimLeague)thatWest Pakistanwishedtodominatetheirprovince.Crowdshadbeguntogravitatetopublic meetingsheldbyOppositionleaderssuchasSuhrawardy andMaulanaBashani.In January1952NazimuddinvisitedDhakaasprimeministeranddeclaredatameeting thatUrduwouldbethenationallanguage.Hisstatementwasmetwithwidespread protestsculminatinginacallforageneralstrikeon21February.Thegovernment declaredabanonpublicmeetingandprocessions.Onthedayofthestrikethepolice openedfire onsome demonstratorskilling fourstudents.Forthe sake ofself- preservation,theprovincialMuslimLeaguepassedaresolutionwithintwenty-four hoursoftheincident,requestingtheConstituentAssemblytodeclareBengaliastate language.Ithadlittleeffect.Whenelectionswereheld,theLeaguewastrounced.It managed to win only 10 seats in a house of 309; even its leader Nurul Amin suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of a student leader. The United Front Party, which had triumphedbywinning223seats,formedagovernmentunderFazlulHaqon3April 1954. Fazlul Haq was soon accused of advocating secessionism and failing to maintain lawandorder.Industrialdisorderhadspreadthroughtheprovinceandariothad taken place at a jute mill in which 400 people had been killed. In less than two months oftakingpower,FazlulHaq'sgovernmentwasdismissedandgovernor'srulewas imposedinBengal.Thenewgovernorwasnoneotherthanthefederaldefence secretary, Iskander Mirza.

Unlikeotherprovinces,politicsinSindhcontinuedtobelittlemorethanapower strugglebetweenrivalpoliticalpersonalitiesandtheirfactions.Duringthisperiod Khuro,despitehisdismissalfromchiefministership,hademergedasthemostpowerful andruthlesslycunningofallSindhipoliticians(until,ofcourse,thesubsequent emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto). In deciding an election petition against an assembly member^75the court,inJanuary 1949,disqualifiedboththe memberandhiselection agent. The election agent was none other than Chief Minister Pir Illahi Buksh, who not

75QaziMuhammadAkbarwhohaddefeatedG.M.Syedinthe1946.

only had to suddenly leave the Assembly, but also had to vacate his chief ministership. Khuro-whocouldnotcontesthimselfduetothecasesregisteredagainsthim-put YusufHaroonforwardforthe job.AsHaroonwasnotamemberoftheProvincial Assembly,Khuroarrangedforhimtogetelectedintheby-electioninSukkur.Hegot Haroonappointedaschiefminister,ensuringthatthreeofhisnomineesweremadeministers.

ThespecialtribunalfoundKhuroguiltyandbarredhimfromholdinggovernmentoffice for three years. Shortly after, in the second case, the court awarded him apunishment of two years in jail. Khuro filed his appeal against the sentence of imprisonmentandmanagedtowinit.Hesoonreassumedhispresidentshipofthe Leaguewhichhadbeenkeptinabeyancebyarrangement.Thiswasfollowedbya nakedattempttodominatethegovernmentbytheuseofregularinstructionssentto ChiefMinisterYusufHaroon.76Resentfulofthisstateofaffairs,inNovember1949 HaroonshuffledhisCabinetbydismissingallthreeofKhuro'smen.Angeredbythe chiefminister'saction,Khuroengineeredavoteofno-confidencewhichHaroon realizedhewouldlose.Haroonquicklycapitulated,andafterconsultingKhuroformed anewCabinetwhichincludedthreeofKhuro'smen.

Within a few months the Sindh Chief Court (now known as the Sindh High Court) held thatthespecialtribunalwhichhadbarredKhurofromholdingofficewas unconstitutional.Soonafter,Khurojubilantlyre-enteredtheAssembly.ChiefMinister Haroon faced reality by tendering his resignation and accepting a diplomatic post, that of high commissioner to Australia. In May 1950, Haroon had been replaced by Khuro's aide,QaziFazlullah.ByMarch1951Khurowasdirectlyinpowerhavingreplacedhis aideFazlullah,whereheskillfullyopposedallmovestoimplementtheruraltenancy reform bill.He also beganintriguing against aSindhirival inthe central Cabinet, Abdus SattarPirzada,theministerforfood.Butverysoonhefoundhimselffacingarevolt encouragedbyPirzada,withinhisownCabinet.Three ministers,includinghis erstwhileaideQaziFazlullah,helpedinstigatesomesixtychargesunderPRODAagainsthim.Khuroretaliatedbybringingsimilarchargesagainsthisopponents.The affairsoftheSindhMuslimLeaguehadnowdegeneratedintochaosasthepartyhad splitintotwofeudingfactions.On29December1951governor'srulewasimposedin Sindh,andKhurowasdismissedaschiefministerforthesecondtimeinthreeyears. EventuallyattheendoftheCentre'sdirectrulein1953,AbdusSattarPirzadawasmade chiefminister.ButwithinayearPirzada'soppositiontothepowerTroika's(Ghulam Muhammad,AyubKhan,IskanderMirza)OneUnitschemeledtohisdismissal.77In

76With Liaquat Ali Khan’s backing, Haroon was making a doomed attempts at introducing agrarian reforms against the wishes of the majority landowning members of the Assembly.

77Abdus Sattar Pirzada did not stay loyal to his anti-One Unitprinciples very long. In May 1956, in the midst of the Muslim League’s struggle survival against the newly formed pro-One Unit Republican Party, Pirzada ditched his League colleagues overnight and accepted a ministership offered to him in the new Republican Party government formed under Dr. Khan Sahib’s chief ministership.

November 1954 the wily Khuro was once more back in as chief minister, with Ghulam MuhammadhavingdismissedthependingchargesofdisqualificationunderPRODA againsthim.HecontinuedinhispostuntiltheestablishmentofOneUnitinWestPakistan.

IntheNWFPtheCentrewastotallyoutwittedbyAbdulQayumKhan.TheMuslim Leaguehighcommand,anditsbureaucraticsuccessor,whichdominatedprovincial politics playing the role of a powerful broker between warring provincial factions, was rendered ineffective. After becoming chief minister in 1947 at Mr. Jinnah's intercession, QayumKhanbeganto ruthlesslysuppressall oppositionheencountered.He broke the gripthattheCongresshadoverthePathansandsoonestablishedhimselfasthe supreme overlord of NWFP. In total command, Qayum was able to introduce agrarian reforms.Heabolishedjagirs,builtroadsandschools,andfundedprojectssuchas hydro-electric works and a new Peshawar University. His critics maintained that his policieswereintendedtoconsolidatehisownpersonalposition,whichwasprobably true.HehadmadetheLeagueirrelevantinNWFPpolitics.Inthe1951electionsthe Centretriedtofightback.TheCentre'sproxieswereKhanMuhammadIbrahimof Jhagra, a member of the central League's working committee and secretary of its parliamentary board, and Yusuf Khattak, the general secretary of the Pakistan Muslim League., But Qayum Khan outfoxed them in this battle between the local and central Leagues. As head of the provincial parliamentary board, he rejected all applications for party tickets from the Jhagra-Khattak faction. A strong protest led to an appeal to the central parliamentary board which led to the reinstatement of eighteen candidates. With the provincial government's machinery at his command, Qayum set up his own men to oppose these candidates as independents. Sensing defeat all the eighteen Leaguecandidates withdrew from the

fight, along with over one hundred other candidates. Not surprisingly Qayum and his menrompedin,officiallywinningseventy-sixofatotalofeighty-fiveseats.Afurther four independents and a solitary non-Muslim joined up with them soon after. Qayum's positionwasunassailable,andtherewaslittletheCentrecoulddoaboutit.He remainedthechiefministeruntil1953whenGhulamMuhammaddismissed Nazimuddin from the prime ministership. Fearing that Qayum Khan might support the oustedprimeminister,thegovernor-generalmadehimamemberofthecentralCabinet. ItwasanofferQayumKhancouldnotresistashehadambitionsofbecomingprime minister.Hewassucceeded byhisnominee SardarAbdulRashid (aformer inspector- generalofpoliceofNWFP),andtheCentrefinallymanagedtogaincontrolofNWFP politics.In1955,despiteinstructionsfromtheCentretowinsupportfortheOneUnitin theProvincialAssembly,RashidKhanfailed.TheNWFPLeaguemembersinthe Assembly unanimously voted against the One Unit. He was abruptly dismissed by the KarachigovernmentandSardarBahadurKhan,GeneralAyub'sbrother,wasbroughtin as replacement.

At the Centre, Khwaja Nazimuddin lasted as prime minister for only eighteen months. Duringhistenurehefacedseveralcrises.Hehadmanagedtosurvivetheproblems caused by a serious food shortage within thecountry inthe summer of 1952, followed byfinancialcrisisasaresultofaseveredepletionofforeignexchangereserves,andhad evenseenthroughtheviolentchaosoftheanti-Ahmedirioting.Intheendhis opponentsinthebureaucratic-militaryallianceprovedtoostrongforhim.Atameeting held in Karachi the prime minister met with verbal abuse at the hands of General Ayub Khanandseniorcivilservantsinthepresenceofthegovernor-general.78InApril1953 supportedbyAyubKhanandthedefencesecretary,IskanderMirza,thegovernor- generalorderedNazimuddintoresign.Herefusedtodosoandwastherefore dismissed.ThefactthatNazimuddincommandedamajorityintheLegislature-the budgethadrecentlybeenpassed-wastreatedwitharrogantcontemptthatmockedthe basicprinciplesofdemocraticgovernmentandParliament.Thedismissalalso demolishedthewell-establishedtraditionofimpartialityonpartofthegovernor- general.ThefactthatNazimuddin'sundemocraticallyselectedsuccessor(Muhammad AliBograwhowasthenambassadortotheUnitedStates)soonobtainedamajorityvote intheAssembly,spokelittlefortheintegrityofthemajorityofthelegislatorswhoso quicklyreversedtheirpositions.Also,AyubKhan'sroleinthiseventsignaledthe openly forceful entry of the army into interfering with democratic politics. It was a sad day for Pakistan.

Afederal constitutionwithaBengali majorityinthelegislaturewasananathematothe bureaucratic-militaryestablishment.Thisputthemonacollisioncoursewiththe legislature.RequiringaquiescentreplacementforNazimuddintheyselectedacivil servant for the job. Muhammad AliBogra was summoned from the US and made prime ministerandalsopresidentoftheMuslimLeague.Noticeably,Bogra,wasnotchosenbythepeoplenordidherepresentanypoliticalparty,butwasthepersonalchoiceof Governor-GeneralGhulamMuhammad.Thenewmanwassoonfacedwiththeimmensetaskofdealingwiththeloomingconstitutionaldeadlock.Thedrubbingthat theMuslimLeaguetookintheMarch1954EastBengalprovincialelectionsbuffetedthe Centre, and theproposal tointegrateall theprovincesinthewesternwing intoa single administrativedivision-theconceptofOneUnit-soonbegantotakeshape.In September1954,despitethesupportofalargenumberofthePunjabicontingent,the MuslimLeague'sConstituentAssemblymembersvotedoverwhelminglyagainstthe proposal calling for the unification of West Pakistan.

TheConstituentAssemblyseemedtobrushofflastminuteattemptsbyGhulam Muhammad'sproxies,suchasFerozKhanNoon,todelaytheaccordthatwasbeing reached on the new constitution. Faced with the end to his monopoly of power, it was rumoredthatthegovernor-generalwasintendingtofilePRODAchargesagainst

78AyeshaJalal,TheStateofMartialRule,op.cit.,1990,p.178.

twenty-twoAssemblymembers.79Ithasevenbeensuggestedthat'theclimaxwas reached when the governor-general hinted to the Prime Minister himself that he could become a victim ofPRODA'.80The Assemblyresponded,on 20 September,by repealing the Public and Representative Officers (Disqualification) Act (PRODA), leaving pending charges under the Act unaffected.81The following day the Assembly further curtailed GhulamMuhammad'spowersbyamendingtheGovernmentofIndiaActtopreclude thegovernor-generalfromactingexceptontheadviceofhisministers(aswasthe practice in other Commonwealth dominions). Further, not only was the Cabinet made collectivelyresponsibleto theAssembly,allministers wereto be members of the Assemblyatthetimeoftheirselectionandcouldonlycontinuetoholdtheirofficeso long as they retained the confidence of the legislature. Reacting to these movesDawncarriedboldheadlinesannouncing'ParliamentmadeSupremeBody'.82

On21SeptembertheConstituentAssemblyalsovoteditsapprovalofadraft constitution.TheproposedconstitutionhadadoptedChaudhryMuhammadAli'sformulaforparliamentaryrepresentation.Itprovidedthatthelowerhousewasto consist of three hundred members elected on basis of population, and the upper house wouldconsistoffiftymembersequallydividedamongthefiveunits,whowouldbe elected by the legislatures of the units. East Bengal's majority in the lower house, on the basis of its population, would be balanced by its minority in the upper house.Provisionwas also made for a Prime Minister who was to appoint the other ministers in a Cabinet collectivelyresponsible to Parliament andremain in office onlyso longas theyretained the confidence of parliament. Politically, the most significant aspect of the draftconstitution was the power of the President (as the constitution called for a republic the officeofthegovernor-generalhadundergoneachangeinnomenclature)wasreduced toamerefigurehead.Hecouldonlyactontheadviceofhisministers.83

While all the Assembly members from Punjab had abstained from voting on the draft constitution, within a passage of a few short weeks they had come to realize that theywould have to live with the new constitution.84According to Ayesha Jalal 'the Punjabigroup ... was seen to have lost influence and clearly regarded the blow at the Governor- Generalasablowatitself.85HavingscheduledtheAssembly'svoteontheconstitution for28October,PrimeMinisterBograconfidentlydepartedforadiplomaticmissionto the United States. His trip was cut short when he was recalled to Pakistan by Ghulam Muhammad.WhenBogralandedatKarachiairporthewas,accordingtonewspaper

79AllenMcGrath,TheDestructionofPakistan’sDemocracy,Oxford,Karachi,1996,p.123.

80LeonardBinder,ReligionandPoliticsinPakistan,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1963,p.357.

81WithinweeksGhulam MuhammadwouldpardoninfluentialpoliticasDaultanaandKhuro-chargedunderPRODA simply to enlist their services against the Constituent Assembly and the proposed new constitution.

82Dawn,Karachi,22September1954.

83Section63,DraftConstitutionofPakistan,Confidential,ManageroGovernmentPress,Karachi,1954.

84AllenMcGrath,TheDestructionofPakistan’sDemocracy,op.cit.,p.130.

85AyeshaJalal,TheStateofMartialRule,op.cit.,p.178.

reports, 'met by the largest crowd since those that had greeted the popular Liaquat Ali Khan'.86Bogramanagedtoassurethecheeringcrowdsthatthenewconstitutionwould be in effect by 25 December, before 'he was hustled into a car by a couple of Pakistani generals and taken straight to the governor-general's house'.87The presence of thegenerals provided clear evidence of the army's partisan role in the looming politicalshowdown.

Theretaliationwasswiftincoming.On24OctoberGhulamMuhammadproclaimed that'theconstitutionalmachineryhadbrokendown...[andthe]ConstituentAssembly hadlosttheconfidenceofthepeopleandcannolongerfunction'.88Thegovernor- general had effectively dissolved the Assembly. Later he enforced a ban on all public meetings for a two month period and imposed Press Censorship. The army highcommand's close involvement in dismissal of the Assembly was further evident when troopsweremovedintothecityfromMalirinreadinessforpotentialdisordereven beforeGhulamMuhammad'sproclamationwaspublished.89On28Octoberameetingof the new Cabinet selected by Ghulam Muhammad was convened at the governor- general's place and it was announced that the governor-general-and not Prime Minister Bogra-wouldpreside futureCabinetmeetings.

RetainingBograasthenominalprimeminister,thegovernor-generalappointedaso- called'cabinetoftalent'.Realpowerwascommandedbyonlytwomenamongthem: thearchbureaucrat,IskanderMirzabecametheinteriorminister,andtheCommander- in-Chief of the Army General Ayub Khan, a serving officer, finally came out openly into thepoliticalfieldtobecometheministerfordefence.Neitherofthesemenhadever receivedamandatefromthepublicwhosefuturenowlargelyrestedintheirhands.The foremosttask before thisministrywasthe creation of WestPakistanintoa single unit.

TheOneUnitschemewaspushedthroughtherecalcitrantNWFPandSindhAssembliesbyforceof arbitrary dismissals.Towardsend October 1954theSindhChief MinisterPirzadawasabletoproduceastatementopposingtheOneUnitschemesigned by74outofthe110membersof theSindhAssembly. Hewasabruptly dismissed and replacedbytheCentrebytheeverruthlessAyubKhuro.Withinafortnightthevery sameAssemblycowardlyreverseditself,andpassedaresolutionapprovingtheOne Unitby100votesto4.Havingropedintheservicesofotherself-servingpoliticians suchasDaultanainPunjabandYusufKhattakinNWFP,IskanderMirzaenlistedthe servicesofH. S.Suhrawardy.Suhrawardy,theleader oftheAwamiLeague(whohad previouslyvehementlyopposedtheconceptofpoliticalparitybetweenthetwowings

86Dawn,Karachi,24October1954.

87Acting British High Commissioner J. D. Murray to secretary of state [CRO], 10 December 1954, Dominion Officer Papers, DO135 series/ 5406, PublicRecords office, London(citedin: Ayesha Jalal,The StateMartialRule, op. cit., p. 192, footnote 178).

88Dawn,Karachi,25October1954.

89ActingBritishHighCommissionerJ.D.Murraytosecretaryofstate[CRO],10December1954,op.cit.

asenvisagedbytheOneUnitscheme)wasmadethelawministeratthecentre,thereby ensuring that all opposition to the concept of One Unit was doomed.

Oneman,thegovernor-general,nowcontrolledthegovernment.Hisaccumulationof completepowerwaschallengedbyMaulviTamizuddinKhan,theSpeakerofthe ConstituentAssembly,whofiledapetitionintheHighCourtofSindh(thenChiefCourt)challengingthedismissaloftheAssembly.90Justwhenitseemedthatthe autocrathadwon,ChiefJusticeSirGeorgeConstantineandJusticeBukshMemon delivered a constitutional broadside againstthe governor-general. The judges declared that'the ConstituentAssembly wasaSovereignbody'and thegovernor-general had no powerofanykindtodissolveit.InoneboldstrokeGhulamMuhammad'scouphad beenrenderedillegal.Theworriedgovernor-generalquicklyappealedthedecisionin the Supreme Court (then Federal Court).

Ghulam Muhammad was now determined not to leave anything to chance.Accordingtohisprivatesecretary,whiletheappealwaspendingintheSupremeCourt,Ghulam Muhammad began exchanging coded written messages with Chief Justice Muhammad Munir making it clear to him the result he desired.91On at least one occasion, ignoring alljudicialproprietary,thegovernor-general 'drovetoMunir'sresidenceinhisofficial carwithflagsflyingandescort'.92ThereisastronglyheldbeliefthatMunir'assuredthe Governmentinadvancethathewouldupset...[theSindhHighCourt's]judgmentwhenitwentbeforehim...'.93Whenthepartialchiefjusticeheardthegovernor-general's appealagainsttheHighCourt'sdecisionitwasamostunfortunatedayinthejudicial historyofourcountry.94ItisalsowidelysuspectedthatMunirevenmanipulatedthe compositionofthebenchtosuitthegovernor-general.95Havingalreadymadeuphis mind,Munirresortedtospeciousandincompletelegalreasoningtosupporthis decisionfavoringthegovernor-general'scase.HisprotégésJusticesMuhammadSharif

90Fearing arrest by the police stationed at the courthouse, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan disguised himself as a burka- clad woman to file the petition. Once the police discovered the petition had been filed, they attempted to forcibly recoveritfrom the Registrarwho hadalreadypassed iton.ThisincidentledChief Justice SirGeorgeConstantineto send a warning to the Inspector-General of Police that any further interference would be treated as contempt ofcourt.

91AllenMcGrath,TheDestructionofPakistan’sDemocracy,op.cit.,p.196.

92Ibid.,p.196.

93Dawn,9August1986.(InanarticlebySultanAhmed,theformereditorofthenewspaper).

94Later Chief Justice Munir would endorse Ayub Khan’s seizure of power by introducing the novel ’doctrine of necessity’ to justify it. Many years later it was revealed - in the 1972 Asma Jillani case-that Munir had played a leading role in the drafting of the Laws Order (Continuance in Force) of 1958 which deprived Pakistanis of their fundamental rights. This man, who proved to be a blight on our legal system was, not surprisingly, made Ayub Khan’s first Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs when the 1962 Constitution came into effect. If a man ever right deserved to be tried for contempt of court (for his blatant disrespect for the independence of our judicial system) it was former Chief Justice Munir.

95Justice Shahabuddin, a strong-minded judge whose previous judicial rulings seemed to favor the Assembly’s position on appeal, was unexpectedly sent to temporarily fill the office of Governor of East Bengal, contrary to the established practice of having the local Chief Justice of the High Court fill in for an absent governor.

andS.A.Rehman,asexpected,fell inbehindtosupporthim.96Itwasbelievedbythe Constituent.Assembly'slegalteamthatthe fourthjudge,Justice Akram,aware that Munirheldthemajoritywithhimwasnowinclinednottoopposehim.Intheenditwas left to Justice A. R. Cornelius to make a lone principled stand on a solid foundation of judicial reasoning and legal precedence. When, on 21March 1955, Munir issued the court's majority decision upholding GhulamMuhammad's dismissal of the Constituent Assembly,inthewordsofalegalscholar,'itdevastatedthepoliticalstructureof Pakistan'.97Ithassincebeencalled'...amomentousruling,onefromwhichPakistanhas never fully recovered'.98

ThreeweeksaftermakingthebrazenjudicialdecisionChiefJusticeMunirseemedto have suffered from serious afterthoughts and insisted in a subsequent judgment that his earlier decision had been 'grievously misunderstood'.99Using this new opportunity the judge tried to make up for his past sins by declaring that the governor-general could not makelawandthatheshouldbringinanewconstituentassemblyintoexistenceassoon as possible.

Deprived of theopportunitytonominatetheirownconstituent 'assembly'and doaway withthepoliticalprocess,thetroikadecideduponaneighty-membernewconstituent assembly.Asthenewmembersweretobeindirectlyelectedbytheprovincial assemblies,itwasthereforenecessaryforthetroikatocontroltheseassemblies.In Punjab,ChiefMinisterFerozKhanNoonrefusedtolettheCentre'sPakistanMuslim League'sparliamentaryboardselectthemajorityofthenewrepresentatives.Hewas sacked and replaced by the compliant Abdul Hamid Dasti. Khuro was allowed to crack the whip in Sindh according to the instructions given to him. InNWFPDr. Khan Sahib's oppositionwascheckedbybuyinghimoutwiththepromiseofmakinghimthefirst chiefministerofWestPakistan.Inpartthiswasalsodonetoallaythefearinthe minorityprovincesof domination bythePunjab. Iskander Mirza knew Dr KhanSahib wellfromhisdaysinthe1930sastheDeputyCommissioneratPeshawarwhenthey oftenplayedbridgetogether.BythisacttheCentreeffectivelydisenfranchised BalochistanbyforciblyelectingtheeagerDrKhanSahibfromthesolitaryseatreserved forthatprovince.DespitethisflagrantabuseoftheCentre'sauthority,theMuslim LeaguefailedtosecureamajorityinthenewConstituentAssembly;itwononly twenty-sixseats.Eventhiscosmeticformof'democracy'ledtoinconveniences.Bogra wasreplacedbyChaudhryMuhammadAliandbynowthealmostcompletely incapacitatedGovernor-GeneralGhulamMuhammad,whowasrecoveringfroma stroke,wasfinallyforcedoutandreplacedbyIskanderMirza,whosoonbecamethe President under the new Constitution. The country was now ruled by a 'duumvirate' of Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan.

96AllenMcGrath,TheDestructionofPakistan’sDemocracy,op.cit,p.197.

97Ibid.,p.198.

98AyeshaJalal,inD.A.Low’sConstitutionalHeadsandPoliticalCrisis,Macmillan,London,1988,p.140.

99UsifPatelandtwoothersv.theCrown,P.LD.,1955,F.C.,387.

Notmuchcanbesaidforthe1956Constitutionasitonlylastedfortwoyears.Despite theConstitutionprovidingforaparliamentarysystemwithatitularpresident,itdid littletocurtailwhathadbecomebynowtheestablishedtraditionofdirectintervention by the Head of State. It has been suggested that Iskander Mirza had never outgrown his earlierroleofaPoliticalAgentintheNWFP,histrainingandexperiencehadresulted fromindulgingintheoldBritishFrontierpolicyofplayingonetribeagainstanother.100As a result of the recent elections there was no majority party in the Assembly; the president who had supporters in several parties, could now play one politician against another. This was a period of unprincipled intrigues, opportunism and power-obsessed rivalries. The period saw the inauguration of the new republican party. 'With both [President] Mirza and [Governor of West Pakistan] Gurmani acting as midwives, KhanSahibannouncedthebirthoftheRepublicanParty,amisnomerforacollectionof Leaguedissidentsandothersattractedbythemagneticpullofpowerandpromisesof land grants, route permits, licenses and other such nostrums.'101

During this period Pakistan had five prime ministers. Bogra who was followed byChaudhry Muhammad Ali in August 1955, was himself replaced in September 1956 by Suhrawardy^102(whoreliedonthesupportoftheEstablishment'sRepublicanParty rather than his own Awami League).103Suhrawardy is believed to have embarked on aplantodevelopmutualunderstandingbetweenPunjabandEastPakistantoachieve some sort of political stability before the next elections. As this represented an implied threattoIskanderMirza'spower,hewasdismissedasprimeministerinOctober 1957.104I.I.Chundrigarwasbrieflyprimeministerfortwomonthsbeforehehimself wasreplacedbyFerozKhanNoon.MuchtoIskanderMirza'sdismay,NoonissupposedtohavereachedanunderstandingwithSuhrawardythathewouldbe supportedbyhimforthepostofpresidentafterthenextelections.Thenadirof Iskander Mirza's rule took place in East Pakistan, when during a no-confidence motion therewasaviciousphysicalassaultonthedeputyspeakerwhosubsequentlydiedof hisinjuries.Bythe latterhalfof1958 bothwingsofthecountrywere inpoliticalturmoil. ItisthoughtthatIskanderMirzarealizedthathischancesofremainingpresidentafter thenextelectionslookedbleak,asmostpoliticiansbynowhadonethingincommon:

100K.B.Sayeed,ThePoliticalSystemofPakistan,Oxford,1967.p.89

101AyeshaJalal,TheStateofMartialRule,op.cit.,p.231.

102Suhrawardy, along with twenty Awami League and the Hindu Congress members from East Pakistan, staged a walkout from the Constituent Assembly at the time of the final vote on the 1956 Constitution and declared his party’s disassociation from the Constitution because he claimed East Pakistan was not being given a fair deal and ’due’ autonomy was not guaranteed. Yet some six months later this ’pillar of democracy and advocate of East Pakistani rightshadassumedtheofficeofprimeminister under theverysameConstitutionandevenwentasfar to say that the Constitution guaranteed ’98 percent of Provincial autonomy’, Hassan Askari Rizvi,The Military & Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, (3rd edition) 1986, p. 50.

103HasanAskariRizvi,TheMilitary&PoliticsinPakistan,ibid.,p.54

104K. B. Sayeed,The Political System of Pakistan, Oxford, 1967, p. 91 (Sayeed maintains that this was also why Mushtaq Gurmani was dismissed as Governor of West Pakistan.)

noonewantedIskanderMirzatobere-electedtothepresidency. ByOctober1958the presidentdealtadeathblowtothepoliticiansbydeclaringmartiallawappointing Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator, and abrogating the Constitution.

Withthedeclarationofmartial law,real politicalpowerhad slippedintothehandsof thearmy.WithintwentydaysAyubKhanvalidatedrealitybyoverthrowinghispartner.PresidentMirzawasforcedatpistolpointtoboardanairplanetoEngland.The militarynowruledthe country underthe sole dictatorshipofanambitiousgeneral. AyubKhanhadbeencommander-in-chiefsinceJanuary1951.Histenure,whichhad previouslybeenextendedbyIskanderMirza,wasduetoexpire inJanuary 1959.It wouldnotbeunfairtosuggestthatinseizingpower,despiteAyubKhan'sprotestations tothecontrary,theGeneralwasalsomotivatedbypersonalconsiderations.Itis revealing that Ayub Khan himself stated - during the few days Iskander Mirza was still in power - that he had told Mirza, 'Are you going to act or are you not going to act? It is your responsibility to bring about change,and if you do not, which heavenforbid, we shallforceachange.'105Itisapparentthatthetwomenwerekeentoimplementmartial lawasitsuitedboththeirprivateagendas.IntheendIskanderMirzahadbacked himselfintoacorner,andmartiallawhadplacedallpowerinthehandsofthe commander-in-chief of the army.

***

In 1954 I travelled abroad, this time accompanied by my friend Akbar Bugti. Apart fromthemandatoryvisittoEngland,thistimeIventuredtotheScandinaviancountries.I had previously visited Helsinki for the Summer Olympics of 1952, but this time I alsovisitedSweden,andNorway.IreturnedafewweeksearlierthanAkbar,whohada moreextendedstay.ItwaswhenIwenttotheKarachiAirporttoreceiveAkbarthatI firstmademyacquaintancewithZulfikarAliBhutto.

Atthe airport terminal while I waited for Akbar, I noticed an elderly man being pushed on a wheelchair by a younger man. A few moments later theyounger man walked uptomeandasked if IwasSherbazMazari.WhenIanswered intheaffirmative,he told methathisfather wished tohaveawordwithme.WhenI walked overtotheelderly manheaddressedmeasbetaandintroducedhimselfasShahNawazBhutto,and pointing to the young man who had come over to me, said, 'And this is my son, Zulfi.' I soonlearnt that SirShahNawazBhutto accompanied byhissonwason hiswayabroad fortreatment.TheelderlygentlemaninsistedthatIhavedinnerwithhimoncehe returned.He intimatedthathe hadknownSirBahramKhanMazariandwishedto know me better.

105ThePakistanTimes,October10,1958.

True tohis word, shortly after Shah Nawaz Bhuttoreturned, I received a telephone call fromZulfikarinvitingme overfordinnerathisfather'sbehest.Anditwasatthat dinner thatShahNawazrelated thestory ofhismeeting withtheearlierMazari chiefin 1922.HesaidthemeetingwaspromptedbytheBritishGovernoratBombay-atthe time Sindh was still part of the Bombay Presidency - whom the elder Bhutto had called uponwithregardtosomework.WhentheGovernorlearntthatShahNawazBhutto was on his way to Delhi, he suggested that he meet with Sir Bahram Khan who he said, wouldbe presentatthe imperialcapitalforthe durbarthatwasbeing heldforthe visiting Prince of Wales. The Governor had a high opinion of the elderly Baloch Sirdar andfeltthatBhuttowouldbenefitfrommeetinghim.WhenBhuttoreachedDelhi,he said, it was crowded with camps set up by the various maharajahs, rulers and chiefs of BritishIndia.AftersearchingaroundhefinallyfoundtheMazaricampamongthe multitude of other temporary settlements. At the entrance he noticed a number of men attiredinthesimplewhiteclothesandturbansthatmadeuptheBalochdress.He informed them formally that he wished to pay a call on Nawab Sir Bahram Khan, Chief oftheMazaris.Muchtohissurprise,ashetoldmelater,oneofthemenrepliedin brokenUrdu, 'YouwishtoseeourBahram?'Themanthenled himtothelargesttentin whichhalfadozenturbanedmenweresittingcross-leggedonaPersiancarpet conversing with each other in low voices. One of them, who was sitting in the middle, addressedShahNawazBhuttoas'youngman'andaskedhimtojointhemonthe carpet. Bhutto sat on the carpet rather uncomfortably(he mentionedto me that he had been wearing a rather closely fitted suit fashionable in those days). He soon found out that the simply attired man who had addressed him was the man he had been seeking. WhentheChieflearntthereasonforBhutto'svisithesaidmodestly,I'mBahrain.'Thirty yearslater, ShahNawaz Bhuttoconfidedto methathehadbeentotallyoverwhelmed byBahramKhan.IrecallhimsayingthatatthattimeeveryoneinDelhiwasdressing themselvesinornateuniformsandjewelsinpreparationfortheRoyalVisit.Thesightof a Baloch chief dressed in traditional plain white flowing robes, in total disregard of the localcommotion,madeforaverydignifiedappearance.Bhuttohadexpectedthatatthe veryleastamemberoftheExecutiveCounciloftheCentralLegislatureandPresidentof Punjab's Chief Association, asBahram Khan was, would affect lordly airs, butinstead it provedtobetheopposite.BahramchattedwithBhuttofortwentyminutesorsoand seemedtohaveleftavividimprintintheelderlyBhutto'smemorythatlastedmore thanthreedecades.'Thatisthereason,'hetoldme,'whenIheardsomeonecalloutyour name at the airport, I wanted to meet you.'

ThatwasthefirstoftheseveralmealsIwas tohaveattheBhuttoresidence.IntimeI got toknowZulfikar, or Zulfi as he was thencommonly known, quite well. Indeed, fora number of years we were even very good friends. Zulfi would drop in at my home at regularintervalsinthemornings.Wewerebothavidbookcollectorsandhada youthfulweaknessforfineclothes.OccasionallywewoulddineatLeGourmettogether. Hedidnotseemtohavemany friendsatthattime, andwould oftenconfidein meabouthisambitionsinlife.Thedeathof hiselder brother, ImdadAli, hadlefthimas

heirtohisfather'spoliticallegacy.Hisgreatambitioninthosedayswastobecomea memberoftheSindhProvincialAssemblyinthe1958elections.Hishometownof LarkanawastheninthestrongpoliticalgripoftheSindhipolitician,AyubKhuro,amanZulfikarBhuttohadcometodetest,becomingabusiveattheverymentionof Khuro'sname.AslongasKhurocontrolledLarkana,Bhuttohadlittlechanceof attaining even meager political success.

Bhutto'sobsessivehatredofKhurowasalsolinkedtoanearlierincidentwhich continuedtoranklewithhim.Onedayherelatedtheeventtome.Itappearedthatuponhisreturnfromcompleting hiseducationabroad, hisfather, Sir ShahNawaz, took himtocallonAyubKhuro,chiefministerofSindh,withtheintentionofseekinga positionintheforeignserviceforhisson.KhuromadetheseniorBhuttoandhisson wait outside on the verandah for a lengthyhalf hour. Later when the two were seated withKhuroinhisdrawingroom,AyubKhuroslightedthembydrinkingteawithout offering them any. Swallowing his pride, Sir Shah Nawaz introduced his son to Khuro, andemphasizingonhisdegreesfromBerkeleyandOxford,requestedtheSindhi politicianforajobforhimintheforeignservice.Khurolistenedtotherequestand askedtheelderBhuttotosubmitanapplicationinwritingtohim.Hethendismissed themcursorilywithawaveofhishand.Whilerecountingthestory,Bhuttocouldnot help but sprinkle the entire tale with expletives directed at Khuro. That was the nature ofthemanIwasgettingtoknow.Laterin1972assoonasheachievedpowerasthe Chief Martial Law Administrator, one of his first acts was to humiliate Khuro by having thewallstohishouseatLarkanarazedtotheground.Cowedintosubmission,Ayub KhuroandmembersofhisfamilysoonjoinedBhutto'sPeople'sParty.AtthetimeI recallBhuttogleefullycommenting,'Theso-called ironmanofSindhturnedouttobe no more than a man of straw'.

AttimesBhutto'ssensitivityreachedabsurdlevels.Heoftentookumbrageatthe merest perception of a slight and never forgave or forgot them. Ahmed Nawaz Bugtirelated an incident to me which in his mind had been so minor that he had completely forgotten about it until Bhutto chose to remind him of it in a bizarre fashion. In the mid- fifties Ahmed Nawaz was hosting a table for some foreign ladies at Le Gourmet. ZulfiBhutto, who was present at the restaurant, spotted him and asked if he could join thegroup. Knowing Bhutto's reputation with women, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti declined. Many years later, Bhutto visited Quetta during his days as president to attend a formal dinner heldbyGovernorBizenjoforPrincessAshrafofIranattheQuettaClub.Seatedsitthe hightable,hesightedAhmedNawaz,whowasthenBalochistan'sfinanceminister, diningatalessaugusttablethanhis.BhuttosenthisADCtobringthebrotherofthe BugtiChieftohispresence.Surprisedatthesuddensummons,AhmedNawazwalked uptothehightableandtotheseatedpresident.BhuttolookedatAhmedNawazBugti andsaid,'Doyourememberthetimewhenyouwouldn'tletmesitatyourtable?Well this time I won't let you sit at mine.'

Bhuttowasacomplexman.Despitehisextremelysensitivenature,healsopracticed whenhehadto,thesycophancywhichhasbecomethehallmarkofthesuccessful Pakistanipolitician.Iwitnessedacuriousincidentwhichservestoillustrate this:In 1957 I received an invitation out of the blue from Jam Sadiq Ali, whom until then I had nevermet,toalunchinhonorofPirPagaro.Bhutto,whohadalsobeeninvited,later telephoned me and suggested that we drive to the lunch together. As we headed in my cartoJamSadiq'shouse-whichwasthenlocatedinthevicinityofGurumandir- BhuttotalkeddisparaginglyaboutPirPagaroandhisfamily. Herelatedpastscandals aboutthePirsfather'ssexualpreferencesandtheman'seventualexecutionbythe Britishonachargeofmurder.He lambasted thepresentPirforbeingnomorethana pleasurelovingsybaritedevoidofconcernforhisfollowers.Imaginemyamazement whenonreachingJamSadiq'shouse,IwitnessedBhuttobowbeforePirPagaroand suppliantly touchhiskneeswithbothhishands.AsI staredathiminsurprise,he turned his head covertly and winked at me. Later as we drove away from the lunch, he shruggedoffhisservile behaviorwithalaugh.Youhadtodothat,he said,ifyouwanted to get ahead in politics.

Like so many ambitious men, Bhutto was keen to meet and establish contact with men ofinfluencewhowouldbeabletohelphiminhisquest,whichthen,asIhave mentioned earlier, was to become a member of the provincial parliament. One evening at Le Gourmet in 1956, as Bhutto's guest, I came across Hamid Ali Noon, who was then acaptaininthearmy.Hamid,whohadbeenatschoolwithme,sawmeatBhutto'stable and came over to say hello. When Bhutto subsequently learnt from me that Hamid not only happened to be Sir Feroz Khan Noon's son-in-law but was also the adjutant of the President'sBodyguards,heinsistedthatInotonlyintroducehimtoHamid,butalso that I should invite him to join our table as Bhutto's guest.

ThepathtoBhutto'sinitialpoliticalsuccesscamelargelyfromcultivatingpowerful people.InLarkanahesoughttheassistanceof Khuro'serstwhileaideandpoliticalrival, QaziFazlullah.UsinghissociallinkswiththeIranicommunity,hegothimself introducedtothe powerfulbureaucratIskanderMirza,the risingkingmakerof Pakistani politics. The manner in which he won over Mirza's affection was through the timewornSindhi feudaltraditionofhostingshikarsforthepowerfulpersonagesofthe dayandbyexpeditioususeofdownrightsycophancy.Inearly1957Iwasalsoaguestat one of Bhutto'sshikars.

InFebruary1957therewasagrandfunctionatGudduwhenthefoundationstoneof the newly planned barrage was laid by President Iskander Mirza. The barrage had been built on our family lands in Sindh, and thus it was somewhat incumbent on me to bepresent at the proceedings. Among those present on the occasion were Mir Jaffar Khan Jamali, the veteran Muslim Leaguer, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In the absence of my elder brother, I was asked to join the president's luncheon table as the senior representative of thearea.AfterlunchMirJaffarKhanspottedmethereandinvitedmetoaccompany

him home as his guest to Rojhan Jamali for an overnight stay. While I was talking to Mir JaffarKhan,ZulfikarAliBhuttojoinedus.HeseemedquiteeagertolearnastohowI cametobepresentatthePresidentialtable.Duringtheusualfriendlychatthat followed,heinvitedmetoashootthefollowingdayathishometownofLarkana.He toldmethathehadarrangedtheshikarfortheUSambassadorandmembersofhis familywhowerearrivingbytrainearlythenextmorning.Ihadlittlehesitationin askingMirJaffarKhanifIcouldbringBhuttoalongwithmetoRojhanJamaliforthe night as it made the arrangements more convenient. As a Sindhi, Mir Jaffar Khan hadknown Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and he happily extended his invitation to include the younger Bhutto.

However, the evening at Rojhan Jamali did not prove to be a complete success for all. It wasnotthatMirJaffarKhan'shospitalitywasfoundwanting-hewasindeedasplendid hostin the Baloch tradition. ItwasjustthatMir Jaffar Khan waseffusive in his praise ofmy elderssuchasNawabImamBukshKhanandhissonNawabBahramKhan,butnotawordwassaidabouttheBhuttos.Itwasaminorsocialgaffe, particularlyinviewofBhutto'ssensitivities.LaterBhuttoinsistedonleavingRojhan Jamali at an extremely early hour the next day without the courtesy of saying farewell to our host. So, I had to leave an apologetic message with Mir Jaffar Khan's manager.

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto received Ambassador and Mrs. Hildrith, their niece and I at the newlyconstructedfamilymansion,'AlMurtaza',inLarkana.TheAmbassadorwasnot onlythechiefrepresentativeofthemostinfluentialcountry,hewasalsothefather-in- law of President Iskander Mirza's son, Humayun. We had a superb lunch catered by the Palace Hotel. Efficient waiters from Karachi dressed in crisp white uniforms and gloves served the food with white and red wines, a remarkable originality for the rural areas of Sindh.AfterlunchweweretakenacrossalengthydistancetothelandsofNawab GhaibiKhan,theSirdaroftheChandiotribe,whohadorganizedagazelleshootforus.

The shoot soon proved to be 'over-organized'. Beaters on trained camels drove the desperate gazelles in large herds of forty or so straight towards our guns. Zulfi and I loweredourgunsverysoonafterthecommencementofthedrive.Wehadalreadyshot a couple of gazelles each by that time. I also stopped my retainer from shooting further. There was little sport to be had in simply massacring these splendid animals.UnfortunatelytheAmericanambassadorandhiswifedidnotshareoursentiments. Theytookpartintheslaughteroffifteenormoreofthesechinkaras.(MyhostandI shared his room at night. When we had retired, Bhutto confided in me that he was quite disgusted with the Americans' behavior.) After thechinkarashoot we were taken to a partridge shoot in thekuchaarea near the lands of Khan Bahadur Nabi Buksh Bhutto (MumtazBhutto'sfather).LatertheAmericans,ZulfiandIhadteaatNabiBuksh Bhutto's housebeforeweall departedseparately forourhomes.

A lot of time and trouble was expended by the hosts on such shoots. But they remain a vitallinkeventothisdaywherebytheSindhi'feudal'canestablishlinkswiththepower brokers of the day. The canny Zulfikar Bhutto, despite having spent most of his life out ofSindh,quicklygraspedtheimportanceoftheseshoots.Moreintelligentthanmost, hisshootswerealwaysheldatthebestshikargahs,whichoftenmeantthattheactual hostswereotherpeopleandnothim.Buttheguestswerehisandtheyremained beholden to him for the invitations. Using these means athis disposal, by 1957 he had firmly ingratiated himself to the avidshikariIskander Mirza, and was off to New YorkaspartoftheUNdelegationledbyFerozKhanNoon.InMarch1958IskanderMirza sentBhuttoas a chairmanof the Pakistani delegationto the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva.

Bhuttowasatalentedoratorandthegiftofpublicspeakingcamenaturallytohim.His triptoGenevaprovedtobeasuccess,andhereveledinhisnewly-acquiredrole. Shortlyafterhisreturn,hevisitedmeathomeonemorningandbroughtalongwith himtheaddresshegaveattheUNConferenceontheSea.Overmorningcoffee,he insisted in reading out the address in full for my benefit. It was related to the laws of territorialsealimits,andwasnotquitewhatIwouldhaveinmindforapieceof morning entertainment, but Bhutto was so proud of his achievement I did not have the heart to disappoint him. I listened to him as he recited the lengthy speech that meant so much to him.

Bhutto'sletterwritteninApril1958toIskanderMirzarevealsthelevelofflatteryhe would descend to, to achieve his own personal ambitions. From Geneva, while he had beenattendingtheUnitedNationsConferenceontheSea,Bhuttohadwrittentohis mentorexpressinghis'...imperishableanddevotedloyalty'.Hewentintoastateof extremefawningbyadding:'WhenthehistoryofourCountryiswrittenbyobjective Historians,yournamewillbeplacedevenbeforethatofMrJinnah.Sir,Isaythis because I mean to, and not because you are the Presidentof my Country.'106

Notsurprisingly,inOctober1958IskanderMirzamadetheyoungthirty-year-old Bhuttohisministerforcommerce.AsIalwaystendtoavoidpeopleinpower,Ibeganto distancemyselffromhimfromthenonwards.However,ourfriendlyrelationship continuedformanyyearsthatfollowed.Itwastolastuntilafewmonthsintohisfateful climb to the very pinnacle of power in Pakistan. By then his ego could brook no equals. InIslamabadduringhisdaysaspresident,heonceinvitedmefordinner.Whenwemet,headdressedmeas'Mr.'Mazari,andI,inturn,addressedhimformallyasMr. President. Itseemedthattheonlyusethepasthad forBhuttowasasameanstogetting where he had got to. It appeared that now that he had got there, apart from the slights he now wished to avenge, the past had become largely irrelevant.

106WhitePaperonthePerformanceoftheBhuttoRegime,Vol.1.GovernmentofPakistan,Islamabad.1979.

***

MylifeinSonmianiremainedrelativelyunchangedinthe1950s.BynowIhadason andadaughterfrommysecondwifeMunawar,and overtime,twomoresonswould follow.There aresome childrenwhowhenborn give somuch pleasure totheirparents thatlifewithoutthemseemsbarrenandincomplete.Yettherearealsochildrenwho willfullyinflictgriefandpainontheirparents.Unfortunatelyithasbeensowithmy second family.

Thetribestilllargelyclungtoitsage-oldwaysandcontinuedtoabjurethenew trappingsofmodernityrepresentedbythedistrictadministrationandpoliceforce. Nearly all my time was taken in settling disputes and suppressing the few incidents of crime that continued tooccur sporadically. Administratively the Mazari area had been amicablydividedintotwosections,theaffairsofRojhanandthewesternportionacross the Indus were dealt by my brother Sher Jan,while the Sindh portion and eastern belt cameundermysupervision.Ourelderbrother,MirBalakhSher,whobecamea memberoftheConstituentAssemblyin1955,wouldregularlyvisitRojhanbut preferred not to involve himself in tribal affairs. Politicswas hismétier,

Ingeneral'tribal'affairsencompassedthegeneralwelfareoftheMazaritribeandall those who lived in the adjacent areas of Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab, and Bahawalpur. It couldrangefromprovidingwheatintimesofflood,topreventingviolencewhen seriousinter-clan disputesarose.Amongthe responsibilitiesthattraditionallydevolved on the tribal chief, was the maintenance and preservation of the tribe's honor. This obligation can never be taken lightly among the Baloch. It so happened one day, when coincidentlybothmybrothersandIwere present inRojhan,that wewerehastily informedofanarmedraidintoourareabytheneighboringBugtis.Iclearlyrecall,it was Christmas day in 1957. After shooting and wounding a poor non-BalochJuthherdsman, the raiders forcibly carried away a number of camels across the desert to the Bugtiarea.InBalochculturearaidintoanothertribe'sareaisregardedasabrazenact ofinsultonpartoftheperpetrators.Itcalledforswift retributiononourpart.

Duetounavoidablecircumstancestheresponsibilityforretaliationfellonme.Mir BalakhSherwasaservingmemberofParliament,andSherJanwasanofficerinthe BorderMilitaryPolice,the lawenforcementagencyforthe TribalArea.Direct involvementinanyactionbyeitherofthemmighthaveledtoanawkward predicament.ThatdayIhadtoissueatribalcalltoarms.ThenextdayIwasriding south onhorseback twenty-five miles into the tribal area with a large armed and quite indignantMazarilashkar.Thatnight,aswecampedoutintheopennearaborderpost

calledBarraatthefoothillsoftheSuleimanRange,theeldermuqqadumsandwaderasof

the clans prevailed upon me to remain at the camp and leave the carrying out of the retaliatoryraidtothem.Thechanceofmegettingwoundedorkilledintheforay would,theyinsisted,leadtoanallouttribalwar.Peaceinsuchaneventcouldthen

onlybecontemplatedonceasimilarfatehadbeeninflictedupononeoftheBugti Sirdars (ironically, bothofwhom,Akbar and Ahmed Nawaz, were my friendsaswellas brothers-in-law). The next day in broad daylight the Mazari horsemen stormed into theBugtiarea.Theycarriedoffahugeherdofcamels,alongwithafinehorsewhich they had captured from a Bugtiwadera. They delivered the captured herd to me atmy desert camp.

ThenextdaywerodebacktoRojhanwithhonoravenged.SomemonthslaterajirgawasheldatKashmortomediatethistribaldispute.Thematterwassettledbetween Sirdar Akbar Bugti and my brother Mir Balakh Sher who were both present on theoccasion.Thestolencamelswerereturnedtobothtribesandacashsettlementwas givenbytheBugtistotheinjuredJuth.Peacewasrestoredbetweenthetwo tribes.

Itprovedtobeabusyweekforme.OnlyadayorsoaftermyreturntoRojhanIheard that Kheeahzais, a tribe associated with the Bugtis, had crossed the border and occupied MazarilandtothenorthatGarmoontheslopesoftheSuleimanRange.Garmowasat the time being prospected for oil by a US company, theAmerican Pak-Shell Company. The Americanshadconstructedratherroughkucharoadstothesitewhichenabledusto coverthethirtyorsomilesrapidlyinmotorvehicles.WhenIarrivedtheremore Mazaris began joining us in groups of small armed bands as the news of the occupation spread.Soonwehadanarmedforceofafewhundred,andhadtakenpositionsonthe

slopes facing the armed intruders. It was a tense situation. I was loathe to start a minorwar,soIthoughtitbesttogivetheoccupiersachancetowithdraw.Clearly,wewere notpreparedtoconcedeaninchofourhistoricalterritory.Thetribalboundarieshad been marked in stone for centuries past, and now due to an ironical quirk of British Raj history,constitutedthedividinglinebetweentheprovinceofBalochistanand District DeraGhazi Khanin thePunjab.

Withinadayofourarrivalwewereengulfedbyahostofbewilderedandworried officialdom. From Balochistan came the Political Agent from Sibi and a force of Baloch Levy,fromDeraGhaziKhancametheDeputyCommissioneraswellasthePolitical AssistantfortheD.G.KhanTribalArea.BecauseoftheAmericaninvolvementintheoilexploration, ithadbecomeaverysensitivegovernmentissue.IpassedNewYear's eve1957onthedarkwintryslopesoftheSuleimanRange.Afterfourdaysofstaring eachotheracrossgun-sights,theKheeahzaishadlittlechoicebuttowithdraw.Only afterIreceived assurancesthatthe matterhad beensettled and that therewould beno recurrences, did we descend and return to our homes in the plains.

AllduringtheearlieryearsmyinterestinBalochaffairsremainedhigh.Overlooking thehistoricalrivalriesbetweenneighboringtribes, theissueof Balochnationalismhad continued to prey on the minds of a large number of Baloch leaders. Even as a youthful sixteen-year old I had been keen for the amalgamation of district Dera Ghazi Khan into Balochistan.TheideaofagreaterBalochhomelandwithintheboundariesofPakistan

wastoremainoneofmy dreamsforseveral yearstocome.Itwasin1946onatripto QuettathatIhadfirstmettheKhanofKalatwhohadinvitedSirdarAkbar BugtiandmetolunchathisresidencetheAwan-e-Kalat.Nowin1957,Ioncemorereceivedan invitation from him. This time he had asked me to visit him at his home at Kalat.

In British India Kalat had enjoyed a senior status among other princely states. After HyderabadandKashmir,itencompassedthegreatestareaofland.Itcomprised Sarawan(upperBalochistan),Jhalawan(lowerBalochistan),LasBela,Makranand Kharan.Despite itslackofdevelopmentorgreatwealth,itsrulerwasentitledtoa nineteengunsalute.ThetreatiesbetweenKalatandBritainwereuniqueand comparabletothosethattheEmpirehadenteredwithNepal.Kalatenjoyedautonomy onallsubjectsotherthandefence,foreignaffairsandcurrency.Inthebeginningthe KhanseemedquiteamenabletotheideaofaseparateMuslimstate.Heeveninvited Mr. Jinnah in 1946, who spent several days in Kalat as well as Quetta. Once the Khan receivedalegalopinionfromtheconstitutionalexpertSirHenryMoncton(whohad also advised the: Nizam of Hyderabad) which suggested that the Kalat State could not automaticallybeintegratedintoPakistan,hechangedhisstance.Hisnowalteredview was further strengthened when the tumandars of the Marri-Bugti and D. G. Khan tribal areasinsistedthattheirareaswerelegallyoutsidethefrontiersofBritishIndiaaswell.

AfterPartitionthe Khan'sgrowing demandsforindependence were stymiedby the CentralgovernmentwhichshrewdlyprevailedupontheheadsoftheminorKalat principalities of Las Bela, Makran and Kharan to accede to Pakistan. This left the Khan withlittleoption.HereluctantlyjoinedPakistantobecomeHeadoftheBalochistan States Union, and was given a cosmetic title of 'Khan-i-Azam' as a conciliatory gesture. The Khan's younger brother, AghaAbdulKarim,was more militant. In 1948heraiseda flag of rebellion. After a clash with the army at Sarlat on the border of Afghanistan, the rebels were captured.107

OnthecreationofOneUnitinWestPakistanin1955,theKhanmuchtohisdismay, found himself relegated to the position of an ordinary citizen. Dissatisfied, he began to campaign for a division of West Pakistan into linguistically defined provinces. He now envisagedtheunificationofKalat,theBalochispeakingpartsofBalochistan,DeraGhaziKhanandJacobabaddistricts,intoasingleprovince.Tofurtherhisplansthe Khanhadalready delegatedthe task ofgathering the BalochleadershipfromKalat state, Dera Ghazi Khan and upper Sindh to Akbar Khan Bugti. It was for this reason he hadinvitedmetoKalatin1957.AsIhadalwaysfeltthattheBalochtribesofDeraGhaziKhanoughttohavebeenamalgamatedwiththeircousinsinBalochistan,I enthusiastically endorsedthe Khan'sproposal-asfarasI wasconcerned,we were ethnically, linguistically, culturally and historically one people.

107Afterservingsevenyearsofaten-yearsentence,AghaAbdulKarimreleasedin1956;hewentontoforma political party called Ustoman Gal (’People’s Party’ in Balochi) withGhous Buksh Bizenjo as the General Secretary.

InOctober1957thelargestevergatheringofBalochleadershiptookplaceinKarachi. The meeting was chaired by the Khan and included the Sirdars of all the Baloch tribes inBalochistan,DeraGhaziKhanandSindh.Onthedayofthegathering,someofus were invited to tea at the Presidency by its incumbent, Iskander Mirza. In the presence ofguestswhichincludedSirdarAkbarBugti,SirdarKhair BukshMarri,GhousBuksh Raisani,MirJaffarKhanJamali,mybrotherMirBalakhSherandmyself,PresidentMirzabegantochidetheKhan.'WhyareyoutryingtomisleadtheseSirdars...',werethewordsheusedtobegin.Thenscathingly,hecontinued,'Thesedaysyouare opposing the One Unit and talking about a new linguistic province, but when that same OneUnitwascreatedyouweremakinglonggushyspeechesinitsfavor.Whatyou reallyhankerfor,isare-creationofyouroldKalatState.Alltherestismerelyeye-wash. Younowjustwanttofoolthesepeopleintosupportingyou.'TheKhanlooked embarrassedandremainedsilent.Wefinishedourtea andleftquietly.Atthe conference the enthusiasm ebbed. Later when some of the leaders belonging to the old KalatStatedemandedthebreak-upoftheOneUnitschemeandtherestorationofKalat, the majority of the other Sirdarsleftthe gatheringin protest.

Whenmartiallawwasdeclaredon8October1958,oneofthereasonsgivenbyIskander MirzawasthepurportedstateofsecessionbyKalat.ItwasallegedthattheKhanhad approached the Shah of Iran to admit Kalat into his country as an autonomous region. Some days earlier the Khan had raised the old State flag on his Mid Fort at Kalat. This actionwasdeemed tobeanactof secession, and hissupposed communicationwiththe Shahwasconsideredtobefurtherproofofhis'treasonous'intentions.Whatwas convenientlyoverlookedwasthatthespecialprivilegesaccordedtotheformerrulersof Kalat,KhairpurandBahawalpuratIndependence-andlaterconfirmeduponthe creationoftheOneUnitscheme-allowedthemforthedurationoftheirlifetime,to retain their titles, their privy purses, dispensations from armsand vehicle licenses and therighttoflytheirpersonal flags.In1957I hadmyselfseen theKhan'spersonalflag fluttering over his palace.

Using his 'treasonable' act as a pretext, on 5 October 1957, an army detachmentsurrounded Kalat. In the clash that ensued, a number of Kalatis were killed and, to theanger of the local populace, a minaret of a mosque collapsed after taking a direct mortarhit.TheKhan,MirAhmedYarKhan,wasarrestedandtakenforciblytoLahore.This actofaggressioncausedawaveofangertosweepthroughoutBalochistan.Itonly further compounded existing ill-will which had been caused by an incident that had occurred the previous year by an act of administrative insensitivity. In 1957 a Baloch woman accused of adultery had been murdered by members of her husband's family. Ignoringtheprecedentsofthelocaljirgalaw,theauthoritieshadinsistedonsending the deadwoman's clothing for forensic teststo Lahore.A post-mortem was also carried outmuchagainstthewishesofherfamily.Thisaffairhadincensedthetribal

communityineverypartofKalat.Itwasgenerallyviewedamongthelocalstobea calculated insult and a degradation of Baloch honor and traditions.

The arrest of theKhanculminated in an armed insurrection on partof asectionof the Zehritribeundertheleadershipofthefieryeighty-yearoldNaurozeKhan,whohad previouslyparticipated inaseriesofarmed revoltsagainsttheBritishinthe1920sand 1930s.NaurozeKhandemandedthereleaseoftheKhanandacommitmentfromthe governmenttorespecttribalcustoms.TheinsurgentstooktothehillsaroundMoola Pass,andfoughtaseriesofactionsagainstthearmy.InearlyApril1959theyambushed and wiped out a platoon of the Frontier Corps' Pishin Scouts at Chuttock near the Iran border.Alittlewhilelatertheyattackedanddestroyedapartofamilitaryconvoyof trucksinapassthirtymilessouthofQuetta,asaresultofwhichtrafficontheQuetta roadwassuspendedduringthenight-time.ForeignPressalsoreportedthatthe guerillashadmanagedtoshootdownthreeslow-movingFuryaircraftofthePakistan Air Force which had been used in aerial bombing raidson their mountainous hideouts.

TherebellionlastedforayearandahalfandendedonlywhenNaurozeKhan's nephew, Sirdar Doda Khan Zehri carrying a Koran assured him that the authorities had acceptedalltheirconditions.Balochtraditionswouldhenceforthberespected,the rightsoftheinsurgentswouldberestoredandtheirgrievancesmetwith.TheKoran was supposedly sent by Brigadier (later General) Riaz Hussain, the army commander engagedagainstthem,asproofofhishonestintentions-anincidentwhichGeneral RiazHussaindeniedtomeinpersonduringaconversationsomeyearslater.108When the rebels came down from their sanctuary in the hills, their leadership was surrounded andtakenintocustody.Forthefirsttimementionwasmadeintheheavilycensored local Press, which referred to these guerrilla leaders as an '11 member gang of dacoits'. LatertheyweretriedbyaSpecialMilitaryCourtatHyderabad.Allofthemwere sentenced to death; only the octogenarian Nauroze Khan was spared from the scaffold becauseofhisage.Afterthemenhadbeenhanged,theauthoritiessadistically requested the aged warrior to identify the bodies. The modern legend that has evolved around this episode is worth mentioning: 'Is this one your son?' an army officer cold- heartedly asked Nauroze Khan as he pointed to the body of the elderly warrior's son. Nauroze Khan stared at the soldier for a moment then replied quietly, 'All these brave youngmenaremysons.'Thenlookingatthefacesofhisdeadsupporters,henoticed that the moustache of one of them had drooped in death. He went over to the body and tenderlycurledthemoustacheupwardswhilegentlyadmonishing,'Evenindeath,my son, one should not allow the enemy to think, even for one moment, that you have despaired.'Thearmedrebellionanditswillfullycallousconclusioninflamedthe emotions of a large number of Baloch, As frustrations gathered and wounds festered, it eventually fuelled the revolt that later blazed through Balochistan in the 1970s. Nauroze KhanandhismenwerelaudedinpoemsoftheBalochlaureate,GulKhanNaseer.His

108GeneralRiazHussainlaterbecamethefirstgovernorofBalochistan.

works,whichrailedagainsttheinjusticesheapeduponpeopleofBalochistan,wereread by the young aspiring nationalists of the Baloch Student Organization and urged them on to take a defiant stand in the 'struggle' thatwas meant to lie ahead.

***

The day Martial Law was declared I was at Karachi. Like most other people I had been watching the increasing political turmoil with deep dismay. So, when my friend Akbar Bugtitelephonedhefoundmeinadepressedstateofmind.Hehadrecentlybegun spendingmoretimeatKarachiasaresultofhisappointmentsomemonthsearlieras ministerofstatefordefence.Tocheermeup,Akbarsuggestedwemeetfordinner. Ratherthanventureout,Iproposedthathejoinmeatmyhouse.Wetalkedlateintothe eveningabouttheeventsthathadbeentakingplace.Thedeathofthedeputyspeakerin EastPakistanwasstillfreshinourminds,aswasthenation-widecivildisobedience movement threatened by the Muslim League. The day before the police at Karachi had used tear gas to disperse a large crowd of Muslim League supporters.

Laterthatnightatabout11.30p.m.hecalledmeonthetelephone.Hehadjustreturned tohisroomsatthePalaceHotel.Irememberhiswords,'Thereissomethingoddgoing on,' he said, 'there are army trucks all over the place'.

Ijokingly replied,'You'retheMinisterofDefence.Don'ttellmeyoudon'tknowwhat your people are up to'.

Justthenathirdvoicepipedonthephone,'Urdu mein bolo, ya angrezi mein. Aurzaban hummain summaj nahin aati[SpeakeitherinUrduorEnglish.Idon'tunderstandotherlanguages]'.

Aswasourwont,wehadbeenspeakingBalochi.Angeredbythisinsolentintrusion, Akbarbellowedattheinterloperandinformedhimofhisministerialrank.Theman coollyretorted,'Don'tyouknow,MartialLawhasbeendeclared!'Withinthehour Akbar's telephone line had been disconnected. Soon more was to follow. Within a year the Bugti Chief found himself in jail with the threat of death lingering over his head.

Theevents that ledupto this extraordinarysituation werequitesimple.With the dismissalofthegovernmentbythecoup,AkbarBugti'sministerialdayscametoan abruptend.SomemonthslaterhewasbackinKarachionavisit.Whenhewas returning to Quetta by road he was stopped at a military check post near the city and chargedwithsmuggling.AllthathehadboughtinKarachiwasconfiscated.Hewas forcedtoundergothishumiliationatthehandsofyoungofficerswhoonlyafew months earlier would have treated him with the utmost deference as a minister fordefence. What worsened the outrage in Akbar's eyes was that it had taken place in hishomeprovincewherehewasaparamounttribalchiefofamajortribe.Aftertheevent

hebecameconvincedthatsomeonehadinstigatedtheactionagainsthim.That someone,Akbarfelt,couldonlybeonewhowasawareofhismovements.His suspicionseventuallyfellupononeofhisrelations,HajiHaibatKhanBugti,whowas alsohisbrotherAhmedNawaz'sfather-in-law.HajiHaibatBugtihadlongbeen mistrusted by Akbar and whenhereceivedfurther evidencefromathird sourceof Haji HaibatKhan'sactivitiesasa'governmentinformer',Akbarbecameconvincedthathe had found his antagonist.

Someweekslater,on11September1959, HaibatBugti wasmissing.Afterasearchfor the missing man proved fruitless, investigation was taken over by the local martial law authoritiesandsuspicionsoonbecamecenteredontheBugtichief.AkbarBugtiwas takenintomilitarycustody,alongwithhisallegedaccomplice,ArshooBugti.After being tortured, Arshoo led the investigators to akaraizfromwhere Haji Haibat Bugti's bodywasfinallyrecovered.TheBugtichiefandArshooBugtiwerechargedwith murder and tried by a Special Military Court. I attended the proceeding where I learnt that a certain Major Sher Ali Baz had been using third degree methods in an attempt to extract a confession from my friend. Akbar refused to succumb to the ill-treatment. He insistedatthetrialthatasArshoo'sconfessionwasextractedbyuseofseveretorture,it heldlittlelawfulvalue.Themilitarycourtdidnotacceptthisview,andinlate December1958sentencedtheBugtichieftodeath.Arshoogotlifeimprisonment.The Martial Law authorities clearly wished to make an example of Akbar Khan Bugti. If the spiritofjusticehadprevailed,theBugtichiefshouldhavebeentriedinanordinary civiliancourtoflaw,orelse,thetraditionaljirgalawofBalochistanoughttohave

prevailed.InfactajirgahadtakenplaceunderwhichAkbarhadagreedtomakea

settlement. According to tribal norms, an informer is deemed to be a base and ignoble personanddeservingofpunishment.Killingonecanoftenbeadjudgedtobeanaffair of honor. Whatever failings there may be in the centuries-old tribal law, it must be rememberedthatevenaparamountchiefwaswhollysubjecttoitandhadtoanswerto it for his transgressions.

***

It was during the 1950s that I first took an active part in politics at the district level. In DeraGhaziKhantherewere,byrecenttradition,twoopposingpoliticalcamps.The deathofNawabSirBahrainKhanin1923,soonfollowedbythedeathsoftwo successiveMazariTumandars,namelymyuncleandmyfather,hadleftapolitical vacuuminthedistrict.ThisvacuumwaslargelyfilledbytheLeghariTumandar,Nawab Jamal Khan Leghari, much to the dismay of the Mazaris. When my brother Mir BalakhSherattained majority,helaid claimtothefamilypolitical legacy. Soonafterthe politicsofthedistrictsplitintodistinctMazariandLegharigroupings.BalakhSherat the age of twenty-one defeated Sirdar Mohammad Khan Leghari in March 1949 for the chairmanshipoftheDistrictBoard.Inthe1955electionsinDeraGhaziKhanforthe WestPakistanAssembly,SirdarMohammadKhan,hisfatherSirdarJamalKhan,and

theirgroupweredefeated.ThecontinuingMazari-LegharitussleinDeraGhazi,which hasnowlastedforoversevendecades,illustratesallthatiswrongwithourrural politics.Thereneverhasbeenany divergenceofpoliticalphilosophybetweenthetwo rival camps - it is just simple battle for local power between two contending political personalities, offering little benefit to the community at large. There is almost a childlike obsession with having your own deputy commissioner and superintendent of police in office.Thesegovernmentofficialsmaybeascorruptandvenalastheymaywishtobe, butaslongastheyblindlyfollowtheinstructionsissuedbytherulingdistrictpolitician of the moment, then all is well as far as most of our rural politicians are concerned. Thereforetheydarenotopposetheparticulargovernmentoftheday.Thismaxim applies to most feudal politicians in the country. Recently, rural politicians have seenseverecriticismfortheirnearhabitualtendencytojointhepartyinpower. Unfortunately,this isnota newphenomenon.

In1956IwaselectedtotheDistrictBoard(asitwasthencalled)ofDeraGhaziKhan alongwithanumberofmyfamilymembers.Isoonrealizedthatintheeyesofmy politicalcolleaguesIsufferedfromaninherentdrawback,asbymynatureIwas inclined towards issues rather than personalities.

CHAPTER3

TheAyubKhanRegime

I boughtmyfirsthouseinKarachiin1957inthe new suburb ofBahadurabad. Atfirstit seemedtobeatquiteadistancefromthecity.WhenmyfamilyandImovedintoournewhome,manyofourneighborswerediplomatsfromtheAmericanandotherembassies.Inthosedaysmuchofthecity'ssocialliferevolvedaroundthediplomatic circle. Formal dinners were very much in vogue. Five course sit down meals with place cards,candlesandafullselectionofwinesandliqueurswereamust.Inhindsight,it does seem a bit unusual, but as a twenty-seven-year old I found myself playing host to ambassadors,highcommissioners,andalargenumberofmembersofthediplomatic corps.Manyofthembecameclosepersonalfriendsandhavekepttheirlinksoverthe decadesthatfollowed.AmongthemweretheUSambassadorWilliamRowntree, Britishambassador,AlexanderSimon,IndianhighcommissionerRajeshwarDayal, MercerandMabelWalter,andBobandPennyClifford.Onemaywellwonderwhat thesegentlemenmadeofayoungmaninhislatetwentiesplayinghosttothem,but thoseweredifferentdays.AmongtheAmericansinparticulartherewasacertain fascinationforPakistan,andtheyseemedgenuinelyinterestedinmeetingandgetting toknowitspeopleandlearningaboutitsdiversecultures.Itwasalsoanageofinnocenceforourrelativelynewnation,and wecarriedour greenpassportwithgreat pride during our trips abroad. My tifne continued to be divided between Sonmiani and Karachi. While at Sonmiani I was kept busy; in Karachi I was relatively a gentleman of leisure.Iwoulddevotemysparetimetoreading,theoddafternoonshowatthecinema,andintheeveningsIwouldinvariablybeouttodinnerorsomeothersocial engagement.Despitethefeelingofgeneralcontentmentwithlife,thereweretwoissues whichcontinuedtognawatmyconscience:onewastheBalochistanissue,andtheother wasagrowingabhorrenceoftheone-mandictatorshipthatPakistanhadnow succumbed to.

***

Upon assumption of power as the chief martial law administrator and president of the country,AyubKhanwieldedsupremepower.Hisauthorityrestedonthesupportofthearmy.Toadministerthecountry,hereliedsolelyonthebureaucracy.Politicianshad noroletoplayasfarashewasconcerned.Infact,lumpingthemwithsmugglersand blackmarketeers,heissuedanopenwarningtotheminhisfirstradioaddresson

declaration of Martial Law in October 1958. He threateningly told them to 'behave, otherwise, retribution will be swift and sure'.109

WhileAyubKhandecidedtolayallillsontheheadsofthebickeringpoliticians,he chose to overlook the fact that all major decisions taken by Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza had enjoyed his tacit approval. He had remained close to the centre of powereversincehiselevationtothepositionofcommander-in-chiefofthearmyin 1951. The fact that he had already stayed on as army chief for seven long years was a reflectionoftheprominentrolehehadplayedduringthe1950s-thedecadeof intrigues.Evensomeofhisseniorgeneralswereoftheopinionthattheircommander- in-chief,despitehavingattainedthehighestpossiblepostinthearmy,harbored limitless ambitions and was 'all out for himself in most matters.'110During this period neighboringIndiahadasingleprimeministerandseveralarmychiefs.InPakistanwe had seen seven prime ministers, but only one General Ayub Khan. In reality thebureaucracy had been ruling the country, at first surreptitiously and then, after the 1953 dismissal of Nazimuddin. openly. The bureaucratic rule had been closely abetted by the army. Ayub Khan gave his open approval of Nazimuddin's sacking by joining Ghulam Muhammad's appointed government as defence minister (in the so-called 'Cabinet of Talent'). By the end of the politically tumultuous decade, the military chief had clearly gainedtheupperhandattheexpenseofhis bureaucraticteammates.

Thechaosthathadpermeatedthepoliticsinthe1950scannotsimplybeblamedonthe politiciansalone.Theirpoliticalgroups,withtheoddexception,werenotformedonthe basisofanyeconomicorsocialprogramme.Theywereformedtowinelectionsor toppleexistingministries,andsoondisintegratedoncetheyhadachievedtheirshort- termobjective.Asearlyas1951thesepoliticalgroupingshadfallenpreytothe bureaucracy'sdivisivemachinations.Asgovernor-general,GhulamMuhammad- assistedbyseniorofficialssuchasIskanderMirzaandAyubKhan-hadlargely destroyedthefoundationsofdemocracy.Thepoliticalturmoilthatresultedwas conveniently blamed on the politicians who were easy targets for the public, not as yet familiarwithback-roomconspiracies,toventtheirwrathat.Thepoliticiansdidnothelp theirimageastheybehavedinanatrociouslyselfishandlargelyundemocraticmanner. Who could defend the unsavory deed? of the likes of Qayum Khan and Ayub Khuro for instance?111Khuro was one of many who had gravitated to politics for the sheer desire for power. For politicianslike him, power had tobe attained atany cost. And yet by the

109Hasan Askari Rizvi,The Military & Politics in Pakistan, op. cit, p. 2 (Appendix C); from General Ayub Khan's first radio broadcast to the nation on 8 October 1958.

110Lt.-General M. Attiqur Rahman,Back to the Pavilion, Ardeshir Cowasjee (privately published) Karachi, 1989, p. 125; the then chief of general staff, General Slier Ali Pataudi's comments to General Attiqur Rahman.

111By the mid-1950s the term 'Khuro-ism had come to mean that 'members of the Legislative Assembly shall be arrested;their relatives will be put under detention; officers will be transferred who will not carry out the behests against inconvenient persons; elections shall be interfered with and members of legislatures shall be terrorized': Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. 1, September 1955, p. 656; cited in Khalid Bin Sayeed,Politics in Pakistan, Praeger, 1980, p. 43.

late1950stherewere signsofa growing realizationamongahandfulof politicians,such as Suhrawardy, that an alliance between groupings belonging to the two wings was necessary to bring a degree of stability to the system. But it was too late by then. Who should one blame for the collapse of Pakistan's first attempt at a democratic system? In reality allthree ofthe ruling groups were at fault:

1. seniorbureaucrats-ledbyGhulamMuhammad,andlaterbyIskander Mirza-willfullyschemedtocircumventtheConstitutionandpreventedelected leadersfrommanaging the country'saffairs.Theywilly-nilly createdand destroyedgovernmentsbygivingandlaterwithdrawingpatronagefrom beleaguered prime ministers;

2. anumberofunprincipledpoliticians,showingscantrespectforthe democraticnatureofthesystem,followedthedictatesofthebureaucratssolely for the sake of achieving power; and,

3. thearmyasrepresentedbyitschiefAyubKhan,whowillfullyaidedand abettedthebureaucratsintheirstratagems,therebypreventedthebasicsof democracy from taking root.

Havingtakenpowerbyforce,AyubKhanbeganhisrulebydisassociatinghimselffrom his own rolein theprevious sevenyears ofpoliticalchicanery.Henowinsistedthat his aimofmakingPakistan'asound,solidandcohesivenation'could'beachievedonlyif asastartaConstitutionisevolvedthatwillsuitthegeniusofthepeopleandbebased on thecircumstancesconfronting them'.112He openly blamed the parliamentary system forhavingfailedtoprovidepoliticalstabilityandnationalunitythatwasnecessaryfor thecountry'swell-being.Holdingthepoliticiansincontempt,hepubliclyconcludedthat'thegeneralbeliefisthatnoneofthesemenhaveanyhonestyofpurpose,integrity or patriotism'.113To gain approval of the public he now presented himself as a man who would finally bring justice in the corrupt society that had been forced upon the hapless citizens.WhenAyubKhanannouncedthatthecountrywasriddledwith'disruptionists,politicalopportunists,smugglers,blackmarketeers,andothersuch socialvermin,sharks and leeches',114thecountryapplauded.

Shortly after thecoup d'étattwo martial law regulations were introduced: one made the adulterationoffoodstuffsacriminaloffence,andtheothermadeblackmarketing subjecttoheavypunishment.Withinamonthofimpositionofmartiallaw,Customs had seized Rs. 30 million of smuggled goods and gold bullion, in comparison with the previouselevenyearstotalseizuresofRs.30million.115Theregulationsalsofixedprices

112MuhammadAyubKhan,FriendsnotMasters,OxfordUniversityPreKarachi,1967,p.186.

113Ibid.,p.68.

114AyubKhan,SpeechesandStatements,PakistanPublications,KarachiVol.I,4.

115KhalidBinSayeed,ThePoliticalSystemofPakistan,op.cit.,p.94.

for a number of basic commodities. There was a sudden and substantial drop in prices inthemarket-place.Thesewerepopularmeasures.Therewas,aninitialwaveof enthusiasmamong the public.Thepeople had becomefedup withthe previousstate of politicalaffairsand welcomedthenewchange.Thearmyasanationalinstitutionstill inspiredagreatdealofrespect,andAyubKhangotthebenefitofthepublic'smood,but it was not to last indefinitely.

One of the first acts of the new regime was to deal with politicians. Political parties had been banned on the proclamation of Martial Law. The ban was accompanied with the freezing of bank accounts and the detention of some of the politicians. Ayub Khuro was dramatically arrested on a charge of selling a car on the black market. Charges ofcorruption and misconduct were brought against former prime ministers, such as SuhrawardyandFerozKhanNoon,andseveralCabinetministers.Theseheadline catchingactionscreatedtheimpressionthat themilitary regime wasallset to cleanout the body politic of the country for good. The promulgation of the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order - or EBDO - defined the term misconduct very widely and disqualified, or 'Ebdoed' as it popularly came to be known, an estimated 5000 personsfromparticipatinginpolitics.Peoplewhohadbeenpreviouslypoliticallypersecuted, suchasAbdulGhaffarKhanwhohadbeenarrestedearlierundertheSecurityof PakistanAct1952,foundthemselvesunfairlydisqualifiedaswellunderthewide rangingambitofAyubKhan'sEBDO.

Themilitarygovernmentbroughtaboutthelongoverduelandreformsin1959.Some

2.5millionacresweresurrenderedby902landowners^116inWestPakistan(outofwhich theMazarichief'sfamilysurrenderedthelargestamountofland-349,600acresinDera GhaziKhanDistrictalone,whichrepresentedfourteenpercentofthetotalland surrenderedinWestPakistan).117TheMazaripropertyinSindhwassurrendered separately.Thesecondlargestsurrenderwas89,500acres,madebyanotherDeraGhazi Khanfamily,theLegharis.ThelandreformscarriedoutinthePunjab(withthe exceptionofcertainpartsofBahawalpurdivision)werefairlythorough.Thelarger landholdersinSindh-perhapsbecauseoftheirpowerfulshikarconnectionsandhelped bylocal revenuedepartmentand corruption,whichwasthenmoreprevalentinSindh- managedtoobtainmorelenienttreatment.DespitethestatedintentionoftheMartial Lawauthoritiesthatthelandreformswereintendedtobringaboutajustandequitable redistributionoflandamongthepoorlandlesstenants,thefirstsignsofself- aggrandizement had begun. A large part of the resumed land was soon handed over to military and civil officials atthrow-away prices. The halcyon daysfor the new military- bureaucraticelitehadarrived.Soonurbanlandwasbeingparceledouttotheseofficials aswell.Sincetherewasnothingtopreventtheseofficialsfromresellingthepropertyat highpricesintheopenmarket,anewclassofwealthwasbeingrapidlyformed.Itwas

116TheEconomicSurveyofPakistan,1963,p.33.

117PakistanTimes,24July1959.

a subtle form of officially sanctioned corruption - but corruption it nevertheless was. In time this military regime largesse would lead to unforeseen ethnic tensions in Sindh,where the beneficiaries of the hundreds and thousands of newly irrigated land werelargelynon-residentPunjabis,military-bureaucraticofficials,andnotmembersofthe local Sindhi peasantry.118

At the very outset, Ayub Khan's regime made the development of the economy of the countryapriority.Itwasanideathathardlyanyonewiththenation'swell-beingat heart could disagree with. But the way it was earned out was, questionable. Ayub Khan himself proclaimed his motto to be: 'I may be right, I may be wrong, but I have no doubts.'119The basis of his economic policy was to provide 'all possible incentives for stimulation of private sector and to create those facilities which the private sector has neither the ability nor the willingness to develop'.120This led to, among other things, the notorious export bonus voucher scheme which allowed businessmen to multiply their profits virtually overnight. As a direct result of the General's skewed economic policies, wealthsoonbecameconcentratedinthehandsofsometwodozenfamilies.121This policyalsolaidthefoundationsofcorruptbusinessethicsinthecountry.Aswealth nowcouldbemadewiththeprocuredconnivanceandassistanceofthebureaucracy, therewaslittleneedforentrepreneurialskillsorbusinessabilities.Honestyand businessintegritywererapidlybecomingathingofthepastforthosewhowishedto make immense profits.

By May 1959 Ayub Khan had formulated the political system which in his view would 'suitthegeniusofthepeople'.HeannouncedtheBasicDemocraciesscheme.It providedfor the election of 80,000BasicDemocrats equallydividedbetween Westand EastPakistan.TheBDmembers,astheyweresooncommonlycalled,weretobeelected bydirectadultfranchise.Theywerepartofafour-tieredstructureoflocalgovernment. AtthelowestleveltheBDmembersweretoformtwo-thirdsofthemembershipofrural unioncouncilsorurbantownandunioncommittees,withtheremainingone-thirdof theseorganizationsbeingnominatednon-officialmembersappointedbythe government.Thesecouncils/committeeswereled byanelectedchairman fromwithin theirranks.Thetierabovewasthethanaortehsilcouncilwhichwaschairedbythelocal

118By1971,landdistributionatGudduBarragewasasfollows:

LocalPeasants      185,606acres

Defence forces/retired govt. officials      103,237acres Displaced Punjabis from Mangla/Islamabad      37,580 acres Frontier tribesmen      1656 acres

TOTAL:Sindhis185,606acresnon-Sindhis:      142,463acres

(Aboveinformationwasobtainedfrom:SindAnnual1971,GovernmentofSindh,December1971).

119KhalidBinSayeed,PoliticsinPakistan,op.cit.,p.55.

120AyubKhan,Pakistan'sEconomicProgress,InternationalAffairs,Vol.43,January1967.

121According toThe Second Five Year Plan, 1960-65(Government of Pakistan, 1960, p. 71.) by '31 March, 1959, 63 percent of the total bank credit went to only 222 accounts in the form of advances of Rs. 1 million and above; advances to borrowers of small means did not exceed 6 percent of the total credit spread over 37,725 accounts'.

tehsildar.Halfitsmemberswerechairmenfromthelocalunioncouncils/townand unioncommittees,andtheotherhalfthana/tehsillevelgovernmentofficers.Thethird tierwasthedistrictcouncilchairedbytheall-powerfuldeputycommissioner.Half its membershipcamefromdistrictlevelgovernmentofficersofdevelopmentdepartments andhalfconsistedofunofficialmembers.Onlyhalfoftheunofficialmembers-or

quarterofthetotalmembership-wererepresentedbychairmenofthedistrictunion councils/townandunioncommittees(i.e.,electedBDmembers).Atthehighestlevel wasthedivisionalcouncilchairedbythedivisionalcommissioner.Itsmembership requirementwasthesameasthatofthedistrictcouncilapartfromthefactthe government officers included all the deputy commissioners in the division.

HavingcompartmentalizedPakistanintosmallconstituencies,thenewsystemensured thatthe electedBDmembersfromtheruralareasremainedwithinthecoercivecontrol of thetehsildarsand deputycommissioners. Therural unioncouncilscould bemanaged and manipulated by patronage or use of intimidation exercised by local officialdom. It was by these means that Ayub Khan planned to out-flank potential urban hostility. His newsourceofpowerwasintendedtocomefromtheenvisagedpassivityoftherural areas.On26December1959thefirstelectionoftheBasicDemocratstookplace.And twoandahalfmonthslater,on14February1960,despitetheabsenceofaproper Constitution, they managed to 'elect' General Ayub Khan as President.

ThefirstmartiallawCabinetofOctober1958hadtenministers,includingthree generals.AmongthesevencivilianministerswasthehostofmanyofAyubKhan'sshikars-thethirty-year-oldZulfikarAliBhutto.Bhuttohadeasilyovercomethestigma ofhiscloserelationshipwithhiserstwhilementorIskanderMirza,andhadrisenhigh inAyubKhan'saffections;eventuallyattaining,forawhile,a roleakinto that ofan adoptedsontotheolderman.AnotherkeyfigureinAyubKhan'sregimejoinedin April1960asthegovernorofWestPakistan.HewasMalikAmirMuhammadKhan fromKalabagh.After theNiaziKhansofIsa Khel,theMaliksoftheAwansofKalabagh were the most prominent family to hail from Mianwali district. The Awans had come to possesstheMianwaliSaltRangeforanumberofcenturiesand,withtime,had extended their influence over their area.

Malik Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh had an autocratic disposition. One critic describedhimasbeing'bynatureandupbringinganoverbearingman,highly consciousofhisascriptiveprivileges,andalthoughbynomeansuneducatedor ignorant,hewasconservative,obscurantistandunprogressive'.122LikeBhutto,Malik Amir Muhammad Khan had come to Ayub Khan's attention because of the lavishhospitality and the quality of game he had provided to the General during his regularshootsatKalabaghovertheyears.DuringhistermasgovernorofWestPakistan,he wasknowntoberuthlesslyfirmwithgovernmentopponents,butinmattersofmoney,

122HerbertFeldman,FromCrisistoCrisis,Pakistan1962-1969,Oxford1972,p.56.

totally incorruptible. It hasbeen said that nomember of his family was ever allowed to stay at the Governor's House at Lahore during his tenure. I was to meet him on several occasions.Onceitwasathisexpress request, afterI had commencedactively working forMissFatimaJinnah.AtthatmeetingKalabaghremonstratedwithmeinamanner similar to that of a family elder dealing with a wayward nephew. Despite my youthful years, he was a model of courtesy throughout. I did not agree with his advice to 'mend [my]waysfor[my]owngood'.Atsubsequentmeetingshestruckasternandrather hostiledemeanortowardsme,butriskinghiswrath,Istubbornlystucktomyviews. Duringhissixyearsasgovernor,Kalabaghacquiredareputationofextremerepression. Hewas knowntocrushanyonewhoopposedorhadoffended him. However, itmustbe remembered that whatever was done in West Pakistan during Kalabagh's time, was often done at the behest of and with the blessings of Ayub Khan.

***

The imposition of One Unit and the brutal hangings of the Baloch rebels led by Nauroze Khan Zehri, had left simmering discontent in Balochistan. This feeling was soon openly reflectedbythedefianceofAyubKhan'sgovernmentbyBalochistan'stwo representativesintheNationalAssembly:AttaullahMengalandKhairBukshMam,both Sirdars of major tribes. The third leading Baloch Sirdar, my friend Akbar Bugti, continuedtolanguishinprisonunderthesentenceofdeath.Movedbymyfriend's plight, I approached Zulfikar Bhutto to intervene in the matter with Ayub Khan. Bhutto assuredmethathewoulddohisutmosttohelpcommutethedeathsentence,andrang meonseveraloccasionstoreassuremeofthis.Hekepttohiswordandeventually played the vital role in getting Ayub Khan to agree to lessen the sentence to life imprisonment.Later,despiteoppositionfromMalikAmirMuhammadKhanofKalabagh, Governor of West Pakistan, Bhutto even managed to convince Ayub Khan to suspend the sentence. On 14 July 1961 Akbar Bugti was out of Hyderabad Jail and once moreafreemanbut'officially'hewasnolongertheheadoftheBugtitribe.Aweek priortohisrelease,anorderhadbeenissuedbyKalabagh'sprovincialgovernment which deposed Akbar from the Tumandari of the Bugtis, replacing him with his teenageson, Salim. Until Salim attained majority, the Bugti area was to be managed? by an administrativecouncilheadedbythePoliticalAgentofSibi.

Akbar Bugti's year and a half in prison had helped in shaping his political thinking. The 'Frontier Gandhi', Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had also been incarcerated at Hyderabad Jailatthattime.Onhisrelease,Akbaremergedamanwithdistinctlychanged perceptions.Henowspokeofoppressionandtheforceddeprivalofrightsofthepeople ofBalochistan-nodoubthehadalsobeenangeredbythegovernment'sactofdeposing him as Tumandar. Very soon he began openly deriding the government in the harshest of terms -temperate language nevercame easily to him. Ayub Khan becameoutraged byAkbar'sapparentlackofgratitude.InJuly1962,thePresident,whileaddressinga publicmeetingatQuetta,attacked'thisman'ashecalledhim, andpubliclywarnedthat

'Ihavestillgotthepowerstoreviewthesentencethatwasawardedtohim'.Akbar Bugtiignoredthewarning.Afewweekslateronthemorningof22August,hewas oncemoreplacedunderarrest.Akbarwaspickedupbythepolicefromhisroomat Palace Hotel at Karachi. It was announced officially that he had only been released the previous year on his assurances of good behaviour, and as he had now 'resumed his objectionable activities', orders had been issued for his arrest. Akbar Bugti had been originally arrested for the charge of murder, this time his arrest was linked clearly to his politicalstance.ItwasclearthatPresident MuhammadAyubcouldnotbrookanycriticism.

AkbarBugti'sarrestonlyservedtofurtherincenseotherBalochleaders.Attaullah Mengal's public condemnation of Ayub's government became harsher still. Hours after Bugti'sarrest,intheafternoononthesameday,Mengaldeliveredablisteringattackon thegovernmentatKakriGroundsintheLyariareaofKarachi.Mengalwasarrested a week later for making his 'Kakri Grounds' speech on a charge of sedition. Not bothered bypropriety,thegovernmentcontemptuouslyfailedtoinformthenewlyconstituted NationalAssemblythatoneofitsmembershadbeendetained.Thisactioncaused dismayamongtheOppositionofthelargelyimpotenttwo-month-oldParliament,but therewasverylittletheycoulddo.MengalwasalsodeposedasSirdarofhistribeby the government. He was replaced by an aged relative, Karam Khan Mengal. After three monthsdetention,AttaullahMengalwasreleasedonbailinlateNovember1962,buthe did not remain free for long. In April 1963 the newly appointed 'Sirdar' of the Mengals wasassassinated. Within a week of the murder, Attaullah Mengal and hiselderlyfather were arrested for the murder of Karam Khan Mengal.

DuringthisperiodanumberofotherBalochpoliticianshadbeensimilarlyarrested, andamongthemwasGhousBuksh Bizenjo whowaspickedupat KarachiAirporton his return from a visit to Dhaka in September 1962. Gul Khan Naseer, the Baloch poet, wasalsodetained.InJuly1963KhairBukshMarriwasarrestedandchargedwith inciting people 'to commit acts ofviolence and rioting'. He was also deposed as Sirdar oftheMarris,butthistimeitwasthoughtwisenottoappointareplacement'Sirdar'. OncemorethePoliticalAgentofSibidistrictwasgivenchargeofanadministrative council. He was assisted in his management of Marri tribal affairs by an uncle of Khair BukshMarri's,DodaKhan,whowasappointedvice chairmanofthe council.DodaMarriwastolastthreeyearsinhisoffice.InJune 1966he wasshotdeadby Marri tribesmen.Coincidentally,thesameyearanearrelationofAkbarBugti's,Ghulam HaiderKhan,whohadbeenassistingthegovernmentauthoritiesinDeraBugti,was shot dead by Bugti tribesmen led by Khan Muhammad Kalpur.123

123Ironically, it was the very same Khan Muhammad Kalpur - once an ardent loyalist of his Sirdar - who was heldresponsible for the killing of Sirdar Akbar Bugti's youngest son Sallal, in 1992, some twenty-six years later.

WiththearrestofallthenotableBalochistanpoliticians,theaffairsoftheformer province were in turmoil. The government's writ was largely tenuous. Ayub and his governor, Kalabagh, would make frequent visits to the area and make much publicized toursandaddressgatheringsof'triballeaders'whichwerereportedinthefrontpages of Pakistan's controlled Press to dissuade the public from thinking that anything may be amiss.Inrealitytheprovincewas ruledbynakedcoercion.

AsaBalochIwasgreatlydismayedatthemannerinwhichmyBaiochfriendswere beingtreated. TheBugtisandMarriswereadjacenttribestotheMazaris.Weshareda common race,culture, language and history. Our bonds had been further cemented by marriagesandpersonalfriendships.Ibecameanardentsupporterofthecauseof Balochistanandregularlyvisitedthe jailedpoliticians. Iwould trytomake,inasmall way,myfriendAkbarBugti'slifeinprisoneasierbytakinghimreadingmaterial, cigarettes,ice-cream,softdrinksandsuchtrifles.IhadmetAttaullahMengalin1957 whentheKhanofKalathadintroducedhimtomeatalunchattheJamofLasBela's house. Now I gottoknow himbetter.I metGhousBukshBizenjofor thefirsttime.Even thentherewasamarkeddifferencebetweenthetwomen.Bizenjo,whohadnotribal following,wasashrewd political operatorwhonotonlyspokewithagifted tongue,but was always prepared to find a middle way out of a possible confrontation. He was once described by a close colleague asbeing amanwho'can'tlive withoutpolitics...he hasto haveitallthetimeorhewillperish'.124Ontheotherhand,Mengalwasfirstand foremostaSirdar.Hewasbluntandoutspokenandseemedtohavescantregardfortheconsequences.

***

In March 1962 General Ayub Khan announced a proposed new Constitution for thecountry. It was said to have been largely drafted by one of his ministers, Manzur Qadir. Earlier,in1960,theGeneralhadappointedaConstitutionCommitteeundersupervision of Justice Shahabuddin. The Commission's recommendations on the future ConstitutionwerecompletelyatvariancewithAyubKhan'sideas.Ratherthangivein topressurefromtheGeneraltochangehisviews.ChiefJusticeShahabuddintookthe onlyhonorablecourseopentohimbyresigningfromtheCommission.125

Under Ayub Khan's new Constitution, a National Assembly of 156 members was to be createdbytheholdingofnon-partyelectionsandthevotingrestrictedtothe80,000BD members.Butneitherthepresidentnorhis.chosenministersweremaderesponsibleto thenewAssembly.TheAssembly'spowersweretobeverylimited,especiallyin relationtofinancialmatters.OvernationalexpendituretheAssemblywastohaveno

124Selig S. Harrison,In Afghanistan's Shadow, Baluch Nationalism an SovietTemptations, CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1981, p. 52.

125TheformerChiefJusticeShahabuddinconfidedhisviews tomeinpersonsomeyearslaterwhenwemetinLahore.

control whatsoever, except with respect to what was referred to as 'new expenditure', whichrepresentedaveryminoraspectoffinancialmatters.TheAssemblywastobe givennopowerstorefuseinvotingthemoneysupplies;alltheycoulddowas impotently criticize it if they wished to. In reality, under the proposed Constitution, PresidentAyubKhan'sresponsibilitiestotheAssemblyandtheBDmemberswas minimal,andhisexecutivepowerwasalmostunlimited.ThePresident'svetocouldnot be overridden even by two-thirds majority, for he could refer the bill in question to a referendum to his chosen electorate, the 80,000 BD members of Pakistan. It was nothing morethananewversionoftheimperialsystemwhichhadimperiouslyruledBritish India for nearly two hundred years. Like the days of British rule, opposition could nowonce more be controlled with the help of the army and administrative power. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, described the new Constitution accurately when he stated that it was a governmentofthePresident,bythePresident,and for thePresident.126

The proposed Constitution did not meet unanimous approval despite the sycophantic utteringsofmanywhichwereregularlyreportedinourlocalPress.Inhisradio broadcasttothenationon1March1962,AyubKhanannouncingtheConstitutionsaid 'Ibelieveineveryword...andhavecompletefaithinit'.Yetduringthenextfiveanda halfyearstheverysameConstitution'...wastheobjectofsomuchchangeand amendmentbyAyubKhanandhisGovernmentthat,attimes,itappearedasifthey were floundering in a quagmire of irresolute views, conflicting opinions, andapprehensionsforthefuture'.127Itwasamendedonnolessthaneightseparate occasions, and as such, it is singularly difficult to credit the soundness of its intellectual foundations.Inrealityit wasanartificialframeworkdesignedsimplytoproducea politicalsystemincloseharmonywithAyubKhan'sauthoritariannature.

The1962non-partyelectionsresultedintheemergenceoffactionsledbycertainleadersorformedonabasisofprovincialloyalties.Therewasalsotheusualhostof landowning independents'. At the first session of the new Assembly held in June 1962, thenewConstitutionwasdulyratified.WithinamonthAyubKhanassentedtoabill permittingtheformationofpoliticalparties.128BySeptemberofthatyeartheMuslim League(Convention)hadbeenorganizedastheofficialgovernmentparty.Earlierin Augustithad beenannounced by someveteranMuslimLeaguemembersthatacouncil ofthepartywouldmeeton29September.Topre-emptthem,arrangementsweremade forameetingoftheMuslimLeagueconventionatKarachion4September.Onthe

126Finding themselves a few votes short of a majority, the Government obtained the crucial support of the necessary number of members of the National Assembly by dispensing favors. Among these was by a grant of a public transport route permit and Rs. 20,000 formadrassahsto an NWFP religious leader and; by awarding atextile mill license to an MNA from Jhang.

127HerbertFeldman,FromCrisistoCrisis,op.cit.,p.vi.

128Political Parties Act, 1962; This new law was enacted as a result of mounting Opposition pressure in the Assembly which could only be checked by the creation of a government party. Ayub Khan was compelled to reconsider his earlier anti-political party convictions for the sake of sheer expediency and so, one of the key features of the new Constitution was fundamentally altered within weeks of its promulgation.

appointedday,AyubKhan'sloyalistsmetatarowdyandvociferousconvention,and managedtoappointChoudhryKhaliquzzamanastheChiefOrganizeroftheirparty, whichbecameknownasMuslimLeague(Convention).Inreaction,otherMuslim Leaguers later held their council meeting, which led to the formation of the opposition Muslim League (Council).

MuslimLeague(Convention)wascreatedforthepurposeofbecomingAyubKhan's party.Itcomprisedministers,Assemblymembers,andotherfollowersofthe government,includinganynumberofsycophantswishingtoacknowledgetheirloyalty tothegeneral.TheConventionistshad78membersandheldthemajorityinthe Assembly. In November the Opposition elected Ayub Khan's brother, Sardar BahadurKhan,asitsleader.HisdeputieswereMasihurRahmanfromtheeasternwing,and Khair Buksh Marri from the west. Interestingly, of the 60 members in the Opposition, 55 werefromEastPakistan(comprisingover70percentoftherepresentativesofthe easternwing).Thisclearlyrevealedtheexistingrealitiesoftheday-thatsycophancy wasatraitlesscommonamongtheBengalis thanwiththeso-called'martialraces'of West Pakistan.

After appointing himself Presidentin1958,Ayub Khanhad chosenGeneral Musaashis successorascommander-in-chiefofthearmy.Hischoicewaslargelymotivatedby AyubKhan'sconvictionthatMusaposednothreattohim.Musahadrisenfromthe ranksasasoldierandpossessedaremarkablyunambitiousandsubmissive nature. KeepinghisgripontheArmyandbuttressinghispositionwiththehelpofsenior bureaucracy,in1962AyubKhanventuredfurthertogainthesupportofthevery people whom hehad sworn would be thenemesis of Pakistan- thepoliticians. As the history of Pakistan constantly reveals, a government in power never has any difficulty inenlistingthesupportoftheeverexistinghostofcompliantpoliticians.Having officiallyretiredfromtheArmy,AyubKhan,nowacivilianpresident-withthe backingofthepowerfulArmyandadependablebureaucracy-haddecidedtogive himself further legitimacy by 'seeking' the support of his chosen politicians.

***

At the beginning of 1962 I received an invitation from the US State Department to visit America on what they called a 'Leadership Exchange Program'. Very soon after, I wasaskedbyanumberofmyfamilymembers,inparticularmybrotherSherJan,tostand for the local provincial seat in the forthcoming elections. Sher Jan had already discussedtheissuewiththeresident familypolitician, ourbrotherMir Balakh Sherwho it seems, hadagreedwiththeideawhenSherJanbroacheditwithhim.Initially,beingfamiliar withthestyleofpoliticsinDeraGhaziKhan,Iwasnotallthatkeentoparticipate.But Sher Jan was most persuasive. Largely due to his efforts, I decided to put the US Government's invitation in abeyance. I went from Karachi to Ozman to meet with my brotherandthenonwardstoD.G.Khan.Muchtoourmutualsurprisewelearntthat

the so called Mazari Group had been prevailed upon to allow Ramzan Drishak to standfromourprovincialseat.Itseemedanabsurdsituationtous.SherJanandIwerethe ones who administered the affairs of thetribe, and as far as the Mazari tribe wasconcerned we were their natural leaders. But politics can be a strange pursuit. Sher Janwasbelligerent,insistingthatIfilemynomination,butforonceitwasIwhokeptthe calm-usuallythepositionwasquitethereverse.Forthesakeoffamilyunity,Idecided toreturntoKarachiandproceedwithmyplannedtriptotheUS.SherJanalso withdrew to the seclusion of his fort in Ozman. Earlier, disgruntled with the constantfamily intrigues taking place in Rojhan, he had also decided - like me - to set up home elsewhere.Sometwoyearsbefore,hehadconstructedafortforhimselfatOzman,in the tribal area, close to the Suleiman Range. He told me that he had come to enjoy the tranquilityhefoundthereawayfromthepettyrivalriesthatexistedinRojhanatthetime.

InAprilofthesameyearIleftPakistanforaprolongedtripoverseas.Takingthe opportunity,I decidedtovisitplacesthatwere consideredratherexoticandoffthe beatentrackonthewaytotheUnitedStates.Andso,IsawBangkokinpristine conditionbeforetheVietnam-basedUSGI'sruinedit.Commodore(laterAdmiral) Ahsan, whowasPakistan's representativetotheSEATOinThailand, insisted thatIstay withhim.Ahsan,athoroughgentlemanandasplendidhost,wouldtenyearslater,afterhisretirementasNavalChief,becomemuchesteemedforhisroleasthehonorable and fair-minded governor of East Pakistan who did his utmost to preserve the unity of Pakistan.FromBangkok I flewtoHong Kong,whichthenlackeditsnowtowering skyscrapers, and then on to Tokyo, which had begun its recovery from the devastation of the war. In Tokyo my old schoolmate Aziz Khan of Hoti, then Third Secretary at the PakistanEmbassy,wasmyhost.AfewdayslaterIleftforHonolulu,whichwas, especiallytheWaikikiarea,unspoiltandstilluncommercialized.Duringavisittothe UniversityofHawaiiIwasofferedascholarshiptoresearchBalochhistorybyProfessor RonaldAnderson,theirDirectorofAsianStudies.Amusingly,afewmonthslaterI receivedanothersimilaroffer,thistime itwasmade by DrRichardFryre,Headof PersianStudiesatHarvardUniversity.ItwouldseemthatBalochscholarswereinshort supply at American universities in the 60s!

From Hawaii it was the turn of continental United States, which was in its heyday withJohnFitzgeraldKennedy asPresident.AtthattimetherewasnoairportatWashington, DC.TheplanelandedatBaltimorewhereIwasreceivedbyMajorHarryPaynterofthe US Air Force who drove me to my hotel at Washington. I was quite taken aback by the unexpectedsightofpovertyaswedroveintothecity.Theroutetookusthrougha seriesofslumswhichexistedclosetotheheartofWashington.IntheUScapital,the StateDepartmenthadarrangedforaCongressman,WilliamMinshallofIllinois,toact asmyhost.TheCongressmantookmeonatouroftheHouseofRepresentativesand the Senate, both of which were in session, and the remarkable Congressional Library,whichhasthelargestrepositoryofbooksintheworld.LaterIwastakentolunchinthe

Congressdiningroomwhichwaslocatedunderthelargedomewhichdominatedthe building.OtherguestsatlunchincludedAzizAhmed,Pakistan'sAmbassador,and Humayun Mirza, Iskander Mirza's son.

FromWashingtonItravelledtoKnoxville,Tennessee,whereI wastakentotheoffices ofthethenfamousTennesseeValleyAuthority,andthenonwardstoOklahomawhereI stayed at Fort Sill with some American friends, Colonel John Glorio and hiswife Vivian, whohadrecentlyreturnedfromapostinginKarachi.FortSillhadagunners'school where I met a number of young Pakistani army officers who were undergoing training. Ialsotookthe opportunityofvisitingthe ApachechiefGeronimo'stomb.Frommy childhood I had retained a lingering admiration for the Red Indians who had fought so courageously against such overwhelming odds. The Apache chief was one of the more notablewarriorsofhisrace,aremarkablybraveman.FromOklahomaIventuredsouth toMiami,NewOrleansandTexas.Inthesouthernstatesdiscriminationagainstthe Americanblackracewasstillpervasive.Thereweresignsonstreetbenches,toiletsand otherpublicconveniencesclearlystatingtheappallingwords'WhitesOnly'.Theracism wasonlyleveled attheBlacks,andasaPakistaniIneverfound anyanimosity orbias directedtowardsme.Onthecontrary,everywhereIwent,Iexperiencedextremely warm American hospitality. I continued on to Arizona, Nevada and California, where I visited Los Angeles, San Francisco and Sacremento. At the state capital I was given the opportunitytomeetwithGovernorPatBrown,whostayedinpowerforalengthy period until meeting defeat at the hands of Ronald Reagan in 1966.

Itravelledextensively intheUSandthefew AmericansI metwhowerefamiliar with PakistanwouldbeginbypraisingAyubKhan.ItwasapparentthatthePakistani President'svisittotheUSinmiddleof1961 hadbeenatoweringsuccess.Thesecond person they would invariably mention was Bashir, the Pakistani camel-driver who had recentlyvisitedtheUSatVice-PresidentJohnson'spersonalinvitation.Coincidentally, whenIarrivedatSeattletovisittheWorldFairthatwasbeingheldthere,Iwas receivedattheairportbyCaptainSaeed,formerlyofthePakistanArmy,nowaprotocol officeroftheUSStateDepartment.Saeed,whohadoncebeenanADCtoGovernor- General Ghulam Muhammad, had married an American lady and had settled in the US. He had aninteresting story totell. Itseemsthatatthe time of Bashir the camel-driver's visit,theStateDepartmenthadgotintoaflurrysearchingforanUrduinterpreteras BashircouldnotutterawordinEnglish.IntheirsearchtheyhaddiscoveredSaeed, whowasquicklyhandedthejob.Vice-PresidentJohnsonwhoseemedtoenjoytaking Bashiraround,tookalikingtoSaeed.ItwasaresultofthisthatSaeedhadfound himself permanently employed by the State Department.

FromSeattleIflewtoChicago.Ispentafewdaysinthislakesidecityandwasquite impressed by itsremarkable Natural History Museum.Then itwasontoPhiladelphia where I stayed with my friends Stan and Emma Hennimieyer. I took the opportunity of visitingthelocaluniversitywhereImettwogiftedscholars,DrDresdenofthePersian

faculty, and the Arab specialist, Dr Goitein. A few days later Stan drove me through the fascinating Amishcountry,withitshorse-cartsandblackcladfolk,toPrinceton UniversitywhereIremainedaguestofProfessorPhillipHitti,thefamousArab historian.IspenttwoenlighteningdaysatPrinceton,whereIwasputupatsuperbly furnishedLaurieHousesurroundedbyfiveacresofbeautifulgrounds.Themansion containedsomevaluablefurniture,includingabedandasetofdrawerswhichonce belongedtoNapoleonBonaparte,andwedinedatasuperblycrafteddiningtablewhichhadbeenbuiltforPresidentWilson.IstillhaveabookonArabhistoryinmy librarywhich had beenpresented to mebyits author, PhillipHitti, as amemento of myvisit.

IspentafewdaysinNewYorkasatourist.DuringmystaythereIwashostedameal at the United Nations restaurant by the Pakistani Consul-General, Hamdani. We werejoinedby Choudhury Zafarulla,Pakistan's outgoing PermanentRepresentative,Agha Shahi,thenewly-designatedPermanentRepresentative,andJavaidIqbal,Allama Iqbal's son, who was on his way to a conference in Mexico. Finally I arrived in Boston to attendasix-weekInternationalManagementseminarheldatHarvardUniversity.Atthe seminar there were participants from many other countries and it was pleasing tomake their acquaintance. My friend, Bill Hall, the US Charge d' affaires at Karachi, had arranged for me to meet a number of leading academics at his Alma Mater, Harvard University.WhilethereImetanumberofpeople,themostnoteworthybeingEd Mason,theDeanoftheHarvardBusinessSchoolandaprofessornamedHenry KissingerwhowasthenadvisortoPresidentKennedy.LittledidIknowwhenhetook me out for lunch that Kissinger would have such a widespread impact on international affairs withinashortspanofyears-but,Isuppose,in1962,neitherdidhe.

AfteralengthythreemonthstayintheUnitedStates,IwenttoLondonwhereIwas joinedbymywife.TogetherwetravelledacrossEuropevisitingStockholm, Copenhagen, The Hague, Geneva and Paris before heading south to Rome and Vienna. AtIstanbulwesawtherelativelyundevelopedcitywithitsancientbuildingsstill dominatingtheskyline-theviewoverthe Bosphorusstillremainsoneofmyfavorite sights. After a brief few days in Teheran, I was back in Pakistan in October of 1962.

A few days after my return I was invited as chief guest to address the Baloch Student's Organization (BSO) at the Karachi University. Among the other guests present wereAli Buksh.Talpur,AliAhmedTalpur,andAttaullahMengal-whohadrecentlybeen releasedonbailandwasshortlytobere-arrestedthefollowingmonth.Inmyshort speechImadeadeliberatereferencetothejailedGulKhanNaseertocriticizetheregime:

...herightlydeservesthetitleofthe'RebelPoetofBalochistan'forthegreat service andsacrifices he has made. Let us therefore once again dedicate ourselvestohelpourBalochbrothersinwhatevercapacitywecan.Theirsacrificeswillnot

goinvain,andGodwilling,timewillprovetoeveryonethatinspiteofthe present darkness, dawn will arise.

Though the speech mayseem tame by modern conventions, by the standards of Ayub Khan's reign it was bordering on the seditious.

Forthe nextfewmonthsI remainedbusy withtripstoSonmianiandlargely preoccupied with work which went under the general description of tribal affairs. The conditionsinBalochistanhadnotimprovedduringmyabsence,butinfacthad worsened.The prolonged detention of the aged Nauroze Khan Zehriwhowasserving a life sentence,129the more recent arrests of Akbar Bugti, Attaullah Mengal, Khair Buksh Marri,GulKhanNaseer,GhousBukshBizenjoandothers,hadledtoasituation simmeringwithdiscontent.In1963aloosely basedguerrillaorganizationcalling itself thePararishadcomeintoformation.Theirnumbersremaineduncertainastheyhad establishednumerousarmedcampsinremoterareasofBalochistan.ThePararis claimedthatbyJuly1963theyhadestablishedtwenty-twobasecamps,eachwith400full-time volunteers and several hundred part-time reservists, spread over 45,000 squaremiles, fromtheMengal tribalarea ofJhalawaninthesouth,totheMarri-Bugtiareain the north.130

InFebruary1963myfriendAkbarBugtinowaskedmetoenlisttheservicesofA.K. Brohitoactonhisbehalf.BrohihadbeenAkbar'stutorduringhisyouth,andhefelt sure that the lawyerwoulddo his utmost to get him out of imprisonment. I visitedA.K. Brohiathisofficesandmetwithakeenresponsefromhim.Thelawyerrecalledhis former pupil fondly and agreed to defend him in court. Imagine my surprise two days later when I returned to find a suddenly much chastened Brohi who now seemed very eager to do anythingother than to defend Akbar Bugti! He hadreceived a curt message fromthegovernmentaskinghimtodesistfromhelpingAkbar.Theselfproclaim defender of law and liberty had cowed down abjectly, and understandably so, as a few dayslatertheannouncementwasmadeofhisappointmentashighcommissionerfor Pakistan in Delhi.

AfewweekslaterinAprilAttaullahMengalinformedmeofMohammedHussainUnka'splight.UnkawasaBalochintellectualwhohadbeenaclosesupporterofthe Khan of Kalat's brother, Agha Abdul Karim. He had been in jail on a charge of sedition, and was having difficulty meeting his bail payment. My commitment to the cause was strong,andI paidthe bailmoneywithoutgiving the matterasecondthought.Ten thousand rupees was not a small amount inthe early 1960s.

129Sevenofhiscloserelatives-includinghisyoungson-werehangedinHyderabadandSukkurjail.

130SeligS.Harrison,InAfghanistan'sShadow,BaluchNationalismanSovietTemptations,p.52.

In August 1963 I was approached by a delegation of leaders from Balochistan whoincluded,MeharullahMengal(AttaullahMengal'sbrother),LaiBukshRind, MuhammadYusufNaskandi,KadirBukshMutahir,AkbarBarakzai,andarelationof mine,Saif-ur-RehmanMazari,131whospentmostofhistimeinQuettaespousingthe causeofBalochnationalism.Theypersuadedmetomakeanefforttobridgethe extremedividebetweentheregimeandtheBalochleadership,mostofwhomwerein jail. There was much distrust on both sides. The rulers viewed all Baloch as potential secessionists while the politically conscious among the Baloch felt that the people of Balochistan,stillunderthegripofArmyoccupation,werebeingforcefullyadministeredasacolonybythebureaucratsandthegeneralsandbeingdeniedtheir right to be treated as equal citizens in Pakistan.

I draftedarathersevere memorandumaddressedtoAyubKhanstating theBaloch viewpoint, which included the following words:

We are first and foremost patriotic Pakistanis. Our fight is not against FM Ayub KhanorthePresidentialsystem,butagainstthepersonalitycult,unbridled dictatorship,andthebureaucraticsystemoflawinthehandsofthe unsympathetic,andbrutalattitudeoftheofficials.Westandforafreeand democraticsociety,adultfranchise,andtheruleoflaw.Forthisconvictionwe arewillingtomakeanysacrificeandsufferforthisjustcause.Timeandagainwe aretoldandthreatenedthatwearefighting againstapowerfulregimewithno hopeofsuccess.Letitbeunderstoodquiteclearlythatoppressioninthelongrun doesnotsucceedinsuppressingthegenuinedesireofthepeople,andinstead only bringsthemtogether and raisestheir morale. Governmentsand individuals come and go, but the country of Pakistan, with the Grace of Almighty, has come to stay.

Thesewerehardlypeaceful words writtentoamanconvincedofhisauthorityand destiny, but we were not prepared to shirk from our obligation to the people ofBalochistan. Bluntness in stating facts was a traditional Baloch attribute (which I sadlyfind,nowthirtyyearslater,tohavebeenlargelydilutedamongthenewergenerations oftherace).WealsomadethefollowingdemandswhichIhavesubsequentlyabridged for the sake of easy readability:

1. Thereleaseofallinternedprisoners,withdrawalofallcasespending against them and restoration of their confiscated property.

2. The setting up of a Board of Inquiry under aHigh Court judge to examine the atrocities committed in Balochistan, and the guilty officials punished.

131Saif-ur-RehmanMazariwasmarriedtoSirdarKhairBukshMarri'ssister.

3. CreationofauniversityinBalochistan.Alsomakingeducation compulsoryaswellasfree.Constructionofacollegeineachdistrict,a highschoolineachtehsil,amiddleschoolineachsub-tehsilandprimary school in each sizeable village.

4. Balochi be recognized as a regional language and be used as a medium of instruction in all primary classes.

5. Constructionof ahospitalineachtehsilanddispensariesineverysizeablevillage.

6. GovernmentservantgradesofClassII,inandlowerbereserved exclusivelyforthoselocallydomiciled.All developmentworkstorecruit local labor.

7. Constructionofroadsandimprovedcommunicationsamustfor Balochistan. The local harbors and fisheries to also be developed.

8. Acompleteabolitionofthesirdarisystem.

Thememorandum,whichwassignedby measaleaderof'concernedBaloch'was delivered by hand to Ayub Khan by Maulana Bashani, who had offered to act as a go- between. I was to receive no reply from the Government.

In February 1964 I received a disastrous blow. On the ninth of that month I was atSonmiani and ready to depart for Ozman to see my brother Sher Jan, when thetehsil'sDeputySuperintendentofPolicecametoseemeonsomeurgentwork.Hewasteda greatdealofmytimeandasaresultIhadtopostponemydeparture.Earlynext morningIheadedofftoOzman,drivingmyjeepaccompaniedbytworetainers.The road to Guddu Barrage was stillkuchaand it took us more than two hours to reach Kashmor.JustbeforereachingKashmorIwaswaveddownbySaeedKhan,thewaderaoftheMazariclanofEasiani.Lookingveryanxious,heapproachedmyjeepwindow.In a concerned voice he told me, 'I have just heard that Sirdar Sher Jan Khan has been wounded. He has been taken to Rojhan to seek medical attention.' Then he added thewords,'Iamsurehewillbeallright,it'sprobablyonlyaminorwound.'Deeply

distressed, Itriedtotakea smallmeasure of confidencefromthe words'hewillbe all right'. SaeedKhaninsistedonaccompanyingmetocheckonmybrother'swelfareand I headed forRojhanasfastasI could drive.A few milesafter theturnoff fromKashmor, I sawabusapproaching.Itstoppedthemomentthedriverrecognizedmyjeep.A numberofmengotout.Theywereallbare-headed.Theremovalofthetraditional turban is a mark of mourning among the Baloch, and is usually done on the death of a seniormemberofthefamilyorthesirdarofthetribe.Astheyapproachedmethey brokedownweepingandbeganbeatingtheirchests.MyheartsankandIknewthe

worst had happened. I had lost my brother. Without stopping to talk to the men, I desperatelydroveon.ThethirtymilestoRojhanwereakintoapersonalnightmare.I wasnumbedwiththedeepestsenseofgriefIhaveexperiencedinmylife.

All along the route every manwe sighted was bareheaded, with his turban undone and looselydrapedacrosshischest.TheywereallheadingforRojhan.Thedustyroad throughtheariddeserttookoveranhourtocross,andinadazedstateIreached Rojhan.Idrovestraighttoourfamilyoldcourthouse,theMini.Thetenacreopenmaidaninfrontofthebuildingwasfilledwiththousandsofbewilderedwhite-robed menwhohadspontaneouslygatheredupon hearingthenews.Morewerejoiningthem. I had to park my jeep at a distance as the way was completely blocked, and picked my waythroughthecrowdonfoot.Someofthemenhadrubbeddustintheirhair,an ancientsign of deep grief. Itwasa harrowing sightwhich I will never forget. The whole tribewasgatheringtosharetheirgriefattheunexpecteddeathoftheiryoungthirty- four-year-oldSirdar.SherJanhaddevotedagreat part ofhis lifelivingamongthetribe

-thecitieshadheldlittleinterestforhim.Hehadbeenamuch-lovedman.

SherJanhaddiedlatethepreviousnight.Earlier,expectingmyarrivalatOzman,he had posted men in the desert with lanterns in case I lost my way in the darkness of the desert.Afterhissuddendeath,everyefforthadbeenmadetocontactme.Therewere notelephonesinthosedays.Inthemiddleofthenight,ridershadbeensentfrom Ozrnan to Sonmiani, a direct distance of some thirty-five miles. It had taken themessengers time to rouse the boatmen to ferry them across the river. They arrived in Sonmianiminutesaftermydeparture.HavingreachedRojhan,Inowfacedthetragic taskofburyingmybrotheronmyown.MirBalakhSherhadleftKarachibyroadas soonashehadheardthenews,butitwouldtakemanyhoursbeforehereached.He finallyarrivedatonethenextmorning.Theroadswereverybadinthosedays. NecessitydictatedthatSherJanbeburiedwithinatwenty-fourhourperiod.

ForoverfortydaysMirBalakhSherandIsatinmourningatRojhan.Virtuallyevery member of the Mazari tribe from all over came to join us in our grief. Fqod was served tothegatheredmultitudeforsixweeksaswasourtradition.Othersfriends, neighboring Sirdarsandwell-wisherscame fromfarandwide toexpresstheir sympathies. It took me a long time to recover from my loss. Sher Jan or Jani as he was affectionatelycalledwasagood-naturedhumanbeing.Hewasalwaysgenerous, thoughtfulandlovingtome-everythingonecouldaskforinabrother.Ihadlosta supporting pillar in my life.A void had been created that still remains with me to this very day.

***

AfewmonthslaterIfacedtheprospectofleadingtheelectioncampaignforMiss Fatima Jinnah in district Dera Ghazi Khan. With Sher Jan no longer there to help share

theburden,theresponsibilityoflookingafterthewholeMazariareanowlargely devolvedonme.Even afterour brother'sdeath,Mir BalakhSherexpressedlittle interest in tribal affairs.

PoliticalpartiesopposedtoAyubKhanformedanewgroupcallingitselfCombined OppositionParties(COP).132Thecombinedpartiesgladlyreceivedamongtheirnumber anyonewhowasequallyas determinedtoremoveAyubKhanfromoffice.Inaturally welcomedtheirofferandjoinedthem.AnearlycontenderfortheCOP'spresidential candidatewasGeneralAzam,whoasgovernorofEastPakistan,hadprovedtobe immenselypopularandhadasubstantialfollowingthere.Thefactthathewasanex- generalandhadparticipatedinthedeclarationofMartialLawasacloseassociateof Ayub Khan, went, in the end, against his candidature.

Previously,Daultana,ChaudhryMuhammadAliandafewothershadapproached Miss Fatima Jinnah and pleaded with her to stand against Ayub Khan, but Miss Jinnah found it difficult to place her trust in politicians. A fewyears earlier during the political debacleofthe1950s,MissJinnahhad,notsurprisingly,becomedisenchantedwith politicians,andhadgone asfaraswelcoming AyubKhan'stakeover.She hadthen hopedthatthechangewouldleadtoamorestableformofgovernment.Theeventsthat followedhadledhertodislikethedespotismoftheregime,andthepersonalitycult that had grown around the General. In the end it took Maulana Bashani^133to convince hertoovercomeherdistasteforpolitics. HepleadedwithherthatEastPakistanlooked uponherasthesymbol of democracy, and thatsheshould notletdownthepeoplewho hadplacedsuchhighhopesonher.ShefinallyagreedtobeCOP'spresidentialcandidate.

MissJinnahpossessed afirmand dauntlesscharacter. Beingthesisterof the founderof thecountry,shewasheldingreatrespectbythepeoplewhoreferredtoheras'Madar-i- Millat'.Thepublicwasmuchmovedbytheideaofthevenerableanddynamiclady takingontheentrenchedstrong-man,AyubKhan.Herappealwentdirectlytothe heartsofthe peopleasshefiercelyattackedthemanwhohadsuppressedthe freedoms ofspeechandexpression.She calledAyubKhanapower-hungry dictatorwhohad conspired for years to seize power, and alluded to the growing stories of nepotism and corruptionimplicatingclosemembersofthepresident'sfamily.MissJinnahherself, possessedanunblemishedreputation.Hercampaignmetwithatremendousresponse

132It included the Council Muslim League led by Khwaja Nazimuddin Mumtaz Daultana; the Awami League led by MujiburRahman:theNationalAwamiParty led by WaliKhan;the Nizam-i-IslamPartyled byChaudhryMuhammad Ali; and Jamaat-i-Islami (led by Maulana Maudoodi).

133Ironically Bashani was the first to back out on Miss Jinnah. His excuse at that time was that as China (his party's overseas mentor) had friendly relations with Ayub Khan's regime, he was not in a position to oppose Ayub Khan. Later, however it became an open secret that Bhutto, acting as Ayub's emissary, had bribed Bashani with Rs. 500,000 to ensure withdrawal of his support from the COP. Some years later I confronted Bashani with this accusation. The Maulana did not bother to deny it. He said that the money had been donated to help run hismadrassahs.

amongthepublic.But,asweallknew,thefateofthepresidentialelectionlayinthe hands of the 80,000 BD members. The government had already made two very shrewd movesduringtheBDmemberelectioninOctober-November1964.First,the ConventionMuslimLeaguedidnotnominateanyofficialgovernmentcandidates,whichmighthaveled totheirpossiblerejectioninfavorof othercandidateslikelytobe votingforMissJinnah.Insteadthegovernmentplannedtowinoveramajorityofthe newly elected BD members by patronage and coercive pressure during the two-month gapleadingtothepresidentialelections.Theothercleverstratagemwasthedecisionto holdtheNationalAssemblyelectionsafterthepresidentialone.IftheAssembly electionshadbeenheldearlier,the governmentwouldhave beenforcedtogive its supporttotheleaderofoneparticularfactioninaruralarea,therebyautomatically antagonizingtheleadersoftheotherlocalfactions.Byavoidingtheearly,selectionof thegovernmentcandidate,thegovernmentensuredsupportfrommostofthefeuding landowning factions.

On24December, theCOPheldapublicmeetinginDeraGhaziKhan. Thosegathered thereincludedChaudhryMuhammadAli,MushtaqGurmani,MahmoodAliKasuri, NawabzadaNasrullahKhan,mybrotherMirBalakhSher,SirdarZulfiqarAHKhosa, KhwajaNizamuddinofTaunsa,SirdarRamzanDrishakandmanymore.Itwasattendedbyaverylargecrowdwhoweremuchmoved,sometotears,whenHabib Jalib,thepopularpoet,recitedhiswell-knownpoemscriticizingtheregime:'Meinnahin

manta,meinnahinjanta',directedattheone-manConstitution,and'Bachonpargoli

challi',whichdescribedthedeathofastudentprotestorwhohadbeenshotbythe police. The public meeting went extremely well, and news of this unprecedented 'achievement' reached Kalabagh. The Governor soon brought the full force of the local administration against us.

Shortly after the meeting, I received a telegram from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister.Themessagesimplysaid,'CometoKarachi'.WhenIarrivedatKarachihe came over to visit me. He told me that he had come as a friend and wanted to give the bestpossibleadvice.Thepurposeofhismissionwasobvious-hewantedmeto withdrawmysupportforMissJinnah.BhuttoinsistedonreferringtoMissJinnah derisivelycalling her'Budhi',andhislanguagetowardsheroftendescendedtothe gutter level, much to my distress. He argued,

IftomorrowawarbreaksoutwithIndia[it issignificantthathereferredtoan event which was to takeplace only afewmonths later] whatwouldyou expect a frailoldwomantodo?Shewouldbedisastrousplacedinasituationlikethat. Ayub Khan is a man, a strong one at that. The country needs his rule. We need a savior like Attaturk, and Ayub Khan is the man for the job.

In return, I told him that it wasinconceivable for me tosupportAyub Khan. Not only didIopposethetypeofrulethathehadfoisted uponthecountry, butIhadalsomadea

commitment.A commitmentwhichI firmlybelievedin.Asfarasthe issue ofMiss Jinnahwasconcerned,Itoldhimthatitwaswe,themembersoftheCOP,whohad persuadedthe ladytotakea stand. Itwasnowunthinkable forme tobetray her. And so, my meeting with Bhutto ended on a note of disagreement. He was upset by the fact that he had been unable to convince me, and left in a huff. Thingswould never be quite the same between us ever again.

OnmyreturntoSonmianiIwenttoworkonMissJinnah'scampaign.In1964there were probably only two or three dozen privately owned vehicles in all of D. G. Khandistrict, thelargest in Punjab. Unlikethe rural campaignsof todaywhen eachcandidate hasconvoysofseventyorsovehicles-mostlyhiredtrailinghim,minewasaone- vehicleshow.AlongwithpeoplesuchasmyfriendZulfiqarKhosa,andanumberof otherprominent residents ofthedistrict, wecoveredeverypart ofthedistrict from Taunsa in the north to Kandhkot which lay over a hundred miles to the south in district Jacobabad.ItravelledinmysolitarybutsturdyWilly'sjeep,withaspecially constructed lantern^134affixed to its bonnet. Nearly all the roads in our backward district were stillkucha,anddust became a constant companion duringthe gruellingweeks leading up to the election.

Kalabaghkepttruetoform.Heappointedaspecialtaskforcetodealwiththe Opposition activity in D. G. Khan. His chosen men consisted of Muhammad Khan (the LeghariSirdar),135and Ashiq Mazari(a seniorCSP Officer).136These two together, with thelocalDeputyCommissioner,ChoudhryBashirAhmed,andthelocalPolice Superintendent,NawazishAli,andMianSamad,politicalassistantfortheD.G.Khan tribalareas,wouldholddailymeetingstochalkoutthegovernment'scampaignof repression. Soon we faced the full wrath of the local government administration which wasbeingcloselysupervisedbythegovernor'sspecialtaskforce.Theirfirststepwasto disconnect the supply of irrigation water to our lands at Sonmiani. As we had no other source of irrigation in those days, our cropssuffered. This was followed by instigation ofcriminalcasesinvolving murder,abductionanddacoity againstfourofmy close relations.Anotherrelativewhoheldthechargeofthetribalarea'sbordermilitarypolice wassoonsackedfromhisjob.Thinkingthattheyhaddealtwithus,theythenturned theirattentionontheindividualBDmembers.Towardstheendtheyeveninflicteda reignofterrorontheshopkeepersofRojhanandsomeofourlessprominent

134MissJinnah'sandtheCOP'selectionsymbolwasalantern.

135Sirdar Muhammad Khan Leghari had earlier, in 1960, been 'ebdoed the regime for allegedly approving a previously rejected extension to the 'Gadai Minor' canal for the sole benefit of himself and his family members while he had been the provincial minister for public works in Punjab. Using his link with Kalabagh-whose son was married to his daughter-he had managed to get back into government favor.

136Ashiq Mazari had by now become a habitual opponent of the Mazar chief family. The fault was not all his. Due to reasons of his birth his close family members had refused to acknowledge him and had even tried to deny him his inheritance. The hostility that this had generated on hispart had led to almost a permanent state of enmity.

supporters,toillustratethefullextentofthegovernment'spowerandthehelplessness of the tribe's leaders to confront it.

InD.G.Khandistricttheelectionswerequiteshamelesslyrigged.Inthenorth,fromD.

G.KhantoTaunsa,thepolicethanaydarshadphysicallyroundedupalltheBDmembers ontheeveofelectionday,andkeptthemincustodyuntilthenextmorningwhenthey cast their votes under close police supervision. Taunsa was already quite notorious as duringtheBDelectionsheldacoupleofmonths'earlier,thepolicesuperintendenthad got seven pro-government BD members of Taunsa elected by the simple use of coercion, accompanied by false ballots.

ByelectiondayIwasalreadyawareoftwootherlocationswhereunfairelectoral practiceshadabounded.OneofthesewastheMarri-Bugtitribalareain Balochistan.As the area lay adjacent to Mazari territory, I attempted a journey to Sui on 1 January 1965 onlytofindthattheroadhadbeenstrategicallycutoff-byatwentyfootwidetrench- asitwounditswayaroundsomehills.Similarly,MissJinnah'selectionagentforthe areawaspreventedfrommakingthejourneytoDeraBugti.Hemadetwoattemptsto get there, but the security forces would not let him venture anywhere close. Later it was announced that 100 percent of the Bugti votes were cast in favor of Ayub Khan. In the 1960s the Bugti tribe was solidly behind their jailed chief Akbar Bugti, who had been incarcerateddirectlyonAyubKhan'sinstructions.TheelectionresultsfromtheBugti area were worse than dubious. Later I was to learn that the localtehsildar, who was the presidingofficerforthearea,hadmarkedalltheballotpapershimself.

The second location was the town of Kashmor in Sindh. To my personal knowledge themukhtiarkar, in his capacity as the presiding officer, had called upon each of the local BD members, in person, two days before the elections. Some he chose to bribe, others he intimidated with coercive threats. In one instance themukhtiarkartold a BD membernamedHazoorBukshthathisbrotherwhohadbeendismissedfromhisjobon corruption charges - would be reinstated as apatwari, once Hazoor Buksh had voted for Ayub Khan. The officialdom had many other methods of garnering votes for theircandidate, and when all else failed, then the police was always present to administer the necessary dose of terror to ensure compliance.137

As Miss Jinnah's pollingagent for the Rajanpurtehsilin Punjab,and the KashmortalukainSindh,Ihadalmostdailyrun-inswiththeadministration.OnelectiondayIvisited thepollingboothtofindAyubKhan'sframedphotographprominentlydisplayedonthe wall.I protestedtothepresiding officer,the localAssistantCommissioner,that eitherhedisplayanequallyprominentphotographofMissJinnahalongsideonthe

137Darya Khan Khoso, local pro-government politician, arranged for handgun licenses-which were extremely difficult to obtain in those days-for a number of Kashmor's BD members. When these members went to theDeputy Commissioner's office to get his signature sanctioning their licenses, they were asked to swear on theKoran that they would vote for Ayub Khan before the requisite signature was provided.

wall,orelseheshouldremoveAyubKhan'spictureimmediatelyfromthepremises. ThegovernmentofficerinsistedthatasAyubKhanwasthePresidentofPakistanhe was entitled to have his portrait displayed in the polling station. My insistence that both Miss Jinnah and Ayub Khan were presidential candidates and deserved to be accorded equaltreatmentonelectionday,failedtoimpressthebynowagitatedgovernment officer.Atthisjunctureoneofmysupporters,LaiShah,decidedtotakethematterinto his own hands. He leapt at the wall, grabbed Ayub Khan's picture and tore it to shreds before anyone could stop him. News of this incident soon spread throughout the area.Itdid not take long for this relatively minor news from distant Rajanpur to reach Lahore. I laterlearntthatGovernorKalabaghwasaghastatthenews.Heissaidtohave exclaimed, 'How dare anyone desecrate the picture of the Father of the Nation in this manner!', or words of a similar effect. The servile veneration that the feudal classes of Pakistan unceasingly sink to,in their worship of thesourcesof power inour country, neverceasestoamazeme.AfewdaysafterthiseventatthepollingboothIwas charged with sedition and anti-State activities.

InD.G.Khandistrictthemajorityofthetribalsirdars^138hadsupportedCOPandhad soon found themselves pitched against the full force of the Kalabagh government. Thesame,however,didnotapplytotheotherruralareasofWestPakistan.Inmostrural areas the government, with all its patronage and coercive powers at its command, could easilyde-stabilizetheprevailingsocialhierarchies.Notsurprisingly,inSindhand Punjab the politically powerful and influential land-owning classes had largely aligned themselveswiththegovernment.TheGovernorofWestPakistan,MalikAmir MuhammadKhanKalabagh,wasamanfromtheirownclassandknewhowto forcefullyenlisttheirsupport.Consequently,thepirs,mukhdooms,maliks,waderasof SindhandsouthernPunjab,safeguardingtheirselfinterest,hadassistedtheirlocal deputycommissionersandpoliceofficialsinloyallyassemblingpro-governmentvotes. In other areas the situation was far from dissimilar. Balochistan had by now become a fiefdom of the government officials, and votes for Ayub Khan were amassed by any and every means possible. In East Pakistan, where Ayub Khan had come to be hated, the GovernorAbdulMonemKhan,whohasbeendescribedas'themostexecratedmanin hisprovince',139hadbytheheavyuseofofficialpatronageanddistributionof development funds, disabled much of this hostility among the East Pakistani BD members.140Atthattimethegovernmentparty'scofferswere,unliketheCOP's,well filled.Thenewlyenrichedbusinessmagnateshadbeenaskedtocontributefunds

138With the sole exception of the Leghari Sirdar. Two days before the elections, due to the tremendous pressure exerted by the administration, the Opposition tribes were reduced to two: the Mazaris and the Khosas (thanks to the resilience shown by my friend Zulfiqar Khosa). The others-the Gurchanis, Drishaks, Bozdars, Lunds and Qaiseranis-had been forced to join the government camp.

139HerbertFeldman,FromCrisistoCrisis,op.cit.,p.174.

140In East Pakistan it was not the Deputy Commissioner but the sub-divisional bureaucrat, the Circle Officer Development,responsible for the allocation of development funds,who emerged asthemain forcein pressurizing and persuading the BD members to vote for Ayub Khan. (Khalid Bin Sayeed,The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 238-9).

generously.Insomecasessecrettariffswerefixed.141Asaresultofthisconcertedeffort, thebusinesscommunitypouredlargeamountsofmoneytofundAyubKhan'scampaign.

ThepublichadrespondedtoMiss Jinnah withsuchenthusiasmthateven'mostofthe presspeopleagreedthatifthecontestweredirectelection,shewouldwinagainst Ayub'.142Butthepublichadbeendisenfranchised.Inthe end,MissJinnahreceived 28,345votesfromtheBDmembers,whom,hadshewon,wouldhavebecomepolitically extinctbyMissJinnah'sdeterminationtorevivethedirectadultfranchisesystem.Itwas stillaremarkableperformancewhenoneconsidersthestrenuouseffortsthe governmentmadetobringaboutherdefeat.Itwasobvioustomethattheelectionshad beenshamelesslyinfluenced,andparticularlysointheruralareas.EvenBhutto,who hadbeenoneofthekeyorganizersofAyubKhan's1964re-electioncampaign,later privatelyadmittedtooneofhisconfidantesthattheelectionshadbeenanythingbutfair.143

I met Miss Fatima Jinnah a few days after the elections at her residence at the Mohatta PalaceinKarachi.Irecallshehadalittledognestledinherlapthroughoutourmeeting. Therewerethreeotherdogsscamperingabouttheroombarkingateachother.'You don't mind dogs do you?' she had asked me with an initial show of concern. She was a direct and forceful lady, using words sparingly. As we began discussing the elections, I soonrealizedthatshehadlittleconceptofthegovernmentmachinerythathadbeen unleashed againsther.Havingled ashelteredlifeinrelativeisolation, shewasunaware oftheholdthatthebureaucracyandpolicehadovertheruralareas.Nordidshe understandthenatureofthefeudalsystem,whichhabituallysupportedwhomsoever wastherulingpoweroftheday.IattemptedtoexplaintoMissJinnahthemeansby whichthegovernmenthadwrestedtheelectionfromher.Imentionedinstancesof policeterrorandotherswheremoneyandotherinducementshadchangedhands.Miss Jinnahrefusedtoconsiderthesereasonsassufficient,'Ifthepeoplehadbeen determined,theywouldhavecasttheirvotesformeregardlessofthedifficultiesthey had to face.' She seemed quite bitter and wasof the opinion that the leading politicians had let her down, and did not bother to mince her words.

***

Ayub Khan in his victory speech assured the country that 'no trace of malice, nor ofrevenge should inhibit us from rejoicing in the glory of the people'. It would appear by subsequenteventsthathisfavoredson,theretiredarmycaptain,GoharAyub,choseto

141Copies of two secret letters issued by All-Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) to its members were published in the Weekly Mail of Karachi. These letters requested its members to contribute a levy of Rs. 2 per spindle andRs. 25 per loom. Thetotalincome from this source wasmeant toprovide AyubKhan's partychest with Rs. 1.5 crore.

142KhalidBinSayeed,op.cit.,p.220.

143RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan1967-1977,OxfordUniversityPress,1996.p.327.

ignorehisfather'swords!InWestPakistan, Karachiwasthesolecitytodefythepro- government trend of the elections.144On 4 January, despite theSection 144 of theCode ofCriminalProcedurewhichallowedamagistratetoprohibitmakingofspeechesor theholdingofprocessionsonthegroundsthatitmightlead toadisturbanceofpeace imposedinKarachiatthattime,GoharAyubledalargevictoryprocessionintothe heartoftheOppositionbeltinthecitytoplacessuchasGolimar-sowingforthefirst time,thegermsofethnicdivideinKarachi.Thatnighthavocwaswreakedinthese parts of the city as Gohar Ayub's supporters inflicted their vengeance byburningdown huts and other dwelling places, and firing upon its residents. Those attacked defended themselves,andanight-long conflicttookplace.Itisbelievedthatscoresofpeople died,contrarytoofficialreportsoftwentykilled.Bythissenselessandstupidact,Gohar Ayub ensured that Karachi would become implacably opposed to his father's regime.

Atthisstagemorementionshouldbemade ofGoharAyub.Notmuchcanbegleaned abouthisshortarmycareerotherthanthefactthatheactedasADCtohisfather,and thatheusedtoaccompanyhimonhispresidentialtripsoverseas.145Asaretired militaryofficer,havingheldtherelativelyjuniorrankofcaptain,hewassoon transformed into a major business magnate. The General Motors car assembly plant was converted to form Gandhara Industries, which was jointly established in 1963 by Gohar Ayubandhisfather-in-law,GeneralHabibullahKhanKhattak.Hisotherholdings included an investment company and a canning venture. The retired Army captain'swealth was estimated by foreign specialist, Dr Franz Pick, a few years later, to be in the vicinityofUS$4million.146DrPickalsoestimatedthatthetotalwealthofAyubKhan andhisfamilytobeintherangeofUS$10to$20million.Foramanwhohad,onlya few years earlier, forced his way to power at gunpoint with the self professed aim of eradicatingthecorrupt'sharksandleeches',thiswasasavageindictment.

Corruptioninits nefariousformsbeganvirtually atthe conceptionof Pakistan withthe grossmisuseinthedistributionofevacueeproperty.Thetheftanddeliberate miscalculationofevacuee property wascommittedlargelybythe bureaucratsanda handful of politicians. As Choudhry Zafarulla Khan commented with justifiable anger:

This was not committedby the have nots andthe destitute, but largely by thosewho had suffered from no privation and had not been subjected to any loss. They becameknownasthelocalaffluentrefugees.Someofthemgorgedthemselves withcarrion,wereseverelyinfectedwithmoralleprosyanddoubtless transmitted the poison to the next generation.147

144Of the total 1890 valid votes cast in Karachi, 1049 favoredMiss Jinnah and Ayub got 837. The remaining 4 went to the other two candidates.

145(Lieut.-General)M.AttiqurRahman,BacktothePavilion,Karachi,1989,p.130.

146DrFranzPick,WorldCurrencyReport,April1969.

147MuhammadZafrullaKhan,TheAgonyofPakistan,KentPublications,UK,1974,p.161.

Corruptioncontinuedtoslowlyprosperandgrow.Allegationsweremadeof commissions received by a member of Governor Ghulam Muhammad's family, butIskanderMirzadespitealltheaccusationsmadeagainsthimwasfinancially scrupulous.148UnderAyubKhannepotismandcorruptionenteredanewphase,it openlyenteredthepublicdomain.Also,forthefirsttimedirectfinancialinducements- intheguise ofcash, import licenses,transportroutepermits, licensestoconstruct factories and bank loans and other money making schemes - were given to politicians in returnfortheirsupport.Previouslythetemptationofholdingofficewasconsideredto be sufficient incentive in itself to a politician, but not anymore. In the heavily controlled commercial environment businessmen began offering money and other inducements to bureaucrats who could assist them in obtaining lucrative licenses and other government sanctions.Urban plots became atemptation,as well,for those in power,in one case an areadesignatedasasuburbanparkwaschosenbyGoharAyubtobuildhislarge Karachi house. The concept that the law could not be equally applied to the politically privilegedwastakingapowerfulturnfortheworse.

ItwasduringAyubKhan'sregimethatthearmedforcesbegantoenjoyspecialnew privileges.TheGeneral,unimpressedwiththedemocraticsystem,wantedtokeephis mostpowerfulconstituencyonhisside.Othermembersofthemilitarysoongotanovel opportunity toindulge inmoney-makingactivities.Unlike theircounterpartsin neighboringIndiawithwhomtheysharedacommonhistory,the Pakistanimilitary begantoenjoyexceptionalprivileges.Apartfromthevastamountsoffarmland distributedamongitsofficers,whichIhavementionedearlier,newhousingsocieties were also developed for them. Officers bought urban property at extremely reasonable pricesonly tosellthemlucratively atcommercially higherrates.Retiredofficersno longerwenttotheseclusionoftheirhomes,theybecamediplomats,headsofpublic sectorcompanies,provincialgovernorsandonoccasion,evenwealthyindustrialists.In timesomeof our senior-mostsoldiersweretodevelopatastefor luxury,whichI might add, wastotally at oddswith therequirements of theirchosen profession.149

Afewmonthsafterthe1965elections,ourarmedforceswereseverelyputtothetest. Theheroismandvalourshownbythejawansandyoungofficersduringthedaysof conflictmadetheircountrymenjustifiablyproudofthem.Notbeingjingoisticallyyounganymore,Icanstatethatitismybeliefallwarsareabominable.Asthe successfulBritishgeneral-heroofWaterloo-theDukeofWellington,oncesaid,'The

148TheformerPresidentwastofacearelativelyimpoverishedexistenceduringhismanyyearsofexile.

149This was the beginning of a new culture among our military which would eventually lead to our generals, air chief marshals and admirals driving in prohibitively expensive Mercedes-Benz cars, accompanied o course with a plethora of convoy vehiclesand a cacophony of sirens. The Indian Army,which sharesitspre-Partition history with our forces, still maintains its more spartan accoutrements, which suits a soldier's life concerned solely with the defence of his country. During my days at cadet college we were taught that officers had to lead the jawans by setting an example. What sort of an example can a senior officer cocooned in modern comforts set to his subordinates these days?

nextgreatestmisfortunetolosingabattle,istogainavictory.'Warscauseneedless deathoftheyoung,andintheirwakeleavethousandssadlycrippled,youngwives widowed,innocentchildrenorphaned.Warsalsocreateeconomichavocwhich impoverish nations for many years to come. The only justifiable war, in my book,is the one in which a country is forced to fight to defend its territory against invasion. It is a war of necessity and it hasto be fought regardless of consequences.

The trouble started on 4 April 1965 when Indian forces occupied a Pakistani outpost at DingintheRannofKutch.ThePakistanArmyretaliatedinthebriefwarthatensued, and successfully pushed back the Indians from the disputed area. Despite a cease-fire agreement that followed, tensions between the two countries remained high. The Kutch incident created a strong feeling of animosity towards India. Unfortunately, due to the abject performance of the Indian troops during the conflict, the Pakistani leadership also becameconvincedofthenearinvincibilityofitsowntroops,whichwastohave dangerousconsequences.150ItwasnowthattheKashmirCell,whichhadbeen previouslysetupbythegovernment,decidedtoimplementanewpolicy.

The Kashmir Cell was chaired by Aziz Ahmed, Secretary Foreign Affairs, and consisted ofDefenceSecretaryNazirAhmed,theDirectoroftheIntelligenceBureau,andtwo seniorarmy officers,GeneralsSherBahadurandGulHassanKhan.151The Cellwas greatly influenced bytheviewsofAzizAhmedandhisMinister, ZulfikarAHBhutto. Bhuttohadalsotakentolobby theArmydirectlyby visiting seniorofficersattheir residences,andseekingtoimpressthemwiththeindispensibilityoflaunchingraids acrosstheCease-FireLine.ThesevisitsledGeneralMusatocomplaintoAyubKhan thatBhuttowasbrainwashinghisofficers.152ItmustberememberedthatAyubKhan, despitehisgrandioselyself-imposedrankofFieldMarshal,hadlittlecombat experience.HismuchacclaimedpostingattheBurmafrontduringtheSecondWorld War hadbeen verybrief.153Havingonlyrecently won the elections,(albeitwith blatant rigging) the presidential ego was now tempted by a chance to acquire further glory by addingthelaurelsofvictorytohisname.Inthesummerof1965,Bhuttoadvisedthe President that it was now time to 'hit back hard' at India^154that would help restore his image.LaterduringaCabinetCommitteemeeting,theForeignMinisterinformedthe

150It would lead Ayub Khan to write: 'As a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows...', Ayub Khan to General Musa, 29 August 1965, Annexure G to GHQ letter no. 4050/57 MO-1, 1 August 1973, held in Bhutto Family Archives, (cited in: Stanley Wolpert,Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 90

151StanleyWolpert,op.cit.p.89.

152GeneralMuhammadMusa,MyVersion,Wajidalis,Lahore,1983,p.10.

153(Lieut.-General) M. Attiqur Rahman,op. cit.,p. 83. In hismemoirs, my friend Shaukat Hayat Khan is much more merciless on Ayub Khan. He states that General Reece of the British Army had once told him that he 'had sent [Ayub Khan] back from Burma when he showed tactical timidity': Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan,The Nation That Lost Its Soul, Jang Publishers, 1995, p. 182-3.

154A memorandum sent by Bhutto to Ayub, held in Bhutto Family Archives, (cited in: Stanley Wolpert,Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 89).

Presidentthat'apopularrevoltwassweepingthewholeofIndian-heldKashmir'.155AndsoatBhutto'sbehestandwithAyubKhan'sapproval,'OperationGibraltar'came into existence.

The aim ofOperation Gibraltarwas originallytwofold: one wasto train localKashmiris in the art of sabotage and then send them into Indian-held Kashmir, and the other was totrainguerrillasandunleashthemacrosstheCease-FireLine.Theintentionof OperationGibraltarwastodisruptthesituationintheSrinagarValleyandcreate conditionswherebytheemboldenedlocalpopulacewouldriseagainsttheIndianArmy of occupation using weapons provided by Pakistan. Once the Valley was under a state ofarmedrebellion,thuskeepingtheIndianArmysuitablypreoccupied,theproposed supplementaryOperationGrandSlamwouldthentakeplace.UnderGrandSlam, Akhnurwastobecaptured.ThiswouldsevertheonlyroadlinkbetweenIndiaand Kashmir,therebyisolatingandpreventingthefivedivisionsofIndiantroopsin KashmirfromobtainingfurthersuppliesfromIndia.Bothoftheseoperationswere basedupontwovitalassumptions.Theseassumptionshadlargelyresultedfrom fancifulthinkingonBhutto'spart.Asaself-proclaimedforeignpolicyandKashmir specialist,hehadassuredAyubKhanthatonceOperationGibraltarcommencedthe peopleofIndian-heldKashmirwouldthrowofftheirshacklesandriseagainsttheir oppressors.HealsomanagedtoconvincethePresidentthatIndiawouldneverretaliate by crossing the international border.

By mid-August some 7000 trained guerrillas led by Pakistan Army officers crossed the Cease-FireLineandlaunched theirattack. TheIndianswerecaughtbysurprise,butthe peopleofoccupiedKashmirrefusedtoriseinawarofliberationandengagethe attentionoftheIndianforces.SomeoftheKashmiriseveninformedontheguerrillas leadingtotheirearlycapture.Memoriesoftheatrocitiescommittedbythetriballushkarof1947hadprobablynotbeenentirelyerased.ThismiscalculationallowedtheIndian Army,after someinitialsetbacks,tobeginattacksallalongtheCease-FireLinetoseal theguerrillabasesinAzadKashmir.Thiswasfollowedbyanall-outattackonAzad Kashmir with the intention of capturing its capital, Muzaffarabad. The Pakistani troops providedvaliantresistance againstthisheavy onslaught.Itwasclearlynowtime to launch the counter-offensive, Operation Grand Slam. On the night of 31 August Major- General Akhtar Hussain Malik, commander of the 12th Division, was allowed to launch OperationGrandSlam.On6September,respondingtoPakistanArmy'soffensive towards Akhnur, the Indian Army attacked near Lahore. Open war had begun.

Itisnotmyintentiontodiscussthemilitary aspectsofthe1965Warinthis book.Itis thepoliticalaspectsandtheroleplayedbythecountry'sleadershipthatisofconcern here.InhisbookGeneralGulHassaninsiststhatcommunicationpreparedbyhis DirectorateofOperations,signedbytheCommander-in-ChiefGeneralMusa,andsent

155AltafGauhar,AyubKhan-Pakistan'sFirstMilitaryRuler,Sang-e-Meel,Lahore,1993,p.315-6.

toGeneralAyub,clearlystatedinunambiguouswordsthatIndianreactiontoOperation Gibraltar would be violentand thatthey would not confine the retaliation to theterritoryofKashmiralone.ThisiscorroboratedbyGeneralMusawhoinsiststhathe warnedthePresidentof'thedangersinherentintheForeignOfficeproposal'.156It appearsthatthePresidentchosetoignoretheadvicegivenbyhisownsoldiersand instead followed the 'wisdom' proffered by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Foreign Office. Not surprisingly, after the war had ended Ayub Khan was to tell Mumtaz Bhutto, 'Your cousin is a madman. Don't follow him! He'll lead you astray, get you into trouble'.157

Oncemorethejawansandyoungofficersofourarmedforcesdisplayedgreatvelour andfoughttheinvaderswithintensity.Manydied,morewereinjured,neworphans andwidowswerecreated,butPakistanwasinastateofeuphoria.Asinallwars,the firstcasualtywasthetruth.UnderthecontrolofthewilyAltafGauharwewere subjectedtoanintensecampaignofwartimepropaganda.Fedabatteryof'sugar- coated'truthsandmistruths,thepublic'semotionsweregreatlyheightenedandit became convinced that the Indians were going to be trounced any day. The reality was sadlydifferent.TheeagerlyawaitedPakistanicounter-offensivecodenamed'Mailed Fist'launchedfromanareanearKasurranagroundby11Septemberinthe waterlogged fields of Khem Karan. The abrupt ending of the counter-offensive led to a suddencollapseofPakistan'sentire militarystrategy.Withoutthe possibilityofany furtherdecisiveoffensive,thewarwaseffectivelyover.Ironically,byengaginginhis propaganda campaign with such gusto, Gauhar had doomed his mentor. Ayub Khan's subsequent efforts to end the war would expose him to the charge of 'snatching defeat from the jaws of victory'.

Modern warfare, as we know, cannot subsist on sheer bravery alone. Its demands feed upon a heavy and constant supply of logistics; guns are no good without ammunition; planes need bombs; fuel is not only required by tanks and airplanes but also by trucks thatsupplytroopsengagedinbattleatthefront.Aftersixteendaysofopenwar,the PakistanArmywas runningshortof vitalmaterial. Ourarmedforces were dependant onsuppliesofwarmaterialfromabroad,particularlyfromtheUnitedStatesof America. US military aid to both Pakistan and India was cut-off the moment war broke out.Indiamanagedtomaintainweaponryfromothersourcesbuttheembargocauseda greater problem for Pakistan. A large part of our army supplies and virtually all of our airforce'srequirementweredependantonAmericanequipment.AyubKhanknewhowperilouslylowthesupplyofbombsandbulletswere.Hewas,unlikethepublic who were caught up in Altaf Gauhar's world of propaganda, aware of the exact lossesinlives,planesandtanksandhadtoaccepttherealityofthesituation.ThePresident agreedtoacease-firewhichtookplaceon23September1965.InJanuary1966peace talkswereheldatTashkentattheinvitationoftheSovietPrimeMinister,Aleksei

156GeneralMuhammadMusa,op.cit.,p.6.

157StanleyWolpert,ZulfiBhuttoofPakistan,op.cit.,p.92.

Kosygin.UndertheTashkent Declaration both sides agreedto withdrawtheirtroops to the positions they had held prior to 5 August 1965 (i.e., before the commencement of Operation Gibraltar).

AtthetimeoftheSeptembercease-fireitmusthavebecomeapparenttoAyubKhan thathehadgambledinKashmirandlost.TheaimsofOperationGibraltarand OperationGrandSlamhadnotbeenachieved,theSrinagarValleyhadnotbeenwrested fromIndiancontrol. He hadbeenwrong tothink thatthere wouldbe ageneral uprising in Kashmir. He was wrong also in believing that the Indians would not extend theconflictoutsideKashmir'sCease-FireLine.TheresultingwarwithIndia,acostly eventinbothlivesandexpenditure,hadyieldednowinnersnoranyvisible gains- despite the factthatPakistanisoldiershadwithstoodamore numerousenemy and foughtthemtoastandstill,initselfaremarkableachievement.Itwouldbenormalin thesecircumstancesforAyubKhantoplaceblameonthosethathadadvisedhimto pursuethisventure.158BhuttoknewbynowthathisroleasthekeysubordinateinAyub Khan's regime had come to an end.

***

On the evening of 6 OctoberBhuttorang me.I rememberthe incidentwell asitwas my birthday.Mywifehadpreparedaspecialteawithcakeandherusualdeliciousselection of snacks and titbits. My children had gatheredaround the tea table whenthe telephone rang.Bhuttosoundeddejectedandwanted metocome over.I toldhimthatI was busy with a family birthday, not wishing to reveal that in fact it was mine. But he wasveryinsistent,eventotheextentofsoundingabitdesperate.'Youmustcome,I have tosee you', he said with his voice strangely breakingwith emotion. Leftwith little choice,Ihadtodesertthefamilygatheringandleavefor70Clifton.Onenteringthe house I saw his wife Nusrat standing on thestaircase with a worried look on her face. Shethenwavedmeforward'Zulfi'sinhisbedroomwaitingforyou'.WhenIenteredtheroomIfoundhimlyingproneonhisbedlookingveryshattered.Hegotupand approached me.I noticed his eyes were unusually bloodshot. He then gripped me in a tightembraceandtearsbeganflowingdownhisface.'IamsorrySherbaz,Itrulyam sorry',hesaid.Iwasnaturallyabitdumbfoundedbyhisbehavior.Bhuttothen continued, 'I should havesupported MissJinnahmyself. Imadeabig mistake.'I uttered a few words of solicitude tocalm him down, and after a while I succeeded. He finallylet go of me and we both sat down.

ForthenexthourBhuttolambastedAyubKhanandtheArmy.Hesaidtome,These useless miserable people refused to take my advice. If they had then they wouldn't havelostthiswretchedwar.'ThenherantedatAyubKhan.'ItwasIwhomadeAyubKhan

158Ayub later referred to the 1965 War as 'my weakest and fatal point' He said that he had been greatlymisled by theForeignMinistryduoofZulfikarAliBhuttoandAzizAhmed:G.W.Choudhury,TheLastDaysofUnitedPakistan, Oxford University Press. 1993, p. 20.

respectedoverseas.Withoutmyhelphewouldhavebeenaninternationalnothing.I served him loyally for so long, and now the bastard has ditched me. Now he is making me eat shit and soon he will sack me.' Then he launched into a diatribe against General Musa,theCommander-in-ChiefoftheArmy.Afterabusinghimcopiously,hebegan questioningtheGeneral'scourageandmilitaryacumen.Beforetheeveningwasover, helambastedthearmygeneralsforbeingimbeciles.'Iftheyhadonlylistenedtome, Kashmir would have been ours.' I listened to him in silence, not wishing to point out to himthathewasnotacknowledgedtobeanexpertonmilitarystrategy.Itwasan evening of tirades which I patiently bore up with. Seeing the state he was in, I actually feltsorryforhim.Hewasunderimmensepressureandwishedtoletoutsteamby talkingtosomeone.IhadrealizedbythenthatBhuttohadchosenmebecause,asa friendaswellasanopponentoftheregime,Iwouldnotbetrayhisinnerthoughtstohis colleaguesinpower. During thewar Bhuttohad excited thepublicwithhisemotionally charged speeches, including the one in which he had declared, 'We will wage a war fora thousand years.' Inthe aftermath of thewarhe had emerged as anational hero inthe eyes of the jingoistic masses, but within 'the government his influence had plummeted. Onlyhiswartimepublicpopularityhadpreventedhisearlydismissal.Hewaseven snubbedbyAyubKhanduringtheTashkenttalks.159Thoughheventedhisrage privately,publiclyhecontinuedtodefendtheTashkentDeclarationandtriedhisbestto retain his job as Foreign Minister, but it was to no avail.160By March he was dismissed as secretary-general ofthe Convention Muslim League. On 20 June 1966 hewas sacked fromhisofficeofMinisterforForeignAffairsbyAyubKhan,thoughthepretextthen officially given was 'a leave granted for health reasons'. He was ensconced in a special governmentrailwaycarandsenttoKarachi.AyubKhan,waryofBhutto'spublic popularity,wantedtoensurethatheremainedsilent,so,onthewayitwasarranged thatBhuttomeetwithGovernorKalabaghatLahore.Ahugeandenthusiasticcrowd receivedBhuttoattheLahorestation,butherefusedtoutterawordtothem.Duringhis meetingwiththeGovernor, hewasread out theRiotAct and told innouncertain terms whathisfuturewouldentail ifhedecidedtopubliclyopposethegovernment.Bhutto arrived at Karachi totally cowed down. Malik Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh had acquiredsuchareputationforoppressionthatevenBhuttowasterrifiedofhim.Theex- foreignministersoonleftforanextendedgovernment-paidtripoverseasspecially arrangedsothathewouldstayoutofthepubliceye.ItwasonlywhenKalabaghleft officethreemonthslaterthatthepoliticalfieldappearedlessfilledwithdreadfor Bhutto. He returned to Pakistan a few weeks later in October having regained some of his lost confidence.

159Ayub Khan's snubs are confirmed by Stanley Wolpert who states that the President insisted on meeting Shastri on his own, and on one occasion extended a forefinger forcing Bhutto to back away from joining them. Ayub also began having solitary meetings with Altaf Gauhar, and Bhutto was no longer accorded this presidential privilege. (Stanley Wolpert,op. cit., p. 100).

160Bhutto defended the Tashkent Declaration in his speeches before the National Assembly on 14 and 16 March 1966, and in his press statement issued at Larkana on 15 January 1966 (this is also confirmed by: Hamid Yusuf,Pakistan in Search of a Democracy, Afrasia Publications, Lahore, 1980, p. 85).

Afewweeksafterhisreturn,mywifeandI wereinvitedtotheBhuttos'forlunch.The only thing I remember of that particular occasion was an episode involving a foreign correspondentfromThe Times.Thecorrespondenthadrecentlyreturnedfrom RawalpindiwherehehadinterviewedAyubKhan.DuringlunchBhuttoaskedthe man, 'Did Ayub mention anything about me during the interview?' The correspondent repliedinthenegative,whereuponBhuttoturnedlividwithrageandexplodedintoa loudabusiveharangueagainstAyubKhan.Thewordsheusedinthepresenceofthe lady guestswere quiteunnecessary.I decidedtoleaveearly thatday.Onthewayhome, mywife,Souriya,madeitcleartomethatthiswouldbethelasttimeshewouldvisit the Bhutto household. Despite her friendship with Nusrat, whose marital problems had aroused a great deal of compassion on her part, Souriya refused to enter 70 Clifton until some years after Bhutto had died.

***

InSeptember1966AyubKhandroppedthesecondkeymemberofhisregime.He sackedKalabagh.Theimmediatereasonsforhisdeparturelayintheevents surrounding a bye-election at Karachi. Mahmood Haroon, having become a minister in the West Pakistan Government, had to vacate his National Assembly seat which he had wonfromLyari.TheHaroonsconsideredtheLyariareatobetheirpoliticalbailiwick andwishedthereplacementcandidatetobesomeonewhowouldsupporttheir interests. They did not approve of Hafiz Habibullah Piracha who was lobbying for the officialConventionMuslimLeagueticket. Instead,theychoseGhousBukshBizenjoto be their man. TheGovernor, Kalabagh,did notapprove of Piracha either. Ina displayof 'feudal arrogance' Kalabagh dismissed the idea of supporting Piracha, whom in a fit of rage,hedisparaginglyreferredto'asnothingmorethanasonofapettyshopkeeper fromMakhud'.161InitiallyKalabaghdidnotcareforBizenjoeither,insistingthathewas asecessionist.ToplacatehimtheHaroonstookBizenjotomeetKalabagh,where Bizenjo,theeverconsummatepolitician,nowreachedanunderstandingwiththe Governor. In return Kalabagh agreed to support him. In the meantime Ayub Khan had already approved HafizHabibullahPirachaastheofficial governmentcandidatefor the bye-election, A showdown was on the cards.

WhentheelectionswereheldinlateMay1966,Kalabagh,theHaroonsandJamGhulam QadirofLasBela^162supportedBizenjoagainstthe'Government'ConventionMuslim League candidate, Piracha. Bizenjo won overwhelmingly.163(Yusuf Haroon would later tellmethatmanyoftheBDmembervoteshadbeenpurchasedforsumsranging betweenRs.1500toRs.2000).AyubKhan'srevengewasswift.Withinaweekboth

161InaconversationwithYusufHaroon.

162Afterthe setupofOneUnit,LasBelabecamepartofKarachi.

163The by-elections results were as follows: Ghous Buksh Bizenjo: 348 votes Hafiz Habibullah Piracha: 125 votesMajor Ashfaq Qureshi: 4 votes.

MahmoodHaroonandJamGhulamQadirofLasBelaweredismissedfromtheWest PakistanCouncil of Ministers. Ayub Khanwasinfuriatedbythefactthatthepresident's candidate had metdefeatatthe hands of the governor's candidate.By September 1966 Kalabagh was made to leave his office and was replaced by the loyal General Musa.

Ayub Khan had surrounded himself with a coterie ofdurbarisfor whom he could do no wrong. They would constantly eulogize him in his presence. It has been suggested thatAyubKhan'shumblebirthgavehimanin-builtsenseofinadequacy.This,itis maintained,ledAyubKhantofeedupongratuitouspraisesanddevelopaconceit which knew few bounds. However it is a fact that his ego grew to such an extent that in 1965,atacommitteemeetingoftheMuslimLeague,AyubKhanboldlystatedthat during the past fifty years the Muslims had not seen a leader greater than him.164SurroundedbydeferentialofficialslikeAltafGauhar^165andPirAliMuhammad Rashidi^166he was largely, kept cocooned from the true state of affairs. Not surprisingly, AyubKhanwasshockedtolearn,whenamantriedtoassassinatehimatapublic meeting, that people were actually unhappy with his rule. The attempted assassinationonly took place four months before his actual overthrow. Remarkably, until then he had been led to believe by his advisers that the people, with the exception of a handful of politicalleaders,allsupportedhim.167Ithadbythenbecomeahabitofhis administrationtoignoreunpleasantrealities-bynotreportingthemorbydiscouraging orsuppressingallreportsofthemandcreatinganillusionoftheirnon-existence. Having become divorced from reality, he committed such outlandish acts as the one conferring the title of 'His Highness' upon the Wali of Swat - who happened to be his daughter'sfather-in-law.Conferringofregaltitleswashardlythepreserveofa president of a republic. With no one having the courage to correct him, Ayub Khan's prejudiceshadalsocometothefore.Hisbiasagainstpoliticiansmadehimwillingly adoptmethodsmorerepressivethananyofhispredecessors.Thefactthatopen criticismofhisregimewouldoftenlandpeopleinjail-andonoccasionevenbesubject toassassination-seemedtomeanlittletohim.168Intheendnoneofhisprejudices

164Fazalul Qader Choudhry (then a prominent minister in Ayub Khan' Cabinet) stated inUrdu Digest, June 1969 (cited in: Herbert Feldman,op. cit., p. 279).

165Altaf Gauhar was one of the main architects of building a personality cult around Ayub Khan. He also was the ghost-writerfor AyubKhan'smemoirs.Herbert Feldman states,'That AltafGauhar servedAyubKhanfaithfullyand, often, well cannot be denied, but the value of his services was marred by his love of power, his unbounded ambition and the tremendous self-confidence based upon his rapid advancement...' (See, Herbert Feldman, FromCrisis to Crisis, op. cit., p. 303).

166When other courtiers suggested that Ayub Khan make himself president for life, Pir Muhammad Ali Rashidi is known to have taken it one step further by fawningly telling him that he should commence a hereditary reign as the firstBadshahof Pakistan.

167HasanAskariRizvi,op.cit.,p.155.

168In January 1965Zamir Qureishy was shot to death by assassins evidently aiming at someone else. Qureishy had been leaving Ghulam Jillani's house, accompanied by Baqi Baluch. Both Jiliani and Baluch were deeply involved in opposition activities. It was generally believed that one of the two men was the intended victim and that the act had been commissioned by Governor Kalabagh himself.

servedhim,andnonemoresothanhisentrenchedbeliefthattheBengaliswere 'inferior' to the so-called 'martial races' of West Pakistan.

***

The East Pakistanis had several grievances. Some were of a political nature, others were largelyeconomic.AyubKhan'sdictatorshiphaddeprivedthemoftheopportunityto haveashareinthedecision-makingprocess.BycurbingthepowerofParliamentand by rendering the Cabinet ineffective, the regime had denied the Bengalis their right to participateinnationalaffairs.Ontheeconomicfront,theprincipal foreignexchange earner for the country since 1947 had always been East Pakistan, and the East Pakistanis believed that most of the benefits from it had gone to the western wing. In the public servicestherewasaclearcaseofunder-recruitmentinEastPakistan.In1966,ofatotal of 5048 gazetted officers, only 1338 came from the east, and of a total of 109,254 non- gazetted officers, only 26,310 had been recruited from there. Bureaucrats and even government officials behaved like the colonials. In the armed forces Ayub Khan's malevolent dictum on martialraces andnon-martialraces had been closely followed. Othercomplaintsweremorebroad innatureandrelatedtowhatwasperceivedasa policy of general subjugation of the Bengali language and culture by the western wing. During an opposition gathering at Chaudhry Muhammad Ali's house in February 1966 called to provide a unified front against the Tashkent Declaration, Mujibur Rahman producedtheearlyversionofhisfamousSixPoints.InbrieftheSixPointsdemanded:

1. AfederalConstitution forPakistan.

2. TheCentralGovernmenttobelimitedtoDefenceandForeignAffairsonly.

3. The two provinces to have separate currencies (or restrictions be placed on themovementofcapitalfundsfrom oneprovincetoanother).

4. Alltaxescollectedbelongedtotheprovinceofcollection.

5. AllforeignexchangeearnedbyEastPakistantoremainthere.

6. EastPakistantohavetherighttoformitsownmilitia.

TheSixPointssooncapturedtheBengalipublic'simagination.Afewmonthslater,in earlyApril1966,MujibdemandedanationalreferendumonhisSixPointissue.This was followed by intense campaignderiding the government for plundering the eastern wing. By the time Mujib was arrested a few days later on 27 April, his movementhad gatheredgeneralpublicacclamationinthe easternprovince.LaterMujibandanumber

ofhissupporterswereimplicatedinthe'AgartalaConspiracy'case^169whichwould serve to further aggravate the generalfeelingof discontent in theeastern wing.

In West Pakistan there was a great deal of public disillusionment following the signing oftheTashkentDeclaration,particularlysoamongstudentsandthegenerallyIndia- phobicPunjab.170Thepublichavingbeenraisedtotheiremotionalpeakduringthewar, feltletdownbytheDeclaration.Stronganti-governmentdemonstrationstookplaceina numberofmajorcitiesandAyubKhan'simageasastrongmanwasconsiderably tarnished.Inanefforttorehabilitatetheregime,'TheGreatDecadeofDevelopmentand Reform'waslaunchedon25October1967bytheMinistryofInformation,ontelevision, radioandtheprintedPress.Themainthemeofthisyear-longpropagandacampaign wastheconstantglowingtributesaccordedtothe'personalityandgenius'ofthe President.ThecentralfigurebehindthisdeliberatecultofAyubKhan'spersonalitywas noneotherthanthewartimepropagandistandSecretaryforInformation,AltafGauhar.

Astheyearworeon,itappearedthattheonlypeoplewhobelievedinthismassive publicity drive were Ayub Khan and his campaigners. Among other things the constant appearancesofnewspapersupplementsonthe successesofthe regime,whichwere financed mostly by compulsory advertising, led to growing disbelief and boredom. No onereadthem.171Theregimedidnotrealizethetruedepthofpublicdiscontent.The Generalhadbeeninpowerfornearlynineyears.Longevityofpowerinthenatural courseofthingseventuallybreedspublicdiscontentmentanddesireforchange.Bythis time the people had had enough of Ayub Khan. He was now perceived as a man who hungeredforpowerandwishedtoretainit;172asmanwhoseclaimtointegrityhad been corrodedby the strong taint of corruption in his administration, as wellas among his close family members; and as a man who had promised an economic miracle which he,evenaftereightyearsinpower,hadfailedtodeliver.173Ironically,asiftoemphasize

169On 7 January 1968. 28 persons were arrested in East Pakistan-they included officers and men of the armed forces and three members of the CSP - and were charged with plotting to overthrow the government in East Pakistan and with the intention of making a separate and independent state. It was claimed that several of the allegedconspiratorhad visited AgartalainIndia,wherewithIndian help,theplanhad been formulated. Afewdays later it was announced that Mujib would stand trial along with those already under arrest.

170Punjab, particularly the eastern part, had endured untold suffering a time of Partition, and the memories remainedfresh.

171Nowthirtyyearslaterthemessagestilldoesnotseem tohavesunk.Thehaplesspublicisstillsubjectedtothese type of supplements on a regular basis. The hidebound nature of our bureaucracy and the egotism of our leaders, who are deluded into thinking that they are being praised ensures their continuance. The fact remains that even today no one bothers to read them.

172The State of Emergency which had been declared in the country on commencement of the 1965 War remained in place, providing Ayub Khan with a strong legalized arsenal of power-The Defence of Pakistan, under which hundreds of dissidents came to be jailed. The 'Emergency'was withdrawn as late as 17 February 1968, barely over a month before Ayub Khan's political demise.

173'Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), the one that covered a good part of the Martial Law period, wasa substantial success from the statistical point of view. But there waslittle overall improvement in the life-style of

the last point of public criticism, within a dayor two after the end of the 'Great Decade' campaign,inNovember1968,sugarrationingwasintroducedthroughoutWestPakistan.

ThesparkthatledtothegreaturbanunresttookplaceinRawalpindi.Inearly November1968thecitypolicehadseizedsomegoodsfromstudentswhowere returning from the NWFP smugglers' haunt at Landi Kotal. This provided a pretext for students tocall for a demonstration. Their main cause of complaintwas the Ayub Khan establisheduniversityordinancethatprescribedseverepenalties-suchasthe confiscationofuniversitydegrees-againststudentswhoindulgedinpolitics.The studentdemonstrationon9Novemberledtoapoliceconfrontation,andone ofthe studentswaskilled.Thisresultedinmoreviolence.Thegovernmentwasfurther unnervedwhenafew dayslateranassailantopened fireonAyub KhanatPeshawaron

11November.Withintwodaysanumberofleadingoppositionpoliticianswere arrested, including Wali Khan and Bhutto.

Thesearrestsof thepoliticiansled todemonstrationsinanumberof NWFPand Punjab townsandcities.Thedemonstratingstudents,whohadoriginallybeenprotesting againstthe university ordinancesandcalling forchangesinthe educationalsystem, nowlaunchedintothepoliticalsphere.Theybeganclamoringfortherevivalofcivil rights,restorationofparliamentaryinstitutions,andreleaseofpoliticalprisoners.The killingofonestudentbythepoliceinonetownwouldleadtoseveralsuccessive demonstrationsinothertowns.Thesefurtherconfrontationswouldonlyleadtomore killingstherebyaddingtotheworseningsituation.ByearlyDecember,AyubKhan repealed the hated university ordinance, but it was already too late. From 9 November 1968to25Marchofthefollowingyear,notadaypassedinPakistanwithoutsomekind ofcivildisturbance,riot,strike,bloodshed,ordemonstration.Inthefirstweekof DecemberAyubKhanchosetovisitDhakaforashortstay.Hisarrivalgeneratedviolentanti-governmentdemonstrationsinthecity,andonthe veryfirstdayofhisvisit twoprotesterswerekilled.Within amatterof.daysthe wholeof EastPakistanwasin the grip of intense student agitation.

At this stage mentionshould be made of thepoliticians and their part in Ayub Khan's downfall.Asignificant,dateforMumtazDaultanaandother'ebdoed'politicianswas31 December1966,whentheperiodoftheirbanfromholdingpoliticalofficecametoan end. Alarge number of them attempted tocapitalize on the anti-Ayub Khan feeling that hadbecomewidespreadamongthepublicas aresultof theTashkentDeclaration, but they,intheend,hadonlyalimitedroletoplayintheeventualoverthrowofthe president.ThekeyplayersinthedownfallofAyubKhanwereAirMarshalAsghar

thegeneralpopulation.'ProfessorLawrenceZiring,Pakistan:TheEnigmaofPoliticalDevelopment,Dawson Westview, 1980, p. 92.

Khan,ZulfikarAliBhutto,andseniormembersofhisformerconstituency-thearmygenerals.

AfterhisreturntoPakistaninOctober1966,Bhuttomaintainedalowprofile ashe sought to get back into politics. As his whole political life, since becoming the Minister forCommerceinIskanderMirza'sgovernment,hadbeenlinkedtothegovernment,it wasadifficultanduncertainperiodforhim.AtfirstheattemptedtojointheCouncil MuslimLeague,offeringhimselfforthepositionofsecretary-generaloftheparty,but Daultanarejectedhim.Itwasthenthathe decidedtoformapartyofhisown.The PakistanPeople'sParty(PPP)wasformedon1December1967.Thecasefortheparty beingformedonaSocialistplatformwasenunciatedinasetofguidingprinciples writtenjointlybyJ.A.Rahim,anintelligentmanwithstrongsocialistviews,andDr. MubashirHassan.ThepartymanifestowaslargelythehandiworkofJ.A.Rahim himself.TheoriginalnucleusofthepartyconsistedofJ.A.Rahim,Dr.MubashirHassan, Mairaj Muhammad Khan, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Muhammad Hayat Sherpao, andBhutto'scousin,Mumtaz.Ishouldstateatthisstagethat,despiteexhortationsto thecontrary,Bhuttohadnevershownany leaningstowardssocialism.Initially Bhutto was concerned that no party espousing socialism had met with success in Pakistan and wasreluctanttopursuethisbrandofphilosophy.174Hisstruggleasfarashewas concerned, was based noton any brand of ideology, buta relentless pursuittoget even with his ex-mentor, Ayub Khan. It is only when he was convinced by the likes of J. A. RahimthatthetimingwasrightforsocialismtoappealinPakistan,thathesawthe viability of using this creed as a vehicle to power.

Bhutto made his first speech as Chairman ofPPP at Mochi Gate in Lahore.He wantedtocapitalizeonhispopularity inthePunjab and tapthepublic'sgrowing resentmentof AyubKhan.Inhisspeeches,towinpublicpopularity,Bhuttousedafourfaceted campaign;thefirstwasan attackonthepersonalityofAyubKhanandthecorruption scandals surrounding his family and his government; the second and vital assault was basedupontheTashkentDeclarationandtheso-called'greatbetrayal'thatstemmed fromit;thethirdpartwasfierceanti-IndiarhetorictogainfavorinLahoreandthe populouscentralPunjab;thelastwasanti-USinnature,totakeadvantageofpublic hostility whichhadresultedfrom the USarms embargoduringthe 1965 War andafter. Whentheanti-governmentstudentriotsstarted inNovember1968theywereskillfully supportedbyBhutto.Coincidentally,hehappenedtobepresentatRawalpindionthe daytheybeganandthenextdayhetooktheopportunitytovisitthefamilytooffer condolences. Within a day or twohe wasback at Lahore exhorting the people onwards againstthedictatorshiphehadbeenapartoffornearlyeightofitsnineyears.Faced with the onslaughtof daily student rioting the government, fearing that Bhutto would onlyworktowardsfurtherincitingthestudents,decidedtodetainhim.On12 NovemberBhuttowasarrestedundertheDefenceofPakistanRulesandchargedwith

174RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.4.

inciting 'hatred and contempt' in his speeches against the government. Wali Khan and a numberofotherpoliticians were alsoarrested onthesameday.

On 17 November Air Marshal Asghar Khan proclaimed that he would actively enter the campaign against Ayub Khan. He charged the general's regime with corruption and administrativeincompetence,andcondemnedthesuppressionofPressandthefreedom of speech. With Asghar Khan - a military figure - in the field,the movementagainstAyubKhantookfurthercourageandothergroupsquicklyswelledtheranksof theagitatingstudents.TheAirMarshaltookanation-widetourtomobilizepublic opinion.InEastPakistanhewaswarmlyreceivedandmetwithcriesof'Downwith Ayub!' By mid-January the street violence had further intensified. The large number of studentdeathsinDhakaledtoageneralstrikeinthecity.Angryyoungpeople dominated the streets in Dhaka, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Khulna and elsewhere. The mobs soon turned on Ayub Khan's supporters in the Convention Muslim League, and a number of the party's workers were killed. While no accurate estimate of the total deathtollwasgiven,theestimatedtollraninhundreds..Finallybymid-JanuarytheArmy was called in to control the areas of severe disturbance.

TheDemocraticAllianceCommittee(DAC)-whichconsistedofsuchpartiesasMaulanaMaudoodi'sJamaat-i-Islami,MuftiMahmood'sJamiat-ul-Islam,WaliKhan's NationalAwamiParty,NurulAmin'sNationalDemocraticFront,Daultana'sCouncil MuslimLeague,MujiburRahman'sAwamiLeagueandAwamiLeague(Nawabzada Nasrullahgroup) - hadbeenformed inJanuary 1969. Faced withthe competing egosof theseniorpoliticians,atactfulsolutionwasfoundbygivingthechairmanshipofthe DACtotherelativelyuntestedNawabzadaNasrullahKhan.175Intheabsenceofthe jailed Mujib,Bhuttoand Wali Khan, thiscommitteehad thepoliticalfield -withthesole exceptionoftheboycottingMaulanaBashani-alltoitself.On5February,the desperatelyplacedAyubKhaninvitedtheOppositionpartiesfortalks.TheDAC agreedtomeetwithhimprovidedhewithdrewtheStateofEmergency(anditsDefence ofPakistanRuleswhichhadbeenimposedsincethe1965War),releasealldetained politiciansandstudentsprotestersandliftthebanonpublicmeetingsandprocessions. The government met these conditions and the talks that are now known as the 'Round TableConference'werere-scheduledfrom17to19February.Allthejailedpoliticians were released.

Soonafterbeingreleased,BhuttodecidedtoboycotttheRoundTableConference.At thetimesuspicionswereraised,butnowithasbeenconfirmedthatBhuttowas promptedtorejectthesetalksatthebehestofGeneralPeerzada.RafiRazarevealsinhis bookthatBhuttohadenteredintoasecretunderstandingwiththeseniorgenerals

175Interestingly, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan's politics during the pre-Partition era began with the Ahrars. In those days the Ahrars were known to be pro-Congress and anti-Muslim League. Then he left the Majlis-i-Ahrar and was elected in 1951 as a Muslim League candidate to the Punjab Assembly. He contested the 1955 elections but was unsuccessful from his home seat at Muzaffargarh. In the 1950s Nasrulla Khan joined Suhrawardy's Awami League.

whichwasreferredtobyamutualcodedesignatedasthe'CeylonTeaParty'.176Inthe end Bhutto's boycott proved of little consequence as the talks failed for reasons of their own.Buttheinescapablefactremainsthatseniorgeneralshadalreadycommenced theirpoliticalmaneuvering.AndBhutto,whoduringhisdaysofpoliticalwilderness was always concentrating on retaining the confidence of the Army, was ever ready tooblige them.

DespitefreeingBhutto,WaliKhan,andotherpoliticiansaspromised,theregimehad refusedtoreleaseMujibandtheotherallegedconspiratorsintheAgartalacase.This now led toanothercrisis. Awami League, whichbynow largelycontrolled thesituation inEastPakistan,refusedtoattendthetalksuntilthesepeoplewerereleased.Initially, thegovernmentofferedtoreleasethemonparole,butonfacingadamantopposition backeddowncompletely.Mujibandthethirty-fourco-accusedweresetfree unconditionally. Butalreadygreaterdamage hadbeendone.Afewdaysearlieron15 FebruaryoneoftheAgartalaaccused.FlightSergeantZahuralHaq,wasshotdead supposedlyduringanattempttoescapefromcustody.Thistriggeredoffverysevere riotsinDhaka-twocentralministers'houseswere setonfire andthe arriving fire fightingmachinesandpolicejeepsweredestroyedbythemob.LatertheStateGuest House and the offices of Convention Muslim League were also burnt down.

InordertofacilitatetheRoundTableTalks,AyubKhanannouncedthathewouldnot seekre-electionintheelectionscheduledfor1970,Thetalkscommencedon26 February, and consisted of a brief session and included Ayub Khan and three of his ministers,leadersoftheDAC,MujibandAsgharKhan.Aclearconsensusemergedon theneedforaparliamentarysystemofgovernmentanddirectelectionsthrough universal adult suffrage. The second session was scheduled for 10 March. By now the different views held by the various opposition parties had come to the surface and some hadbegunsquabblingwitheachother.ManyoftheleadersparticipatingintheRTC were without any popular base. Events were moving fast and soon by-passed them altogether.Inalastdesperateattempt,AyubKhantriedtoholdsecrettalkswithMujib but these met with failure. It is felt that Mujib was worried that these talks mightjeopardize his image at home, but it has also been a suggested view that senior generalshad tempted Mujib with the prospect of getting elected to power in the near future as opposedtogettingtherethroughthe'back-door'viaAyubKhan.177

By March the situation had deteriorated even further as labor power had now begun to assert itself in the urban areas. On 4March5000 workers at theValika mills went on strike, later setting the textile mill on fire. In Punjab mill workers attempted to burn the Saigolfamily'sKohinoortextilemill.On6MarchtheclericalstaffattheNationalBank ofPakistan'sheadofficegheraoedthebankandconfinedthebank'spresidentand

176RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.327.

177G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.39.

managingdirectortotheiroffices.IntheeasternwingtheAdamjeeJuteMilland PakistanTobaccoCompany'sfactorywerebothgheraoedandthemanagementofboth wereforcedtoaccepttheworkers'demands.Strikesandgheraosweremultiplying rapidly and this was having a serious impact on the country's economy.

The penultimate blow to the regime was Mujib's decision to withdraw from the second session of the talks. This led to a strike call from the All-Pakistan Students Action Committee which at Dhaka halted all train services and government work in the eastern wing. A reign of terror was unleashed. Police stations were attacked and officials were clubbedtodeath.AlargenumberofBDmemberswereforcedtoresign,andothers wereslaughteredincoldblood,somebeingburnttodeath.Executiveauthorityceased toexistandanarchyprevailed.TheGovernor,MonemKhan,facedwithasituation totallybeyondhiscontrol,fledtothesecurityofIslamabadalongwithhisfamily members.Asafinaldesperateattempt,on19MarchAyubKhanappointedDr.N.M. HudaandYusufHaroonasthenewgovernorsofEastandWestPakistan.Theirs provedtobetheshortestgovernorshipsinthecountry'shistory-theyweretolastin their offices for no more than a week.

ThefinalblowtoAyubKhancamefromhisownconstituency,theArmy.ByMarch 1969hehad largelylosttheconfidenceofhis armed forces.The President,disoriented bya worldcreated by hiscourtiers,seemed oblivioustothefactthathehad damaged hisstandingwithintheArmyasaresultoftheTashkentDeclaration,andthatthe resentmentwithintheofficersandrankshadcontinuedtofester.In1966hehadmoved theloyalGeneralMusaKhanfromtheArmy,makinghimtheGovernorofWest Pakistan.HereplacedhimasCommander-in-ChiefwithGeneralYahyaKhan,by- passinganumberofmoreseniorgenerals.ItisbelievedthatYahyaKhanwaschosen largelyforhisnon-politicalandnon-seriousnature,inthehopethathewouldbe contentwithconvivialandsuitablyalcoholicsocialevenings.YahyaKhan'slong- standingfriendshipwithGeneralPeerzadawasclearly overlooked.Ithasbeen suggestedthatitwasPeerzada'spersonalambitionsandhisinfluenceonthenew Commander-in-ChiefthatledYahyaKhantodetachhimselffromthe'Supreme Commander'andasserthisownindependentposition.178Attheheightoftheunrest AyubKhan'srequestfortheimpositionoflimitedMartialLawinthekeycitiesof disturbancewasflatlyrejectedbyGeneralYahyaKhan,Accordingto one commentator, YahyaKhanhadbynowbecomeconvincedbyhiscolleaguesthatbyproviding unqualifiedsupporttothebeleagueredPresident,hemightrelinquishhisown opportunitytoexercisesupremepower.179YahyaKhanandhisgeneralshadalready beguntoenterintopoliticalconspiracieswiththelikesofBhuttoand,ashasbeen

178Ibid.,p.22.

179HasanAskariRizvi.op.cit.,p.164.

suggestedbysome,Mujib,topreventthepossibilityofanyconsensusemerging betweenAyubKhanandtheoppositionleadership.180

ThePresidentnowfacedasituationborderingontotalanarchy,whichhadclearlygone beyond the power of civilian authorities. It had exposed the unreality of his attempt to createpoliticalstabilitythroughbureaucraticdiscipline.Hisclaimeddesiretoprepare peopleforademocraticlifethroughBasicDemocracyprovedtobeatotalfailure, largelybecauseoftheoppressivemethodshehadadoptedtofurtherhisownrule.Even hisplannedeconomicdevelopmenthadkindledhatredforhimandthepublichad cometoresenttherapidaccumulationofenormouswealthbyahandfuloffamilies.The beginningofhiseventualcollapsestartedwiththeriggingofthe1965presidential elections.The1965WarandtheTashkentDeclarationservedtoaddfueltothegrowing disillusionment.Chargesofcorruptionandnepotismblackenedhisreputation.On25 Marchthe beleagueredPresident-aftereighteenyearsofbeinginpower,firstasa forceful Commander-in-Chief of the Army, then as a dictator - finally decided to throw inthetowel,andincompletecontraventionofhis1962Constitution,hehandedover power to General Yahya Khan and the armed forces.

***

ItwasduringthistumultuousperiodofAyubKhan'sfallthatIfirstbecameinvolved withanindividualpoliticalparty(asopposedtoMissJinnah'scombinedopposition grouping of 1965) for the firsttime. I use the word involved, because as I will explain, I did not become a member of any party until much later.

On9February1967IwasapproachedbyBhuttotoparticipateinthefoundingofa politicalpartythathewasthenproposingtocreate.Ittooktenmoremonthsforthe PakistanPeople'sPartytocomeintoexistence,butIstayedawayfromit.Again,ata dinnerhostedbyM.A.H.Ispahanion13March1969,onlytwelvedaysbeforeAyub Khan'sresignation,IwasoncemoreapproachedbyBhuttowhohadbeenreleasedfrom jailonlydaysbefore.OnthisoccasionBhuttowasextremelyexuberant.Itwasapparent toallby thenthatAyubKhan'sdaysinpowerwere numbered.Bhuttowasclearly overjoyedattheprospectofhisformermentorfastapproachinghisnemesis.Having proclaimedtomethathispartyrepresentedthepoliticalforceofthefuture,hewasnow insistentthatheneededmebyhisside.OncemoreIpolitelyshruggedhisofferoff.I had known Bhutto since 1954 and though we had maintained a friendship, I would not venture to say that I had learnt to trust him.

180'It has been confirmed that Mujib had secret meetings with Yahya Khan during the RTC days, and was assuredby the latter that Martial Law would not be imposed. Mujib was trapped. When Martial Law was imposed after Ayub's resignation, Mujib repented for having contribute towards the failure of the Round Table Conference'; Safdar Mahmood.Pakistan Divided, Ferozsons, Lahore, 1984, p. 53.

Undeniably, he had provided valuable help in getting my friend Akbar Bugti out of jail. Bhuttohadpossessedsomeredeemingqualities,butithadbecomeevidentbythenthat hewasnowamandrivenbynakedambitionaloneandhispositivequalitieswerein recession.Inhisavidpursuitofpower,basicconceptssuchastruth,loyaltyand integrityhadbecomelargelyforeigntohisnature.Theideaofjoiningapartyledby him was not a conceivable option for me.

ByNovember1968anotherfigurehadmadehisappearanceinthenationalpolitical scene.I hadknown Air MarshalAsghar Khan since the late 1950s when he hadbeen the AirForceChiefbasedatKarachi.MywifeandIwouldoftenmeettheAirMarshaland hischarmingwife,Amina,atsocialgatheringsinKarachi.SouriyaandIhadhelda dinnerforthemin1959.AsgharKhancanquiterightlytakethecreditofhavingbuilt the Pakistan Air Force. Despite his retirement just months before the 1965 War, he emergedasawarhero.Duringthesixteendaysofwar,theAirForcehadbeenmore than capably led by Air Marshal Nur Khan, but its remarkable performance at war werealso seen by the public as a vindication of the years of Asghar Khan's leadership. His subsequent years as chairman of PIA kept him prominent in the public eye. When heretiredfromtheairlineinmid-1968,peopleencouragedhimtoenterpolitics.Evenat thenumerousfarewelldinnersandlunchesthatweregivenonhisretirementfromPIA, hewouldregularlybecorneredbyguestsimploringhimtoemergeasanalternateto Ayub Khan.

AsthepoliticaloppositiontoAyubKhangainedmomentumandthestreetrioting commenced,AsgharKhanwasfinallycompelledtoshowhishandandpublicly proclaimhisentryintothepoliticalfieldinNovember1968.Mypersonalantagonismto theAyubKhanregimehadcontinuedunabated,despitethefactthatmybrotherMir BalakhSher,muchtomydismay,hadreturnedtothefoldoftheConventionMuslim LeagueinJuly1967.Ihadkeptmyowncounselandhadoptedtostrikeanindependent course.Iwelcomed AsgharKhan'smove.Havingknownhimfor anumberof years, I was certain of his honesty and integrity. I believed that the Air Marshal, unlike Bhutto, was a man who could be relied upon.

InJanuary1969AsgharKhanarrivedatKarachiandmetwitharousingreceptionatthe airport.On26JanuaryIwasinvitedtoattendameetingheldatthehouseof hisbrother AnwarKhan.ThepurposeofthisselectgatheringwastogiveAsgharKhanan opportunitytoconsultpeoplebeforeannouncingthelaunchofhisparty.Afewdays later he asked me to accompany his party on a tour of lower Sindh which was planned for 31January.Thetripproved tobeagreatsuccess. Themuhajirsof theurbanareasof Hyderabad,ThattaandMirpurKhasaccordedtheAirMarshalthewarmestof welcomes.Itwasthesameintheruralareas,butthecriesof'JiyeBhutto'were noticeablyprevalent.InthefirstweekofFebruary,Ialongwithanumberofpeople from various political parties, accompanied the Air Marshal in defying the Section 144 whichhad beenimposed inKarachi. Theprocessionstarted fromLiaquatabad andwas

supportedveryenthusiasticallyallalongtheway.LaterinFebruarygeneralamnesty wasdeclaredandtheremainingdetainedBalochleaderswerereleasedfromjailand were restored full privileges by the government. Attaullah Mengal, Akbar Bugti, Ghous Buksh Bizenjo, Gul Khan Naseer and others were very keen to meet with Asghar Khan, andapproachedmetoarrangeameetingforthem.IintroducedthemtotheAir Marshalandtheyheldaseriesofdiscussionswithhim.Atthetimeeveryonewastrying toanticipatethechangednatureofnationalpoliticsasAyubKhanhadveryrecently announcedthathewouldnotstandforthenextpresidentialelections.Political alignments were very much on their minds as politicians contemplated the impending post-AyubphaseinPakistan.Sometimelater,largelyasaresultofGhousBuksh Bizenjo'spersuasions,theBalochleadershipoptedtojointheNationalAwamiPartyled by Khan Abdul Wali Khan.

On 23 March 1969 the inaugural convention of Air Marshal Asghar Khan's Justice PartywasheldatmynewhouseinKarachi'sDefenceHousingSociety.Thepartymanifesto andtheoffice-holderswereannounced.DespitemybynowcloseaffiliationwithAsghar Khan I was the only one present at the convention who did not apply for party membership that day. In fact I never joined the Justice Party at any stage of its brief existence.Thereasonsforthiswerepersonal.Ihadalwaysheldanindependentstance inmypoliticstodate.EveninDeraGhaziKhanIhadneverbotheredtobeconfinedto the dictates of the so-called Mazari group or even the consensus decisions of my family members. To join a party meant accepting party discipline, which though was not necessarilyanathematome,IhadtobesurethatIagreedwithallitsgeneral philosophy. Joining a political party was a deep and abiding commitment and I wantedtimetothinkitover.WhileIheldAsgharKhanindeeprespectasanindividual,Iwas asyetunsurehowhewouldshapeupasapoliticalleader.Despitemyadmirationfor the man I had noticed a trait in him which I found disconcerting: perhaps due to hismilitarybackgroundtheAirMarshalwouldoftentakedecisionswithoutconsulting others. Inexperienced as he was in the murky field of politics, I was not sure if it would augur well for the future.

CHAPTER4

The1970ElectionsandtheirTragicAftermath

TherenewalofmartiallawontheresignationofAyubKhanwasgreetedwithrelief. After months of violent agitation, an eerie calm descended upon the country asarmed troopsinbattledressbeganpatrollingthestreetsonceagain.Despiteitssuperficial similaritywiththemartiallawof1958,thesituationwasentirelydifferent.WhenAyub Khanhadascendedtopower,theexistingpoliticalsystemhadbeenunderminedand itspoliticianshadbecomegenerallyreviledbythepublic.Theprevailingcircumstances had allowed Ayub Khan a free opportunity to dominate and mould his individual grip ontheaffairsofthenation.Yahyawasgivennosuchopening.Ironically,Yahyahad assumed powerasa militarydictatorata timewhenthe publichad expressed seething resentmenttowardsauthoritarianrule.Thepeopledesireddemocracy,andYahya,as thenewChiefMartialLawAdministrator,wasinnopositiontoconfrontthem.Inhis firstradioaddresstothenationon26March1969hedeclared:

I have no ambitions other than the creation of conditions conducive to Jhe establishmentofconstitutionalgovernment.Itismyfirmbeliefthatasound, cleanandhonestadministrationisaprerequisiteforsaneandconstructive political life and for the smooth transfer of cower to the representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise. It will be the task of these elected representatives to give the country a workable Constitutionandfinalsolution to allotherpolitical,economic andsocialproblems that have been agitating the minds of the people.181

On 1 April 1969 Yahya officially assumed the office of President. Along with being the HeadofState,henowalsoheldtheofficesofCommander-in-ChiefoftheArmyand ChiefMartialLawAdministrator(CMLA).GeneralPeerzadawasappointedasthe Principal Staff Officer (PSO) to the CMLA and would soon be referred to in the Sunday TimesasthedefactoPrimeMinister.182UnderthePSOweretwobrigadiers(later promoted to major-generals), one placed in charge of martial law affairs, and the other givencontrolofcivilaffairs.G.W.Choudhury,whowasamemberoftheYahya government,describesthesetwoofficersasbeing'supersecretaries'andaddsthat,'It wasanamusingphenomenontoseetopbureaucratswaitinginthecorridorsofthe brigadiersandthenatthe office ofthe all-powerfulPSO;very rarelydidtheyhave occasiontoseethePresidenthimself'.183ItwasthefirsttimeinthehistoryofPakistan

181ThetextofYahyaKhan'sbroadcastof26March1969waspublishedthenextdayinDawn,27March1969.

182HamidYusuf,PakistaninSearchofDemocracy,1947-77,op.cit.,p.99.

183G.W.Choudhury,TheLastDaysofUnitedPakistan,op.cit.,p.50.

that the civil service had been relegated to playing such a subservient role. Clearly, the regimedesiredtohavenopartnershipwiththebureaucracy.Peerzadaisreportedto havesaid,'Wetooktheblamelasttimewheneverythingwasdonebycivilians.This time we will do everything and take the credit too'.184

Notsurprisingly, thenew regimewassolidlybased onseniorarmed forcespersonnel. Thevariousministriesweresoondividedupamongtheseniorarmy men,andthe chiefs of the air force and navy. The generalswho mattered, other than Peerzada, were HamidKhan,Umar,Mitha,andtheDirectorofMilitaryIntelligence,Akbar.Itwould takeanotherfourmonthsbeforetheregimechosetoallowcivilianstobecome government ministers.

At this juncture it would be pertinent to state that, unlike his predecessor Ayub Khan,Yahyawasnotthetotalmasterofthearmedforces.Itwouldprobablybemorecorrect todescribehimastheheadofanarmyjunta.Eitherhedidnotfeelitnecessary,orhe was not quite able to assert his dominance over other senior military officers. In themonthsthatfollowed,anumberofthegeneralssuchasPeerzada,HamidandUmar began following their own secret private agendas with their own chosen set of political leaders. In the disastrous aftermath that led to the end of the military regime, many questions were left without complete answers. Who among the army junta were responsible for the tragic consequences that left a shattered country? The safest and possibly the most accurate answer can only be: all of them. Faced with an explosivepoliticalsituationinEastPakistan,throughtheirgrossineptitude,theirambitious political scheming and their inherent intellectual mediocrity, they proved incapable of dealing with the crisis.

Soonafterassumingpower,Yahyaenteredintodiscussionswiththepoliticalleadersof the country. His most important talks were of course with Mujib, as herepresented the Bengaliswhonowconstitutedthealienatedmajorityofthecountry.Thecrucialissue waswhetherMujibwouldmodifyhisSixPointswhichhadgivenrisetomany misgivingsinWestPakistan,nottheleastamongleadingmembersofjunta.Aftera seriesofregularmeetingsinOctober1969accordingtoG.WChoudhury,who accompanied the President to Dhaka, Mujib told Yahya that his Six Points were not the 'KoranortheBible'andwerenegotiable.185Satisfiedwithhisaccomplishment,Yahyais saidtohavereturnedtoWestPakistan.ChoudhurymaintainsthatYahyabelievedin Mujib'swordandwouldregularlydismissallevidencetothecontrarybysayingthat politicalpressurespreventedMujibfromprematurelydisclosinghiscommitment. According to Choudhury, it was only after his post-election meeting with Mujib in the beginning of 1971 that Yahya felt he had been totally betrayed.

184FazalMuqeemKhan,Pakistan'sCrisisinLeadership,NationalBookFoundation,Karachi,1973,p.19.

185G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.85.

InNovember1969Yahyaannouncedtwomajorchangesinthecomingpoliticalsystem. Thesechangeshestatedwereadirectresultofhismeetingswiththepolitical leaders. The firstwasthe proposeddissolutionofthe One UnitinWestPakistan.The other majorannouncementwastheregime'scommitmenttotheprincipleof'one-man-one- vote',whichsignaledtheendofthelong-standingsystemofpoliticalparitybetweenthe twowings.ThelargerpopulationofEastPakistanwouldensurethattheeastern provincewouldnowhaveamajorityrepresentationinthefutureConstituent Assembly, something the Bengalis had been denied ever since the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution. Yahya seemed to have realized that the Bengalis could no longer be deprivedoftheirdemocraticrightandprobablyhopedthatbyconcedingmajority representationtotheeasternwinghewouldpacifyitspoliticalleadership.Other explanationshavealsobeenofferedforthisdecision.Ithasbeenoftensuggestedthat thearmyjuntabelievedthattheelectionswouldseetheemergenceofalargenumberof political partiesintheAssembly.Nopartywould haveacommandingmajority,thereby leavingtheinitiativeinthehandsofthepresidentandtheemergenceofcoalition governments.Thisviewpresupposesthatthejuntadidnotreceiveaccurateintelligence reportsfromtheeasternprovince,oriftheydid,186theyweredim-wittedenoughto ignore the reality of the political situation asitexisted there.

Having taken these two major decisions, Yahya and the army junta issued the Legal FrameworkOrder(LFO)on30March1970.TheLFOincludedthefollowingpoints:

1. A National Assembly of 313 members of which 54 percent or 169 memberswere allocated to East Pakistan.

2. AnelectedMembercouldonlyresignaftertheAssemblyhadmet,bya notice in writing to the Speaker.

3. TheAssemblyhadasetperiodof120daystoframeanewConstitutionor else it would be dissolved.

4. ThatunderthenewConstitution:

a) 'Pakistan shall be so united in aFederation that theindependence,the territorial integrity and the national solidarity of Pakistan are ensuredandtheunityoftheFederationisnotinanywayimpaired.'

b) 'All powers including legislative, administrative and financial shall besodistributedbetweentheFederalGovernmentandthe

186In fact the military intelligence report prepared by General Akbar Khan predicted Mujib's total victory in EastPakistan: G. W. Choudhury,op. cit.,p. 130.

ProvincesthattheProvincesshallhavemaximumautonomy,thatis to say maximum legislative, administrative and financial powersbut the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internalaffairs and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country.'187

c) 'Withinaspecifiedperiodeconomicandallotherdisparities betweentheProvincesandbetweendifferentareasinaProvince are removed by the adoption of statutory and other measures.'188

The constitutional stipulations in the LFO were a clear attempt to both appease Mujib as well to serve as a curb against his Six Points. However, it contained some glaring contradictions and omissions. Most importantly, the LFO did not stipulate the majority requiredforthepassingofthenewConstitution.Ifatwo-thirdmajority-aswasusual in such circumstances - had been specified, it would have ensured the consensus and participation of elected Members from both wings. Instead, in his broadcast announcingtheLFO,YahyaKhanstatedthat'thevotingprocedureevolvedbytheAssemblyfor itselfshouldbejust andfairto allregions of Pakistan',thusleavingthedooropento simplemajorityvotinginpassingthenewConstitution.Itwasamajorblunderon YahyaKhan'spartandwouldhavethemostdisastrousrepercussions.

Achronicleroftheeventsatthetimequestionedwhetherthisdeliberateomission meantthat 'thematterof votingprocedurewaslefttothedecisionof theAssemblyasa favour,orwhetheritwaslefttotheAssemblyoutofsheermischiefinthebeliefthat most of the 120 days allowed would be consumed inarguingover this very topic'.189In fact,G.W.Choudhury,thenamemberoftheCabinet,laterrevealedthatothermembersofthejuntahadinsistedinthe'inner'Cabinetmeetingthatasixtypercent vote in the Assembly be made a requirement in the passing of the new Constitution. It wasYahyaKhanwho'attheeleventhhour,bymostskilfulmaneuvering'hadtheclause dropped from the LFO. Choudhury continues by stating that 'Mujib didnot want this issue decided by Yahya but left tothelegislature,in which there would be a clear Bengali majority. On this vital issue too, Yahya complied with Mujib's wishes and as a resultwascriticized,bytheWestPakistanileaders.'190Othermembersofthejuntawere notaltogetherpleasedbywhattheyperceivedwasa'soft'policytowardsMujib.Hawks likeGeneralHamidandhiscloseallyGeneralUmarweresaidtobeangered,but Peerzada whodisliked his colleagues, chose to adopt a neutral posture.191

187LegalFrameworkOrder-Section20(4),30March1970.

188LegalFrameworkOrder-Section20(5)(ii),30March1970.

189HerbertFeldman,TheEndandtheBeginning,ReprintedbyOxfordUniversityPress,Karachi,1976.p.67.

190G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.87.

191GeneralGulHassan,whowasthentheChiefofGeneralStaff,mentionsthatthe recently promotedChiefof ArmyStaff.GeneralHamid,andthePrincipalStaffOfficer,GeneralPeerzada,loathedeachotherheartily'and

AtthisstageitbecomescriticallyevidentthatYahyaKhanhadplacedneartotal reliance on Mujib's commitment to negotiatethe Six Points. If one goes by reports that werepublishedsubsequently,aclearerpictureemerges.Theofficialgovernment accountconclusivelystatesthatintheirmeetingsMujibalwaysconveyedthe impressionthatthe Six Pointswere negotiable andnecessaryadjustmentswere possible.192This view is further corroborated by the close participant G. W. Choudhury whostatesthat'IcarefullyexaminedthesubstanceoftheYahya-MujibandMujib- Ahsan[thenGovernorofEastPakistan]talksin1969-70andcanvouchthatMujib repeatedlyassuredthathewouldmodifyhissixpointsoncetheelectionswereover.'193Facedwithsuchevidenceitwouldbedifficulttodoubtthesincerityofpurposewith whichYahyaKhantriedtodealwiththecrisisloominginEastPakistan.Someofhis decisionsmayhavebeenextremelyquestionablebutitseemsplainthathewasgenuine inhisdesiretosolvetheEastPakistancrisis,aswellascommittedtohandingover power at the coming elections. It seems obvious though that while Yahya and the junta wereexpectingasizeableelectoralvictoryfortheAwamiLeagueinEastPakistan,no onecouldhavepossiblyenvisagedthemagnitudewithwhichthepartywouldsweep virtually all the National Assembly seats from the east wing into its own hands.

***

Duringthisperiodofpoliticalupheavalandthere-impositionofMartialLawinthe country,IhadcontinuedmypersonalassociationwithAirMarshalAsgharKhan.By now he had got together a dedicated group of capable men around him. Not long after forminghisJusticePartyAsgharKhandecidedtoamalgamateitwithChaudhry MuhammadAli'sNizam-i-IslamParty,NurulAmin'sNationalDemocraticFrontand NawabzadaNasrullah's'two-man'fragmentoftheAwamiLeague,andformthe PakistanDemocraticParty(POP).Thisabruptsteptookmostofhissupportersby completesurpriseashehadnotconsultedmanypeoplewhenmakingthisdecision. Thisunexpectednewscausedacertainamountofdistressanddisillusionmentamong hissupporters. Nevertheless, asmy relationship withAsghar Khan still remained more personal rather than political, I continued myassociation with him.

InlateJuly1969AsgharKhanvisitedtheMazaritribalarea.Hefirstarrivedat Sonmiani,thenItookhimtoKashmorandfromthereonwardstoRojhan.Duetohill torrentstheroadbetweenKashmorandRojhanhadbeencutoff.Uponreaching ShahwaliIhadarrangedforustobemetbyalargepartyofhorsemenwhothen accompaniedusaswecrossedthefloodedrouteonhorseback.Itmadeforquitea

'were at loggerheads with each other': (Lieut.-General Gul Hassan Khan,Memoirs, p. 269 and p. 256). These fissures within the junta, in my opinion, could only have complicated matters further at this decisive juncture inour history.

192WhitePaperontheCrisisinEastPakistan,GovernmentofPakistanIslamabad,5August1971,p.10.

193G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.92.

colorfulsceneandisstillrememberedbysomeofthevisitorswhohadaccompanied Asghar Khan on that trip. At Rojhan, the Air Marshal addressed six thousand people, a remarkablylargegatheringforatownthesizeofRojhan.Afterspendingthenightat Rojhan,ItookmyguestsnorthwardsstoppingatthetownsofRajanpur,Mithankot, Fazilpur,MuhammadpurandJampurwhereAsgharKhanopenedPDPofficesand addressed afew words to the local people who had gathered to receive him. That night we reached Dera Ghazi Khan where I put my guests up at Mazari Manzil, a large brick edificeconstructedattheturnofthecenturyshortlyaftertheresettlementoftheold townwhichhadbeenfloodedintoextinction.ThenextdaytheAirMarshalmadea speechatthelocalBarCouncilbefore weproceededonwardstoMultanwhereI bade farewell to my guests.

Inthelastweek of September 1969Asghar Khaninsisted thatI accompany himand his small delegation to Dhaka to participate in the PDP's first party convention. It was my firsttriptoJheeasternwing.Iwasquitetakenabackbythesheer'foreignness'ofthe place,despitethefactthatitwasaconstituentpartofoneandthesamecountry.The most obvious sign was the absence of the Arabic script, all signs were either in Bengali orEnglish.Thedressofthepeoplewasdistinctlydifferent-therewasnosignofthe ubiquitousshalwarkameezofthewesternwing.Theirlanguageandculturehadlittle similaritywiththeoneIwasaccustomedto; ourculturalenvironmenthadbeengreatly influenced by neighboring Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, while their's was much more indigenous. Even the climate and flora were of a tropical nature,so dissimilar to thegeneral aridity of WestPakistan. Thereality of the predicamentwasnot lost onme. If East Pakistan seemed an alien land to me, the Bengalis of East Pakistan were equally likelytoviewWestPakistanisinasimilarlight,butwithanaddedacerbicedgetoit. TheWestPakistanis,hadvirtuallyruledthemasacolonyfortwodecades,andtheir bitternesstowardsuswasunderstandable.Intheriverinecountryofdeltaswewere distinctoutsiders.HavingwitnessedthesuppressionofBalochrightsatclosehand,I hadlookeduponthetreatmentmetedouttoEastPakistantobeequallyasabysmal. NowthatIhadactuallyvisitedtheprovince,mysympathiesforthesuppressed Bengalis increased markedly.

ThePOPconventionprovedtobeablowtoAsgharKhan.Havingacceptedthereality thatthepartypresidentwouldhavetobeanEastPakistani,theAirMarshalconceded theposttoNurulAminandwaskeentobeelectedtothepostofpartysecretary- general. He was clearly the most publicly acclaimed figure at the convention and commanded considerable respect, but in the scheming nature of politics that was not simplyenough.AsgharKhan was opposedbyacliqueofWest Pakistanis ledby Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan who were supporting Mian Naseem Hasan from Lahore. NasrullahKhanandhispoliticalcronies,withyearsofsimilarexperience,wereexperts in the intrigues of back-room politics. Before the election for the party secretary-general tookplace,itdawnedonusthattheAirMarshalwouldlose.Anumberofusthen

prevaileduponhimtowithdrawfromthecontestandsavehimselftheembarrassment of a public humiliation.

On25OctobertheconventionofWestPakistanPDPtookplace.Itturnedouttobea duplicitousgamebetweenthethreefactionspresent.ThefactionsbelongedtoAsghar Khan,ChaudhryMuhammadAHandNawabzadaNasrullahKhan.Thenextday Nasrullah Khan, made use of hisabundantstore of political guile, gothimself elected as the party'sWestPakistanPresident.OnAsgharKhan'spersuasionsI stoodandgot electedasoneofthepartyvice-presidents.Itprovedtobeanextremelybrieftenurefor me.ItwasnotlongaftertheconventionthatAsgharKhandecidedtoresignfromthe POP.Surprisingly,oncemorehereachedthisdecisionwithoutconsultinganyone. HavingjoinedthepartybecauseofmyfriendshipwithhimIsawlittlereasonto continue my link with the POP. I resigned as well, taking a large number of supporters fromDistrictDeraGhaziKhanandtheSindhdistrictsofJacobabadandSukkurwithme.

ItwasaboutthistimethatIprofferedsomeunsolicitedadvicetotheAirMarshal. Having seen the shenanigans of politicians close at hand I believed it was best for him to retire from politics altogether. I told him that a time might come when people, tiring of the existing political leadership, would themselves seek him to serve as their leader. The alternative in my view held little for him. He was by nature not suited to wiles and deceitsthatwerepracticedinourlocalpolitics.NorasamatteroffactwasI.Whena comparatively lesser political figure like Nasrullah Khan, who had last won an election inthePunjabprovincialelectionsof1951,could politically surpassaleaderwhowasat theverypeakofhisnationalacclaim,littleelseremainedtobesaid.Ifeltitbestfor Asghar Khan to keep himself out from the fray and maintain a dignified silence. But it was not to be.On 25 December 1969 the Air Marshal visited me in Sonmiani, bringing his daughter Shireen with him. While at my village, they stayed overnight at my guest house. He told me thatbecause of theintense pressure thathissupportershad brought tobearonhim,hewasleftwithlittlechoicebuttoreenteroolitics.AsgharKhannow wanted to launch Tehrik-e-Istaqlal and wished to persuade me to join with him. It was at this stage that I politely declined his offer. I much admired the man for his integrity andhonesty,butIdecidedthatmyfuturepoliticswouldbedeterminedbymyindependence.

Theotherherooftheanti-AyubKhanmovementwasenjoyingbetterluck.Withthefall of Ayub and his established link with General Peerzada, Bhutto was no longer a man houndedbythegovernment.InJuly1969IwastoinviteBhuttoandhiswifetomy house. The occasion was a visit to Pakistan by Bob Lebacq, then Belgian Ambassador to Indonesia,andhiswife,Jessie.TheLebacqshadpreviouslybeenpostedatKarachiand had become good friends with Souriya and I. While here they had also established very cordial relationships with Zulfikar and Nusrat Bhutto. I hosted a dinner for them and invitedalltheirfriendsandacquaintancesatKarachi,includingtheBhuttos.Itturned

out to be an extremely pleasant affair. Later in the evening, I noticed two of my guests engagedinwhatseemedtobearatherearnestconversation.Idecidedtojointhemand seatedmyselfbesideBhuttoandHankRamsay,thelocalUSConsulGeneral.BhuttowasreassuringtheAmericandiplomatthathewasnotantiAmerican,aseveryone assumed hewas.HekeptreferringtohisyearsasastudentinCaliforniaand howmuch hehad learned tolovetheplace.Bhuttowasadamantthatitwashisopponentsand the governmentintelligencedepartmentsthatinsistedontagginghimwiththeanti-US label.Heaskedthediplomattoinformhisgovernmentthatwhateverhesaidwas simplypoliticsandshouldnotbetakenashispersonalview,andifanything,his personalviewswerecompletelyopposite.Afterawhilehavingdonehisbestto convincethediplomatofhisAmericansympathiesIrecallBhuttorequestingafavor from him. He wanted a place at Radcliffe College for his daughter Benazir. Ramsay said he would speak to his superiors in Washington and convey the request. He then asked aboutBenazir'sschoolgrades.Bhuttolookingabitabashedreplied,Iamafraidtheyare notparticularlygood.ThatiswhyI,asaformerforeignministerofthiscountry,will requestitasaspecialfavorfromtheStateDepartment.Pleasedoaskyourpeopleto help me out on this one.'

DuringthisperiodIremainedinclosetouchwithmyfriendsinBalochistan.Theending oftheOneUnitsysteminWestPakistanon1July1970wasanexceptionaleventforthe peopleofBalochistan-itwasfinallybeingaccordedthestatusofafull-fledged province.Iwasinvitedtojointhefestivities.IflewtoQuettaon30Juneandwas received at the airport by two delighted men, Akbar Bugti and Attaullah Mengal, bothofwhomhadbeenbitteropponentsoftheOneUnitscheme.Earlymorningthenextday I went with Akbar to watch Khair Buksh Marri raise the National Awami Party flag at their provincial party office. Despite his strong political affiliations with NAP, Akbar Bugtihadbeenhamperedfromjoiningtheparty.OnhisreleasefromjailtheMartial Lawgovernmenthadimposedafive-yearbanonhimpreventinghimfrom participatinginanypoliticalactivity.Laterthatmorning,muchtothechagrinofmy Balochcolleagues,inparticularAkbarBugti,Iattendedtheswearing-inceremonyof myfriendGeneralRiazHussainastheGovernorofBalochistan.Ihavealways maintainedthatpoliticsshouldnotprecludeonefromsustainingthecommon courtesiescreatedbypersonalrelationships.RiazHussainwasagoodhumanbeingand his uniform and new elevated status did not detract from his fine personal qualities. In theeveningIparticipatedinatorchlightprocessionthroughthestreetsofQuetta commemoratingtheendoftheOneUnitbeforeattendingadinnerforSheikhMujib heldbyMuhammadKhanRaisani.MujibhadmadeRaisaniBalochistan'sprovincial President of the Awami League on Akbar Bugti's advice.

I had met Mujib on two previous occasions, once during my visit to Dhaka with Asghar Khan, and later more recently at Karachi. On both meetings I had left without being impressedbytheman.Itseemedthathehadbeenmorefavoredbycircumstances ratherthananyoutstandingleadershipqualities.Hisskillsundoubtedlylayinmaking

rousing speeches. He was an accomplished agitator. The next day during a lunch given by Akbar Bugti, I had another opportunity of meeting him. On this occasion he made a commitmentthatintheupcomingNationalAssemblyhewouldsupportalldemandsforgivingthepeopleofBalochistantheirduerights.TheBalochpoliticiansinreturn expressed their open empathy with the plight of the Bengalis.

***

FollowingthepracticeestablishedbyAyubKhaninthe1950s,themembersofthe Army junta foundit now opportune to indulge in back-room politics.Armyofficersas a class tend to be Rightist in their political thinking. Generals such as Umar, the National SecurityAdviserandtheretiredMajor-GeneralSherAliKhan,theMinisterfor Information, were nodifferent.194After piecingtogether various reliable sources one is abletosurmisethatanumberofgeneralsdevisedadeliberatestrategytosabotageleft- wingpartiesintheforthcomingelections.Fromtheavailableevidenceitisclearthat they had received Yahya Khan's blessing to carry out their plans. Their scheme,which initselfisreasonablywell-known,wastobringaboutaunificationofalltheseparate versions of Muslim League under one banner under Abdul Qayum Khan and provide it with unlimited funds to gain a substantial electoral victory.

ShaukatHayatwritesthatMumtazDaultanaandheweresummonedtomeetYahya Khan. Daultana wasthen the party president,andHayat,the party secretarygeneral,of theCouncilMuslimLeague.YahyaKhanrequestedthesetwopoliticianstocombine theirpartywiththeConventionMuslimLeagueunderthebannerofaunitedMuslim League.TheGeneraladdedthathewouldrequestAbdulQayumKhantobringhis MuslimLeaguefactionintothefoldaswell.195ButasHerbertFeldmanquitevalidly pointsout,theleadersofbothCouncilandConventionMuslimLeaguewereonlytoo awarethatbyvirtueofhisassociationwiththeArmyjunta,QayumKhanwouldquicklygaintheascendancyoverthecombinedLeagues,leavingtheothersfloundering inhiswake.196AsfarastheRightistgeneralswereconcernedQayumKhanwasa politician of whom they approved. Not only would he be amenable to their control, he had also provedinthe past to be aruthlesslysuccessful politicianin theNWFP.In their mindshewasasuitableantidotetotherisingspectreof socialism.Despitethepressure exertedby the administration,the anticipatedunificationofthe Leaguesnevertook place, but at the same time individuals such as the Khan of Kalat and the Pir of Pagaro readily acceded to the demands made upon them and joined Qayum's League.

UnderAyubKhantheConventionMuslimLeaguehadaccumulatedavastfortunein itspartycoffers.InJune1970byissuingaMartialLawOrder,YahyaKhanseizedthe

194On one occasionMajor-General Sher Ali Khan hadgoneasfar asto declarethat all personswhoprofessed to be socialists werekaffirs: Her Feldman,op. cit., p. 46 (n).

195SirdarShaukatHayatKhan,TheNationthatLostitsSoul,p.276.

196HerbertFeldman,op.cit.,p.80.

partyfunds.TheOrdersignedbyYahyaKhansimplystated,'Nopersonshall henceforthoperatetheaccountsofthesaidfundsexceptinaccordancewithorders issuedbyme'.197Thesefundswerethensaidtobeusedtofinancefavoredpolitical parties.Notsurprisingly,QayumKhanwasabletofieldnotlessthan132candidatesfor the elections. All of this required money. Interestingly, strong suspicions alsoarose,as tothesourceofBhutto'sPeople'sPartyfunding.Inthebeginningof1970,thepresident ofthe ConventionMuslimLeague accusedBhuttoofreceivingmoneyfromits confiscated party funds inthe handsof the government.198By mid-1970itwas obvious that in West Pakistan the largest number of party flags visible belonged to the People's Party.NowfurtherobjectionswereraisedagainstPPPqueryingthesourceofits expenditureof'acolossalamountofmoneyonhoistingflags'.199ShaukatHayat maintainsthattheMilitaryjuntahaddecidedtobackQayumKhanintheNWFPand BhuttoinPunjabandSindh.200Despitehisconstantslogansof'IslamicSocialism',the juntaknewbynowthatBhutto'scommitment tosocialismwaslessthanlukewarmand nothing more thananappealing politicalguise. ThroughoutthisperiodBhuttonotonly remained friendly with General Peerzada but he also carefully cultivated his links with GeneralGulHassanandthenewAirForceChief,AirMarshalRahimKhan.Bhutto, Rahim Khan and Gul Hassan used to frequently meet, often at their mutual friend Iqbal Shahban'splaceinIslamabad,andhavelengthyconvivialchatsoverdrinks.GulHassanandRahimKhanwerecoming totheconclusionthattheynowunderstood Bhutto and would provide support to him when the opportunity later arose.

***

SometimelaterIwasapproachedbyAirMarshalRahimKhan,withwhomIwason quitefriendlyterms.Ihadknownhimsince1958,whenhebeenstationedattheDrigh AirForceBaseatKarachi.OnoneoccasionmyfamilyandIhadstayedwithhimand hiswife,Mehru,astheirguestsattheAirForceHeadquartersatBadaber,near Peshawar,foranumberofdaysattheirinvitation.Rahimhadbeenknowntobea brilliantanddaringfighterpilot.WhileIwasatSonmianiIreceivedamessagethatthe AirChiefurgentlywishedtomeetwithme.IreturnedtoKarachiacoupleofdayslater andcontactedhim.Havingbeenfriendlywithhimfora numberofyears,Iwastaken abackwhenthepurposeofthemeetingdawnedonme.RahimKhanwasveryeager thatIjointhePPP.Inabluntrejoinder,IaskedhimifhetrustedBhutto,towhichhe gavemeaninterestingreply.RahimKhan'sanswerwasthatBhuttowasanenigmato him, but when compared to the other alternatives, he offered the best option. As if to illustratehisopinionofBhutto,herelatedanincident,which,hesaid,hadbewildered him.RahimKhantoldmethatrecentlyoneeveningBhuttohadcalledonhimathis homeinPeshawar.ThetwoofthemweresittingchattingoverdrinkswhenRahim

197MartialLawOrderNo.14,dated12June1970.

198Dawn,14January1970.

199Ibid.,25August1970.

200SirdarShaukatHayatKhan,op.cit.,p.286.

Khan'sorderly informed him that two gentlemen had just arrived who wished to meetwithBhutto.Annoyedattheintrusion,BhuttoaskedtheAirForceChief'sorderlyto findoutwhothemenwere.TheyturnedouttobenoneotherthantwoofBhutto's right-hand men, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Khurshid Hasan Meer. According to RahimKhan,Bhuttosnappedattheorderly,Tellthemtowaitoutside!'AtthisstageRahim Khan decided to intervene andtold Bhutto that as it was his house he felt it impolite tohavethesetwomenwaitingoutside.ButBhuttoremainedobdurate.Heinsistedthat theynotbeallowedin.AsacompromiseRahimKhanarrangedforKharandMeerto be seated in his veranda and sent out whiskys for them. Bhutto spent a leisurely hour or morechattingwithRahimKhanbeforetakinghisleave.Onhiswayout,ashewas stepping into his waiting car, Bhutto summoned Khar and Meer. Then in Rahim Khan's presencehecurtlyadmonishedthemasiftheyweremereschoolboys.'Dothetwoof youhavenothingbettertodobuttofollowmealloverabouttheplace!'Andsaying that,heabruptlydroveawayleavingKharandMeerstandingthereashen-facedmuch to Rahim Khan's embarrassment.

AfterhearingRahimKhanrelatehisexperience,Iaskedhimagain,'Doyoutrust Bhutto?'Irecallhimanswering,'Maybenot,butwhoelsehavewegot?Itseemed obvious to me that my friend approved of Bhutto only to the extent that he disliked the others. Having been accustomed to a liberal way of life, people like Air Marshal Rahim Khan and General Gul Hassan feared the onset of religious conservatism. Despite their misgivingstheywerepreparedtosupportBhuttosimplybecausetheyperceivedhimto possesswhattheybelievedwasaprogressiveandbroad-mindedapproachtosociety. In trying to convince me to join up with the PPP, Rahim Khan had my interest at heart. He seemed certain that Bhutto was soon going to be in power and that it would benefit me politically to join up with him at this early stage. He was clearly disappointed with myrefusal.Inthemonthsthatfollowedhewouldmakefurtherattemptstoconvince me to change my mind.

Afterthe deathofmybrotherSherJan,thesole supervisionofMazaritribalaffairs devolvedonme.MyelderbrotherMirBalakhSherhadbynowmadeitabundantly clearthatthistaskheldlittleinterestforhim,andhecontinuedwithhisextended sojourns in the cities of Karachi and Lahore. My duties led me to spend more and more timeinSonmianiandRojhan.The1965presidentialelectionsandmyactiveleadinMiss Jinnah'scampaigninthedistrict,hadindirectlyestablishedmyindependentcredentials as a political entity of the area, and during this struggle against Ayub Khan I had come to meet and become familiar with virtually every political personality within the large- district of Dera Ghazi Khan (now a provincial division). By the time the 1970 elections were announced, itwasnear impossiblefor the Mazari family toignore my presence in thearea,andsotheyhadlittlechoicebuttonominatemeasacandidateforthe elections.IfiledmypapersforthenationalseatfortheareawhileMirBalakhSher optedfortheprovincialseat.The1970electioncampaignwasthelengthiestinlocal history.ThecandidateshadtofiletheirnominationpapersbyJune.Aterriblecyclone

devastated East Pakistan forcing a postponement in the elections which were eventually held in late December.

It was the nature of district politics that our campaign turned into two rival camps: the Mazari group versusthe Leghari group. Thepolitical rivalry between the two families hadalengthyhistorydatingbacktothe1920s.AfterthedeathofNawabSirBahram KhanMazari,quicklyfollowedbythedeathsofmyuncleandfather,theMazariprimacyinthedistricthadpassedontoNawabJamalKhanLeghari,whohadsoon emergedasthemostcapable leader inthe district.JamalKhanprovided leadershipto thedistrictuntilafewyearsafterPartition.AssoonasmybrotherMirBalakhSher attainedtheageofmajorityin1949,heenteredlocalpoliticsanddefeatedNawabJamal KhanLeghari'ssonandsuccessorSirdarMuhammadKhan,inthedistrictelection becomingChairmanoftheDeraGhaziKhanDistrictBoard.Fromthenonwardsthe Mazari group remained in ascendancyin districtpolitics. In 1955 Mir Balakh Sher once more,thistimeinhisbidforthenationalAssembly,defeatedMuhammadKhan Leghari.201The1970electionswereregardedlocallyasafurtherassessmentofthe Mazaridominationwithinthedistrict.TheLeghariswerenotgoingtoacquiesceintheir defeat without a fight.

TakingtheMazaritribalvoteforgranted,Iconcentratedinsteadinthenorthernareasof theconstituencywhichincludedotherBalochtribessuchastheDrishaks,theGurchanis and a portion of the Legharis (the Leghari family seat of Choti fell within my electoral boundaries).IwashelpedinmytaskbymybrotherMirBalakhSherandNasrullah Drishak, bothcontestants for the twosouthernprovincial seatsinthe district. I took an independent stand from the Mazari group by supporting Dr Nazir Ahmed of Jamaat-i- Islami againsttheir chosencandidatefor the other national seatfrom DeraGhazi Khan. NazirAhmedpracticedasahomoeopathinthe townofDeraGhaziKhanandhad establishedhimselfasapersonofhonestyandintegrity.Amanofmodestmeans,he wouldcycletovisithispatients.IhadbecomeacquaintedwithhimduringMiss Jinnah'scampaignin1964andcometoadmirehimforhissincerityandsenseof dedication. Impressed as I was with him, I began openly canvassing for Nazir Ahmed. HiseventualsuccessandsubsequentcourageousperformanceintheNational Assembly made whatever effort I made on his behalf well worth it.

Theelectionresultsprovedtobemostsatisfactory.Imanagedtowinwithasubstantial margin.DrNazirAhmedjoinedmeasthesecondrepresentativetotheNational Assemblyfromthedistrict.IntheprovincialelectionsbothMirBalakhSherand Nasrullah Drishak won by a large lead. The Legharis, not surprisingly, held onto their twoprovincialseatswithintheirarea,buttheirleaderMuhammadKhansuffereda crushingblowinhisrunfortheNationalAssemblyseat.Notonlydidhelosetothe

201Upset athissonMuhammad Khan'sdefeat in hishome seat,Nawab JamalKhanlater usedhispolitical influence and got him elected to the National Assembly from Sahiwal.

humble homoeopath from Dera GhaziKhan, but heonly managed togeta sixthplaceinthecontestandsufferedtheignominyoflosinghisdeposit.OnthenationallevelI wassaddenedtolearnofAsgharKhan'sdefeatinRawalpindiatthehandsofalittle known retired Air Force non-commissioned officer, Khurshid Hasan Meer of the PPP.

***

BhuttoshowedamazingvitalityduringtheelectioncampaignashetouredWest Pakistan,attimesaddressingsixgatheringsaday-makingahostofextravagant promises.InPunjab,tothe delightofthelocals,he ventedhis venomousrageagainst India. He appealed to their Punjabi pride by insisting that in the 1965 War their 'victory' hadbeenbetrayedatTashkent,andcaptivatedtheirattentionbydramatically promising to reveal the sordid secret behind the 'betrayal'.202In Sindh he portrayedhimself as a native born man of the people. In the urban areas he talked about higherwages for the working classes and restrictiofts on the profits of the 'bloated' industrialelite. He offered all things to all men. He appealed directly to the masses by often irreverentlydancing-evenonoccasionwigglingaroundmakingavulgarparodyof IndiraGandhi-onthestageinfrontofthousands.Mockingthepublicstatureofhis rivals,hewouldpubliclygivethembelittlingnicknames.Attimeshewouldevensink tocruderformsofabuse.Yethekepthisvenomselective.Inthepoliticallykeyprovince ofPunjab,BhuttowasnervousofMumtazDaultana'sstrength.Oneofhisadmirers noted that in the pre-election days Bhutto '... expected some sort of [future] politicalalliancewithDaultana.Herefrainedfrompersonalpublicattacksagainsthim, studiouslyavoidpublicdisagreementswithandneverreallycarriedhiselection campaign to Daultana's home territory of Vehari.'203

InfactBhuttoneverreallyexpectedtheelectorallandslideheeventuallyreceivedinthe westernwing.InMarch1970hehadhimselftoldmethat,'Inshallah,Ishouldget betweenthirtytothirty-fiveseatsintheNationalAssembly'.G.W.Choudhuryalso mentionsthatinhis talkswiththe PPP leaderinJune1970,Bhuttorevealedtohim that his greatest expectation was to win forty seats to the National Assembly.204In the end, he ended up netting over twice that number. After ten years of Ayub Khan the people desiredacompletechange.TheelectionresultwasdueasmuchtoBhutto'ssuccessasit wasthefailureoftheolderbreedofpoliticians.TheRoundTableConferencehad taintedthemintheeyesofthepublic.Theyhadbeenperceivedtobeselfishlyambitious men who had bickered among themselves over future spoils without making seriously genuinedemandsforthereturnofthedemocraticprocess.FurtherasDaultanaandthe othershadstubbornlyreliedontheirpastlaurelsandnotbotheredtoofferanything

202As most people know the so-called secrets of Tashkent were nothing more than a fraudulent device used toplayupongulliblepopular opinionNaturallyBhuttonever revealedthesesecrets.Theyhadbeennon-existentfrom the very beginning.

203S.Taseer,Bhutto,apoliticalbiography,IthacaPress,London,1979p.107.

204G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.103.

new in their election campaigns to the jaded public, their political statures were considerably weakened. Not surprisingly in the Punjab, where PPP won sixty-two out a total of eighty-two seats to the National Assembly, greater political awareness linked to higher literacy rates played a key factor in this movefor change. Later analysis showedthattheurbanandthemoreadvancedruraltehsilsvotedheavilyforthePPP.205

Unlike Punjab, in Sindh Bhutto resorted to using traditional 'feudal' leverage. He relied onthelocalpowerofsuchpersonalitiesasMirRasoolBukshTalpurofHyderabad. MakhdoomTalib-ul-MaulafromHala,GhulamMustafaJatoifromNawabshah,Pirof RanipurandotherpirsandwaderosofSindh.UndoubtedlyBhutto'sownpopularityasa nativeSindhialsogreatlyenhancedhisresultingsuccessatthepollsinthissouthern province.ThePPPwoneighteenoutofthetotaloftwenty-sevenseatsallocatedto Sindh for the National Assembly. In the remaining two provinces of Pakistan, the PPP faileddismally,winningonlyoneseatoutoftwenty-fiveintheNWFP,andnoneinBalochistan.

What is often overlooked about the PPP's. performance in the 1970 elections was that its victory in West Pakistan was disproportionately large in comparison to the actual percentageofvotesitreceived.Thisisclearly revealedinthefollowingtable:

PercentageofValidVotespolledbythePPPinthe1970NationalElections^206

EastPakistan

Punjab

Sindh

NWFP

Balochisian

Total

Pakistan

TotalWest

Pakistan

41.66%

44.95%

14.28%

2.38%

18.63%

38.89%

Two factors helped the PPP receive an unduly large share of seats in proportion to thevotes cast for it. One factor was the system of plurality-based election in single-member constituencies, more commonly known as the 'first past the post' system in which the candidate with the most votes wins. The other factor which assisted the PPP was that atotalof798candidatescontestedthe138NationalAssemblyseatsinWestPakistan. These rival candidates divided the vote among themselves to PPP's great advantage. In seventy-fourconstituenciesinthePunjab,fourormorecandidatescontestedeachseat. In ten constituencies as many as seven contested, and in another ten as many as eight candidates contested. Throughout the province a one-on-one contest was witnessed inonlyasingleconstituency.207Withapproximately39percentofthevoteinWest Pakistan,thePPPmanagedtocapturenearly60percentoftheWestPakistan'sseatsin theNationalAssembly.WithonlyonevoterinthreesupportingthePPPinWest

205Shahid J. Burki and Craig Baxter,Socio-economic Indicators of the People's Party Vote in the Punjab: A Study at Tehsil Level(in: W. H. Wriggins (editor), Pakistan in Transition, University of Islamabad Pres Islamabad, 1975, p.164-5).

206ReportontheGeneralElectionsPakistan1970-74,Vol.I,ElectionCommissionofPakistan,Karachi,1972.

207ReportontheGeneralElectionsPakistan1970-71,Vol.I,ibid.,pp.197-9,204-5.

Pakistan, the party won nearly two-thirds of the voters' representation in the nationalParliament.

InNWFPthevotesrepresentedaconfuseddivisionofvotesbetweenQayumKhan's MuslimLeague,WaliKhan'sNational AwamiParty(NAP)andthereligiouselements representedbyJamiat-ulUlema-i-Islam(JUI).Outofatotalofeighteenseatsfrom NWFP's'settledarea',QayumKhanwononlyseven,showingthatdespitethefundsandsupportfromtheArmy juntahispoliticalpowershaddeclinedconsiderably even withinhishomeprovince.WaliKhanandhisNAPwonthreeseats.Thereligious southernpartoftheprovincegavesixseatstoJUI.Theremainingtwoseatswere bagged by the PPP and the Jamaat-i-Islami. As usual the Tribal Area of NWFP provided afurther sevenseatswhichwenttotheso-called independentmaliks.208

Balochistan had only four National Assembly seats. The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan,hadputuptwoofhissonsforelections.Hehadearlierbeenpersuadedby GeneralYahyaKhan'sbrother,AghaMuhammadAli,thechiefoftheIntelligence Bureau,tojoinQayumKhan'sMuslimLeague.TheKhanactivelycanvassedforhissons,buthispositionhadbeenweakenedconsiderablybyhisearlierpolitical somersaults. Not only had he previously joined Ayub Khan and publicly acclaimed the locallydetestedOneUnitscheme,hehaddesertedAyubKhanafterhisfallandhad openly lionized his successor Yahya Khan the moment Martial Law had been imposed. Having diminished his position it was not surprising that his sons were both routed in theelectionsbytheirNAPrivals.AghaMohiuddinwasbeatensoundlybyGhous BukshBizenjo,andthePresidentoftheBalochStudent'sOrganization,AbdulHai Baluch defeated Agha Yahya Jan. The third NAP seat was won by Khair Buksh Marri. ThefourthelectedrepresentativewasaJUIcandidatewhowonfromaPushtospeaking constituency.Theelectionshadfinallygiven thepeopleofBalochistananopportunity to be represented by leaders from within their own province.

Lastlyandmostimportantly,inEastPakistantheAwamiLeaguecapturedslightlyover 75 percent of the province's votes. It swepttoa parliamentary majority by winning 160out of 162 East Pakistani seats, which represented 53 percent of the total of 300 seats intheNationalAssembly.Thislandslidewinwouldnowleadtonationalcataclysm.Not onlywasMujibinthepositiontoformthegovernment,butduetoYahyaKhan's simple-mindedblunder,hecouldlegallychoosehisownConstitutionandhaveit adoptedinthenewAssemblybyuseofasimplemajority.

***

208WithminusculeelectoratestheseMaliksopenly bribe thevoters. Thehighest bidderalwaysmanagestowin the election. These days with the presence of drug money, the ones elected are inevitably tainted with criminality. These Maliks invariably become close supporters of whichever government takes power. Sadly, every government of the day supports the existence of these political 'parasites' simply because it relies on them for their backing.

IntheProvincialelectionstheresultswereasfollows:209

Province

Total

Seats

PPP

PML

(Q)

PML

Coun

PML

Conv

JUI

JU

Jamaa

t-i-

NAP

Other

Parties

Indepe

ndents

Punjab

180

113

6

16

5

2

4

1

6

27

Sindh

60

28

5

4

7

1

1

14

NWFP

40

3

10

1

2

4

1

13

6

Balochistan

20

2

3

8

1

6

In East Pakistan the Awami League captured 288 out of the total 300 seats, losing only 12seatsofwhich7werewonbyindependents.InWestPakistanthePPPgotamajority onlyinthePunjab.Despitesubsequentclaimstothecontrary,thePPPdidnotgeta majority in Sindh.

***

Therewerethreemajorplayersinthenationalcatastrophethatwastofollow-Yahya Khan, Mujib and Bhutto. In earlier years I had occasionally seen General Yahya Khan at socialgatherings,buthemadelittleimpressiononmeasanindividual.Otherswho knew him better found him to be a cheerful extrovert and a bon vivant, with a known appetite forwhisky andapredilectionforwomanizing.SirMorriceJames,aBritish High Commissioner to Pakistan recalls:

...asGeneralOfficerCommandingPakistantroopsintheEastWing,[Yahya Khan]invitedmetodinneroneeveninginhismess.Afterwardstherewas dancing, and Yahya in a mood of good humored tomfoolery took over theregimental bandmaster's hat and baton, and for some time conducted the music.ForAyubtohaveunbentinthiswaywouldhavebeenunthinkable.210

UnlikeAyubKhan,YahyaKhanhadacquiredareasonablelengthofexperienceatthe front.DuringtheSecondWorldWarhehadservedinNorthAfrica,(wherehewas taken prisoner, but escaped), Iraq and Italy. Later in the Pakistan Army - at the age ofthirty-four - he achieved the distinction of becoming the youngest brigadier ever. Ayub KhanwouldneverhavemadeYahyaKhantheCommander-in-ChiefoftheArmyifhe hadthoughtthatYahyaKhanhadthepotentialtothreatenhispositiononeday. Clearly, Yahya Khan had been chosen for this senior position for the 'wrong kind of credentials'.Neverthelessmostofhisprofessionalassociatesspokewellofhim.His closesubordinateGeneralGulHassandescribedhimasasuccessfulChiefofGeneral Staff by saying: 'I found him to be competent, decisive, broad-minded, easy in mannerwhichisasignofconfidence,andaboveallhepossessedaremarkablememoryanda

209ReportontheGeneralElectionsPakistan1970-71,Vol.2,pp.356-7.

210SirMorticeJames,PakistanChronicle,Oxford,London,p.171.

high IQ. All these traits were refreshing when comparing him with most of the other generals of the time.' By nature Yahya Khan was not a devious man. In approaching the crisis in East Pakistan there is no evidence to suggest that Yahya Khan worked on a pre- determined planon dealingwithMujib. He wentalongtaking thingsasthey cameand triedtomanagethemtothebestofhisabilities.PlacingtotaltrustinMujib'sword provedtobeanunforgivablemistake.Hewasknowntobeapoorjudgeofcharacter. HissubordinateGeneralAttiqurRahman,referringtoYahyaKhan,oncecommented: 'Hewasabittookind-heartedtohisclosecronies,andemployedasPrincipalStaff Officers at GHQ when they were palpably not equipped professionally for suchappointment.211

It is felt that becoming president led to Yahya Khan's undoing. Instead of surrounding himself with men of proven ability, he chose to rely on his army cronies, including his closefriendfromtheIndianMilitaryAcademydays,GeneralHamid,andotherssuch asGeneralsPeerzadaandUmar.GulHassan,whoasChiefofGeneralStaffwasawitnesstotheseevents,speaksscathinglyofthesegenerals,callingthemtheGHQ Mafia,andmaintainsthat'theyexertedunconscionableandselfseekingpressureson thePresident,whobecameapuppetintheirhands'.Suchastatementgiveslittle confidenceintheabilityofamanwhohadbeenthrustintoapositionofsupreme responsibility.ItbecomesapparentthataftertheelectionswhenYahyaKhanfinally concludedthatMujibhaddeceivedhimonthenegotiabilityofhisSixPoints,hebecame confoundedbythenatureofhisperilouspredicament. Bythistime hehad largely cut himself off from all but his close companions, and regularly indulged himself senseless inalcohol.GulHassanrecalls:'Inthisbewilderingandconfusingenvironment,our professionalsycophantsfoundeasyentry,andvolunteeredtohelpthePresidenttake majordecisionsinanalcoholichaze'.212Andsadlythatseemstohavebeenthe conditionoftheArmyjuntawhenitdecidedtocrushtheAwamiPartywithmilitary might, leading to a civil war which broke the country into two pieces.

Mujib was an entirely different man from Yahya Khan. His rise to political prominence beganwhenasastudentleaderhedefeatedthe.sittingchiefminister,NurulAmin, fromhisprovincialconstituency.Thisoccurredinthe1954electionswhichsawtherout of the Muslim League in East Pakistan. Shortly afterwards he became a minister in the brief United Front government of Fazlul Haq which lasted less than two months before itwassummarilydismissedbytheFederalGovernment.Withinayearhewasa ministerintheAwamiLeaguegovernmentunderAttaur-RahmanKhan.Mujibsoon emergedasakeylieutenantofthe AwamiLeague leader,H.S.Suhrawardy.Upon Suhrawardy'sdeathin1963,themantleofpartyleadershipfellontheforty-three-year- oldMujib.Hewasafieryoratorwiththeabilitytomesmerizethecrowdwith

211(Lieut.-General)M.AttiqurRahman,BacktothePavilion,p.227.

212Lt.-GeneralGulHassan,op.cit.,p.257andpp.288-9.

flamboyant rhetoric.213Mujib also had a talent in directing a political organization, aquality Suhrawardy had found extremely useful. But he had never been known to be a politicalthinkerormuchofastrategist.TheAwamiLeague'sSixPointprogrammehad not been his creation, but in 1966, armed with this new political message, he began to stumptheEastPakistanicountryside.Usinghispowerfuloratoryhepreachedthe gospel of total autonomy and gained many adherents. Soon afterwards the Ayub Khan regime had him jailed. From March 1966 he was shunted from one jail to another on variouschargesofmakingseditiousspeechesandforothersubversiveactivities.In 1968, having arrested a large number of people in the Agartala Conspiracy case, the Governmentdecided,afterafewdays,toimplicateMujibinthecaseaswell.The reactionamongtheBengaliintelligentsiawasoneofutterdisbelief.Intheeyesofthe EastPakistanimasses,Mujibbecameamartyrovernight.HehadbecomeEast Pakistan'sprincipalsymbolofdefianceagainsttyranny.

AyubKhanhadbeenpressurizedbypoliticianstoreleaseMujibatthetimeofthe RoundTableConferenceinFebruary1969.Mujib,however,refusedtobackdownfrom hisSixPoints,therebydoomingtheRTC.Ithasbeenclaimedthathewasofferedthe primeministershipatthisstagebya desperateAyubKhan, butMujib wasnervousof jeopardizinghisimagewiththeBengalis.Itwasalsosaidthatanotherreasonfor himto turndownAyubKhan'sofferwasthatsomegeneralshadsecretlyofferedhimthe alternativeofgaining legitimatepowerthroughelections.Noneofthiscanbeproved. The downfall of Ayub Khan and his successor Yahya Khan's promise to hold elections, offered the opportunity that Mujib and his Awami League had long sought.

Early on in his reign, Yahya Khan realized the importance of Mujib and began making attemptstowinhimover.Thegeneraladoptedtheprincipleof'one-man-one-vote' concedingthemajorityoftheproposedfutureParliamenttotheEastWing.Yahya Khan, in an effort to appease Mujib, also committed the fatal blunder of permitting the futureConstitutiontobedeterminedbyasimplemajorityofthenewNational Assembly.ApoliticalscientistlatercommentingonthesituationstatedthatYahya Khan'sconcertedattemptstoplacatetheleaderoftheAwamiLeagueledMujibto privatelyconcludethat'Yahyacouldnotsay"no"tohim'.214InreturntheBengalileader managedtoconvinceYahyaKhanthathisSixPointswerenegotiable,butdueto politicalpressureimposeduponhim,hecouldnotopenlycompromisehisposition until the elections were over.

The first post-electoral broadside was fired by Bhutto who announced on 21 December 1970 that any constitutional arrangement which excluded him and his PPP would be doomed to failure. Within a short time he received a contemptuous rejoinder fromTajuddinAhmed,theGeneral-SecretaryoftheAwamiLeague,unequivocallystating

213In his book Safdar Mahmood gives examples of how Mujib would o occasion purposely misrepresent facts toexploit the emotions of his audiences: Safdar Mahmood,Pakistan Divided, Ferozsons, Lahore, 198 p. 80.

214SafdarMahmood,PakistanDivided,ibid.,p.59.

thattheAwamiLeaguecouldframetheConstitutionwithorwithoutthecooperationof anyotherparty.Allthroughhiselectioncampaign, BhuttohadignoredMujib andhis Six Points. Instead, he had concentrated onmaximizing his appeal in West Pakistan to winasmanyvotesforthePPPashepossiblycould.Withtheunexpectedsizeofhis victoryintheWestWing,Bhuttofoundhimselffacedwithadilemma.Admittedlyhe hadattainedalargeelectoralvictorywithintheboundsofWestPakistan,intermsof parliamentary democracy itwas an ephemeral win. PPP's 81 seats were nowhere close totheAwamiLeaguemajorityof160seatsintheNationalAssembly.UndertheLFOthenewConstitutionrequiredonlyasimplemajorityintheNationalAssembly.The AwamiLeaguecouldframetheConstitutionsinglehandedly,leavingthePPPwithno role to play in its framing. And moreimportantly Bhutto would berestricted to playing thelimitedroleoftheleaderofthe Opposition.Obsessedashe waswithobtaining power, thealternativewasequallyasfrustratingforhim. If hevehementlyopposed the AwamiLeague'sconstitutionalproposalandsomehowsucceededinblockingits passage,hewouldhavetofacenewgeneralelections.Underthe LegalFramework OrderiftheConstitutionwasnotpassedwithin120daystheAssemblywouldstand automatically dissolved.215By then the West Pakistani politicians opposed to him, who werenowcognizantofBhutto'svotingstrength,wouldcombineintoacoalition electoralgroupingdirectedagainsthim.Thiswouldalmostcertainlyresultina substantialdeclineintheseatsthatthePPPwoninanyfutureelection.Facedwiththese unpleasantchoicesBhuttosoughtathirdoptiontosolvehispredicament.Fortunately for himthe seniorgeneralsof the Armyjuntasoon made his task all the more easier.

Yahya Khan and his generals had not foreseen that Mujib would gain an absolute parliamentary majority in the polls.216Their intelligence reports had indicated asubstantialvictoryfortheAwamiLeagueandtheyhadmadesurreptitiouseffortsto dilute the party's electoral chances by providing funds to parties such as the MuslimLeagueandNurulAmin'sPakistanDemocraticParty,whichhadlaunchedamovement inEastPakistanagainsttheSixPointprogramme.Aftertheregime'sdisastrousfailure toinfluencetheelectionresults,oneofthemajorproponentsofthescheme,General Sher Ali Khan, was made to resign his Cabinet post on 14 December 1970, three daysbefore the provincial elections were to be held.

In January1971 Yahya Khan invitedMujib to Islamabadfor discussions,but Mujib declinedtocometoWestPakistan.Instead,itwasYahyaKhanwhohadtogotoDhaka to meet with Mujib. Dr G. W. Choudhury, who then acted as one of the President's constitutional and political advisers, recalls:

215According to General Rao Farman Ali, Yahya Khan when told that 120-day period might be too short, repliedthat he wanted pressure on the politicians, otherwise 'they would take ten years to get a result like the first Constituent Assembly': Rao Farman Ali interviewed by Arfan Siddiqui,Takbeer, 11 January 1996, pp. 26-31.

216Mujib told Shaukat Hayat in January 1971 that he had offered twenty to thirty uncontested seatsto the Muslim League in East Pakistan, 'but the offer had been spurned on account of their over-estimates of their own strength and popularity or ... at the behest of the junta': Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan,op. cit., p. 296.

Yahya had expectations that Mujib would show him the Awami League draft constitutionashehadpledgedtododuringtheirsecretmeetingsontheeveof the elections. For this reason Yahya asked me to accompany him to Dacca so that someonecouldadvisehimonMujib'sdraftconstitution.Thefirstmeeting betweenYahyaandMujibtookplaceonJanuary12andlastedoverthreehours; no other person was present. As soon as the meeting was over, I received and answeredasummonsfromthePresident'sHousetoseeYahya.Ifoundhim bitter and frustrated. He told me: 'Mujib has let me down. Those who warned me against him were right; I was wrong in trusting this person.' He then gave me the substanceofhisdiscussionwithMujibingreatanguishaswellasanger.Mujib hadrefusedtoshowhimthedraftconstitutionashehadsolemnlypromised beforetheelection.Hemadeit clearto Yahyathat as leaderofthemajorityparty, he and he alone, was responsible for the new constitution; Yahya's job was to summontheAssemblyimmediately;hethreatenedYahyawith'dire consequences' if he failed to do so. For Yahya it was the greatest shock; he hadtakenagreatriskbyputtinghisfaithinMujib'sassurancesandpromises.His imageamongthearmygeneralswouldbeseriouslyaffectedashehadprovedto be naive in dealing with Mujib.217

In the absence of any other witness account to the crucial Yahya-Mujib talks of January 1971, the benefit of doubt should be given to G. W. Choudhury. As someone closelyinvolvedintheproceedingsashewas,thereisaninherentdangerofslantinghis account favorably towards himself. But as Choudhury prides on himself as a political scientistandanacademic,oneshouldplacesomevalueonhisreliability.Choudhury also insists that at this stage Yahya Khan was prepared to concede virtually all the Six Pointswiththeexceptionofonlytwochanges.218Afederalgovernmentevenif truncated to the Six Points' envisaged three functions (defence, foreign affairs and currency)requiredrevenuetorunthem.YahyaKhanwantedtheAwamiLeagueto makeconstitutionalguaranteesthattheCentrewouldreceiveafixedpercentageof taxesraisedbytheprovinces.Itshouldthereforenothavetodependonthelargesseof the federating units, which might vary from time to time according to their whim. The second change that Yahya Khan had wanted, related to the Six Points insistence on provincialgovernmentsbeingabletonegotiatetheirownforeigntradeandaid. According to Choudhury, Yahya Khan wished to insert a clause which permitted independentforeigntradeandaiddealingsprovidedsuchdealingswere'notagainst thefundamentalsofthecountry'sforeignpolicy'.ThedangerofpossibleIndian economic interference lay large on the militarymind.

217G.W.Choudhury,op.cit.,pp.149-50.

218See,chapter3forasummary oftheSixPoints.

Therefusaltoguaranteeanallocationoffundstothefuturefederalgovernmentheld disastrousimplicationsfortheArmyjunta.Theabsenceofproperrevenueforthe Centre would directly affect the defence budget and paralyze the Army. An American academiccommentingonthesituationsaid,TheelectionresultsintheEasthad underscoredtheAwamiLeague'sdemandsforgreaterautonomy.Itappearsthat certainmembersofAwamiLeaguefeltthatWestPakistan(thegeneralsandother influentials) would not intervenein forcein view of the magnitude of electoral support thatexistedfortheAwamiLeague'sdemands.'219NeverthelessYahyaKhanstillheld hopeforsanercounselstoprevail.OnleavingDhakaafterhisfrustratingtalkswith Mujib, he announced, 'Shaikh Mujibur Rahman is going to be the future prime minister of the country.'

It seems at this point inhistory the othergenerals ofthe junta beganto take charge. On hisreturnfromDhaka,on17January,YahyaKhanaccompaniedbyGeneralsHamidandPeerzada,flewtoLarkanaforconsultationswithBhutto.220Thejuntahadnow decidedtoenlistBhutto'ssupportinthegovernmenttusslewithMujib.Hislobbyof generalsintheJuntanowincludedHamid,Umar,andAkbar(aswellashistrusted benefactor Peerzada). With the routof Muslim League they now saw Bhuttoas a useful 'defender of nationalinterests'againstthe 'perfidious'Mujib.As his compass pointwas alwayscentred towardshisownpersonal ambitions, Bhuttowasnow solely concerned abouthisprospective role inthe newpoliticalsystem.HisrivalwasMujib.Itsoon becameapparentthatatthisstagethatBhuttoenteredanunderstandingwithanumber ofgenerals,whoseviewsdidnotnecessarilyagreewiththoseoftheirsuperiorYahya Khan. Bhutto's subsequent political maneuverings would clearly support this view.

Bhutto sent his aide Ghulam Mustafa Khar to Dhaka to meet with the Awami League leadershipandarrangea'summit'meetingofthetwopartyleaders.LaterBhutto arrivedatDhakaon27January.BhuttohadseveraldaysofdiscussionswithMujibon the Six Points centred on the major topics of taxation and foreign trade. On one occasiontheBengalileadermadeitclearthatEastPakistanwouldcontributetothedefence budget 'in proportion to her representation (which was obviously very little: the writer's comment) in the armed forces. Bhutto opposed the idea saying that it would not be acceptabletotheArmy.'221Themeetingswentontill31Januarybutonhisdeparture

219RobertLaporte,Jr.,PowerandPrivilege,InfluenceandDecisioninPakistan,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1975,

p.80.

220General Rao Farman Ali who states that General Umar told him that during this meeting Bhutto (whorepeatedly referred to Mujib as a 'traitor') suggested to Yahya Khan that the best way to test Mujib's patriotism was by delaying the Assembly meeting. If Mujib did not react adversely to the delay then he was a 'patriot', and if he responded wildly then Mujib did not have the interests of Pakistan at heart, and could be deemed to be a 'traitor'. According to Farman Ali this idea registered with Yahya Khan [writer's comments: Yahya Khan, later in February, when angered by Mujib's refusal to come to Islamabad would decide to implement this test with disastrous consequences]: Rao Farman Ali,Takbeer, 11 January 1996, pp. 26-31.

221SafdarMahmood,op.cit.,p.102.

Bhuttoindicated thatnoclearagreementor understandinghad beenreached.222Much hasbeenmadeaboutthefailureofthesetalksanddoubtshavebeenraisedabout Bhutto'ssincerityofpurposeinreachinganaccord.AnoteworthycriticwasGeneral Gul Hassan who said:

SomethingwentwrongwiththemissionBhuttowasgiven.Insteadofmaking attemptstosolvetheimpasse,Bhuttoofferedhispersonalservices:thathewould becontentwiththeportfoliosofdeputyprimeministerorevenforeignminister. AccordingtoaclosesourcetotheSheikh,thelatterdeclinedBhutto'sgracious offer and remarked that there was sufficient talent in the Awami League to take care of such offices. Bhutto then spoke to the Sheikh in private, where I am told, he threatened Mujibur Rahman with dire consequences if he did not come to an understandingwithhim[Bhutto].Thethreatconfirmedwhateverforebodings theSheikhmayhavehadabouttheintentionsofthePresidentandfurther hardened his attitude.223

MujibbecamequiteincensedatBhutto'sarroganceandpresumptuousness,athis cavalierattitude towardsa constitutionalsolution,andhisapparentsensethatMujib's majorit^'v/asinfactnothingmorethanaminorityofarespectablesize.224Afewweeks laterinFebruary1971,MujibissaidtohavetoldShahAhmedNoorani,theparty presidentofJamiat-ulUlema-i-Pakistan,thattheessenceofBhutto'smissionwasto sharepowerwithhim.Bhuttohaddemandedthedeputyprimeministershipamong other things, and alluded to the fact that he not only represented the PPP but the Army aswell.225ThiswasfurthercorroboratedbyGeneralRaoFarmanAliwholaterstated thatBhuttotriedtoimpressonMujibthathehadthesupportofpowerfulgeneralsin the Army.226

Bhutto had now gained the vital support of General Hamid and General Peerzada the senior-mostmembersoftheArmyjuntaafterYahyaKhan.Thesetwogenerals,who hadbeenatloggerheadswitheachotheruntilnow,unitedagainsttheircommon enemy,Mujib.HamidandPeerzadawishedtopursueanaggressiveapproachtoMujib, as they had come to the conclusion that Yahya Khan's 'soft' approach had resulted in ignoble failure. Yahya Khan's position in the junta had considerably weakened as a consequence.EvenhiscloseadviserG.W.ChoudhuryconfessesthatinFebruary1971 hethought that YahyaKhanmight bereplacedbyGeneralHamid.It washisbeliefthat onlythefearthatthemovemightbringadversereactionsinWashingtonandBeijing

222Later Bhutto would write that he had been prepared to accept all of the Six Points with the exception of the'half point' relating to foreign trade and aid. The so-called 'Five and half points': Z. A. Bhutto,The Great Tragedy, Vision Publications, Karachi 1971, pp. 24-5.

223Lt.-GeneralGulHassan,op.cit.,p.258.

224RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,WarandSecession,UniversityofCalifornia,1990,p.70.

225SafdarMahmood,op.cit.,p.103.

226GeneralRaoFarmanAll'sarticleinNawa-i-Waqt,26April1978.

thatstalledthedissatisfiedgeneralsfromacting.227Itisfairtostatethatwhilethe leadinggeneralsandBhuttohadreachedanunderstandingvis-a-visMujib,their motivationsremaineddistinctlydifferent.Thegeneralswishedtosafeguardtheir interpretationof'nationalintegrity'andtheinstitutionofArmy,whileBhuttocontinued to be haunted by his pursuit of personal power.

It is therefore logical that Bhutto, on his uniformed benefactors' instructions, conveyed a suitably aggressive tone to Mujib, even to the extent of threatening him with 'dire consequences',duringthemeetings.Atthesametimehefollowedhisownprivate agenda in quest for personal power. It would not surprisingly lead Mujib, who was well awareoftheArmyjunta'svisittoLarkana,toconcludethathisfearsofcollusion betweenWestPakistanipoliticiansandtheArrnyjuntawerejustified.Thisperception ofaconspiracyagainsthimonlyfurtherintensifiedhisanimositytowardsYahyaKhan and his regime, leaving even less room for future negotiations. Bhutto's mission had resultedinwideningthesplitbetweenthetwowings,andtherearemanywhostill holdtheviewthatthishad been doneintentionally.

ShaukatHayatvisitedEastPakistanaboutthistime,arrivingon31Januaryshortlyafter Bhutto'sdeparturefromtheprovincialcapital.HecalledonMujibthatveryevening, whoinformedhimthatBhuttowasinleaguewiththegeneralsand'hadshownlittle interestintheconstitutionalproposalsoverwhichhewaspreparedtogoalongwith him'.228MujibtoldShaukatHayatthattheSixPointswerenotsacrosanctandsuggested thatWestPakistanipoliticiansotherthanBhuttovisitDhakaafewdaysbefore the Assembly and sit with the Awami League and hammer out a Constitution which Mujib wouldthenannouncepublicly. HewassuspiciousthatBhutto'sinsistencethataprior agreementandsettlementbemadebetweenthePPPandtheAwamiLeaguewaspartof a conspiracy hatched at the instance of generals. He wanted Yahya Khan to display his honestyofintentionbycallingtheAssemblyon15Marchandconfidedthathewas underextreme pressure.ShaukatHayatstates:'[Mujib]felthe wouldbe ingenuine difficulties,especiallywiththeNaxalitesandCommunistinspiredextremists,who might insist on passing a Constitution unilaterally should Yahya fail to honour his own legalframework order.'Attheendof themeeting MujibaskedShaukatHayattoconvey hiswillingnesstonegotiate the ConstitutionwithWestPakistanipoliticiansandhis requesttoconvenetheAssemblyon15March1971.ThesamedayShaukatHayatcalled onGovernor Ahsanwhoalsoexpressed hisdisillusionmentwiththejunta, complaining that his advice to Yahya Khan was now being overruled by the junta's generals.229

227G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.156.

228Mujib's comments to Shaukat Hayat are corroborated by another authoritative source. Rao Farman Ali states that when he met Mujib shortly after Bhutto, 'Mujib told me there was no disagreement about theSix Points betweenthem.The dispute thatarosewasabout power-sharinginthe newgovernment.'Rao FarmanAli,Takbeer, 11 January 1996, pp. 26-31.

229The elderly politician gives an interesting account of his visit to East Pakistan: Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan,The Nation that Lost its Soul, p. 295-304.

Uponhisreturntothewestwing,ShaukatHayatwasfrustratedinhisunsuccessful attemptstomeetwiththe President.Later hewastodiscover thathe hadbeenblocked ateveryopportunitybyGeneralUmar,theNationalSecurityAdviser.Eventually, Umar was to finally tell him that there was no point in his meeting Yahya Khan 'as the President'smind was[already] madeup'.230Umar had alwaysbeenacloseconfederate of his superior General Hamid. One may be able to conclude that attempts were being madetoisolateYahyaKhanfromreceivinganyopinioncontrarytothoseheldbythe leading 'Hawk' generals of the junta.

AkbarBugtivisitedMujibduringthisperiodaswell.OnhisreturntoKarachihe dropped in for lunch at my place on 10 February when he gave me details of his trip to East Pakistan and about his meetings with Mujib.He brought along with him the newly elected Balochistan provincial chief of the Awami League, Muhammad Khan Raisani,as wellasone ofmy relatives,Saif-ur-RehmanKhanMazari.InAkbarBugti'sopinion MujibwasextremelyconciliatorytowardsWestPakistanipoliticiansingeneral(of coursewiththeexceptionofBhutto).Myfriendwas,notsurprisingly,extremely satisfiedwithMujib'sexpressedcommitmenttoupholdtheconceptofprovincial autonomy for the minority provinces in Pakistan.

SoonafterhisreturnfromDhakaBhuttoengagedhimselfinsolidifyinghisposition within West Pakistan. Firstly, he dealt with the PPP members of the National andProvincialAssembliesandtookan'official'mandatefromthemtoseekamendmentsto the Six Points from the Awami League. Then from 12 February 1971 onwards he single- mindedly pursued his strategy of denying Mujib access to any other West Pakistanipoliticalparty.HeheldtalkswithQayumKhan,MuftiMahmood,WaliKhanand others.His ambitionwas to emergeas thespokesmanforacombined front consistingof all major political parties of West Pakistan. He tried to persuade the various political leaders to develop a consensus on constitutional issues, which meant unanimity on amendmentstotheSixPoints,andthenunitedlyopposingthetransferofpoweruntil theAwamiLeagueagreedtomodifytheSixPointsaccordingtotheirdemands.Not onlydidBhutto'sattemptatrallyingtheWestPakistanipoliticiansbehindhimfail,but his actions increased Awami League hostility towards him. Mujib had now become convincedthatBhuttohadbecomethejunta'sstalking-horseandwas'creating conditions that would offer an excuse not to transfer power (the risk to Bhutto being minimal,sincehewouldnotgainpowerunderpresentcircumstancesbutmighthope toiftheywerefundamentallychanged)'.231Tragically,judgingbytheeventsthat followed,Mujibmighthavebeenright.

230SirdarShaukatHayatKhan,ibid.,p.304.

231RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.77.

MujibhadbyhisobduracyinpubliclyrefusingtonegotiatetheSixPoints,broughtthe nationtoaprecipice.TheSixPointshadoriginally been draftedbya numberofBengali intellectuals-acertainDrMuzaffarChaudhuryissaidtohaveplayedanimportantrole intheirformulation.232ThedraftersoftheoriginalSixPointsfirstapproachedNurulAmin.Butfindinghimunresponsive,inFebruary1966theythenwenttoMujib,who wasatthetimepreparingtoattendtheOppositiongatheringatChaudhryMuhammad Ali'shouseatLahore-calledtoprovideaunifiedfrontagainsttheTashkent.Herbert FeldmansumsupMujib'sreactionasfollows:'Seeinginthedraftacrystallizationofwhathewantedbuthadnotbeenabletoenunciatesoprecisely,Mujibseizeduponit andcarriedtheproposalstoLahore'.233AmonthlaterMujibwasinjailforvigorously propoundinghisnewlyfounddoctrine.Bythetimehewasreleasedthreeyearslaterin 1969,theSixPointshadbecomeanunshakablecredooftheAwamiLeague.Itwasthe baseonwhichtheAwamiLeaguelaunchedtheir1970electioncampaign.Thesizeof thevictoryeffectivelysealedthedoorsonMujib'sability,evenifthathadbeenhis originalintention,tocompromiseontheSixPoints.Hehadbynowbecomeahostageto thehardlinersinhispartywhowerestridentlydemandingtheimpositionoftheSixPointProgrammeinitstotality.234ByJanuary1971theirdemandsweremade vociferouslyandinpublic.On20January1971atapublicmeetinginPaltanMaidanNur-e-AlamSiddique,theleaderofthestudentfrontoftheAwamiLeague(EastPakistanStudentsLeague),declaredthat'...thestudentcommunitywouldnottolerate [the]slightestdeviationfromthe11-pointstudentandtheSix-Pointprogrammesinthe futureConstitutionofthecountry.Themeetingalsogaveawordofcautiontothe electedrepresentatives that theywouldbepushedout ofBengalifthepeople's mandate was betrayed in the framing of the Constitution.'235

AtthesamemeetinganAwamiLeagueMNAandformerstudentleader,MuhammadAli insistedthat '...he wouldnot accept any Constitution that didnot contain each and every provision of the Six Point and Eleven Point Programmes. He assured the cheering crowdthatifnecessaryhealongwithhiscolleagueswouldwalkoutfromthe Parliament and join the masses in a struggle for attaining the rights of 70 millionpeople.'236The stringent speeches Mujib made after the elections decisively committing himself to the Six Points programme can also be seen in another light. While combating what hefearedwas aconspiracyto deprivehis parliamentarymajoritypartyfrom fulfillingitsmandate,hewasalsocarefullysafeguardinghispositionastheleaderof

232Morning NewsKarachi, 18 January 1974. Dr M. A. Chaudhry was of the Department of Political Science at the Dhaka University during the 1971 crisis.

233HerbertFeldman,op.cit.,p.180.

234In January 1971 Choudhury Sir Zafarulla Khan met Mujib and asked Awami League leader some pertinent questions on the implications of the Six Point plan, and whether some of the demands were actually realistic or feasible. In return all Mujib could offer was a 'quizzical smile': Muhammad Zafrullah Khan,The Agony of Pakistan, Kent Publications, 1974, pp. 127-8.

235SyedHumayun,SheikhMujib's6-PointFormula,RoyalBookComKarachi,1995,p.345.

236SyedHumayun,op.cit.,p.345-6.

theAwamiParty.TheSixPointformulahadbecomeapoliticalnoosearoundMujib'sneck.

Aseventswouldshow,Mujibtoowishedforawayoutoftheimpasse.Hewaswaryof theultimateaimsoftheArmyjuntaandviewedBhuttoasanoverlyambitious conspirator.MujibobservedinearlyFebruary,'Pakistan'spoliticsispoliticsof conspiracy and intrigue. Conspiracy has yet not stopped, it is still going on.'237He was clearly convinced that the only way to achieve his aims was an early meeting of theNationalAssembly.Ifonewishestogivehimthebenefitofdoubt,itispossibleto surmisethatoncetheAssemblymet,Mujibfeltthathispositionasprimeminister would prove sufficient to overawe the extremists within his own party. He would thenhave the opportunity to meet with other West Pakistani politicians and come to an acceptablearrangement.238Untilthenhewasahostagetohisownsupporters.

DuringthefirstweekofFebruaryYahyaKhanhadinvitedMujibandsomeofhis associatestoIslamabadashispersonalguests.AccordingtoGeneralFarmanAli,who was then in charge of political affairs in the east wing, Mujib had invited Yahya KhanduringhisJanuaryvisittohishouseforameal.YahyaKhanhaddeclinedthe invitation.Later,whentheAwamiLeagueleaderlearntofYahyaKhan'sextendedstay at Bhutto's house at Larkana, Mujib became incensed. He took it as a personal snub and angrily told Farman Ali, 'Does Yahya Khan take us to be his inferiors!' Affronted by this presumedinsult,heturneddownYahyaKhan'sinvitationonthepretextthathewas busywithpartymeetingsuntil18February.Laterhewaspersuadedbyothers including Farman Ali to change his mind. Mujib announced that he would travel to Islamabad on 19 February.239

Mujib'searlierrefusalhadprovokedatelegramexpressingdissatisfactionwithhis refusal and threatened him 'with serious consequences that would follow'. The telegram was sent to Governor Ahsan with instructions to read it out in person to Mujib in the presenceofGeneralYakubKhan,theMartialLawAdministratorofEastPakistan.Mujib had been called to the governor's office, and as the men gathered and prepared to read out Islamabad's message, a call came from the President's House in Islamabad instructingtheGovernortowithholdthecontentsofthemessage.Laterhewasordered toburnthetelegram.240ThisepisodehelpstoillustrateYahyaKhan'sindecisiveness under the growing pressure of the junta generals. On this occasion, it appears common sense seemed to have prevailed. A few days later, on 13 February, the PresidentannouncedthattheNationalAssemblywouldmeetatDhakaon3March1971.Inalater

237Dawn,10February1971.

238On 21 February 1971 Mujib met with Mufti Mahmood and Maulana Hazarvi of the JUI in Dhaka and told them that once the Assembly met, the Awami League would be responsive in the constitution making process to the interests and suggestions of themembers from the province of West Pakistan:Pakistan Times, 22 February 1971.

239RaoFarmanAli,Takbeer,11January1996,pp.26-31.

240RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.77.

interview Yahya Khan stated that this decision was made by him because he had been warned that East Pakistan was set to politically erupt on 21 February, or 'Shaheed' (Martyr's)Dayifa date wasnotsetfortheAssemblymeeting.241

The Awami League openly expressed its pleasure at the news. The hardline Secretary General of Awami League, Tajuddin, indicated that the League would continue to seek consensus with other parties and that he was 'more than optimistic' about the ultimate success of the quest'.242At the same time Mujib assured his party members that the Six Pointswerenowpublicpropertyandnotsusceptibleto'adjustmentandexpansion'.243Itseemstheyweresendingtwosignalsofreassurance,onetoWestPakistanandthe other to their supporters. The contradiction may be explainable by the nature of Mujib's predicament. Some chose to believe him. others such as the 'Hawk' generals of the juntahadalreadyconcludedthathewassimplyacompulsiveliar.

Drivenbyhisdevouringappetiteforpoliticalpower,Bhutto declaredthatunlessthere wasanunderstandingbetweenMujibandhimselfonthefutureConstituentAssembly, it would not be allowed to meet. He desperately craved a position of authority^244andwouldhaveeagerlyacceptedthepostofdeputyprimeminister,presidentoreven foreignminister.HisforthcomingroleastheleaderoftheOppositioninanew democratic system held little appeal for him. Even one of his young devotees confessed: 'Perhaps another politician with more moral scruple and with a greater respect for democracy would have bowed before the will of the majority and quietly entered the ConstituentAssemblytodebatethefutureofPakistan.Bhutto,however,possessed none of these gentle characteristics. He never had much faith in the parliamentaryprocess.'245

Aftermuchbombasticrhetoricandrageventedinpublic,Bhutto everhopeful,left the dooropentoMujibforcompromiseindicatingthathewouldacceptanyassurance, eventhroughprivatechannels,thattherewouldbearoleforhiminthefuture system.246When no offers were made by the Awami League his political onslaught intensified. On 17 February, he announced that any attempts to mediate and arbitrate wouldonlycomplicatematters,andtherefore,therewasnofurtherroomfor negotiationswiththeAwamiLeague.HefurtherdeclaredthataNationalAssembly

241Yahya Khan, interviewed by M. D. Tahir and Iftikhar Ahmed, (Reprinted in) DailyKhabarain, 14 July 1995. ('Shohid' day commemorated the death of a large number of students at the Dhaka University campus as they demonstrated for the adoption of Bengali as a national language of Pakistan on 21 February 1952. The dayacquired a hallowed significance among Bengali nationalists.)

242Dawn,15February1971.

243PakistanObserver,16February1971.

244Yahya Khan was once told by Muzaffar Qizalbash, his Cabinet min that he had been informed by a 'foreigner' (presumed to be the Shah of Iran) that if Bhutto did not get power within three years he would go stark ravingmad: Yahya Interview (Reprint), DailyKhabarain, July 1995.

245S.Taseer,op.cit.,p.121.

246RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op. cit.,p.79.

meeting in Dhaka would be a 'slaughter house' for West Pakistanis.247Ironically, Bhutto should have been the last person to express concern for the well-being of West Pakistani MNAs,astendays laterhehimselfthreatenedto 'breakthelegs' ofanyMNAfromthe WestWingwhodaredventuretoDhakafortheAssemblymeeting.The'slaughter house' speech infuriated Mujib. He cancelled his plans to visit Islamabad at the very last moment, announcing that if Dhaka is a 'slaughter house' for West Pakistanis thenIslamabadisa'slaughterhouse'forBengalis.248ThisdecisionofMujib'swouldhave graverepercussionsforthefutureasitledtoYahyaKhanbecomingseriously embittered towards him.

On 18 February Yahya Khan had summoned Bhutto. During their talks the President maintained that he chided Bhutto for his refusal to attend the Assembly meeting and for inflaming the political scenario with his agitation. He ordered him to desist. Bhutto, according to Yahya Khan, listened to him without saying much, and ignored hisinstructions completely. Yahya Khan later asserted that Bhutto's refusal to attend the Assemblymeetingwasthesinglemostcontributoryfactortothebreakupofthe country,addingthat'Bhutto'sincendiaryspeechesweremoredangerousfortheunity of Pakistan than any ever made by Mujib'.249As these comments of Yahya Khan's were madesixyearslater,muchofYahyaKhan'sbitternesstowardsBhuttocanbe interpretedbysometobearesultoftheilltreatmenthereceivedatBhutto'shands during the interim years, but his insistence that he persevered with Bhutto to attend the Assembly meeting cannot be ignored.

YahyaKhan seemed tobedoinghisbest to resolvethe situation, but henolongerhad a free hand. From the moment he had taken charge of the country in March 1969, he had operatedwithinacollective leadership,reservingtheroleofprimusinterparesfor himself. After his return from Dhaka in January, his position had become considerably weakened. The 'Hawks' within the juntahad decided that Mujib was notto betrusted further and had adopted a malevolent stance towards the Bengali leader. When Yahya KhanlearntofMujib'srefusaltocometoIslamabad,hesummonedFarmanAlito Islamabad, whoreached there on 20February. According toFarman Ali, as he stood up tosaluteYahyaKhanwhoentered theroom,thePresidentburstout, Tilfixthisbastard Mujib.'FarmanAli statesthatheadvised the Presidentthat, 'Themanyou arereferring tohappenstobetheelectedmajorityleaderofthecountry.Lockinghimupwillnot solveanything.'TothisYahyaKhanangrily responded, 'Whodoesthisbastard think he is? Why didn't he come?' Farman Ali remains" convinced to this day that it was at this stagethatYahyaKhanviolentlychangedhismindaboutMujib.Themilitarysolutionso avidly recommended by his junta generals had now became a sudden reality.250

247Dawn,18February1971.

248RaoFarmanAli,Takbeer,11January1996,pp.26-31.

249YahyaKhanInterview(Reprint),DailyKhabarain.14July1995.

250RaoFarmanAli,Takbeer.

Ifoneviewswhatfollowedwiththiseventinmindtheybecomeeasiertofathom. Duringmeetingswithhiselectedpartymenon20and21February,Bhuttotookan ante-dated resignation from every PPP member elected to the National Assembly. In addition,thesepersonsboundthemselvesbyoathtoobeyhisinstructions.Inreality these resignations had no value as the LFO had stipulated that resignation was possible only after the Assembly had met and the Speaker appointed. The very same day (20 February) the LFO was amended with immediate effect allowing elected members toresignbeforetheAssemblymet. Thecoincidencewastooobvious,and wasaclear exampleofcollusionbetweenBhuttoandmembersofthejunta.Shortlyafterwards YahyaKhanandhisjuntabeganapplyingpressureonotherWestPakistanipoliticians tojoinBhuttoinboycottingtheAssemblymeeting.251QayumKhan,whohadahistory of following each and every government's diktat, was the only one to succumb. The rest displayedsurprisingresistanceandinsistedonjourneyingtoDhaka.Havingfailedto unitealltheWestPakistaniMNAsinaboycottoftheAssemblythejuntanowresolved to postpone the scheduledmeeting on 3 March.

As Bhutto ranted'Idhur Hum, Uddhur Turn[we are here, you are there]'252Yahya Khanandhisgeneral'smovedonestepclosertothecrisis.Theyhadbegunstepstoarrange the pretext that as the majority of the West Pakistani Assembly members would not be attending the Assembly session, there was little point in holding the meeting of the Assembly. G. W. Choudhury informs us that the President then asked him to prepare a conciliatorystatementannouncingthepostponementoftheAssemblymeeting.The draftthatChoudhurypreparedattemptedtomollifytheEastPakistanis,butYahya Khan 'gave it to Pirzada, who, in alliance with Bhutto, torpedoed it'.253Instead, later, amore provocative statement tersely announced the postponement on the radio. After hearingthenewsHerbertFeldmancommented:Ttwasnotedinbothwingsthatthe new decisions had not been broadcast by Yahya Khan himself but that a statement had simplybeenreadtothenationbyaradioannouncer.Itwasaskedwhetherthese decisionshadbeenforcedonYahyaKhanandmade inspiteofhim,or whetherthe method of delivery was simply cavalier.'254

Regarding the 'Hawk' generals, Peerzada, who was the Principal Staff Officer to the Presidentandtheso-called'PrimeMinister',hadalignedhimselftoBhuttoatanearlier

251One example was the Council Muslim League. According to Shauk Hayat, General Umar had instructed the leadership of the party to boycott the Assembly meeting which led to dramatic confrontations within the party hierarchy. With the generals' flatterers such as Choudhry Zahoor Ellahi exchanging hot words with him: Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan,op. cit., p. 305.

252Given the prevailing circumstances,'Idhitr hum, uddhnr tum'implied 'We are the majority party in WestPakistan and you are the majority in East Pakistan.' Interestingly, in his article in The Muslim (Islamabad, 15 December 1992) Dr. Aftab Ahmed insists that the words were never uttered by Bhutto, but, in fact, coined by AbbasAthar,the newseditor ofAzadwho specializedin condensing speechesand newsworthy eventsinto banner headlines for his newspaper.

253G.W.Choudhury,TheLastDaysofUnitedPakistan,op.cit.,p.157.

254HerbertFeldman,op.cit.,p.114.

stage.Peerzada'srivalandtheseniormostrankinggeneralafterYahyaKhan, wasthe ChiefofArmyStaff,GeneralHamidKhan.HamidhadnotviewedBhuttofavorably,untilaftertheDecember1970elections.AmonghisobjectionstoBhuttowouldhave includedhissuspicionsofBhutto'scloselinkswithhisadversaryPeerzada.Hamid's antagonismtowardsMujib would nowleadhimtoperceivingBhuttoasa common ally. GeneralUmar,anactive 'Hawk',wasaclose associate ofHamid'sandfollowedhis preferencetoutilizeBhutto.Major-GeneralAkbar,ChiefofMilitaryIntelligence,was also known to be 'advocating a hard line against Awami League'.255General Mitha was knowntohaveassiduously keptcloseconnectionswithGeneral Hamid, and therefore wasthelastremaining 'Hawk'. Theonly exception, other thanYahyaKhanhimself, was Gul Hassan. As Chief of General Staff he was occupied with Army affairs and seems to havemaintainedastrictlymilitarypostureuntilhisrebellionagainstthejuntaatthe end of the debacle.

For months Yahya Khan had come under overwhelming pressure from his colleagues. GeneralsHamid,Peerzada,Umar,MithaandAkbar.Nowinthelatterdaysof February,thePresidenthadbecomeaconverttotheircause.On20FebruarytheLFO (as mentioned earlier) was amended to suit Bhutto. The next day the civilian Cabinet,which one senior general referred to as 'a bunch of smart alecks - an unnecessary bottlenecktoefficientadministration',wasdismissed.256On22Februaryatameeting held by Yahya Khan, the first overt mention of postponement of Assembly arose. The meetingwasattendedbymembersofthejunta,thetwogovernors,theseniormartial lawadministratorsandheadsofmilitaryandcivilianintelligenceservices.Admiral Ahsan, Governor East Pakistan, put up a judicious and valiant defence. The Governor advisedthePresidentthatthereactionintheeasttopostponementwouldbeadverse andimmediate.Publicorderwouldbedifficulttomaintain.Hepointedoutthat membersoftheprovincialserviceandpolicewerelargelyBengali,aswerethemajority oftheEastPakistanRifles.ManyofthemsupportedtheAwamiLeagueandthosethat didnotwouldbetoofrightenedtoresist.Oncethepoliticsturnedintothestreets, Ahsan insisted, the situation would become untenable. The participants of street politics wouldnotbeasdedicatedasthepoliticalelitetotheintegrityoftheState.Doomedto beignoredlikeaCassandra,AdmiralAhsanwarnedthegatheredmediocrityof generals of the disaster that loomed before them.

Onthemorningof23FebruaryAdmiralAhsancalledFarmanAliforameeting.Hestated:

GeneralYakubKhan[MartialLawAdministratorofEastPakistan]wassitting therewithAdmiralAhsan.Itlookedasiftheyhadnotsleptthewholenight.

255Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose.op. cit.,p. 108. During a meeting in February with Admiral Ahsan at Dhaka (in General Farman Ali's presence) General Akbar announced that: 'We will not allow these bastards to rule over us': Rao Farman Ali.Takbeer, 11 January 1996, pp. 26-31.

256RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.82.

Theytoldme thatthe NationalAssemblysessionhadbeenpostponed.Itold them that this would now lead to major agitation and army action was bound to follow. Bothhisseniorsagreed withhim. AdmiralAhsanthendecidedtowrite an urgent handwritten note to the President warning him that this action would eventually lead tothe Indiansbecoming directly involved in EastPakistan. Upon receivingthenoteYahyaKhanimmediatelysummonedAhsan.ThePresident informedAhsanthatheagreedwiththeviewsexpressedinhisnote.YahyaKhan then told Ahsan to meet with Bhutto and try and convince him to turn up at Dacca.257

AdmiralAhsanandGeneralYakubKhanvisitedKarachionadesperate missionto persuadeBhuttotochangehismindandattendtheDhakaAssemblymeeting.Ithas beenreportedthatYahyaKhanwentasfarastoofferasolemnpromise thatifthe Awami League attempted to unilaterally impose the Constitution, the President would immediatelyproroguetheAssembly.258These effortsweretonoavail. Bankingonthe factthatthe generalsofthe juntawere withhimratherthanYahyaKhan,the man remained fixated on his own ambitions.

***

On 27 February 1971 I had invited a number of the independently elected MNAs for a meetingtomyhouseatKarachi.AmongthosewhocameincludedSaeed-ur-Rasheed AbassiandMianNizamuddinHaiderbothfromBahawalpur,MakhdoomNoor MuhammadfromRahimyarKhan,HajiMoulaBukshSoomrofromShikarpurand MaulanaZafarAhmedAnsari.Atourmeetingwecametoauniteddecisionthatwe wouldallgotoDhakatoattendtheNationalAssemblysession.Atthesametimewe expressedourconcernatthemannerinwhichthemilitarygovernmentwashandling the political crisis inEast Pakistan. Unfortunately Yahya Khan's sudden announcement afewdayslaterpostponingtheAssemblysessionputanendtoourplanbut neverthelesswesoonresolvedtotraveltoDhakawheneverafuturedatewassetforthe inaugural session of the Assembly.

Afew days laterontheevening of2March 1971,I received unexpectedvisitors. They were two old Aitchisonian friends of mine, Nawabzada Sadiq Qureshi and his brother Naseem. Sadiq tried his best to convince me to join the PPP. He also informed me that he had been sent by Zulfikar Bhutto to extend an invitation to meet with him that very sameevening.InitiallyIwashesitanttoacceptthisalmostlastminuteinvitationsent throughathirdparty,butatthesametimeIfounditdifficulttosaynotoSadiqQureshi.Bhuttoseemedtohavechosenhisemissaryforthismissionwithsome foresight.Sensingmypredicament,SadiqspoketoBhuttooverthetelephone,whothen

257RaoFarmanAli,Takbeer,11January1996,pp.26-31.

258SyedHumayun,SheikhMujib's6-PointFormula,op.cit.,p.353.

asked to speak with me to personally invite me over to his house. Later I accompanied Sadiqto70Clifton.WewerereceivedatthedoorbyGhularnMustafaKhar.InsideI foundBhuttoseatednearthestaircase.TherewereanumberofhisPPPmensitting alongside;theyincludedGhulamMustafaJatoi,RafiRazaandafewotherswhomI cannot now recall.

ThepostponementoftheAssemblyhadbeenannouncedbyYahyaKhantwodays earlierandIfoundBhuttobaskinginpleasurewiththewayeventshadtakentheir course.Henowwishedtopersuademeoncemoretojoinhisparty.Accordingtohim mybrotherMirBalakhSherhadalreadymadeacommitmentwithhimtojointhePPP in the near future, and suggested that I would be wise to follow in his footsteps. As the provincialgovernmentofPunjabwouldbeaPPPone,heintimatedthatitwouldbe verymuchinmyintereststobecomeapartymember.Ilistenedtohisdiscourse patiently.Hewasalwaysverypersuasive whenhewantedtobe.Hethentoldmethat if thepresidentshoulddecidetoschedulesomefuturedateforanAssemblysession,he thenexpectedofme,asafriendofhis,torefusetovisitDhaka.Myreplywasdifferent towhathewishedtohear.ItoldhimthatIwascommittedtoattendingthesessionof theNationalAssemblybecauseIbelievedittobethemostsensibleandhonorableway ofresolvingthecrisiswhichhaddevelopedintherelationshipbetweenthetwowings of the country. A short while later, as he was in the middle of an expansive oration to convince me otherwise, his servant, Babu, interrupted the proceedings with theinformation that General Umar was on the telephone for Bhutto. A few minutes laterBhutto returned wearing a smug expression on his face. He did not reveal the precisenature of the call, but told me within everyone's hearing: 'You can forget about the possibilityofevertravellingtoDhakaforanAssemblymeeting.Thatisallovernow and done with.'

AtthetimeIwasnottotallyconvincedaboutthetelephonecall;knowingBhutto,asI did, I thought it might have been a simulated sham to impress me with his Junta connections -no morethan yet anotherattempt at luring me tojoin the PPP.Resortto suchartificeswerenotunknowntoBhutto.Butwiththebenefitofhindsight,itdoes seem certain that Umar had spoken with him. For Bhutto to have been so sure that the AssemblywouldnotmeetinDhakacould onlymeanthathehadbeeninformedin advanceoftheJunta'splansforamilitarycrack-downinEastPakistan.Ifthatwasthe case,thenitwouldgoalongwaytowardsprovingthatBhutto'striptoDhakatwenty days later was part of a premeditated plan between the generals and him to ruin anychanceofanagreementbeingreachedbetweenYahyaandMujib.Theroledesignated forBhuttowouldthenhavebeenoneofaspoiler.Onemightevengoasfarasto suggestthattheon-offnegotiationsbetweenYahyaandMujibhadbeenpermittedby the Junta simply to keep the Awami League off guard, thereby gaining time to fly in a sufficient number of troops for the crackdown.

HavingmadetheannouncementofhistelephonecallfromUmar,Bhuttooncemore beganhisattempttowinmeovertohisside.Speakingratherderogativelyofthe assembledPPPleaders,heannouncedloudlythatallofthemhadbeenelectedonhis coat-tails.Thenturninghischarmonme,heintimatedthatheneededpeoplelikeme close beside him for the days ahead. I politely listened to his speech knowing very well that as anindependently-elected MNA, Bhutto valued my joining the PPP in his questtogetgreaterrepresentationwithintheNationalAssembly.IhadnodesiretojoinBhutto.

On 8 March, only sixdayslater, another attempt was made at convincing me to join the PPP. This time it was in my family town of Rojhan. On that day my brother Mir Balakh Sher,visitedmeandtoldmethathisfriendNasrullahDrishak,thenewlyelected Rajanpur MPA from the local Mazari Group, had arrived at Rojhan and was waiting to meetwith me.259Mybrother took me tomeetwith Nasrullah.During the meeting Iwas toldbyNasrullahthatbothmybrotherandhehadbeentoldbyBhuttothatGeneral Yahya had committed himself to letting the PPP form the government atthe Centre as Mujib was neither trusted nor acceptable to the Army Junta. My brother and Nasrullah nowsoughttoconvincemethatasBhuttohadamajorityinthePunjabandhisPPP would soon be forming a government in ourprovince, it was in our interest to join the party and have a share in the Punjab government. By then I had learnt that Bhutto had calledohmybrotherathishouseinLahoreandhadlunchwithhim.HehadspentsomefivehourswithmybrotherMirBalakh Sher,duringthecourseofwhichBhutto toldhimthatwiththe exceptionofnine ortenpeople hisPPPcomprisedcomplete asses.260ThePPPleadertoldmybrotherthathewasindireneedofgettingtheright kindofmentojoinhisparty.Flatteryapart,asthePPPalreadyhadamajorityin Punjab, winning over my brother Mir BalakhSher and his associate Nasrullah Drishak, who had both been elected to the Punjab Assembly, was not such a priority for Bhutto aswasthecaseofgettingmeanewly-electedMNA. ThePPPclearlyneededasmany membersfortheNationalAssemblyas possible. Attheendof theirmeetingmybrother madeacommitmenttoBhuttothatheandNasrullahDrishakwouldsoonbejoiningthe PPP,andthathewouldalsopersuademetodolikewise.Thiswasapparentlythe commitment Bhutto had referred to when I had met with him on 2 March.

InRojhanwhenmybrothertoldmethathehadalreadymadeacommitmenttoBhutto onbehalfofallofus,ItoldhimthatbothheandNasrullahDrishakcoulddoasthey wishedbut that Iwouldneverjoin thePPP.Imademyreasons plain to bothofthem saying that I could not accept the stand Bhutto had taken against the elected majorityleaderofPakistan.WhetherwelikedMujibornot,ifwebelievedindemocratic

259TheSecretaryHousewasoriginallyconstructedasaresidentialbuildinginRojhanbymypaternaluncleMirDost Muhammad Khan to provide accommodation for hisPrivateSecretary Choudhury Rahmat Aliin the early 1920s. In more recent years it has been used as a guest house and a place to hold private meetings away from the publiceye.

260TheUrduwordheusedwasghaddas.

parliamentaryprincipleswehadtoaccepthismanastheprimeministerofthecountry. Anyothercourseofaction,inmyopinion,wouldnotonlybeunprincipledand undemocratic, butwould alsoleadtoa potential national catastrophe. My other reason againstjoiningthePPPwasmorepersonal.ItoldthemthatIcouldneverplacemytrust with a man like Bhutto. My decision was final. Unfortunately, as a result of this rather unilateral decision on mypart, myrelationship with mybrother once more wentinto adecline.

Over the months I had been greatly dismayed by the turn of national events. Mysympathies lay with the ideals of democracy. In my view the Awami League had won aclear majority to govern the country and no one had the right to dictate terms to them.Even if, as opponents of Mujib insisted, the Bengalis wished to form a separate country, then as a democratic majority they were well within their rights to do so. It could not be termed as secession. Secession by its very definition means a break-away from themajoritywishesofanation.TheBengaliswereinaclearmajorityandtheirclaimthat theyhadbeenbadlyneglectedwasvalidin myview.Eveninthe1950sEastPakistanis had complained about the West Pakistani leadership in vociferous terms. It is worth recallingthatasearlyas1954aBengalirepresentativespeakingintheNational Assemblyarticulatedthemoodofhispeople bystating:

Sir,I...yesterday...saidthattheattitudeoftheMuslimLeaguecoterieherewas oneofcontempttowardsEastBengal,towardsitsculture,itslanguage,its literature and everything concerning East Bengal... In fact, Sir, I tell you that far fromconsidering EastBengalasanequalpartner,theleadersoftheMuslim Leaguethoughtthatwewereasubjectrace andtheybelongedtotheraceofconquerors.261

The hostility generated by Awami League's Six Points in thewest wing could perhaps beunderstoodbutwaslargelymisconceived.ThedepthofBengalihatredforthe existingpoliticalset-up hadtobe resolved withoutrecoursetobloodshed. Theideaof anarmedinterventionbythemilitarywastomymindcourtingdisaster.TheSixPoint's devolution of power from the centre tothe provinces did not necessarily mean an end ofthesovereignstateofPakistan,butforthosewhohadundemocraticallydominated theaffairsoftheState,itmeanttheirextinction.ShortlyafterMr.Jinnah'sdeaththe bureaucracy,andlaterthemilitary-bureaucraticalliance,hadkeptthereinsofpowerin thecountry.Self-appointed,thesepeoplehadmadethemselvesthearbitersofthe nation's destiny, andinsistedon dictating to the people what they claimed wasbest for them.Aftertwenty-threeyearsofnationhoodwefoundourselvesatcrossroadsyet again.Themilitary-bureaucraticleadershiphadfailed.Itwastime,Ibelieved,tore- examine the existingstructure andifnecessaryalteritcompletelytoaccommodatethe

261ConstituentAssemblyDebates,vol.vii,no.6,p.183;quotedinHerFeldman,op.cit.,p.4.

wishes of the majority of the people.Failure to come to terms with the Awami League boded calamity for the country.

Implementation of the Six Points in their original form could only have ended with two possibleresults.Withitsstrictprovincialtaxationandforeignaffairsclauses, itwould have renderedthe central governmentclose tounworkable. Thiswould have eitherled toaneventualcompromiseorapeacefulpartingofways betweenthetwowings. The compromisewouldhaveledtoaweakercentralgovernmentexercisingitslimited authoritywithintheconfinesofthenewConstitutionunderanAwamiLeague government. The reality of actual governance would have forced the Awami League to changeitsSixPointsbytemperingsomeofitsmoreextremeconcepts.Ontheother handiftheAwamiLeaguegovernmentshowednointerestinmanagingtheaffairsof thewestwing,thentheWestPakistaniscouldhavepeacefullybrokenawayfromthe majority. The likelihood of the Awami League forcing unity on West Pakistan was non- existent.Notonlywouldtheyhavebeenwhollyuninterested,theArmywhichwould have been called to perform this imaginary task, was a wholly West Pakistani entity.

***

TodealwiththeexpecteddisturbancesfollowingthepostponementoftheAssembly meeting, the junta'sfirst batchof troop reinforcements began arriving in Dhaka late in the afternoon of 27 February, and by 2 March a two battalion brigade had been sent to EastPakistan.262CommunicationsbetweenRawalpindiandDhakacametoanabrupt haltduringthelastfewdaysofFebruary,andGovernorAhsanandhismenhadno knowledge of what was transpiring in the Martial Law GHQ. Upon his return to Dhaka AhsaninformedMujibthatYahyaKhanwasundertremendouspressuretopostpone theAssembly,andurgedhimtogotoRawalpinditohelpbreakthedeadlock.263Thoughvisiblyshaken,Mujibrepliedthatanoverturefromhimatthisstagewould makelittledifferenceandinsteadmightgivethevestedgroupsinthewestwingabelief that their strategies against him were working. Admiral Ahsan sent messages to Yahya Khantointercedepersonallyandresolvethesituation,becauseiftheAssemblymeeting waspostponed,theoutbreakofviolencewouldbebeyondthecontrolofthecivil administration in the east wing. On the evening of 28 February Ahsan called Mujib and hiscloseadviserstohisresidencetoinformhimthatthepresidentwasgoingto announcethepostponementoftheAssemblythefollowingday.Mujibprivately pleadedwith governor that a newdate forthe reconvening of the Assemblybe given in theannouncement.Hesaidheneededsomeflexibilitywithwhichtohandlethe reactiontotheannouncementotherwiseitwouldbebeyondhiscontrol.FarmanAli who was present at the meeting recalls:

262Lt.-GeneralGulHassan,op.cit.,p.261.

263RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op. cit.,p.87.

The Governor, General Yakub and I represented the government side and Mujib broughtalongTajuddinAhmedandKamalHossain.Tajuddintoldusthathe knewaboutthepostponementinadvance.Accordingtohim,TheWest Pakistanis would never let us come into government. So we will have to find ourselves another way to get power.' Mujib tried to calm him down by saying tohim,'Speakwithacoolhead.'Itwasaverysadmeetingresemblingafuneral. Mujiblatersenthiscompanionsoutsideandthentoldus,'ForGod'ssakegetme anewdatefortheAssemblymeeting.EvennowIcancontrolsomeofmy people.'Mujibwasbeggingforanewdateforthemeeting.Ifoneapplied Bhutto's test [the one he had suggested to Yahya Khan as a test for Mujib's intentions] then Mujib proved to be a patriot otherwise [as the troops from West Pakistan had yet to arrive at this stage] there was nothing to stop him from announcing the creation of Bangladesh.264

Ahsan sent anurgent telex toYahya Khanwho was then at Karachi saying: 'I beg you even at this late hour to give a new date for the summoning of the Assembly and not to postponeitsinedie,otherwise...wewillhavereachedthepointofnoreturn.'265Within half anhour AdmiralAhsan received his reply.He hadbeensackedfrom hisposition as GovernorofEastPakistan.The'Hawk'generalsandBhuttohadwon.Thegeneralswere certainthatsuperiorbruteforcewouldwinthedayinEastPakistan.Ontheotherhand, Bhuttoprobablyseemednottocarewhathappenedaslongashisroutetopower remainedfree ofobstacles. Ruefullyreflecting on these state of events Yahya Khan was tolatersay,'EvenatthislatestageMujibprovedtoabettermohib-e-watan[patriot]than Bhutto ever could have been.'266

***

The reaction to the postponement of the Assembly was worse than anticipated. Central authorityintheeasternprovincecollapsedcompletelyandgovernmentofficesceased to function. The strict censorship laws went unheeded and curfews were purposefully violated. The curfew violations led to shooting in which both army jawans and Bengali civilians were killed. Units of the Pakistan Army found themselves unable to control the publicupsurgeofresentment.Soon,accordingtooneseniorarmyofficer,theauthority of the Martial Law Administrator 'extended no further than his Headquarters.'267In the powervacuumthathadbeencreatedbythespeedofevents,theAwamiLeague assumed authority. On 3 March, the day the Assembly was to have convened, ahartalannouncedbytheAwamiLeaguebroughttheprovinceto astateofparalysis.East Pakistanbecamecut offfromtheworld.All commercialactivity, railways, airlinesand even the courts, ceased to operate.

264RaoFarmanAli,Takbeer,11January1996.pp.26-31.

265RichiydSissonandLeoE.Rose,op. cit.,p.90.

266YahyaKhanInterview(Reprint),DailyKhabarain,14July1995.

267RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.91.

Inthemorningof3MarchtheGovernorandMartialLawAdministratorofEast Pakistan, General Yakub Khan sent an urgent message to Yahya Khan insisting that he visit Dhaka and negotiate directly with Mujib. When General Peerzada telephoned him totellhimthatthepresidentwouldnotbecoming,Yakubchosetheonlyhonourable optionavailabletohimandresignedfrombothhisoffices.268Atamassrallyheldonthe samedayMujibhadannouncedthatallformsofviolenceshouldceaseandurgedhis countrymen to conduct a Gandhian satyagraha. He also spoke for communal harmony between Bengali and non-Bengali and between Muslims and Hindus. Within two days, by5March,thetroopsstationedatDhakawereabletoreturntotheirbarracksasa resultofthiscallfornonviolentresistance.TheresponsetoMujib'sappealhadbeen complete.Lifeintheprovincewasatatotalstandstill,even'thejudges,the quintessentialsymbolofnationalauthority,wentonstrikeandGeneralTikkaKhan,the new governor, could find no one to swear him into office'.269

AlittleoverafortnightlaterIhadachancemeetingwithGeneralYakubKhan.My friend Syed Asad Ali had invited a few people over for a dinner held in honor of Lady MacFarquar,thewidowofaseniorBritishcivilservant.TheGeneralwasoneofthe guestsinvitedtothefunction.IhadknownYakubKhansincehisdaysasaBrigadierin theearly1950satQuetta.HewasalsoanoldboyofmycadetcollegeatDehraDoon, RIMC.AlongwithAdmiralAhsan,whomIheldingreatrespect,GeneralYakubwasa man of integrity. At the time one could only hazard a guess at the reasons for his recent resignationfromthehighestofpostsintheEasternWing.KnowingthemanIbelieved he must have had a very good reason for doing so, but in the circumstances it was not appropriateto inquire. During thecourseoftheeveningGeneralYakub provideda detailedstudyoftheconditionsthatexistedinEastPakistanatthetime.Itmadefor verydepressinghearing.ThechasmthatIhadbelievedtobebridgeablehadwidened even further.

After Yakub Khan's resignation, Farman Ali was summoned toIslamabad. Prior to his departure hewent to see Mujib onthe night of 4 March. Recollecting, hestates:

268Farman Ali recalls: On 4 March General Yakub Khan, General Khadim Ali and I had returned from the airport after seeing Admiral Ahsan off a were sitting for lunch when the phone rang. It was Peerzada calling for Yakub, ... [After some discussion on the phone] Yakub said to Peerzada, 'You then better accept my resignation.' SimultaneouslyGeneral Khadim Ali and I informed Yakub that he also advise Peerzada of their resignations as welt but by that time he had hung up on the telephone. The decision to take military action had now taken place and none of usagreed with thisdecision(RaoFarman Ali,Takbeer,11January 1996,pp. 26-31). On5March1971in his written message confirming his resignation to Peerzada, General Yakuh included the following words, 'a ... military solution ... would mean civil war and large scale killing of unarmed civilians and would achieve no sane aim. It would have disastrous consequences.' General K. M. Arif,Working with Zia, Oxford, Karachi 1995, p. 24.

ForhisclearforesightYakubwasdemotedtotherankofMajor-Generalandforciblyretired.

269DavidLoshak,Pakistan Crisis,McGraw Hill,New York,1971,p. TikkaKhan waslater sworn on 9 April 1971 much after the military's brutal crack-down.

IwenttomeetMujib ina small nondescript caralongwitha driver. Thewhole cityofDaccawasunderthecontroloftheAwamiLeague.Atthemanned checkpointstheBengalishadsetupIwasrecognizedandpermittedtogo through. On meeting Mujib I asked him can Pakistan be saved. He replied, 'Why not?Of courseitcanbesaved.'Inoticed ashadow outsidefromagapinthedoor andassumedthatourconversationwasbeingeavesdropped.Ipointedthisout toMujibbutherejectedmysuspicions,butwhenhelookedoutofthedoorhe foundTajuddinstandingthere.MujibinvitedTajuddinin...Tajuddinalso answeredmyquestionbysaying:'Pakistancanbesavedprovidingtherewere two separate meetings held of the National Assembly. One in the East Wing, the otherintheWest.'Itoldhimthatthiswouldinrealitymeantwoseparate countries.Tajuddinrepliedthat,'We cannotsitunderthe same roofwiththe "NumberOne" killerof Bengalis.'HewasreferringtoBhutto. Icanoffernoproof of this but in those days everyone in East Pakistan held a similar view.

The next day when Farman Ali arrived in Islamabad he went to thePresident's House to answer Yahya Khan's summons:

WhenIleftDaccaUrduspeakingcitizenswerebeingslaughteredinthestreets andshopswerebeingsetalight.Thegovernmentcontrolhadcollapsed completely. Overwrought with the looming disaster in East Pakistan I arrived in thecapitalandwenttothePresident'sHousewhereIwastakentosmallveranda wheresittingalongsidealongtablewhereYahyaKhanwassittingbarefooted withGeneralHamidandBhutto.Thethreeofthemwerelookingrelaxedand chattingoverglassesfilledwithwhisky.Iwastotallytakenabackandshocked bythisdisplayofunfeelingbehavior.WithhalfofPakistanablazewitnessing their indifference my thoughts immediately went to the days of Rome and Nero. Yahya asked me, 'What is the situation in Dacca?' I replied that I wished to brief thePresidentinprivate,whereuponBhuttopickedhiswhiskyandwenttoan adjacent room. I then informed Yahya that. The Bengalis regard Bhutto as being responsibleforthecurrentturnofeventsandrefertohimasthenumberone killeroftheBengalis.ThesituationisnowclearlybeyondtheSixPointsissue...270

Later that evening Farman Ali who had been invited to dinner by the president, cameacrossaYahyaKhanlividwithrage.HehadcometoknowofGeneralYakub's resignationandaccusedhimofdesertioninthefaceofduty,andinstructedGeneral Hamid who was present, to prepare for a case of court martial against all the officers involved including Farman Ali. In the end it turned out to be no more than a case ofdrunken bluster.

270RaoFarmanAli,Takbeer,11January1996,pp.26-31.

Earlieron3March,afterconsultingwithBhutto,YahyaKhanhadcalledfora conference of all party leaders in Dhaka on 10 March, followed with a convening of the Assemblyafortnightorsolater.ThisinvitationhadbeenrejectedbyMujibwho, alreadyconvincedthattheAssemblymeeting'spostponementhadbeenarrangedby Bhuttoincollusionwiththejunta, wasnow suspiciousand resentful aboutthefact that theAwamiLeague,unlikethePPP,hadnotbeenconsultedinadvanceaboutthe conference.271ToendthestalemateYahyaKhanmadeaspeechon6Marchannouncing thattheinauguralsessionof theAssembly wouldnowtake placeon25 March.At the same time he insisted thathis decision topostpone the Assembly had been 'completely misunderstood'andindicatedthattheimpassewasaconsequenceof misunderstandingsbetweenthemajorpartiesandcriticizedtheAwamiLeaguefor allowing'destructiveelements'into'thestreetsanddestroyinglifeandproperty'.Yahya Khan'sspeechendedonanoteofwarning,'Iwillnotallowahandfulofpeopleto destroythehomelandofmillionsofinnocentPakistanis.ItisthedutyofthePakistan ArmedForcestoensuretheintegrity,solidarityandsecurityofPakistan,adutyin which they have never failed.'272The threat of the military option had now been madeclear.

Mujib's reply came at a public meeting, a massive rally held at the Ramna Race Course, on7March.HeannouncedthathewouldnotattendtheNationalAssemblymeeting scheduledfor25Marchunlessfourofhisdemandshadbeenmet.Thesedemandswere:

1. withdrawalofMartialLaw;

2. returnofallmilitarypersonneltotheirbarracks;

3. anenquiryintotherecentshootingsandkillingsinEastPakistan;and,

4. animmediatetransferofpowertotheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople.

MartialLawauthoritiespreventedMujib'sspeechfrombeingbroadcastontheradio. Consequently,the employeesofRadioPakistanDhakawentonstrike andallradio transmissionwentofftheair.Thetransmissiononlyresumedthenextdaywiththe playingofMujib'stapedspeech.273Theauthoritieshadbecomelargelyhelplessasby now the Awami League was running a parallelde factogovernment.

271RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.99.

272Dawn,7March1971.

273ThePakistanObserver,9March1971.

WiththeoutbreakofviolenceinEastPakistan,Bhuttohadbeensubjectedtocriticism and attempts were made to 'discredit him as being a main contributor to the impasse'.274CaughtonthedefensiveandfacedwiththeprospectoftheAssemblymeeting scheduled for 25 March, Bhutto sent a telegram to Mujib on 10 March offering to visitDhaka to recommence theirtalks. The Awami League by this time had concluded that Bhutto was not to be trusted and ignored his offer. Rebuffed, Bhutto nowopenlydemanded that, 'if power were to be transferred to the people before any constitutional settlement as demanded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, it should be transferred to the majority party in East Pakistan and the Majority party here [in West Pakistan]'.275In a subsequentstatementthefollowingday,Bhuttowentastepfurtherbydeclaringthat'in asituationfacedbyPakistan,havingageographicaldistancebetweentwoparts,the rule of majority didnot apply'.276In refusing to acknowledge the basic principle ofmajority rule,Bhutto was preparedto invertthe lawsofdemocracy simply tosuithis quest for power.

Earlier,on13MarchMuftiMahmoodhadcalledtogetherameetingofthesmaller politicalpartiesofWestPakistan.Themeetingwasattendedbyrepresentativesof Jamiat-ulUlema-i-Islam,Jamaat-i-Islami,Jamiat-ulUlema-i-Pakistan,CouncilMuslim LeagueandConventionMuslimLeague.WaliKhan'sNationalAwamiPartywasnot represented,buttheconferencehaditsbacking.Thesepartieshadearlierbeenprepared toattendthe3MarchAssemblymeeting,successfullyresistingthejunta'spressureand the pleas and threats of Bhutto and his PPP, only to find the meeting postponed at the lastmoment.EveryoneatthemeetingacceptedMujib'sfourdemandsandcalledforthe creationofinterimfederalandprovincialgovernmentswiththeconveningofthe National Assembly on25 March. Rejecting Bhutto'sinsistence for a prior agreementon constitutionalprinciples,thegroupcriticallycommentedthat'compromisesinsisted upon and arrived at outside the floor of the house and concealed from the scrutiny and vigilanceofthepeoplehavenorelevancetoconstitutionalsettlement,althoughthey mayhavetomakearrangementsforsharingpower'.TheyurgedYahyaKhanto proceedtoDhakaandremovethe'misunderstandings,apprehensionsandsuspicionsin frank and cordial talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman'.277

Yahya Khan decided finally to travel toDhaka to negotiate with Mujib.He arrivedthere on15Marchandwasaccompaniedwithanearlyfullcomplementofhisjunta generals.278ThePresidentbeganhispoliticaldeliberationswithMujibthefollowing day.Early thenextday, YahyaKhanhad conceded tothreeof thefourpointsthatMujib hadinsisteduponasapreconditiontohisattendingthe25MarchAssemblymeeting.

274HerbertFeldman,op.cit.,p.115.

275Dawn,15March1971.

276G. W. Choudhury,op.cit.,p.163.

277Dawn,15March1971.

278The generals included Umar, Peerzada and Mitha. Yahya Khan is s have asked Hamid to stay behind in case his presence at Dhaka be interpreted to be a sign of greater military involvement.

NowonlyMujib'sdemandforaninstanttransferofpowerremainedtoberesolved. Later,whenMujibandYahyaKhanwerejoinedbytheiradvisers,furtherdiscussions took place on the possibility of a transfer of power and proposals leading to an interim constitutionalsolution.Theyeventuallyagreeduponthefollowing:

1. the liftingofMartialLaw;

2. thecontinuationof YahyaKhanasPresident;

3. the creation of two constituent committees, one for West Pakistan and onefor East Pakistan,to resolve provincial issues; and,

4. thedraftingofaConstitutionintheNationalAssemblysittingasone body after regionalcommittees had completed theirpreliminary work.279

Furthertalkstookplaceon19 March.AfterthismeetingMujibwas toinformasenior militaryofficerthat'heandYahyahadtentativelyagreed ontheformationof anational governmentcomposedofelevenministers.Sixofthese,includingthePrimeMinister, were to come from East Pakistan, and five, (three from PPP and two from the National AwamiParty),weretocomefromWestPakistan'.280Therewasoneimportantquestion stilltobeaddressed:howtodealwiththelegalityofaninterimsituationaftertherepeal of Martial Law and before the meeting of the National Assembly and the promulgation of a new Constitution? This issue was to be resolved by a meeting of negotiating teams representingthePresidentandtheAwamiLeague.Thateveningthetwoteamsmet, andafterlengthydiscussionswhichcontinuedtillthefollowingmorning,itappeared that this issue had beenresolved between thenegotiating parties.

Thepresidentialteamthenpreparedadraftincorporatingtheitemstheteamshad agreedupon.Theprincipalelementsofthedraftproclamationwereasfollows:

1. MartialLawwouldeffectivelyendwiththeadministrationofoathsto provincial Cabinets;

2. theProvisionalConstitutionalOrderof4April1969wouldserveasthe fundamental law until the promulgation of the new Constitution;

3. YahyaKhanwouldcontinueaspresidentduringthisinterimperiod;

4. thePresidentwouldexercisepowerasauthorizedbytheProvisional Constitution Order and the 1962 Constitution;

279RichardSisson andLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.114.

280Ibid.,p.116.

5. acentralCabinetwouldbeformedwithrepresentativesfrombothEast and West Pakistan;

6. theNationalAssemblywouldfunctionasprescribedbythe1962 Constitutionexceptfor'limitationsandmodificationstobeagreedupon with respect to the province of East Pakistan';

7. thefunctionsoftheprovincialassemblieswouldbethesameasunderthe 1962 Constitution, again with exceptions made forEast Pakistan;

8. provincial governors would be appointed by the President in consultation with the leaders of the parliamentary groups of each province, while a Cabinetofministerswastobeappointedwithachiefministeratitshead to'aidandadvise theGovernorin theexercise ofhis functions';

9. within seven days of the creation of the provincial government, two constitutionalcommitteeswouldbeestablished-oneinDhakaandthe otheratIslamabad-orthepurposesof'formulatingspecialprovisions

andrequirements of each province of Pakistan to be incorporated in the constitution to be framed by the National Assembly, which would be convened by the president after the committees had completed their work;and,

10. whenever 'it is made to appear to the President on a report from the GovernorofaProvinceorotherwise,thatasituationhasariseninwhich theGovernmentoftheProvinceassumetohimselfalloranyofthe functions of the executive government of the Province'.281

Ontheeveningof19MarchMumtazDaultanaandShaukatHayatcalledonMujibat hisresidence.ShaukatnoticedthatMujib'scompanionsTajuddinAhmedandNazrul Islamseemedkeennottolethimspeaktothemalone,he mentionsthatwhenMujib 'askedthetwotogetteaforus,onlyonewouldgoatatimeandtheothersatgluedto hisseatandwouldnotbudge,evenifrequested,tilltheotherhadreturnedtostand guard'. Later that evening Shaukat received a confidential messenger from Mujib. The messengerturnedouttobeanacquaintanceofhis,KhondkarMushtaq,aleading AwamiLeaguemember.ShaukatHayatrecalls:

[Khondkar]toldmeofthehappeningssinceourlastmeetingamonthearlierand howSheikhMujibhadsavedthesituationon7thMarchbyhishandlingofthe crowd,inthefaceofheavyodds,atthePaltanMaidan.Nineteenoftheirparty

281WhitePaperontheCrisisinEastPakistan,p.18-20.

menhadvotedagainsthisviewsasagainstthreeforhim.Mushtaqhadtearsin his eyes and informed me that ever since, the Sheikh and he were suspects in the eyes of their opponents, and the Sheikh was virtually kept under guard as aprisoner by the extremists. He begged me to explain to the General that thesituationwasgettingoutofhandandtheymustberealisticandpassoverpower to Mujibso that hemight get the situationundercontrol.282

ItwouldappearfromShaukatHayat'stestimonythatMujib'spositionhadbecome fairlyprecarious.Trappedbyhisextremistcolleagues,hemusthave,atthisstage, keenlysoughtaresolutionthroughthepoliticalimpassewithoutbeingseentohave givenground.Despite the suddenrise inprospectsofasolutiontothe crisis,there remaineda dark cloud on the horizon. YahyaKhan had madeit clear atthe onset of the dialoguesthatthoughhewascommittedtothetransferofpower,thefinaldetails wouldhavetobeagreeduponbyallinterestedparties,includingthePPP.Withthe arrival of Bhutto in Dhaka events suddenly took a turn for the worse.

Bhutto who had earlier rejected Yahya Khan's invitation to be present in Dhaka, now hurried to East Pakistan. Word of a 'settlement' between the President and Mujib had served to unnerve him. The difficulties of managing the proposed West Pakistani 'constitutionalcommittee'wouldhaveweakenedthepositionthathehadsoskillfully built forhimselfasthe leaderofthemajority partyintheWestWing.Intheelectionhe hadonly won a majority in Punjab. In Sindh he was three seats short of a majority,butonceinpowerhewouldundoubtedlyhavebeenabletocobbleamajoritytogetherby new converts to the PPP. Balochistan and the NWFP were out of his control altogether. Antagonism between the provinces would be intense and in all likelihood be directed towards Punjab, the bastion of PPP's strength. Conflicts between PPP and the smaller parties had already arisen and could only deepen further thereby fatally weakening Bhutto's claim to represent West Pakistan. From Bhutto's viewpoint any agreement between Yahya Khan and Mujib would put an end to his schemes to isolate Mujib. The possibilityofformingaunitedWestPakistanfrontagainstMujibandhisAwami League would vanish and provide the Awami League with the freedom to draft the Constitutiononitsown.ThiswasruinousforBhutto'sambitionsashewouldthenbe left out in the cold of political wilderness.

Bhutto'sarrivalatDhakawithhisfifteenaidesonlyservedtoheightenAwamiLeague's suspicionsof a planned conspiracy.The mutual distrustbetweenMujibandBhuttohad turned to near loathing. When they met at the President's House on 22 March, 'neither MujibnorBhuttowould lookmorethanobliquelyattheother,atfirsttheyrefused to converse,eachsitting halfturnedawayfromeachother'.283YahyaKhanreproached themfortheirchildishbehaviourandencouragedthemtotalktoeachother.Inhislater

282SirdarShaukatHayatKhan,op.cit.,p.311.

283RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.122.

interview Yahya Khan stated that shortly before leaving Karachi for Dhaka Bhutto had made some acrimonious and critical comments about Mujib. When Mujib came to hear aboutthesestatements,hehadcomplainedtothePresidentthatBhutto'sintentionsto negotiatewithhimatthisjuncturewereclearlysuspect,andtherewasnopointfor them to meet with each other. Had Bhutto been serious in his aims, Mujib insisted, the PPPleaderwouldnothavebeensovituperativetowardshimontheveryeveoftheir discussions.YahyaKhanstatesthatheprevaileduponMujibtomeetwithBhutto.At themeetingheinsistedthatthetwopoliticiansgooutsideintothegardenandhavea privatetalk.AccordingtoYahyaKhan,duringthesetalksBhuttobluntlyaskedMujib whatshare he wouldhaveinthe future AwamiLeague government.Mujibreplied tersely that he would have none.284

The nextday the Awami League team returned the president's negotiating team's draft proclamationinsistingonanumberofamendments.Threeoftheseamendmentscaused consternationamongthegovernmentteam.First,theAwamiLeaguehadsubstituted 'ConstituentConventions'for'ConstituentCommittees'thoughtheirpurposeremained unchanged.Thesecondprovisionrelatedtotheoathtobeswornbythemembersofthe NationalAssembly.Thegovernment'sdrafthademphasizedsovereigntyandobligationtotheState,whereastheAwamiLeagueversionemphasizedobligationto the Constitution. It was the third change which magnified the consequences of the first two amendments in the minds of the government team. The Awami League wanted to change 'Federation of Pakistan' to 'Confederation of Pakistan'.

Interestinglyenough,whenBhuttometYahyaKhanonthemorningof24March,he raised no objections to the Awami League's amended draft proclamation, instead he opposedtheremovalofMartialLawwhichYahyaKhanhadearliercommittedhimself tointhegovernment'soriginaldraftproclamation.Bhuttoinsistedthatsuchastep would create a legal vacuum. This argument had earlier been effectively countered by Yahya Khan's constitutional advisers who had insisted that a Presidential Proclamation would suffice as it had done when Yahya Khan had taken power by abrogating the 1962 Constitution. In reality the removal of martial law would have been a major concern to Bhutto's backers - the junta generals. The removal of martial law would have rendered them powerless overnight. Having enjoyed supreme power - and its accompaniedtrappingsforthepastmanymonths,thegeneralswerereluctanttopartwithit.For Bhuttotheirlossofpowerwasequallydamaging.Thesuddenimpotenceofthe generalswouldhaveeffectivelyenfeebledBhutto'sroleinthefuturepoliticsofthe nation. It appears likely that the generals had decided to crush the insurgent AwamiLeagueseveralmonthsbefore.TheyhadbeensimplywaitingforMujibtopolitically tripupandprovidethemwitha'legal'justificationtodealwithhimwiththeuseof armedforce.Bhutto'sroleasapremeditatedlastminutespoilerofthenegotiations cannotbediscounted.SincelateFebruarytroopshadbeenpouringintoEastPakistanto

284YahyaKhanInterview(Reprint),DailyKhabarain,14July1995.

reinforcetheexistingbattalionslocatedthere.Itisworthrecallingthatwhentheleaders ofthesmallerWestPakistanpartiesmetwithYahyaKhaninDhakaduringthese criticallastdaysofnegotiations,severalofthemrememberthat'Peerzadawatched Yahya like a hawk, much as they felt Mujib had been by Tajuddin' during their meeting with him a few days earlier.285Clearly in these last dying moments of political tragedy, the two main participants wereno longer masters of theirownfates.

As a last attempt, Yahya Khan tried to enlist the help of some of the West Pakistani politicians present in Dhaka to break the impasse. A West Pakistani delegation went to Mujibonthenightof23Marchtotryandconvincehimontwopoints.Thefirstwasto ask him to allow the meeting of the National Assembly to be held before the separate constitutionalconventions.Mujibinsistedthatthismatterhadalreadybeenagreed upon in the original draft proclamation issued by the government team and it was now impossibleforhimtogobackonit.TheirotherrequestwasfortheinclusionofBhutto andhisPPPintoMujib'sCabinet.ThisdemandwasrejectedoutofhandbyMujib.On theeveningof24March,AwamiLeaguerepresentativesmetwiththePresident'steam forwhatturnedouttobethelasttime.ThehardlineTajuddininformedthe government that their amended proclamation was final as far as the Awami League was concerned,buttheywerewillingtoacceptcertainminorchangesoflanguage.286AccordingtoTajuddin,GeneralPeerzadapromisedtotelephonethemtoarrangea further meeting to finalize the terms of the amended draft proclamation. The call wasnever to come.

OneoftheWestPakistanipoliticianspresentatDhakawasGhousBukshBizenjo,then the provincial party president of NAP, Balochistan. He returned to Karachi in the early hoursof25March.Afewhoursafterhisarrivalhevisitedmy-housetoprovideme with an up-date of the situation in the Eastern Wing. While the fact that the crack-downwasabouttotakeplacewasunknowntousall,Bizenjosucceededinpaintingan extremelydismalpictureofthesceneatDhaka.Hestatedthathe.alongwithother West Pakistanipoliticians presentintheEasternWing,hadmanagedto prevailupon Mujibtoadoptamoreconciliatoryattitudeforthesolesakeofmaintainingtheunityof thecountry.MujibandhislieutenantKhondkarMushtaq,accordingtoBizenjo,had finallyagreedtotheideaofforminghismajoritygovernmentwithoutinsistingupon the removal of Martial Law. This had become the serious constitutional sticking point betweenthenegotiatingsides.Butatthesametime,inspiteofhavingseemingly removed the only major point of disagreement between the two sides Bizenjo soundedvery despondent. He then confirmed my suspicions that Yahya Khan was not fully incontrol of the government. Bizenjo told me that Yahya Khan had become hedged in by ambitious and intriguing members of the Junta who had already decided to 'sort outMujib'.AccordingtoBizenjo,thesegeneralshadgoneasfarastoinsistthattheNational

285RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op.cit.,p.131.

286PressStatementissuedbyTajuddinAhmed(asPrimeMinister-in-eBangladesh),17April1971(quotedin: Safdar Mahmood,The Delibera Debacle, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore. 1976, pp. 216-28).

Assembly be suspended. In its place they called for allowing the provincial majorities to form their localized governments. It seemed clear that, in addition to their antipathy towardsMujib,themembersoftheJuntahaddevelopedthetasteforpowerandwere not keen to voluntarily abdicate at the Centre.

Onthenightof 25MarchthePakistanArmy moved intothestreets of Dhakaand began their'OperationSearchlight'.Theobjectivesweretoneutralizethepoliticalpowerofthe AwamiLeagueandtore-establishthewritofthejuntaregime.Initsinitialstagesitwas executedinaccordancewithacarefullypreparedplanasisthecaseofmostmilitary operations. First,thetopleadershipoftheAwami Partyhad tobecaptured.Thesecond prioritywastoneutralizeitsmoreextremesupporters,suchasuniversitystudent leadersandheadsofothersimilarorganizations.MostoftheAwamiLeagueleaders managedtoevadecapturewiththeexceptionofMujib.Manypeoplediedinthefirst fewdays.LaterchargesweremadethattheArmy'sSpecialForcepersonnelhadbeen instructedtowipeoutalltraceofexistingBengaliintellectualism.Theevidenceis necessarilylimited.OnecasehighlightedbyHerbertFeldmanwasthatofA.Ahad whom he described as being 'head of Dacca's leading firm of lawyers and a director of many important companies'. Feldman statesthat Ahad 'was arrested at thetime of the army's crack-down and has never been seen since.There islittle doubt he was shot.'287Ahad would hardly have fallen under the description of a firebrand secessionist.

There can be little doubt that innocent civilians were mercilessly killed during the army actionwhichculminatedmonthslaterinthedestructionofthecountryasweonce knew it. In West Pakistan there was only one leading civilian who openly justified the militarycrack-downfromitsveryoutsetandthatwasBhutto.Heannouncedonhis returnfromDhaka,'ThankGod,Pakistanhasbeensaved.'288YahyaKhan's proclamation in Karachi on 26 March announced: 'I have ordered the armed forces to do their job and fully restore the authority of the Government.'289There were nearly two complete army divisions present in East Pakistan by March 6 to carry out the junta'sorders. The decision to use them against Pakistani civilians reflected the callouslyblinkeredvisionoftherulingjunta.InanefforttosavetheirconceptofPakistanthey hadembarkedonaventurethatwouldtakeitasneartoastateofnationaldestruction aswaspossible.ItwouldbefutiletoblameIndiaforthefinalaftermathwhichresulted in abysmal defeat of the Pakistan Army. The state of hostility which existed between PakistananditsneighborensuredthatIndiawouldtakeadvantagewhenevera situationdetrimentaltoPakistanarose.ItwasthearmyjuntawhichprovidedIndia withavitalopportunitytowreakitsrevengeonPakistan.Themilitarycrackdownin

287HerbertFeldman,op.cit.,p.110.

288TheMorningNews,Karachi,27March1971.

289Surprisingly,GeneralGul Hassan who asChief of General Staff w actively involved inmilitaryrather thanmartial law matters, insists that he and the Army GHQ at Rawalpindi were kept in the dark about the final order to take military action until after the event: Lt.-General Gul Hassan,op. cit., p. 273.

EastPakistanshouldneverhavetakenplace.Theblameforthisdisasterliessquarelyon thegeneralsofthejuntawhoordainedthemselvestobethejudgesofwhatwasbestfor Pakistan.YahyaKhandidtrytofindalternatesolutionsbuthewasfoundtobeineptfor the task in the end. He totally lacked the political wiles to deal with the conundrum posedbytheAwamiLeagueandEastPakistan.Lastly,ofallthepoliticiansinWest Pakistantherewasonly onewhohad wholeheartedlysupported themilitaryactionat the time it took place. He had even gone as far as suggesting to Yahya Khan that 'lightmilitary action'would solvetheproblem.290AstuteasBhuttowas, hemusthaveknown thatmilitaryactionofanysortbyaperceived'alien'forcecouldonlypermanently shatter the already tenuous bonds that kept the two wings of the country together. His closeinvolvementwiththejuntageneralsduringtheprecedingmonths,andtherole thatheplayedtofurthercomplicateanalreadyperiloussituationbyattemptstoisolate the Awami League, denounce his intentions from the onset. The junta generals could at leastprofesstheclaimthattheyhadactedinwhattheyperceivedtothebestinterestsof the country. Bhutto was in no position to offer any such excuse. He as alwaysremained blind to all other interests save his own.

ThecivilwarthatsoonenvelopedtheEasternWinghadnotbeenproperlyenvisaged bytheJuntaleadership.Inflictinganactofarmedbrutalityuponamajorityofthe nation's citizenry was a solution which could only have been conceived by a moribund military dictatorship. On 14 April 1971 I met Air Marshal Rahim Khan at a dinner held inhishonorbyAirCommodoreandBegumBalwantDass.RahimKhanhadjust returnedfromDhakaand whatnewshehad totelluswasdepressingtotheextreme. Hestatedthatthirty-sixmenoftheAirForcehadbeenkilledinisolatedpostsinEast Pakistan. The Army was coming across stiff opposition from armed Bengali rebels and theprevailingmoodthroughouttheEasternWingwasoneofresistance.Eventhose whohadrecentlybeen imprisonedonvariouschargesofseditionandtreasonrefused to be cowed down and continued to remainSefiant. Thirty percent of the personnel of thePakistanAirForcehadbeengroundedbecauseofsuspecteddividedloyalities. Having said all this Rahim Khan remained optimistic about the end result. His views, I have no doubt, echoed those of his service colleagues in the Army Junta. Even more so, when he could not help but contemptuously add: 'Don't worry! We will be able to sort out the Bingos'.

ShortlybeforethefallofDhaka,aresolutionwassubmittedtotheUnitedNations SecurityCouncilbyPolandtoseekanendtotheIndo-Pakhostilities.ThePolish proposal called for an immediate cease-fire, troop withdrawals and transfer of power in East Pakistan to the elected representatives. These provisions aroused considerable distressinIndiaastheywouldhaveputanendtotheIndianstrategyofadecisive militaryvictoryleadingtothebreakingofPakistanintotwoandtheformationofan

290Bhutto'sinterviewwithKuldipNayar,Statesman,NewDelhi,231972.

independent Bangladesh.291Much to India's chagrin the resolution also contained the clausecallingfor'renunciationofoccupiedterritory'.Thiswouldhaveledtothereturn of some of the strategic points India had seized from Pakistan across the Kashmir cease-fire line. But this was not to be.Subsequent historians reported:

Inourinterviewswithhimin1979,Yahya Khanrelatedarathercuriousaccount ofhisexperiencewithBhuttoonthePolishresolution.Yahyahadbeentalkingto Bhutto - who was at the UN meetings in New York - by telephone about several matters. At one point Yahya said that he was far away, of course, but the Polish resolutionlookedgood,and'weshouldacceptit'.Bhuttoreplied,'Ican'thear you.'Yahyarepeatedhimselfseveraltimes,andBhuttokeptsaying,'What? What?'TheoperatorinNewYorkfinallyintervenedandsaid.'Icanhearhim fine,' to which Bhutto replied, 'Shut up.'292

India by now hadreluctantly conceded thatitwould have little choice buttoaccept the PolishresolutionwhichhadinrealityoriginatedfromtheSoviets.FortunatelyforIndia, Bhutto,theheadofthePakistanidelegationtotheUN,cametoitsrescue.Inthe SecurityCouncilmeetingon15December1971,BhuttocondemnedtheUNfornot acting promptly enough and then threw a public tantrum.No furtherdiscussions could be heldonthe resolutionmuchtothe delightofthe amazedIndianspresentatthe proceedings. As General Jacob, second-in-command of the Indian invasion forces, lateradmitted:

APolishresolution,presumablybackedbytheSovietUnion,calledforan immediateceasefireandtroopwithdrawals.Sucharesolution,ifadoptedwould havebeendisastrousforIndia.FortunatelyforusBhutto,on15December,tore up his copy of the resolution, denounced the United Nations and stormed out of the session.293

ThefollowingdaytheIndianforcespresentedthetermsofsurrendertoGeneralNiazi. A day later, on 16 December, Dhaka fell. If the Polish resolution had been accepted, the ignominyof 17Decemberwouldhave been avoided.Thefactthatit demandedthe transferofpowertotheelectedrepresentativesrankledBhutto.Itmeantareturnof MujibandtheAwamiLeague.Bhuttowouldthenhavebeenreducedinpoliticalrank. As a parliamentary minority leader, he would have been relegated to the peripheries ofpower.

291In fact key officials in India could not comprehend why Pakistan did not immediately agree to the Polish Resolution as it would 'have left India in a most difficult and compromising position': Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose,op. cit.,p. 306 (note 27).

292RichardSissonandLeoE.Rose,op. cit.,p.306-7(note28).

293Lt.-GeneralJ.F.R.Jacob,SurrenderatDacca,BirthofaNation,ManoharPublishers,NewDelhi,1997,pp.131-2.

CHAPTER5

EntryoftheCivilianMartialLawAdministrator

Having successfully assisted the Junta in getting rid of Mujib, Bhutto's utility to thegeneralssufferedadecline.Afterthemilitary crackdowninEast Pakistan,hewasnow onlysummonedbyYahyaKhanwhenhewasfoundtobeofusetotheregime.InJuly hewassenttoTeherantoseeksupportfromtheShahasthecivilwarwasprovingtobe an expensive venture both militarily and financially. The US-imposed embargo on shipments of arms to Pakistan forced the government to resort to seeking military hardwarefromIran'svastsupplyofUS-madeweaponry.AfterBhutto'sreturnfrom Iran Yahya Khan decided to confer with him regarding the possibilities of future constitutionalarrangements.Duringthemeeting,Bhuttotriedhisbesttoofferhimself forthepostofprimeministerbypledgingthatYahyaKhanwouldremaintheHeadof Stateinanyfuturegovernment.Bhuttoalsotemperedhispersuasionsmakingan implied threat. He told the president that 'If our opponents are put in power, we willoppose them and destroy them'. Yahya Khan replied rather curtly, 'Don't talk of confrontation with me... I want to transfer power to you but I cannot say who will be in powerintheCentre'.294ThepresidenthadeffectivelyclosedthedooronBhutto's ambitionofprimeministership.ItleftthePPPleaderchafingatthebit.

InAugust1971 GeneralGulHassanmentionsreceivingamessagefromBhuttothrough his emissary Sadiq Qureshi:

Sadiqinformedmethathehadcomeonanerrand:ChairmanBhuttohad especiallysenthimsothatIshouldconveytothePresidentthatunlesspower was handed over to 'the elected representatives of the people' immediately, he [Bhutto] would no longer be in a position to keep his party in check. I questioned Sadiqastowhyhehadbeensenttome,becausetheproblemashehaddivulged it lay in the bailiwick of the PSO(P) [General Peerzada]. I had nothing to do withsuchissues.SadiqtoldmethattheChairmanhadalreadyusedupthatchannel.295

GulHassanfurtheradds:

294Stanley Wolpert,Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, p. 159: Wolpert quotes from minutes of the meeting between Yahya Khan and his aides, and Bhutto and his advisers, held on 29 July 1971.

295Lieut.-GeneralGulHassanKhan,Memoirs,p.279.

I knew just as well as anyone in the country that thePeople's Party began andendedwithBhutto,sothequestionofholdinghispartyincheck,inthatcontext hadnomeaning.Ontheotherhand,ifBhuttohadanynotionsregarding disturbingpeaceintheWestandplannedtoembarkuponasimilarventureas wasinprocessintheEastWing,then'IwouldadviseyourChairmanthathe should think again'. Yahya Khan would under no circumstances tolerate any upheavalhereandBhuttoshouldnotforgetthatthemeansavailabletocurb such inclinations in this Wing were infinitely more effective, and I did not think YahyaKhan,oranyoneelseinhissituation,wouldhesitatetoemployallmeans at his disposal to save Pakistan. (Of course, I had to draw on my choicestvocabulary, of which my store is vast, and it is most explicit on such occasions.) IalsovolunteeredtoaccompanySadiqifhefeltanyconstraintsinexpressing himselfinmylucidstyle.Hedeclinedmyofferandleft.296

ButitseemsBhuttowasdeterminedtopresstheissue.AweeklaterhevisitedGul Hassaninperson.TheGeneraldescribestheirconversationasfollows:

'I amcoming fromameeting withGeneralPeerzada,whoholdsyouinhigh esteem,' Bhutto said.

'SowhatamIsupposedtodo?'Iasked.

'Iwouldadviseyoutogetclosetohimandworkintandemwithhim.Thesooneryoureconcileyourselftothefactthatheisdoingaveryimportantjob,the betterforyou,'Bhuttoremarkedmenacingly.Icouldnotletthatonego.'You seemtobeagainmisinformed.Iamnotexactlydrivingatongafrommorning until sunset.'297

Afterwhich,accordingtoGulHassan,Bhuttolefthishouse'ratherunceremoniously'. Thisincidentdoesserve tosuggestthatdespite hisrecentproblemswiththe Junta, BhuttohadmanagedtomaintainhiscontactswithPeerzada.ButevenPeerzadawas not able to ease Bhutto's political dilemma for others such as Yahya Khan had come to distrustthePPPleader.UncertainabouthisownpoliticalfutureBhuttoremained hauntedbytheimprisonedMujib.AsYahyaKhanwasabouttoleavefortheShah's grandiose'2000thanniversary'ofIranianmonarchy,Bhuttoadvisedhimtohave Mujib quicklytriedfortreasoninamilitarycourtandthensummarilyexecuted.298Yahya

296Ibid.

297Ibid.,p.280.

298Yahya Khan Interview(Reprint),DailyKhabarain,14 July 1995. Bhutto'sadvice to Yahya wasconfirmed byG. W. Choudhury, who was then serving as a presidential adviser. Choudhury says that he was also approached byBhutto to convince Yahya Khan. 'Bhutto's contention to me was that Yahya, being a weak person, was likely to succumbtoworldpressureandmayreleaseMujibormighteventransferpowertoMujib.Itwastherefore,

Khanignored thispieceof unsolicited advice.By September Bhuttohad becomedeeply frustrated.WhileaddressingacrowdoutsideMr.Jinnah'smausoleumatKarachi,he gaveventtohisfeelingsbydramaticallycryingouttothepublic:'Whathappenedin East Pakistan can happen inWest Pakistan aswell... But I warn the powers that be that wewillnotpermitbloodshedhere...Speak,speak,myQuaidwhenwillthisnightof oppression end?... For God's sake, restore democracy.'299

Fate suddenly intervened for Bhutto. The imminent threat of an Indian invasion of East Pakistan rehabilitated Bhutto's value in the eyes of the regime. In late November Bhutto flew as Yahya Khan's personal emissary to Beijing to urgently request for some military hardware. It was an elevated post for him because he headed a team consisting of the Commander-in-ChiefofthePakistanAirForce,RahimKhan,aswellastheArmyChief oftheGeneralStaff,GeneralGulHassan.On21NovembertheIndianArmyhadbegun itsattackacrossseveralplacesontheEastPakistanborderandmanagedtocapture someenclaves.Ratherthanconsolidatea strongcircumferenceofdefence,the CommanderoftheEasternFront,GeneralNiazi,unwiselychosetodispersehistroops towidespreadpositionsontheborderwiththeintentionofevictingtheenemy.Ina large number of instances our troops on the border were quickly surrounded or at times bypassedbya largerenemy force. Torelievethepressureontheeasternfrontthe Pakistan Air Force made air strikes on Indian air bases from West Pakistan and the war began in earnest in the western front. The strategy proved to be a total failure. On 17 DecemberPakistanitroopsinEastPakistanformallysurrenderedtoIndiaand Bangladesh became a reality.

WhenthepublicinWestPakistanlearnedofthemilitarydefeattherewasshock, outrage and a keen urge to punish the leaders responsible for the national cataclysm. A foreign observer accurately summed up the situation:

Confidenceinthemilitary whohadruledPakistanforsolongwasabruptly shattered.Itwas bad enoughthatin Dacca, beforetheeyesofthe whole world, thePakistanforceshadsurrenderedunconditionallytoanIndiangeneralandall beenmadeprisoners-of-warwithnocertaintywhenoratwhatfurtherpricethey wouldbe allowedto return home. But in addition Pakistan's East Wing wasnow clearlygoneforever,andwithitmuchofthecountry'swealthandpopulation.All this at the hands of Pakistan's inveterate rival and enemy, India.300

Thesenseofdisquiethadalsobeguntospreadamongthearmy.Intheheartlandof Punjabsoldiershadbeenstonedandabusedbycivilians.Thecontemptandscornof theircountrymenwasnoteasytotolerate.Dishonoredintheeyesofthepublicand

needed, according to Bhutto, to execute Mujib before Yahya went to Teheran in late 1971': G. W. Choudhury,The Pakistan Times, 22 September 1988.

299StanleyWolpert,ZulfiBhuttoofPakistan,pp.159-60.

300SirMorriceJames,PakistanChronicle,p.187.

with some 80,000 of their officers and men in Indian captivity, a large many soldiers seethed with resentment. In these circumstances a handful of senior officers decided to raisethevoiceofprotest.301Bymid-Decembertherelationshadbecomeexceedingly tense between the army GHQ largely now under the control of General Gul Hassan (the ChiefofArmyStaff,GeneralHamid,waslookeduponasaJuntaman)andthe politicized army generals at the Martial Law HQ. Gul Hassan maintains that during this periodthe'disciplineintheArmywasonthevergeofsnappingandtherepugnant odorofanarchywasintheair'.302AtthearmyGHQtherewasastrongfeelingthat YahyaKhanhadtogo.Itissaidthatatthisstagethereweretwoschoolsofthoughton his replacement. Some favored Asghar Khan, others Bhutto. Asghar Khan's opponents according to one source maintained that:

TointroduceyetanotherarmedforcesmanasPresidentmightwellprovokestiff oppositioninanationwhichhadnoreasontofeelconfidenceinthepoliticalskill ofmeninuniform.Moreover,intheelectionof1970,AsgharKhanhadbeen soundlydefeated-inaRawalpindiconstituency,veritablehomeofthearmed forces - by aPeople's Party candidateof nogreat prominence.303

ItwasnowthatBhutto'spreviouseffortstoingratiatehimselftoGeneralGulHassan andAirMarshalRahimfinallypaidoff.ThesetwopowerfulfiguresopenlyoptedforthePPPleader.Bhutto-whohadonlyrecentlybeenappointedasDeputyPrime Ministerunderatitularciviliangovernmentartificiallycreatedon7December1971- wasattendingtheUnitedNationstoaddressanEmergencySessionoftheSecurity Council onPakistan'sbehalf.304He soonreceived informationsuggesting thathe would dowelltoreturnassoonaspossible.From18to20December1971Pakistanwas virtually without a government. Yahya Khan had been rendered a virtual prisoner and the Junta generals had become totally enfeebled. Real power now lay with Gul Hassan. On20DecemberBhuttoflewintoRawalpindianddrovestraighttothePresident's Housewhereashortwhilelateratransferofpowertookplace.YahyaKhanresigned and Bhutto became the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and the President ofPakistan.

***

Bhutto had finally achieved his long held ambition to become the most powerful figure inthecountry.Ontakingpowerheannounceda'new'beginningforPakistanand

301Six of these officers-including General Shamim, Brigadiers Iqbal Mehdi Shah and Farrukh Bakht Ali - were later compulsorily retired from the army. Later when General Hamid, the Chief of Staff, addressed a meeting of officers held at the Rawalpindi GHQ a number of younger officers responded to him by loud mutinous booting. Some of them even turned abusive and openly denounced the Junta generals as 'bastards' and 'drunkards'.

302Lt.-GeneralGulHassanKhan,Memoirs,op.cit.,p.344.

303HerbertFeldman,TheEndand theBeginning,op.cit.,p.187.

304NurulAminhadbeenmadetheprimeminister.

promisedits citizens that he would'rebuildourdemocratic institutions'.305Though now heprofessedtoworktowardsestablishingdemocracy,hewastheverysamemanwho had only a decade earlier advised Ayub Khan to establish 'a one-party system in whichroles of the legislative and judicial branches of the government were to be completely subservient to an all-powerful central authority'.306Despite his proclivity for delivering grandiloquent speeches in favor of democracy, Bhutto was now resolved to wrest allpowerintohisownhands.Anastutepoliticaloperator,herealizedthatheinhisquest fortotalpowerwouldhavetocontendwithallexistingpowergroupings.Accordingto oneofhiscloseadvisors,Bhuttojudgedthese'powerblocs'tobe:(a)TheMilitary;(b) The Bureaucracy; (c) Big Business; and (d) The Politicians.307Within a few months of obtaining power Bhutto made determined attempts to undermine each and every one of these so-called 'power blocs'.

Shortly after assuming power Bhuttoconsolidated his position by swiftly dealing with thecrisisathand.HeplacedYahyaKhanunder'protectivecustody'andforciblyretired Generals Hamid, Peerzada, Umar, Mitha and two others.308A few days later a number ofseniornavalofficers,includingtheNavalCommander-in-Chief,AdmiralMuzaffar Hussainweresimilarlyretired.By7January1972Mujibwasfreeandboundfor London on his way to make his return to Bangladesh. According to General Arif before Mujib left Bhutto informed him that:

he [Bhutto] was personally responsible for saving him from the jaws of death. He repeatedly mentioned that General Yahya Khan had been determined to execute Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ... For that reason, said Bhutto, he had him shifted from MianwalijailtoChasmarest-house,totakehimoutofthereachofGeneral YahyaKhan.HerepeatedlyrequestedSheikhMujiburRahmanthatonhisarrivalatDhakaheshoulddisclosepubliclythatBhuttohadsavedhislife.309

IhavenoreasontodoubtGeneralArif'sclaim.Veracity,asIhavementionedearlier, was never one of Bhutto's strong traits. The fact that Bhutto should choose to twist the trutharoundandwishtobepubliclyproclaimedasMujib'ssavior,givesthisaccount greaterauthenticity.Bhuttohadalwayspridedhimselfasanartfuldissembler.Ina vindictive attempttodistance himself fromthe previousMartial Lawregime a stormof lurid publicity was unleashed in the daily Press purporting to expose the private life of YahyaKhan by givingdetailsofhisallegeddrunkendebaucheries.Inan interviewwith

305Z.A.Bhutto,'AddresstotheNation',20December1971(Z.A.BhuttoSpeechesandStatements,vol.1, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1972, p. 1).

306ShahidJavedBurki,PakistanunderBhutto1971-1977,Macmillan,London,1980,p.80.

307RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan,op.cit.,p.380.

308TheothertwowereGeneralsKhudaDadandKiyani.

309GeneralK.M.Arif,WorkingwithZia,Oxford,Karachi,1995,p.39

OrianaFallacihewasalsotorefertohisformerbenefactorsintheJunta,suchas GeneralPeerzada, as an'illiterategang ofpsychopaths'.310

ArmedwiththepowersofCMLAandPresidentBhuttoappointedhisloyalistsas governors of the four remaining provinces. A Federal Cabinet was sworn in consisting largelyofPPPministers,suchasJ.A.Rahim,SheikhRasheed,MubashirHassan,GhulamMustafaJatoiandMerajKhalid.On1January1972theMartialLaw governmenttookstatecontroloverallmajorindustries.311Twoweekslaterthe governmentabolishedthepracticeofmanagementagencies.Bhuttohadbynow commencedhisonslaughtonBigBusiness,oneofhisdespised'powerblocs'.This policywascontinuedwiththenationalizationofthevegetableoilindustryinAugust 1972andtheprivately owned bankson1 January1974. Whiletoa large extentBhutto wasjustifiedinlimitingtheexcessesofwealthbeingreapedbyahandfuloffamilies, themannerinwhichthepolicywasimplementedresultedinlonglastingdamagetothe nationaleconomy.Aperiodofgreatuncertaintyfollowedthenationalizations.The erosionintheconfidenceofthebusinesscommunityledtoasharpdeclinein investmentsforthedecadesthatfollowed. Pakistanexperiencedaflightofexperienced businessmenandtheircapital.Italsoresultedinthegrowthofagrosslyover-staffed, incompetentandcorruptpublicsectorwhichbedevilstheeconomytothisveryday. Thestateownershipof thebankswouldeventuallydirectlyleadtopauperizationofthe financial system under successive corrupt and self-aggrandizing governments.

Aspartofhiseconomicagenda,Bhuttoannouncedanewseriesofagrarianland reforms in March 1972. The reforms reduced the ceiling of holdings from 500 (as laiddown in the 1959 land reform) to 150 acres in the case of irrigated land and from 1000 acresto300acresinthe.caseofunirrigatedland.Thelandinexcessoftheseceilings was to be resumed by the state without compensation to the owners. While most agricultural land holdings - including mine - were severely affected, Bhutto had already ensured that his farm property remained fully protected.312

On3March1972BhuttotargetedtheArmedForces.TheArmyandAirForceChiefs whoplayedthevitalrolesofplacingBhuttoinpowerwereunceremoniouslydismissed. Themannerinwhichitwasdone vergedslightly ontheabsurd.Theunsuspecting GeneralGulHassanandAirMarshalRahimwereinvitedtothePresident'sHouse wherethey were presentedwithresignationlettersfor themtosign.After signing,Gul

310OrianaFallaci,InterviewwithHistory,(Englishtranslation),HoughMifflin,Boston,1976,p.191.

311These industries included iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engine electrical equipment, automotive assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, cement, petro-chemicals, oil refineries, and public utilities. Thirty-one large firms controlling about seventy industrial units were placed under eleven corporations under a newly created Ministry of Production.

312In May 1971, while our mutual friends, the Lebacqs, were visiting Karachi, I met Nusrat Bhutto who confided to me that her husband had recently transferred the ownership of a large portion of his agricultural holding onto the names of his farm staff. She then suggested that I do the same to forestall the impact of future land reforms. Needless to add, I did not follow her advice.

HassanandRahimKhanwereputinacar,inthecustodyofa'pistol-packing'PPP Federal Minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and driven at breakneck speed to Lahore by a nervousdriver,whohappenedtobenone otherthanthePPPGovernorofPunjab, GhulamMustafaKhar.313Topreventaretaliatorycoupd'étatattemptBhuttohad temporarilydisabledthearmyhierarchybyhavingsimultaneouslysummonedthe Army'sChiefofGeneralStaff,theDirectorofMilitaryOperationsandtheDirectorof MilitaryIntelligenceforaspuriousmeetingatanearbybuilding.Despiteallthe precautionarymeasuresagreatdealofnervousnesswasexhibitedbythecivilians, including the CMLA himself. Gul Hassan mentions in his memoirs that Bhutto's hands were exceedinglysweaty whenhe shook hands with him attheirfinal parting that day.

After this successful escapade against the military, Bhutto abolished the title of 'Commander-in-Chief replacing it with the more modest one of 'Chief of Staff. He also ensuredthatreplacementservicechiefswerenotawardedthetitleofDeputyMartial LawAdministratorsunliketheirmorepowerfulpredecessors.HavingreplacedGul Hassan with the ever compliant General Tikka Khan, Bhutto now appropriated key personnel functions from the army GHQ. An informal three-man committee headed by Bhutto^314began approvingallpromotionsandtransfersofofficersoftherankof brigadier-general and above. It is reported that he used this committee to distribute thetop military positions among officers who did not have any known group loyalties to safeguard his own position.315So, within three months of attaining power Bhutto hadmadehimselfreasonablysecureagainstthepossibilityofthearmyreassertingitself. The most dominant ofBhutto's four 'power blocs' hadbeen emasculatedfor the timebeing.

Bhutto was also determined to teach the third remaining'power bloc', the bureaucrats, a lesson.Soonaftercomingtopower,on12March1972,hecompulsorilyretired1303 civil servants for alleged corruption or incompetence. Among the dismissed were anumber of senior civil servants who Bhutto believed had opposed him in his days of political wilderness after being sacked in 1966 from Ayub Khan's government. These officials included Chief Secretaries of Punjab and Sindh, Secretary for Defence, and SecretaryforForeignAffairs.Inthewordsofonehistorian,Themessagethatwas received by the bureaucracy as a result of the purge was clear and straightforward: "Support the policies of the People's Party or look for another job".'316

A further blow to the bureaucrats took place in 1973 when the constitutional guarantees protecting their employment from political interference were withdrawn. Major administrativereformssoonfollowedwhichabolishedtheCivilServiceofPakistan,the

313Lt.-GeneralGulHassanKhan,op.cit.,p.368-9.

314The other members of the selection committee included his two loyalist army officers: the Army Chief General Tikka Khan and Bhutto's Military Secretary Major-General Imtiaz Ali Ahmed.

315ShahidJavedBurki,PakistanunderBhutto1971-1977,op.cit.,p.104.

316CharlesH.Kennedy,BureaucracyinPakistan,Oxford,Karachi1897,p.81.

elitistheiroftheoriginalImperialCivilServiceofIndia.InactualitytheCSPhad maintained reasonably high levels of competence and integrity, its major weakness lay initselitist,authoritarianandinflexibleoutlook.Ratherthantryingtocurbthese tendenciesandforcingtheCSPtoacceptdemocraticnorms,Bhuttowantedthe bureaucratstobuckleunderhisauthority.Thenewreformsopenedupentrytothecivil serviceforpeopleofallagesandnotjustthroughcompetitiveexamsrestrictedto collegegraduates.Entrantswentthroughalessrigoroustrainingperiodinamodest newAcademyforAdministrativeTraining.Anotherreform,whichprovedtobeeven more corrosive to the previous high standards of the civil service, was the new system oflateralentry.Inthisnewsystementrantshadonlytomeetabasicfewelementary standardssetbytheEstablishmentDivision-andnottheFederalPublicService Commission. The Establishment Division, which was headed by one of Bhutto's chosen underlings, Viqar Ahmed - an audits and accounts service man-employed new recruits onaclearlypoliticalbasis.DuringthePPPgovernment1374officersofquestionable ability were recruited by thisdivision.317According to one commentator:

Thewithdrawalofconstitutionalguaranteesandmakingthecivilservants answerabletotheheadofadministrationwerestepstakentoreducethepower ofthebureaucracy.OncealltheOrdinancesandActsaimedatreformingthecivil administrationwereonthebooksand oncetheCSPhad beenabolished, the seniorcivilservantcouldnolongeractwiththedegreeofindependencethatwas available to them under previous administrations. This diminution in the power ofthecivilbureaucracymadepossibletheconcentrationofpowerinthehandsof the Prime Minister.318

Nowtheonlyremaining'powerbloc'tobedealtwithwerethepoliticians.Butbefore weexamineBhutto'smaneuveringsagainsthispoliticalopponentsmentionmustbe madeofhisdealingswiththetwoothervitalpillarsofademocraticsystem;the judiciary and the Press.

The courts in Pakistan have regularly escaped closer scrutiny mainly because of our instilled and traditional concept of respect for the institution of the judiciary. Ever since ChiefJusticeMunir'sill-conceivedjudgmentintheMaulviTamizuddinCase,theissueof legitimacy of a usurping government has been at the forefront of a number of constitutional decisions. In the 1958 Dosso Case the Supreme Court had upheld the 'doctrine of necessity' in giving legitimacy to the usurping Ayub Khan. In early 1972 the Supreme Court tried to reassert itself after years of authoritarian rule under Ayub Khanand Yahya Khan. It decided to overrule the principle laid down in the Dosso Case and concludedthatin1969AyubKhanhadnoauthoritytoturnoverthegovernmentto YahyaKhan,whointurnhadnoauthoritytoacceptpowerortoimposemartiallaw.As

317In1974alocalmagazineidentifiedmorethanahundredseniorlevelappointeesascloserelativesand associates of Federal Ministers:ZindigiLahore, July 1974.

318ShahidJavedBurki,PakistanunderBhutto1971-1977,p.101.

YahyaKhan'ssuccessorasCMLA,Bhuttowasnotentirelypleasedwiththeideaofa newly assertive judiciary. Consequently, in the years that followed, he endeavored to circumscribe the powers of the courts at every opportunity. A number of subsequent amendments made to the 1973 Constitution directly impinged on the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts. The Fourth Amendment seriously restricted the High Courts' ability to grantinterimrelieftodetainees.TheFifthAmendmentfurthercurtailedtheHigh Courts'powerstojudiciallyinterfereinanyaspectofapreventivedetentioncase, straight from the initial registration of the case at a police station onwards. TheAmendmentalsodeclaredthatlawsmadepursuanttoemergencyproclamationshad 'beenvalidlymadeandshallnotbecalled intoquestioninanycourt' evenifthey conflicted with the fundamental rights specified in the Constitution. In addition the government amended the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) in 1976 to give specially appointedtribunalsexclusivejurisdictionoveroffencespunishableundertheDPR.

Thisamendmentalsoaffectedthejudgesmoredirectly.Appointmentstothesuperior courtshadalwaysrequiredgovernmentconfirmation,butduringBhutto'srulethese wereoftenpostponedorwithheld, leaving judgeswithonlytemporaryappointments. TheFifthAmendmentcurtailedthelengthofserviceforchiefjustices.Bhutto'sown confidant, Rafi Raza, later summarized these changes forced upon the senior judiciary:

... significantly, the term of office of the Chief Justices of the Superior Courts was to be determined not solelybyagebut, as analternative, by afixed period ... The Executive was also empowered to transfer a Judge to any High Court for up to a yearwithouthisconsentorevenconsultationwiththeChiefJusticeconcerned. Furthermore,inthepast,apowerfulChief JusticeofaHighCourthadattimes refused to be appointed a puisne Judge of the Supreme Court; now, however, it was provided that on failure to accept such appointment he 'shall be deemed to have retired from his office'. In addition, theExecutive could appoint 'any one of the Judges', and not the most senior, to act as Chief Justice.319

Bhuttowasdeterminedtobrowbeattheseniorjudgesintosubmissionandtoalarge extent,hesucceeded.Whenmembersoftheoppositionfacinggovernmentoppression soughtprotectionfromthecourts,theyfoundanumberofthejudgescompletelycowed down.InSeptember1972Ifiledawritpetitioninthe LahoreHighCourtagainsta numberofgovernmentMNAs.IttooksixyearsbeforeIreceivedaresponsefromthe High Court.320By then it was 1978 and General Zia was firmly in power. It should also berememberedthatin1974itwastheSupremeCourtofPakistanwhichupheldtheban againsttheNationalAwamiParty(NAP),whichwasthendeclaredtobe'apolitical party...operatinginamannerprejudicialtothesovereigntyorintegrityofPakistan'.At nostageduringtheseproceedingsdidtheSupremeCourtbothertosubjectthe

319RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan,op.cit.,p.186.

320Thefactsofthiscasearediscussedmorefullyinchapter6.

government's evidence to a thorough or impartial scrutiny.321A recent legal historian commentingontheSupremeCourt'srulingagainsttheNAPbitinglyadded:'Thesumof its long judgment ... was to endorse the Prime Minister's contempt for political opposition'.322Clearly, the days of Bhutto's rule were a sad and pathetic period for a numberofourseniorjudgesastheyshamefullyresortedtotakingshelterbehindthe high dignity of their office.323

Theotherinstitution,whichalsohadtobearBhutto'sdeterminedonslaught,wasthe Press.AssoonasheattainedpowerBhuttodismissedtheChairmanoftheNational Press Trust, retired GeneralHabibullah Khan,324and the Editor-in-Chief ofThePakistan Times, Z. A. Suleri. His rival from the Ayub Khan days, Altaf Gauhar, who was then the editorofDawnwasplacedunderarrest.Theprinter,editorandpublisherofUrdu Digest,Zindigi(Urdu),andPunjabPunch(inEnglish)werearrestedforprotesting againstBhutto'smartiallawandwereconvictedandsentencedevenbeforethewrit petitionschallengingtheirarrestscouldbeheardintheLahoreHighCourt.Shorish KashmiriofChatanwasalsosenttojail.ThenewspapersHurriyatandJasaratwere banned and their editors, Anwar Khaleel and Salahuddin, imprisoned. TheMehranwas bannedaswell.IqbalBurney'sweeklyOutlookwasforcedintoshuttingdownits publication.ThedailySunwasplacedinanequallygrimpredicament,leavingits management little choice but to close down its press.

The journalists of Pakistan took a relentless battering. Restrictions were placed on governmentadvertisementsandthesupplyofnewsprintwasreducedtopublishers who did not follow the official line. As early as 13 February 1972 Bhutto had created an 'official media' by taking charge of the National Press Trust and suspending its Board of Trustees,alongwiththeBoardsofDirectorsofallthreecompaniestheTrust controlled.325Thisgavethegovernmentcompletecontroloveralargepartofthe printed media. After closing down any newspaper that proclaimed its editorial independence and bullying the remainder into submission, the reporting of the 'independent' Press soonbecame no different from that of the official media of theNationalPressTrust.Politicalreportingwaslargelyrestrictedtothedailyuttering'sof

321One serious indictment against the Supreme Court's supposed impartiality was the fact that it allowed newspaper reports to be admitted as evidence. The Chief Justice himself excused this ruling on the grounds that newspaper accounts of events were often admitted into AmericanCourt What the Chief Justice chose blatantly to ignore was that the Press in Pakistan was under strictgovernment supervision. Not only was politic news coverage largelyrestrictedto governmentissued pressnotesbut anyfalsified piece of information could be published at the government instance. Thus, the Supreme Court cravenly opted to accept these report as gospel truth.

322PaulaR.Newberg,JudgingtheState-courtsandconstitutionalpoliticsinPakistan,Cambridge,1995,p.155.

323Sadly, the judiciary proved to be no different during Zia's time when a majority of the Supreme Court's judges disgraced their office by taking an oath to obey Zia's Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO).

324General Habibullah Khan was imprisoned by Bhutto without adequate justification. He was shabbily placed on public display with his hands shackled in chains like a common criminal.

325Thedaily newspapers controlled by theNational Press Trust wereMorningNewsfrom Karachi;The Pakistan Timesfrom Lahore and Rawalpindi;Imrozefrom Lahore and Multan;Mashriqfrom Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar.

Bhuttoandhisunderlings. EvenreportsontheproceedingsoftheNationalAssembly gavecoverageonly tothegovernmentbenches. Onoccasiontherewould bementionof speechesmadebytheOppositionanditsleader,WaliKhan,butthesewerenearly alwaysrestrictedtoabareminimum,takingnomorethanoneortwosentencesofa newspaper column.

***

Bhutto's dealing with the politicians were noted by a remarkable degree of intolerance virtuallyfromthedayhetookofficeasCMLAandPresident.Norwasitalways restrictedtomembersofrivalparties.Thecontemptuousmannerhedisplayedtothe membersofhisownPPPbearsafewwordsofmention.DuringhistimeasCMLA BhuttohadtakenoffenceatthebehaviorofoneofhisPPPMNAs.MukhtarRana,alaborleaderfromLyallpur(nowFaisalabad)haddispleasedhisleaderwithhisleftist ideas and outbursts of divergent opinion. He was deposed as an MNA even before the National Assembly met. Rana was arrested under Martial Law regulations on a charge ofincitementtomurder.Afterbeingsubjectedtoseverephysicalabuseaccordingto one reporthe almostdiedundertorture^326-he wasrapidly convictedinaMilitary Court and sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment, all within a matter of days.

A number of Opposition MNA's, including myself, spoke in his defence both inside and outsidetheAssembly.LaterIwastoreceivealetterfromMukhtarRana,writtenona tornpieceofpaper.Ithadbeensmuggledoutfromhisjailcell.Hetouchinglythanked me for my efforts on his behalf and bitterly accused his former leader for betraying the causeofdemocracy.Lateraby-electionwasheldinthevacantLyallpurseat.Rana's sister stood to oppose the official PPP candidate but as one of Bhutto's ministers later admitted,shehadlittlechanceofwinning;theby-electionhadbeenheavilyriggedin favor of the government party.327In a short space of time an outspoken and courageous PPPMNAhadbeen replacedbyanextremelycompliantone.Itprovidedasharpand brutal lesson for all of the PPP elected representatives. Their parliamentary positions existedsolelyat the whim oftheirparty chairman.

Bhutto'sattitudetowardsthefourthandfinal'powerbloc'-theoppositionpoliticians - wasfirmlybeddedinastateofviolenthostility.AshistorianPaulaR.Newberglater succinctly summarized in her book:

The PPP [on attaining power] soon equated opposition with anti-state behavior, dissent on provincial rights with irredentism, and demands for due process with separatism.ThePrimeMinisterrespondedtooppositionbybringingallthe

326AnwarH.Syed,TheDiscourseandPoliticsofZulfikarAliBhutto,Macmillan,London,1992,p.257.

327RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan,op.cit.,p.357.

powerofthestatetobearagainstit:firstintelligenceunitsandparamilitary forces,thencivilandmilitarycourtsandfinally,thearmy...328

***

Ontheeveningof20December1971,uponassumingtheofficesofCivilianMartialLaw Administrator and President,Bhuttomadehisemotional 'Picking upthePieces'speech on the national radio and television network. He spoke in English.

I would not like to see Martial Law remain one day longer than necessary ... one moresecondthennecessary.Iwantthefloweringofoursociety...Iwant suffocation to end ... This is not the way civilized countries are run. Civilization meansCivilRule...democracy...Wehavetorebuilddemocraticinstitutions... We have to rebuild a situation in which the common map man in the street, can tell me to go to hell ...329

Inretrospectthesewordsprovedtobearemarkableexerciseindeceitanddeception.In themonthsthatfollowedifanyman,letalone'apoormaninthestreet',hadpossessed thetemerityto'tell[Bhutto]togotohell'hewouldhavequickly foundhimself inthe brutalhandsoftheFederalSecurityForces(FSF).Withinabriefpassageoftimeeven seniorPPPpartymenandgovernmentministersfoundthemselvesfacingtheruthless attention of this paramilitary force.

WithindaysofassumingpowerBhuttoappointedhispartymenasgovernorsofthe threeofthefourremainingprovincesinthecountry.InPunjabheappointedGhulam MustafaKhar,inSindhhiscousinMumtazBhutto,andinNWFPHayatSherpao.He paused for a few days before announcing a governor for Balochistan. Unlike the NWFP wherethepoliticalsituationremainedmorefluidinthepresenceofrivalcontending parties,thePPPhadfailedtowinevenasingleprovincialseatinBalochistan.Bhutto invitedtwoofthethreeleadingSirdarsoftheprovince-AttaullahMengalandKhair BukshMarri-tomeetwithhimtodiscussthegovernorshipissue.Hepurposely ignoredAkbarBugtiostensibly because AkbarwasnotanofficialmemberofNAP, Bhutto was shrewd enough to realize that by not inviting him he would annoy Akbar. HewashopingtoexacerbateariftthatwasformingwithintheranksoftheBaloch leadership in NAP. On arriving at Islamabad Attaullah Mengal and Khair Buksh Marri declined the official car sent by the president, and instead drove to Shahi Bagh to meet withthepresidentofNAP,WaliKhan,havingdecidedtoconsultwithhimbefore meetingBhutto,ThePPPleadertreatedtheiractionasapersonalsnubtohim.Rejecting theobviouscandidatesBhuttoinsteadappointedGhousBukshRaisaniasgovernorofBalochistan.

328PaulaR.Newberg,Judging theState,p.118.

329Z.A.Bhutto,SpeechesandStatements,vol.1,20December1971-3March1972(Karachi,Governmentof Pakistan, 1972), p. 1.

Since the resurrection of politics in Balochistan, after the 1969 downfall of Ayub Khan, thepoliticalaffairshadcomeundertheinfluenceofatriumvirateofSirdarsfromthe leadingBalochtribes.MuchofBalochtribalcultureandhistoryarestronglypermeated with notions of ghairat. Among the Sirdars this sense of pride is heightened to a much greaterdegree,particularlymoresowhendealingwithsayals,'theirsocialpeers',which intheircasemeantotherBalochSirdars.InearlierdaysSirdarsofdifferenttribesrarely encounteredeachother.Whentheydidmeet,itrequiredagreatmeasureofetiquetteto getaroundthesensitivitiesofindividualtribalself-esteem,especiallysoamongthe rivalmajortribes-eachofwhichinvariablyclaimedsomeminordegreeofsuperiorityto theother.Inmoderntimeswiththedevelopmentofroadsandlargetowns,Sirdars foundthemselvessuddenly thrustuponeachotheratincreasingly regularintervals. SchoolssuchasAitchisonhad broughtwithit adegree of harmony among Sirdarsfrom tribessuchastheMarri,MazariandBugtibutbecauseofthesuperveningBaloch cultureeventhese schoolbondsprovedtobe tenuousattimes.Apoliticalalliance,such astheBalochistanNAP,ledasitwasbythreeleading BalochistanSirdars-Akbar Bugti, Khair Buksh Marri and Attaullah Mengal - was at times fraught with sensitivities.

WhenAttaullahandKhairBukshleftforIslamabadtomeetwithBhutto,thethird member of the triumvirate was naturally enraged. Unlike Bizenjo, who had no qualmsabout accompanying the two to Islamabad uninvited, Akbar suffered from the endemic Baloch weakness of a surfeit of pride. Rather than angrily gnash his teeth in private, he decidedtoorganizeapublicdemonstrationinQuettaagainstBhuttoandhisMartial Lawgovernment.WhentheactingPresidentofNAPdeclinedtogivethedemonstration the party's official sanction without the leadership's approval - who happenedtobeinIslamabad.Akbarangrilywentaheadwithitanyway.Onthedayof the demonstration the streets of Quetta resounded to rather unusual slogans: 'Bhuttomurdabadwas not out of the ordinary but 'Aurorazindabad'certainly was.330It was very much in line with Akbar's habit of charting an independent course for himself. These demonstrationssoonbecameadailyeventonceRaisaniwasappointedgovernor, havingbythenbeengivenofficialapprovalbytheNAP.

AkbarBugtiwasaknownindividualist.Sometenmonthsearlier,inFebruary1971,he hadtravelledtoEastPakistanatMujib'spersonalinvitationwherehedecidedtogive his unconditional support to the Awami League leader. Accusing Bhutto of wanting the delayoftheNationalAssembly,AkbarforthrightlydemandedthattheAwamiLeague be allowed to frame the Constitution, adding that 'the people of Baluchistan want the constitution based on the Six Point formula'.331As an East Pakistani weekly had at thattime enthusiastically noted:

330GeneralAurorawasthecommanderoftheIndianfortesthatacceptedthesurrenderofthePakistanArmy stationed in East Pakistan in December 1971.

331Dawn,13February1971.

He is the first leader of any importance from West Pakistan to have given such unqualifiedsupporttotheSixPoints.HehasnotonlysupportedtheSixPoints andthestudents11points,buthasfurtheracceptedthatonlythemajorityhas therighttoruntheadministrationinthecountrybutalsohastheresponsibility for framing the constitution.332

AkbarBugtiwaslegallyforbiddentojoinapoliticalpartyforafive-yearperiod;itbeing aconditionofhisreleasein1969afterhavingbeendetainedforthemurderofHaji HaibatBugti.UnabletoofficiallyjointheNationalAwamiParty,henevertheless attended all the party's Central Committee meetings and played a pivotal role in NAP's success in Balochistan. Not only did he fund the party, he was also one of NAP's key organizers in the 1970 election which resulted in NAP winning three out of four of Baluchistan's national seats. Later he made two of his representatives,333who had been electedasindependentstotheprovincialassembly,joinNAP-bringingthenumberof the party's MPAs to ten.

LaterAkbarbecamekeentoputupacandidateforthereservedprovincialseatfor women from his own area. To his annoyance the NAP Provincial Working Committee rejectedhischoiceandinsteadoptedforKhairBukshMarri'snominee.334Itwasat aboutthistimethatanincidenttookplaceduringaNAPProvincialWorking Committee meeting which would later have disastrous consequences for the politics of Balochistan.Asthemeetingoftheparty'shighestprovincialcommitteecommenced, oneofitsmembers,MahmoodAzizKhurd,raisedanobjection.Heannouncedthe presenceofa'stranger' inthecommitteeroom.AkbarBugtilatertoldmethat helooked allaroundtheroom,inallinnocence,lookingfortheoffenderuntilitdawnedonhim thattheobjectionwasbeingdirectedathim.GatheringhisBalochdignityAkbarslowly gotupfromhischairandwalkedoutoftheroomwithoutthrowingabackwardglance. In this short duration he did note, however, that none of his brother Sirdars had come tohis defence. Seething with injured pride at the insult that had been so deliberately delivered,hevowedtotakerevengeonhisformercolleaguesintheNAP.

MahmoodAzizKhurdwasoneofBizenjo'slieutenantsandacertainamountof suspiciondoesariseastoBizenjo'sroleinthisunfortunateepisode.Akbar'sattimes acerbicdispositionprobablydidnothelpinhisrelationshipwithhiscolleagues,butthe mannerinwhichhe wasdismissed fromthe committeemeetingwould suggestthatit hadbeenprearranged.MahmoodAzizKhurdwashierarchicallytoojuniorto personallychallengeAkbar Bugti.Knowing AttaullahandKhairBuksh,Ibelievethey would have thought it beneath their dignity to conceive such a plan against Akbar, but inthecircumstancestheymightlikelyhaveagreedtoitprovidingithadbeenat

332TheIntendingWeeklyReview,1March1971,p.4.

333TheywereSirdarAkbarKhanBugti'sbrotherAhmedNawazandhisson-in-law,SirdarChakarDomki.

334Fazila Aliani, who became the successful candidate thereby giving the extra seat which delivered the provincial majority to the party.

someoneelse'ssuggestivepromptinganddidnotdirectlyinvolvethem.Theonly person who had thestature to be ableto suggest such a course of action wasBizenjo.

UnlikeAkbarBugti,KhairBukshMarriorAttaullahMengal,Bizenjolackedtribal prominenceasabirthright.Fromhisearlydaysasacardcarryingcommunistinthelate 1930shedevelopedapassionforpolitics.Hewastoparticipateinthebrieffifty-two memberlowerhouseoftheKalatAssemblyin1947whentheKhanhaddeclaredthe state'sindependence.Laterhewasa"leadingmemberoftheBalochnationalist UstomanGal(People'sParty)ofthe Khan'sbrother,AghaKarim.He cameintothe nationalprominencerather latein life.Heenteredthepolitical limelightin 1966when theHaroonbrothersselectedhim-astheircandidatefortheWestPakistanAssembly from their Lyari seat.335While his success - as I related in an earlier chapter - led tothe downfall of the Haroons as well as Governor Kalabagh, Bizenjo managed to hold on to hisseatintheAssemblyuntilNovember1967.336Thiswasthefirsttimethathehad been elected and he took theopportunity toprove his Baloch nationalist credentials in the Assembly by determinedly criticizing the One Unit and the despotic nature of Ayub Khan'sgovernment.WiththefallofAyubKhanandthebreak-upoftheOneUnitin WestPakistanthepoliticalrealistBizenjohadquicklydiscernedthatfuturesuccessin Balochistan politics lay with its tribal leaders.

Balochistanhadlackedthepresenceofacommandingnationalistleaderinthemouldof NWFP's Ghaffar Khan. People with nationalist credentials such as the Pushtu-speaking AbdusSammadAchakzaiwereunabletoexerttheirinfluencebeyondtheboundariesofalocalizedarea.Asaconsequencetherewasnoonetobringaboutapoliticaland socialawakeningamongthepeopleoftheprovincewhohadbecomemiredina centuriesoldtribalsystem.Barrenandsparselypopulated,thenewprovince'spolitical vacuumrapidlycame tobe filledby the Sirdarsofthe varioustribes.Among these Sirdars were Attaullah Mengal, Akbar Bugti and Khair Buksh Marri, who not only had largetribessupportingthembutoveraperiodoftimehadestablishedtheirpolitical credentialsasleadingBalochnationalistsandhadbeenmadetosufferjailtermsfor theirconvictions.UponthebreakupofOne UnitinWestPakistantheseBalochistan leadersbeganseekinganaffiliationwithalike-mindedpoliticalparty.AsIhave mentionedearlier,in1969attheirrequestIintroducedthemtoAsgharKhan.Fora while these Sirdars seriously considered aligning themselves with Asghar Khan. In the endBizenjo,whowasaseniormemberofNAP,prevaileduponthemtoreachan understanding with Wali Khan's party instead.

Bizenjowaswellawarethathisfuturepoliticalsuccesswoulddependonthesupport hewouldreceivefromthesetriballeaders.TheSirdars-Attaullah,AkbarandKhair

335The choice of Bizenjo was based upon political practicalities. As Bizenjo was an outsider from Balochistan, hewas in no position to threaten the Haroon family's control of the Lyari constituency of Karachi.

336The West Pakistan Election Tribunal ruled that he was not qualified a candidate as his name was not registered in the voting list.

Buksh-hadasoleobjectivewhichunitedthemintheirpolitics,andthatwastheir desire to safeguard the Baloch racial identity and culture, which they perceived tobeunderthreatfromoutsideinfluence.ThiswaslargelythesumoftheirBaloch nationalism. Despite Khair Buksh's regular allusions to an eccentric notion of tribal Marxism, he was a Baloch purist first and foremost. The three of them believed in the conceptofBalochiyattothefull.Ontheotherhand,Bizenjo'spoliticswerelargely dictatedbypragmatism.DespitehisstrongLeftistinclinationshispoliticalambitions had led him to cultivate these Sirdars, but probably in the end three Sirdars probably proved one too many for him. Undoubtedly Akbar's strong streak of individuality had rendered him a maverick in the eyes of some of his colleagues. His abrasive nature had probably not helped him either. Taking advantage of the Bugti Sirdar's growing unpopularitywithinNAP'sgeneralleadership,Bizenjoandhismencreatedthemeans toarrangeapartingofways.Bizenjowasthequintessentialpoliticalanimal.Attimes hisambitionswouldleaveevenhiscolleaguesmomentarilyspeechless.

InMarch1972BhuttoinvitedtheNAPleadershiptoIslamabadtodiscussproposed changes to the political set-upinBalochistanand NWFP.By all accounts it proved tobe adifficultmeetingasthetwoBalochSirdars,inparticularKhairBukshMarri,treated Bhuttowithundisguisedcontempt.Heissaidtohaveadoptedthedemeanorofasenior tribalSirdarcompelledtodealwithaminorSindhiWadero,whichaccording tothe traditionalhierarchyoflandedaristocracy,ZulfikarAli Bhuttoundoubtedlywas.This rather baffled the urban-dwelling Rafi Raza, who was present atthe meeting and later recalled:'SardarMarriwasthroughoutabrasive.Idonotrecallanyoneelsespeakingin thistonetoZAB[Bhutto],norZABbeingsorestrained.'337OneoftheNAPmembers alsoatthemeetinglatertoldmethatwhenBhuttoofferedthegovernorshipof BalochistantoKhairBuksh,theMarriSirdarcoldlyturnedhisfaceasidewithout botheringtocomment.Bhuttothen turnedtoAttaullahMengalandofferedtheofficeto him.Attaullahobservingtraditionaletiquettereplied,IwouldpreferSirdarKhair BukshKhanbecomingtheGovernor'.BhuttooncemorefacedKhairBukshand requestedhimtoaccepttheoffice.KhairBukshhadarrogantlyturnedhisfaceaway fromhimand haughtily announcedthatAttaullahshouldhave it. Astheoffer rotated between Khair Buksh and Attaullah, both determinedly involved in the rigors of tribal decorum,Bizenjosteppedin.HetoldBhutto,'YeSardarloghain.Unkayleeyehaisichees

unkayshaankaykhilafhae.AapMitjhainmaukadain[TheyareSirdars.Itisbeneaththeir

dignitytoacceptsuchanoffice.Giveittomeinstead].'Thus,tothesurpriseofeveryone present, Bizenjo was appointed Governor of Balochistan.

ThearrogantattitudeoftheBalochSirdarswasacrossBhuttoneverboretooeasily.It wasnotthefirsttimehehadbeensubjectedtosuchdismissivetreatment.'Sensitiveas he was, he would await the appropriate moment to deal with them. He was known to regularlylashoutattheBalochandtheSirdarsinparticularinhisprivate

337RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan,op.cit.,p.153.

conversations. In his occasional meetings with me he would often individually criticize AkbarandKhairBukshfortheirsupposedintractabilityandobstinacy.Buthenever criticized theBaloch racein mypresence, no doubt, indeference to my sensibilities.

***

MuchhasbeenmadeofZulfikarAliBhutto'saberrantcharacter.Everyoneseemsto agree that the circumstances of his birth, his family and his 'feudal' background came to shape his political persona in later life. At the same time virtually every researcher or biographerofhislifehasbeeninsufficientlyawareofthemoresthatshapedand definedtheruralsociety intowhich Bhuttowasborn.Withoutexceptiontheyhaveall beenoutsiderstothe socialstructurethatusedtobe prevalent inruralSindh.

Muchhaschangedinmoderntimes,particularlysointhelasttwodecades.Social outlook has undergone substantial change. The rankingsuponwhichsocial hierarchies were basedhave allbutdisappearedorhave beenlargely renderedirrelevant. However,itmustberememberedthatuntilquiterecently,ruralsocietyinSindh, BalochistanandtheneighboringareasinPunjabwashighlystratified.Inessenceitwas nodifferenttotherestofthesubcontinentwithitsrelativeobsessionwithsocial hierarchyandstatus.WiththeexceptionoftribalBaloch-whereeachtribeformedits ownorganizationalstructure-prominencewasbasedupontitlesandsizeof landholdings.Evenamong the princely statesofBritishIndia,acquiredappellations andprivilegeswereofparamountimportanceamongtherulers.Theirhierarchywas based on titlesand the number of gun salutesaccorded to eachby theBritish rulers. At the apex of the Indian princely states was, of course, the Nizam of Hyderabad who was entitled to be called 'His Exalted Highness' and whose heir apparent wastheonly one intheBritishEmpire-otherthanmembersoftheBritishroyalfamily-tobeallowedthe right to be called a prince.338

Sindh had been ruled by the Baloch dynasty of Talpurs until they were overthrown by BritishinvadersledbyCharlesNapier.DespitethedepartureoftheTalpurs,some tribal chiefs such as the Sirdars of the Chandio and the Buledi - whose tribes hadseparately conquered tracts of Sindh in the sixteenth century which became known as Chandka and Bureedka - continued to exert their influence. Others, like the Jams of the JokiosinthesouthandtheBurfatMalikstowardsthewest,remainedinfluentialintheir

338The Nizam's eldest son was known as His Highness the Prince of Berar. Sons of lesser rulers were known by a mixture of titles, such as Raj Kumars and Nawabzadas. In what became Pakistan there were only three princely states. In Bahawalpur the Nawab'ssonswere known asSahibzadas,in Kalat the Khan'ssonswerecalled Aghasand in Khairpur the Mir's sons were also addressed as Mirs. Apart from the Prince of Berar no one dared to elevate himself to the regal title of prince as it was forbidden by law though, since Partition we have seen an upsurge in princes (and a new innovation, princesses). For that matter a large number of families have managed to acquire a large number of titleswhich would not have been permissible inpre-1947BritishIndia. Forinstance,only twomen in the whole province of Sindh were properly entitled to call themselves Sirdars; these were the hereditary chiefsof the Chandio and the Buledi tribes.

areasaswell.Bythe1920stheywerestillrecognizedbytheBritishtobeamongthe premierfamiliesofSindh.Inthisexclusivelistwereincludedthedescendantsofthe Talpur Mirs and religious luminaries such as the Pirs of Pagaro. There was, however, a tendency among anumber of theseleading Sindhi familiestoadoptarather liberal and licentiouslifestyle.Educationwasoftentreatedwithawidedegreeoflassitude. Consequently,opportunity openedforthe minorSindhilandowning familiesto improve their fortunes. Education proved to be the key to social advancement. A large numberimprovedtheirprospectsbybecominglawyers,othersbypursuing governmentemployment.SoonanewclassstartedrapidlyevolvinginSindh.Bythe time of Partitiona number of thememerged at the forefront of local politics.

Inthe1919GovernmentGazetteerforLarkanamentionismadeoftheprominent familiesofthedistrict.ForemostwasSirdaroftheChandios,NawabGhaibiKhan,who isreferredtoas'rankingfirstamongthejagirdarsandzamindarspresentinSindh^339and as such was listed among the 'first class jagirdars' of Sindh. He was followed by another Baloch, a Jamaliwaderowho was ranked next as a'sardar jagirdar'. Then the smallerzamindarsarelisted,allofwhomareBaloch-suchasTalpurs,LegharisandKhosos- with one exception, a Hindu Rao Bahadur.340These were the families of importance in LarkanaareaonlynineyearsbeforeZulfikarAliBhuttowasborninthedistrict.His familyisoneofseveralwhosubsequentlyemergedfromtheLarkanaareaandentered thepoliticalarenaoverthedecadesthatfollowed.Butitissignificantthatthesefamilies

were not considered worthy of mention by the British. In 1919 it would appear that the socialhierarchyofLarkanawasdominatedbytheChandioSirdar.Thenextlevelof societywasfilledwithjuniorBalochwaderosandasolitaryHindu.Theremaining unnamed landowning residents of the district were left to fill the ranks of the lesserwaderos.ThepreeminenceofBalochinLarkanadistrictwouldinevitablyhavehadan effectonZulfikarBhutto'soutlookintheyearsthatfollowed.341Itisthenatureofa tribal society that lineage is regarded to be of paramount importance. Despite Bhutto's claim to be a great landowning aristocrat, a Baloch Sirdar, such as Khair Buksh Marri,wouldhavebeenonlytoowellawareofBhutto'srelativelyjuniorsocialranking.342

ItwasinfactlargelytheresultofthepersonalsuccessofBhutto'sfather,SirShah Nawaz,thatbroughttheBhuttonamerecognitionbeyondtheconfinesoftheirlocal

339Gazetteer of the Province of Sind, B Volume iv (Larkana District), Government Central Press. Bombay, 1919, p.12.

340With the exception of the Chandios and Buledis, the Sirdars of all of all other Baloch tribes such as Khosos, Legharis, Marris, Jamalis, Domkis and Magsis were all resident in either Balochistan or Dera Ghazi Khan district.

341Mir was a term found only among the Baloch. Later Bhutto was to this appellation to names of his sons, his tragically ill-fated heirs, Mir Murtaza and Mir Shahnawaz.

342The Land Reform of 1958 was a great leveler among landowning families. It ended distinctions between great and smallzamindarsby forcingthem down toownsimilar sizedproperties. Therewere ofcoursealarge numberof evaders, most of them were in Sindh. with a remaining handful in lower Punjab.

district.343TheactualBhuttofamilylandholdinghadresultedfromadispensationgiven to one of their ancestors named Dodo Bhutta (as Bhuttos were then called)344during the Talpur period by one of the local administrators of Larkana, Nawab Wali Muhammad Leghari. It is said that the property was given in return for some private favors given to Wali Muhammad Leghari, but one cannot vouch for the authenticity ofthese reports. Inanyevent,accordingtoofficiallandrecordsDodoBhuttaandhissonsownedaholding ofonly6709acresintheirhomedistrictofLarkana,apaltryholdingforthosedays when feudal land holdings were normally counted in multiples of tens of thousands ofacres.345

AfterfourfurthergenerationsofBhuttos,despitetheincreaseofthetotalfamily holdingovertheinterveningyearstosome31,000acres^346throughpurchases,the expansioninthe numberoffamily membersensuredthatZulfikarAliBhutto,who descended fromajunior branchof thefamily,would receivearelatively minor shareof thefamilypropertyasinheritancefromhisfather.Itwasonlybymarryingtheonly childofhisdistantunclenamedShireen(laterrenamedasAmirBegum)thatBhutto was able to obtain a double share of these lands. His first marriage took place while he was still thirteen, hisfirst wifewas reputed tobe much older than him.347

TheotherfactorthatundoubtedlyplayedinBhutto'spsychologicalmake-upwashis mother.Thisfacthasalreadybeenwell-documented.348Hisfather,ShahNawaz, married a Rajistani Hindu woman from the scheduled castes as his second wife.Upon marriageBhutto'smotheradoptedIslam.InanidealMuslimsocietynodistinction should be made on the basis of race. Unfortunately, with the strong influence of Hindu cultureinthesubcontinent,thesecastedistinctionscarryanall-pervasivestigmawith them.EventothepresentdaymembersofthescheduledcastesinSindh-suchasthe Bhils, Dheds, Mengwars and Shikaris - suffer extreme discrimination. Undeniably, one ofthereasonsforBhutto'shypersensitivitytoperceivedslightsstemmedfromwhat

343Later his son Zulfikar Ali would propel the Bhutto name beyond the province of Sindh, by not only making it a household name in Pakistan but also attaining for it wide international recognition.

344The Gazetteer of the Province of Sind(compiled by A. W. Hughes), (p. 477) mentions a population of Bhuttas residing in the Larkana area. The Bhuttas are part of the larger Arrain caste (Sadik Ali, The Musalman Races Found in Sindh Baluchistan and Afghanistan, 1901, p. 44). After the introduction of the Sindhi alphabet by Sir Bartle Frere and its usage in Schools within the province, the Sindhi language and the Sindhi man of pronunciation became more widespread. Consequently original name such as Chandiya, Khosa and Bhutta were soon transliterated into Chandio, Khoso and Bhutto.

345David Cheeseman,Landlord Powerand Rural indebtednessin colonial Sindh, Curzon Press, London, 1997. p. 56. Later it appears the Bhuttos leveraged their original Ratodero holding of 6709 acres into 21,026 acre in Jacobabad district and 2749 in Naushahro Abro.

346Ibid., p, 56 (Cheeseman obtained detailed information of the Bhutto's family holdings from official Land Settlement Records of Larkana, Jacobabad and Naushahro Abro districts from the 1890s).

347According to his biographer Stanley Wolpert. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto m it clear that his first marriage was 'purely for property': Stanley WolperZulfi Bhutto of Pakistan,op. cit., p. 22.

348Biographersof Bhutto - such asStanley Wolpert,ShahidBurki and Salman Taseer - have all emphasized the role that Bhutto's mother played on his psyche.

wasnomorethananaberranceofbirth.Itwasunlikelythathismotherwouldhave been accepted as an equal by the ladies of Shah Nawaz Bhutto's immediate or extended family. As a child Bhutto spent little time in Larkana. At the age of six his parents left Karachi to settle in Bombay where his father joined the Bombay Presidency's legislativecouncil.349

ThemajorityofBhutto'schildhoodandallhisformativeyearsofadolescencewere shapedbytheinfluenceofthemetropolisofBombay.Hisschoolingandearly friendships belonged to that city. Even when his parents shifted to Junagadh in 1946BhuttoremainedinBombay.InSeptember1947heleftIndiatopursuefurther educationattheUniversityofSouthernCaliforniaatLosAngeles.Hemadehisfirst visit to the newly-established Pakistan two years later in September 1949 during his universityholidays.OnhisreturntotheUSheshiftedhisstudiestoBerkeley Universitywherehecompletedhis degreein politicalscience. At theendof1950he movedto Englandto attendOxfordUniversity.Hemadehissecondholidaytripto Pakistaninearly1951.Overtheshort periodofhisstayhemarriedforthesecondtime. He returned to Oxford taking his new wife Nusrat with him. While Nusrat returned to Karachi to give birth to their first child, her husband continued with his education in England. Upon completing his law degree he moved to London to attend the bar atLincoln'sInn.HearrivedinKarachiasaqualifiedbarristerinNovember1953,amonth or so short of his twenty-sixth birthday.

MuchhasbeenerroneouslymadeofBhutto's'feudal'upbringing.Untilhisarrivalin Pakistan he had spent virtually all his life in Bombay, along with the few years abroad inAmericaandBritainatuniversities.WhenhearrivedinKarachiin1953hecould hardlyspeak Urdu,letalone Sindhi.Inreality there wasverylittle thatwasSindhi abouthim-hehadwithhimallthemarksofasophisticatedEnglish-speakingBombayite.

I firstmethiminearly 1954only afewmonthsafterhisarrival.He wasadapper dresserand displayed all attributesof afashionableurbanlifestyle. Helived inKarachi, whereheworkedasajuniorattheofficeofthewell-knownHindulawyer,Ram ChandaniDingomal.WithinfourshortyearshehadenteredthemartiallawCabinet andwastocontinueasCabinetministeruntil hisousterin1966.Untilhisenforcedstay inLarkanafromlate1966onwards,hehadinactualityspentverylittletimeinrural Sindh.Inthemid-1950shewouldmakebrieftripstoLarkana,visitinghisfarm propertiesandorganizingshikarsforVIPs.Tobuilduponhisruraloriginshesoon constructed an imposing house in the town of Larkana. It was rather an unusual move asmostlandholding familiespreferredtoresideinthe ruralcountrysideamidtheir landholdings.ThenewhousegavehimpresencewithinthetownshipandprovedusefulinimpressinguponhisvisitorshisSindhirootsandlocalstanding.Duringthis

349SindhcontinuedtobeadministeredbytheBombayPresidencyuntil1April1936.

earlyperiodhewasextremelykeentomakehismarkinthepoliticalfieldand determinedlyadvancedhisambitionsbyseekingtominglewithSindhisofinfluence. Thesemenwerenotknownfortheirrefinement. AsoneofBhutto'sbiographersnoted: 'HiscompanionswereusuallysottishSindhilandlords,andtheirinebriatedsessions- often[lasted]allnightandintothenextday...'.350Bhuttoalsomadearesoluteattemptto improvehiscommandofhisnativetongue.Unfortunatelyforhim,despitethe endeavor, his Sindhi remained stilted till the very end of his days.

Having discussed Bhutto's background, it should be reasonably clear by now that the authoritarian streak that Bhutto possessed cannot be attributed to a non-existent 'feudal' upbringing.Theviciousnessofcharacterthathedisplayedduringhisdaysinpower came from deep within his psychological make-up. His intolerance to criticism and sensitivitytoimaginedslightswerecausedbyinsecuritiesthatseemedtohavepreyed onhim.Someoftheseinsecuritiesmayhavedevelopedwhenatayouthfulagehe becameawareofthesocialimplicationsofhismother'sfamilybackground.However, the fact that he savored humiliating his own supporters and took pleasure in meting out sadistictreatmenttohispoliticalopponentscannotevenbejustifiedonthose grounds.351Intheenditwasthisqualityofviciousnessthatwouldleadhimtohis doom. After the 1977coupGeneral Zia made several attempts to placate Bhutto. Theformer prime minister was unwise enough to openly vent his hatred for the usurping general. It resulted in frightening Zia, who realized that for his own safety he could not allowBhuttotoliveandwreakvengeanceuponhim.

Despite his great many weaknesses one significant point remains to be said. In the last thirtyorsoyearsnomanhasexertedasmuchinfluenceinthepoliticsofour countryas Bhuttohas-bothwhenaliveandevenafterhisdeath.Whetheronelikesitornot,he succeededingalvanizingthePakistanimassestoanextentthathadneverbeen witnessedbefore.Histalentedportrayalasafriendofthepoorwonhimtheheartof millionsofPakistan'simpoverishedclassesinboththeurbanandruralareas.The unfortunatemannerofhisdeathonlyadded tohismystique,makinghimamartyr in theeyesofhismanyadherents.Hislegacy inhisprovinceofbirthledtothePPP becomingtheonlypartyofchoiceforthemajorityofSindhisformanyyearsthat followed. Itisthenatureof politicsthatveryfew, if any, of hisdie-hard supportersever knewBhuttoatclosehand.Theyallworshippedhimfromafar.Iftheyhadactually known Bhuttoatclose-quarters, I wonder, how many of them would have continued to be devoted to him?

***

350S.Taseer,Bhutto,apoliticalbiography,p.38.

351On Bhutto's personal instructions a number of his jailed political opponents were subjected to severe sexual humiliation bythe police.Itwouldnot beproper toname these unfortunate victims,asquite understandably,they would not wish to have their identities revealed publicly.

Despite his pledge to end Martial Law Bhutto insisted that he needed to continue with itforthetimebeing.Accordingtohim,thecountryneededastrongcentralgovernment todealwiththegravecrisisitwaspassingthroughintheaftermathofthecivilwar. Having been a minister in Ayub Khan's Cabinet for eight years, Bhutto was well versed intheexerciseofgovernmentalpower.Withtheforceofmartiallawbehindhim,he introducedhisneweconomicmeasuressuchasnationalizationofcertainindustries, andagriculturallandreforms.PreliminarytalksalsowerecommencedwithIndian representativestoformulateapeaceagreementand arrangeforthereturnofPakistani prisoners of war.During this period healso found the time to use his unlimited martial lawpowerstopursuepersonalvendettasagainstamongstotherslikeGeneral Habibullah, Shakir Durrani, Altaf Gauhar and others.

OppositiontoBhuttohadhoweverbecomeincreasinglyvocalinBalochistanandNWFP. In Balochistan the Baloch NAP had accused the local Governor, Raisani, of attemptingtobribeanumberofelectedrepresentativesovertothegovernment'sside by offering them advisory posts.352In NWFP, NAP and JUI had agreed to form a future coalition government in the province. The NWFP provincial elections had led to NAP winning thirteen seats to Qayum Muslim League's ten. The key to forming a coalition governmentwasheldbyJUI,whichhadmanagedtowinthreeseats.ArbabSikandar KhalilofNAPlaterrevealedtomethatJUIhadbeenkeentonegotiatewithQayum's party, but Mufti Mahmood, the chief of JUI, had insisted on demanding the chief ministershipinreturnforhissupport.AbdulQayumKhanwasnotpreparedtoaccede to what he felt was in the circumstances a rather high-handed demand. Daggers drawnwithQayumandhisparty,WaliKhan'sNAPdecidedthatithadlittlechoicebuttogive intoMuftiMahmood'sprecondition.Andso,theNWFPNAP-JUIcoalitionwasborn. Once agreement was reached between the two parties, the necessity of forming their governmentsinNWFPandBalochistanbecametheirprimaryconcern.

Bhuttoknewhecouldnotcontinuewithmartiallawindefinitelywithoutweakeninghis politicalposition.Hehadalreadymadenumerouspledgestorestoredemocracy, includingonetoconvenetheprovincialassembliesby23March1972.353InFebruary 1972 the civilian CMLA opened negotiations with NAP and JUI and by 6 March with all thethreeparties.On6March1972thethreepartiescametoagreementandsignedan accord acknowledging the following points:

1) on1April1972ArbabSikandarKhalilandGhousBukshBizenjo wouldbe appointedgovernorsofNWFPandBalochistanrespectively;

2) soonaftertheNAP-JUIgovernmentswouldbeallowedtobeformedinthese two provinces;

352Dawn,Karachi,7February1972.

35322 January 1972, 'Statement on Convening Provincial Assemblies'Z. A. Bhutto,Speeches and Statements,vol. 1. 20 December 1971-31 March 1972, Karachi, Government of Pakistan, 1972, p. 59.

3) theNationalAssemblywouldbecalledintosessionon14April1972;

4) inreturnforthesegesturesNAPandJUIwouldsupportthecontinuance of martial law until 14 August 1972 and vote accordingly in thegovernment'sfavorifthismatterwaseverraisedinthenationalassembly.

BythetimetheNationalAssemblymeton14AprilWaliKhanandhispoliticalgrouping had suffered from a change of heart. NAP and JUI now refused to support the continuationofmartiallaw.TheirmisgivingshadbeencausedbyBhutto'suseof martiallawinthelargescaledismissalofhundredsofcivilservants.Thosedismissed had also been denied the right to seek redress in the courts. In NAP's opinion not only hadmartiallawbeenusedtorestrictfundamentalrights,judicialauthorityanddue process of law, butitalsoperceiveditas a blatantintrusion intoprovincial authority. A largenumberofthosedismissedwereemployedintheprovinces.Furthermore,another matterhadarisenwhichdeeplyrankledtheNAP-JUIleadership.Thecommitment madebyBhuttotoappointArbabSikandarandBizenjoasgovernorson1Aprilhadnot been fulfilled.

***

All the elected MNAs gathered at Islamabad by 13 April in time to attend the nextmorning'sinauguralsession.Ihadarrangedaroomformyselfatthegovernmenthostel atIslamabad.AtaboutmidnightIwasdisturbedfrommysleepbythearrivalofa numberofunexpectedvisitors.AmongthemwereGhousBukshBizenjo(NAP),ShaukatHayat(fromtheMuslimLeague),ShahAhmedNoorani(headofJUP), MehmoodAzamFaroqi(fromJamaat-i-Islami)andAbdulHakimofMuftiMahmood's JUI.Muchtomysurprisetheyinformedmethatthevariousoppositionpartieshad agreed unanimously to nominate me as the joint opposition candidate for the election ofthe President of the National Constituent Assembly the following day. It appeared thatafteraseriesofconsultationsamongtheoppositionpartiesitemergedthatIwasthe only candidate that none of them had any objections to. Such are the vagaries of politics. After my visitors left I managed to catch only a few brief hours of sleep before I was disturbed by an early morning telephone call. It was the President's Military Secretary informingmethatthePresidentwasonthelinewishingtospeaktome.

Ourconversationstartedquiteamiably.Bhuttobeganby saying,'I believethe Oppositionisputting youupastheircandidate againstme?'WhenI repliedinthe affirmative,hesaidwithanoteofexasperationinhisvoice,'Couldn'tthebloodybeards have found someone else? Why pick a friend of mine to stand against me? You know I will win overwhelmingly. What is the point of this needless exercise?'

'Both you andI,and,as a matteroffact,everyone knows that you willwin. The election willbeasymbolofdemocracy',Itoldhimtryingtoreasonwithhim.'Tomorrowisthe firstsessionofnewNationalAssembly.APresidenthastobeappointed.The Oppositionissimplyexercisingitsright.AndIhavebeenchosenastheir representative. What else would you expect?'

'Iexpectyoutowithdrawinmyfavor',hetoldme. 'I am sorry. I can't do that', I replied.

'Do you realize the consequences',he saidwith a hint of menace in his voice. Over theyears that Ihad known him this was the first time that he had actually tried threateningme.

'Yes', I rejoined, 'I am now fully aware of the consequences but I'll not bow under your pressure'.Hedealtwithmyrejectionbyrevertingtoatoneoffriendliness.Hereminded me of our past association and friendship. I, in return, continued to appeal to his sense of logic. Itturned outtobe afruitless task forboth of us. 'Why shoulditreally matter',I said to him. 'You are going to win anyway'.

'Iwanttobeelectedunopposed',washisearnestreply. Having failedtoconvinceme, he sounded angry and hurt with me at the end of our conversation.

The crux of the matter was that he wished to be elected unanimously. Despite his long declamations on democracy, his emotional rhetoric of the freedom of speech and other fundamental rights, he simply could not abide any opposition to his views - no matter how mild. When the election took place in the National Assembly Bhutto received 104 votes,while I received39(one ofwhichwaslaterdeclaredinvalid).Subsequently I came to learn that four members of the Opposition had defected and voted for the PPP leaderandtwoPPPmembershadsecretlybetrayedtheirpartyleaderbyvotingforme. Laterthatdayfour^354oftheotherindependentMNAsgottogetherandunanimously elected me leader of their Independent Group of MNAs.

The tension between the Opposition and Bhutto was palpable on the opening day of the Nationalassembly'sfirstsession.ItrelatedtoBhutto'sdeterminedinsistencein continuing with his martial law.The members of the Opposition parties were adamantthat now that the National Assembly was officially in existence, democratic norms must return. Angered by their insistence Bhutto resorted to strong-arm tactics. On 14 April ShaukatHayat,theofficalspokesmanfortheoppositionparties,wasbadlybeatenup byapackofPPPgoondasjustoutsidethechamberoftheNationalAssembly.To

354Six independent MNAs (including myself) had been elected in the election, but they were soon reduced to fivein number - asMalikMuzaffar Kalabagh,Nawab AmirMuhammad'seldest son,decided to throw in hislot with the governing PPP party.

enhancehispositionBhuttohad directed hisgovernorsof Sindhand Punjab toobtaina mandatefromallPPPMNAsexpressingtheirconfidenceinthepresidentandhis endorsementofmartiallaw.AttheinsistenceoftheOppositionBhuttoproduceda document containing a list of 104 MNAs.355In the document not only had these MNAs backedtheextensionofmartiallawbuttheyhadallsubmittedtheirresignationsto Bhuttoinmaintenanceofhismartiallaw.Buttheseeffortsweretonoavail.The prevalent mood of the publicwas against themartial law; they had beensubjected to it foraperiodof three longyears,eversincethedownfallof Ayub KhaninMarch1969. Consequently, Bhutto soon realized that he might be forced to give way.

Instead of succumbing to the pressures of democracy, Bhutto chose an inventive alternative.HenowofferedtheOppositionaninterimConstitution.Itwassubmittedto usona'takeitorleaveit'basis.TheinterimConstitutionwasbasedontheGovernment ofIndiaAct1935andrepresentedamodernizedversionoftheviceregalsystemof British India which allowed for a parliamentary system in the four provinces. The Oppositionwasofferedachoiceofeitheracceptingthisdraconianbuttemporaryset-up

-whichtemptinglypermitteddemocraticallyelectedprovincialgovernments-ora continuation of the hated martial law. On 21 April the Opposition opted for the interim Constitution. Under the new system:

Bhutto, as President of the republic, was vested with the powers that the British viceroys had enjoyed under the Grown rule. In the provinces, Ministries were established that were responsible not to the provincial legislatures but to the Governors. The Governors, appointed by the President, were responsible only tohim and not the legislature.356

The Opposition's feeling were somewhat placated by the appointment of a twenty-five memberConstitutionCommitteeoftheNationalAssembly,whichincludedsix OppositionMNAs.TheCommittee,headedbytheMinisterofLaw,MahmoodAli Kasuri was given the task of preparing a draft Constitution by the end of the year.

Thethree-year-oldstateofmartiallawendedwhenBhuttotookhisoathaspresident under the interim Constitution on 21 April 1972. Within a week new governments had been formed in the four provinces. In Balochistan Ghous Buksh Bizenjo was appointed governoron30AprilandAttaullahMengaltookoathasthechiefministerthefollowing day.InNWFPArbabSikandarbecamegovernor,withMuftiMahmoodaschiefminister.InthePPPruledprovinceofPunjab,GhulamMustafaKharstayedinhis position as governor andMeraj Khalid was made the chief minister. In Sindh Mumtaz Bhuttosteppeddownfromthegovernorshiptotakeofficeasthechiefministerofthe local PPP government, and he was replaced as governor by Rasool Buksh Talpur.

355Much to Bhutto's fury two PPPMNAs had refused to sign the document.They were Abdul Hameed Jatoi andDarya Khan Khoso.

356ShahidJavedBurki,PakistanunderBhutto1971-1977,p.91.

AtthetimeIhadstillretainedhopesforabrighterfutureforthecountry.My opposition to Bhutto had been based upon democratic principles, there was no personal animositytowardshim.WiththedebacleofEastPakistanlessthansixmonthsIbehind us, I strongly believed that Bhutto deserved a fair chance. He was not only an intelligentandextremelytalentedpoliticianbuthehadthesupportofalargenumberof Pakistanis.Forthefirsttimeintwodecadesthearmyandthebureaucracywere quiescent.Anationaltragedyhadbroughtwithitarareopportunityforanew beginning.Itjustneededacapableleadertotakechargeofthecountry'sdestinyand chartanewdemocraticroute.On22MayIsuggestedthatweshouldsupportBhuttoif he chose a constructive course of action. This statement made headlines in some newspapers and convinced a number of people that I had suddenly changed sides. Thiswas of course hardly true. Political idealism was not all that well understood. Within ashortfewweeksthePPPgovernmentunleashedacampaignofterroragainstmembers oftheoppositioninPunjab.OneprominentvictimwasmyassociateMNAfromDera Ghazi Khan, Dr Nazir Ahmed. In the National Assembly, Nazir Ahmed had made a vehemently critical speech against the army action in East Pakistan. During the military crackdownhehadvisitedtheEastWingandreturnedsadlyembittered.Hedidnot mincehiswordswhiledescribingtheatrocitiescommittedonthepeopleofEast Pakistan.Withtearsinhiseyeshewouldrecountstoriesofmassacresandrapes inflicted by Pakistani soldiers on their own countrymen. At a public meeting held in Rajanpur on 27 May, he openly flayed Bhutto as being the primary cause for the dismemberment of the country and then speaking as a staunch member of a religiousparty, he took public exception to what he called Bhutto's 'moral turpitude' and accused him of 'licentiousness which exceeded even Yahya Khan's years of womanizing and drinking'.357ThePresshadtakentocoveringNazirAhmed'shard-hittingspeeches muchtothegovernment'sembarrassment.AfewdayslaterKharsummonedthe

Provincial Amir of the Jamaat-i-lslami, Syed Asad Gilani, to his office and told him that NazirAhmed'Kaanjaamsahinahinhoga[Hisfateisnotgoingtobetoogood]'ifhe insistsonadoptingsuchahostileattitude.ButNazirAhmedrefusedtocomply.At8.30

p.m. on the evening of 8 June1972, less thantwo months afterthe inauguration ofthe new National Assembly, Nazir Ahmed was shot dead in his home town of Dera Ghazi Khan. Nazir Ahmed was sitting in his homoeopathic clinic when two men arrived on a scooter.Onewaitedoutsideandstoodguard,whiletheotherenteredtheclinic,fired two shots, then they both fled. The bullets struck Nazir Ahmed in the head and he died soon after.

Thecasewasinvestigatedbythepolice.Whentheysearchedthedeadman'spockets theyfound,anunmailedletteraddressedtome.358Afterpursuingtheirenquiriesthe policechargedtwomenwiththecrimeofmurder.TheirnameswereShahnawaz

357AtaspeechmadebyNazirAhmedatRajanpur on27May1972:Zindigi,31July1972.

358Theletterisstillinmypossession.

SadozaiandFareedAhmed.Aftertheinitialcourthearingbothofthemweresetat large. At the hearing the Session Judge criticized the police and remarked that their investigations 'seemed to have been intentionally dishonest'. Even the prosecutingattorney admitted in court that the policehad botched up thecase from the verybeginning.ThePresstooknoteofthisstrangesequenceofevents.Onenewspaper printed a front page banner headline with the words 'Who is the real murderer of Nazir Ahmed?'Undertheheadlinethenewspaper,afterlambastingthepolicefororganizing acover-up,declaredthemurdertohavebeenpoliticallymotivated.359Anumberof peoplewerestronglyconvincedthatthemurderhadbeencarriedoutatBhutto's specific instructions.360

SomedaysafterNazirAhmed'sassassinationIaddressedaverylargecrowdat Pakistan Chowk in Dera Ghazi Khan. It was estimated at 30,000, a mammoth gathering foratownthesize of DeraGhazi Khan.Mostofthepeoplepresentwerethere forthe sakeofNazirAhmed,ratherthanaresultofanylinkbetweenthemandhispolitical party,Jamaat-i-Islami.Themurderedmanhadbeenwidely likedbythetownspeople. Atthe meeting localmembersoftheOppositionandI demandedthatanimpartial inquirybeheldintothemurder,andcondemnedthePPPGovernmentforitsrolein carryingoutthecrime.LaterIledprocessionsandmadeseverelycriticalspeeches againstthe governmentinvariouspartsofthe district.Asaresultofmy actions,I received a message from Islamabad routed through Khar and Sadiq Qureshi. I was told to'behaveorelse'.Themessageservedonlytoincreasemyfuryfurther.Inanangry rejoinderIissuedachallengetoBhutto.I wasforty-onethenandmorecapableof bravadoatthatyoungerage.InaninterviewwiththeweeklyChatan,afterstrongly attackingBhuttoforhisrepression, Isaid'Iamnotamildanddefenselesspersonlike my latefriend NazirAhmed. If anyonedareslay ahand on me, I'll smash their teeth'.361ThisstatementwasnotappreciatedinIslamabad,This'intransigent'behavioronmy part led Bhutto to try and resolvethe matter by other means.

KharsummonedthreejuniormembersofmyfamilytotheGovernor'sHouseinLahore. Theyconsistedofmy nephewFarhatAzizMazariandtwopaternalcousinsofhis, ShaukatMazariandhisyoungerbrother,Liaquat-allthreeofthemwerepolitically

359Jasarat,Karachi,19 June 1972. (The PPP Minister forInformation Niazi criticizedJasaratand accused it of being highly provocativeandinciting violence. Aftertakinglegal adviceNiaziindicated thatactionwouldbe taken againstJasarat. Bhutto gave his approval for this course of action and noted in writing 'Certainly, this needs to be done'.)360After Bhutto's overthrow the FIA made fresh investigations. One Allah Wassaya wasidentified asthe murderer. HehadbeenabettedinthecrimebyfourD.G.KhanPoliceofficers(includingtheSuperintendentQamrudeen Khan). They were all charged with the offence. Later the accused were released when it emerged that the murder had been carried out on the specific instructions of Governor Khar. Police Superintendent Qamrudeen Khan was saidtohaveassignedthetasktotwocriminalsuponbeingassuredbyKharthathe(Khar)wouldtakefull responsibilityfor the killing. (Later,according to one source,General Zia decided to keep Dr. Nazir Ahmed'scase in reserve just in case Bhutto received acquittalin the Muhammad Ahmed Kasuri murder case: Stanley Wolpert,Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, op. cit., p 313.)

361Chatan,Lahore,24July1972,p.19-29(quotefromp.28).

opposed to my brother Mir Balakh Sher and me. Calling them into his office Khar announcedthathehadataskforthemon'Sahib's'directorders-'Sahib'wasaterm Khar deferentially used when referring to Bhutto. The task was straightforward he told them: 'Sherbaz Mazari is to be eliminated'.

IgatherthethreeyoungMazariswererenderedspeechlessforsometime.Finallymy nephewFarhatspokeup.AccordingtohimheinformedKhar,'Whatyouaskofusis inconceivable.Notjustbecauseheismymama[maternaluncle],butinthetribalsociety webelongto,heistheelder.Besides,ifwedidaccomplishthisdeedwewouldbe signing our own death warrants'. Then Shaukat spokeout and openly agreed with his cousin.HetoldKhar,'I'mafraidwhatyouaskofusissimplynotpossible'.Their negativeresponsesseemedtohaveinfuriatedKharwhoberatedthemforbeing 'spineless cowards'. Then turning to the youngest of them, he addressed Liaquat, 'How aboutyou?Ifyoucan'tkillhimthentheleastyoucandoiscripplehimforlife.Just makesureheneverwalksagain'.Liaquat,whohadrecentlybecomeanofficerinthe MazaritribalareaBorderMilitaryPolice,repliedpositively.HetoldtheGovernor, 'Leaveitwithme,Sir!I'lldealwithit'.Havingheardhisyoungerbrother'sresponse, ShaukattoldKhar,'Don'ttakehimseriously. It'sjustbluster. He issaying itsimplyto please you, he really won't dare do it'.362

Shortly afterwards I received an anxious message from a family member asking me to takecare.Iwastolaterdiscoverthatthismessagehadcomeindirectlyfrommynephew Farhat,whodespiteourpoliticaldifferenceshadshownconcernformysafety. SomehowinformationleakedouttoKharthatFarhathadbetrayedhisconfidence.In spite of his PPP membership Farhat was arrested only a few months later and charged withsmugglingweaponsandattemptingtofermentanarmedrebellionintheMazariarea.

***

Bymid-1972onlyamonthorsoaftertheinstallationofthenewPPPgovernmentin Sindh,the province tumbledintoacrisislargely the resultofthe governing party's creation. The PPP had drawn nearly all its support from the rural Sindhis. In the urban areas, where themuhajirshad largely settled, the voteshad gone to opposition parties. With the success of the PPP the Sindhis acquired a new feeling of confidence. Demands weresoonairedbythemforagreatershareintheprovince'seconomicopportunities.In March1972some2000demonstratorsmarchedtotheGovernor'sHouseatKarachi demandingthatSindhibeacceptedasoneofthenationallanguagesofPakistanand thatninetypercentoftheradioandtelevisionprogrammesbroadcastintheprovincebe inthatlanguage.RatherthancalmthegrowingdisquietBhuttomanagedtoarousethe

362ThismeetingwaslaterreportedtomebymynephewFarhat,andsoyearslatercorroboratedindetailby Shaukat Mazari.

animosityofthemuhajirsby tellingthemthatinsomeareasofSindhthe refugeeshad converted indigenous Sindhis into a minority. 'Remember in America, the Red Indians wereconvertedintoaminorityandhistoryhasnotforgivenAmericauntiltoday'.363Suchpartisanstatementsonlyhelpedintensifythechancesof aloomingethnicconflict.

Bhutto was the first Sindhi politician to become Head of Slate and central government. Hissupportforthegrowing Sindhinationalismwas,ithas beenstrongly suggested, a reaction to the traditional typecast of the Sindhi character.

Of some importance in Bhutto's make-up and in the development of his attitudes towards people and institutions was the Sindhi stereotype against which, consciouslyandunconsciously,heseemstohavereacted.Thisstereotypehad been created by the early British administrators, who found the Sindhi character very different from that of the Pathans, the Punjabis, the Brohis and the Baiuchis. Whereas these administrators,when reporting on the peoplethey workedwith, had positive things to say about other nationalities, a somewhat less attractive picturewasdrawnoftheSindhi.HewasnotcreditedwiththePunjabi's industry,orwiththeBaluchi'sandthePathan'svelourorevenwiththe neighboring Brohi's intelligence... [In] recruiting the Indians, the British army officers drew a clear distinction between what came to be called the 'martial and non-martial'races,andwhereasthePunjabis,PathansandBaluchiswere includedinthe'martialstock',Sindhiswereexcludedfromit.364

As a Sindhi, Bhutto was undoubtedly keen to redeem his racial heritage. Other leading Sindhisintheprovincialgovernment,suchasMumtazBhutto,alsosharedthesame objectives.Unfortunately,therejuvenationoftheSindhisinthecontemporarycontext could only take place at the expense of themuhajirs.

Encouragedbyhis cousin,MumtazBhutto,theChiefMinisterofSindh, soondeclared thatabillwouldbemovedintheprovincial assemblydeclaringSindhitobetheonly official language of the province. This immoderate step was at complete odds with the restofthecountry.Theotherthreeprovinces,acknowledgingthefactthatUrduwas theofficially recognized nationallanguageof thecountry,haddeclared ittobeoneof the official provincial languages. Itissignificantthatthey did soeven when they lacked alargepresenceofUrdu-speakingmuhajirswithintheirterritories.TheSindh governmenthadpurposelychosenapathofconfrontation.Indoingso,theyhadclearly underestimated the explosive reaction of themuhajircommunity.

By June officialSindh government forms were being printed in only English andSindhi,andmeetingsofthegovernmentsecretariatwerebeingconductedinSindhi.The

363Dawn,1April1972.

364ShahidJavedBurki,PakistanunderBhutto1971-1977,op.cit.,pp.

provincialgovernment'smovesencouragedSindhistosettletheirperceivedgrievances against refugee settlers in the rural towns and countryside of Sindh. The Sindhis acted withmuchviolence.Alargenumberofmuhajirsbeganfleeingtheruralareastoseek sanctuaryintheurbancentre'sofKarachiandHyderabadDeterminedlyignoringthe prospect of acute civil disorder and despite the walk out ofmuhajirMPAs, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto allowed his MPAs in the Sindh Assembly to pass the Sindh Language Act on 7 July 1972. Over the nextfew days mobs ofmuhajirsand Sindhi extremists battled each other and with the police in the streets of Karachi, Hyderabad and rural towns such as Larkana. During these days of heavy rioting, colleges, shops and printing presses were burnt, police stations attacked, and scores of people were killed.

TheFederalGovernment'sreactionwasdecidedlynotneutral.Whenamuhajirdelegationmetwiththecentralgovernmentnegotiators,theMinisterofLaw,Hafiz Pirzada told them that PPP government was used to dealing with violent reaction and addingthattheSindhiswerequitepreparedtotakeonthemuhajirs.365Islamabad's stanceonlysoftenedwhenitbecameawareofthegrowingresentmentdevelopingin the PPP powerbase of Punjab against the crisis in Sindh. News had arrived in Punjab of attacksonPunjabisettlersandmolestationofPunjabiwomenintheinteriorofSindh.It issaidthatMerajKhalid,theChiefMinisterofPunjab,convincedBhuttothatthePPP could not afford to lose support in its political bastion. Bhutto reluctantly concurred and concessions were finally made to alleviate the feelings of the agitatedmuhajirs^366Eventually a new ordinance was issued which provided that no civil servant could be discriminatedagainstforhisinabilitytocommunicateinSindhiorUrduforatwelve- year period.

As Karachi and Hyderabad were suffering under convulsions of street violence, Bhutto invitedanumberofoppositionleaderstodiscussthesituation.On13July1972the invited opposition delegation met with him. The delegation included Shaukat Hayat, Noorani,MuftiMahmood,ProfessorGhafoorandmyself.AtthemeetingBhuttoadoptedapostureofdeepconcernonthesituationinSindh.Denyingallresponsibility for the events he insisted that the crisis had been the sole making of his cousin Mumtaz Bhutto. He accused his cousin of overreaching ambitions. He told us, 'Mumtaz wants to project himself as a Sindhi nationalist. He got elected on my coat-tails and now wants to build his own support base. His eventual aim is to challenge my .supremacy in theprovince.' Yet a fortnight later, when he toured Sindh to safeguard his political position among the rural population of the province, he appeared totally unrepentant. In his speechesheshowedlittleregretoverthelossoflifeandpropertyandmadescanteffort to heal the bitter divisions that had arisen as a result of the rioting. During the publicmeetings:

365Zindigi,24July1972,pp.10-11.

366Outlook,12August1972.

[Bhutto] insisted that the Sindh Assembly had acted reasonably in passing the languagebill,andthattheriotshadbeeninstigatedbythe'reactionaries' (meaning the Islamic parties), who had been trying to dislodge his governmentsinceitsinception.Hesaidhecommandedthepowerofthestateandknewhow touseit,andthathewouldcrushthosewhoconspiredagainsthisgovernment.367

Intheaftermathoftheviolentlanguageunrest,theleadersofthemuhajircommunity hadcometocertainconclusions.Duringthedaysofrioting,whichhadresultedindeath and destruction, neither Bhutto nor his ministers had acted with promptitude to prevent the violence.Instead it seemed evident from their behavior that they had been waitingforthemuhajirstoadmitdefeatintheurbanwarfareandyieldtotheSindhi pointofview.AfterpeacewasfinallyrestoredthePPPmadelittleefforttoappeasemuhajirfeelings.Forthemuhajirsthelessonlearntfromthiseventwasthattheycould onlyrelyonthemselvesforthefuturedefenceoftheirinterests.Withnooneto intercedebetweenthetwocommunities,thefeelingsofmutualhostilitywouldonly exacerbatewiththepassageoftime.Thepoliticalfoundationsforthearrivalofa muhajir political force had been made, now it waited for a party such as MQM to stake its claim.

***

On 28 June 1972 Bhutto flew to India, accompanied by a huge delegation of over ninety people, to negotiate peace with Indira Gandhi. The terms of agreement, finally made at SimlawerenotallthatfavorabletoPakistan,butpeacewasfinallyconcludedbetween the two hostile nations. In fact under the Simla Agreement Pakistan conceded territory captured by India during the 1971 War to form a new line of control in Kashmir. The agreement also ignored the all important issue of the return of the Pakistani prisoners of warotherthantostatethatatsometimeinthefuture'therepresentativesofthetwo sides will meet to discuss.. .the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees...'. Thecrucialpoints agreed betweenthetwo leaders were:

Clause (ii): the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.

Clause (iv): the basic issues of conflict between the two countries ... shall beresolved by peaceful means.

Clause(vi):theywillrefrainfromthethreatoruseofforceagainst...eachother.

367AnwarH.Syed,TheDiscourseandPoliticsofZulfikarAliBhutto,Macmillan,London,1992,op.cit.,p.197.

Afteradecadeofbeingpossiblythemostrabidwar-mongerinPakistanipolitics, Bhuttohadhimself finallyconceded thatthe Kashmirdisputewas tobe resolvedonly byuseofpeacefulmeans.Havingplayedaleadingroleintheinstigationoftwo disastrouswars,theoriginalprogenitorofacallfor'athousand-yearwarwithIndia' nowreturnedtoPakistanproclaiminganachievementofprofounddiplomatic accomplishment. Along with many other Pakistanis, I was pleased that peace had been brought about between India and Pakistan. However, at the same time I wished to use theopportunitytopubliclyrecalltheroleBhuttohadplayedinthehistoryofthetwo neighboringcountries.DuringtheparliamentarydiscussionsontheSimlaAgreement in the National Assembly I had made the following comments in my speech:

Ifonecomparestheoft-repeatedTashkentAgreementwiththeSimlaAgreement, IcannotseeinanywaythattheSimlaAgreementisbetterthantheTashkent Agreement.TheTashkentAgreementwasmadeanemotionalissuetowhipup mass hysteria in thecountry. All I can say is, as I said before,I am oneof those whobelievesinpeaceandIbelieveinfriendshipwithourneighbors,butitis alsoworthasking:whohasbroughtaboutsuchconditionsasareprevailing today?Iwouldliketoaskwhoisresponsibleforallthistroublethatwasbrought aboutoverinthispoorunfortunatecountry-thisconfrontation,thiswar, sufferingandmisery?Ifyoureflect, in1970 duringtheelections,ananti-Indian stanceandconfrontationontheKashmirissuewasconstantlyplayedup.Iwouldliketoknowwhowasresponsibleforcreatingthissortofemotionalissue inthecountry.Todayafteryouhaveworkeduptheemotionsofourcountrymen,youtellthemthatweshouldthinkaboutthepathtopeace. AllIcan requestis:pleasefromnowonletusforgetcriticizingtheTashkentAgreement whichwasinnocaseworsethanwhathashappenedinSimla...[However] regardlessofmyviewsonTashkent,theSimlaAgreement,Ifeel,wascorrect and, therefore, I now, in my personal capacity, feel that it is a right step and we should support it.368

My remarks did not please Bhutto. In his Presidential Address to the special session in NationalAssemblytoannouncetheSimlaAgreementhedepartedfromhisprepared text to mockingly criticize me.

Andnowto cometothegreat SardarfromDeraGhaziKhan,myTumandarof whom we are serfs. He asks who is responsible for all this. My Sardar I am responsible! You are not. You do not have any oppressive system in Dera GhaziKhan.Youarenotafeudallord.Weareservants;weareserfs.Butweare servantsofthepeople.WearenotSardars;wearenotMirsandMaliksand Khans.Thesearegreatmen...Wearelow-caste;wearebadpeople.Butwe

368National AssemblyofPakistanDebates,Volume II No.l (Monday,10July 1972),PrintingCorporation of Pakistan Press, Islamabad, p. 51.

belongtothepeopleandweareproudofthepeople.Holdhistoryresponsible; holdtherightpeopleresponsible;donotgivejudgmentinlightvein.

Thenheproceededgivingawordyspeechdenyingallresponsibilityintheeventsthat ledtothecivilwarandeventualdismembermentofPakistan.Heloftilystatedthathis role in the Simla Agreement was even more difficult than the one played by CountTallyrand at the1815CongressofVienna(afterNapoleon'sdefeat at Waterloo).During thecourseofhisexplanationheinterspersedhisspeechwiththeoccasionalsardonic jibedirectedatme:'IamnothighcastelikeourSardarfromDeraGhaziKhan'.Finally, he turned towards me and said:

TodayyousaythatTashkentwasbetterthanSimla.Onwhatbasisdoyousay thatTashkentwasbetterthanSimla?Ifyoucometosuchfeudalisticandobsolete conclusions, Sardar Sahib, let me tell you, my dear friend from Dera Ghazi Khan, thatyouhavemisreadthemoodof thepeople,thatyouhavemiscalculatedthe courageofthepeopleofPakistantohavecometothatconclusion.Wedidnot exploit Tashkent, we were betrayed at Tashkent...

Ihadnever,atanystage,suggestedthattheAgreementatTashkenthadbeenbetter thantheonereachedatSimla.Bhuttohadsimplychosentomisconstruefactsto enhancehisstrangelyspeciousargument.Veracitywasaqualityhehadlittletimefor.

CHAPTER6

BalochistanandtheUDF

Thetrampling ofthePressunderBhuttohad becomeanissueclosetomyheart. Over themonthsI hadmetwithalargenumberofeditorsandpublishersofthe leading dailiesandpoliticalmagazinesandgavethemallthemoralandpublicsupportthatI wasableto. TheOppositionpartiesdeclared1August1972as'PressFreedomDay'. On 28July MoazzamAll,the ChairmanofPPI,calledonme andpresentedme witha charterofdemandscallingforthefreedomofthePressinPakistan.Laterthateveninga meetingoftheOppositionpartieswasheldatMaulanaNoorani'shousewhere,perhaps in recognition of my efforts insupportof Press liberties, I was elected chairman of the Opposition'sPressFreedomStruggleCommittee.ZahooralHassanBhopaliwas nominatedsecretarytothecommittee.Ontheeveningof30Julyanumberofus, includingAsgharKhan,MaulanaNoorani,AzizullahShaikhandMehmood-ul- HaqueUsmani of NAP, met to finalize our plans for the day of protest.

On the morning of1 August I hoisteda large black flag above my house as a mark ofprotest against the government's repression of the Press. Later that afternoon I joinedotherOppositionleadersaswemadeourwaytoKatrakHallinalargeprocession.En routemanyscufflesbrokeoutasgovernmentagitatorstriedtoimpedeourprogress. Themeetingplacewaspackedwithpeopleandalargecrowdhadalsogatheredoutside ofthosewhocouldnotgetinduetolackofspace.AtthemeetingtheOpposition members,includingmyself,madecriticalspeechesagainstthegovernment'sopen

campaignagainstthePress.Iknewthatourmeetingwouldnotleadtoanyabatement in the repression of journalists but it was important to publicize their intolerable plightandexpress publicsympathywiththebeleagueredjournalists.

By mid-1972 the PPP regime policy of repression had become all encompassing. One particulartargetofBhutto'svengefulwrathwasAsgharKhan.TheretiredAirMarshal had reached the peak of his public acclaim in 1969 during the movement that had led totheoustingofPresidentAyubKhan.Hispopularityofthosedayshadseemedtohave leftanindeliblemarkonBhutto'sinsecurepsyche.DespitethefactthatAsgharKhan hadsuffereda ratherhumiliatingpoliticaldefeat in the 1970 elections,Bhutto continued tobeobsessedbyhim.OnthefirstdayofAugustAsgharKhan'shouseinAbbotabad burnt down in extremely suspicious circumstances. About the same time his brother-in-lawColonelAleemwaschargedwithmutinyandconspiringtooverthrowthe government.Apparently,theColonel'sonly'crime'wasthatafterthe1971debaclein East Pakistan he had openly advocated that General Yahya be replaced by Asghar Khan insteadofBhutto.ManyotherswerealsomadetofeelthebruntofBhutto'svindictive

wrath,including,notsurprisingly,myself.BytheendofAugust1972strongrumors werecirculatingaboutmyimpendingarrest.Iwouldoftenbephonedbyconcerned people - including Ghous Buksh Bizenjo, then Governor of Balochistan - simply to find out whether I was still at liberty.

IhadneverbeenpleasedwiththemannerinwhichtheHousehadbeenblackmailed into accepting the interim Constitution. As an independently elected MNA I was free to pursuemyowncourseofaction.Myopportunitytoretaliatecameon3September1972 whenBhuttoannouncedintheAssemblythathehadreceivedalargenumberof resignations from PPP MNAs who were supporting continuation of the state of Martial Law.He hadarrangedtheseresignationstodisplayhisunchallengeable positionof leadershipinPPP.Idiscussedtheseresignationswithmylegaladvisor,Muhammad Anwar,anotedbarristerfromLahore.A writpetitionwaslaterfiledonmy behalf againstallthePPPMNAs^369whohadsignedthedocumentsubmittingtheir resignationsandrequestinganextensionofMartiallaw.Legallyitappearedthatthey hadresignedthemomenttheyhadattachedtheirsignaturestothedocument.Inow wanted the High Court to rule that these MNAs had legallyvacated their parliamentary seats, and call for by-elections in thirty-one constituencies. Unfortunately luck wasnot withme,astheHighCourtsoonprovedtobeasubmissivebodylackinginethical courage.ThefirstofficialacknowledgementigotfromtheHighCourtconsistedofa letter Iwas to receive inOctober 1978.

DearSir,

IamdirectedtodrawyourattentiontothecasecitedassubjectfiledbylateMr.

M.Anwar.Advocate,onyourbehalfadmittedtothefullhearingofMr. Justice Shafi-ur-Rahmanon13September1972.Thismatterisstillpendingadjudication. ThematterrelatestotheelectionofcertainseatsintheNationalAssemblyof Pakistanwhichatpresentdoesnotexist.Youarethereforerequestedtokindly intimatewhetheryouwishtoproceedfurtherwiththiswritpetition,ifso,kindly takefurtherstepstofileafreshpowerofattorneyasyourcounsel,Mr.M. Anwar, has since expired.

Yourobedientservant, SuperintendentofWrits.

Bythattimealengthyperiodofsixyearshadelapsed,astheHighCourtofficialpointedout,myworthyadvocateM.Anwarwasnolongerwithus,andbythistime

369The PPP MNAs who submitted their resignations in support of Marti Law included: Mahmood Ali Kasuri,Minister of Law& Parliamentary Affairs; DrMubashir Hassan,Minister for Finance; Maulana Kausar Niazi,Minister for Information; Abdul Hafiz Pirzada. Minister for Education; Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Minister for Communication; Sheikh Muhammad Rasheed, Minister for Health; Khurshid Hassan Mir, Minister without Portfolio; GhulamMustafa Khar, MNA; Dr Ghulam Hussain, MNA; Malik Muzaffar Khan, MNA; Abdul Sattar Gabol, MNA; Hakim Ali Zardari,MNA.

Zia's Martial Law had extinguished all vestiges of a democracy, including the National Assembly. It seemed that the High Court had finally considered it safe to retrieve cases that previously it had been too fearful to examine. Sadly, it was a pathetic reflection on the state of the judiciary of those times.

Undoubtedly my filing of the writ in the High Court only served to further irritate the PPP. Events that followed in Dera Ghazi Khan would acerbate the matter.

***

The assassination of Nazir Ahmed on 8 June 1972 had created a vacancy in the northern Dera Ghazi Khan National Assemblyseat. Under the interim Constitution by-electionsshouldhavetakenplacewithinsixtydaysofthevacancyhavingbeencreated.Wishing toestablishmorefavorableconditionsforitscandidate-indirectcontraventionofthe law-thegovernmentpurposelyprocrastinated.Eventuallyitwasannouncedthatthe by-electionwouldbeheldon14November.ThePPPcandidatewasGovernorKhar's own nephew, Khawaja Sulieman.

Thepoliticalsituationinthedistricthadchangedinonedistinctwaysincethe1970 elections: by now most of the Sirdars had joined hands with the PPP government. The firstSirdarfamilytogoovertothePPPcampweretheLegharis.Theoriginsoftheir movewerelinkedtoSirdarMuhammadKhanLeghari'sdeathin1971.Afterhispassing awaytheLegharishadapproachedmybrotherMirBalakhSherandIwithaviewto reachingapossiblepoliticalunderstandingfortheby-electionthatwastobeheldinthe nowvacantprovincialseat.In1970theMazarigrouphadputupFarooqGurchani againsttheLegharichieffortheprovincialelections.Intheendhehadonlybeen narrowlybeatenbySirdarMuhammadKhan.Withtheprospectofanimpendingby- electiontheLeghariswerenotconfidentaboutthe successoftheircandidate,Sirdar MuhammadKhan'syoungerbrother,AttaMuhammadKhan.On12October1971we had a meeting with them at the Circuit House at Dera Ghazi Khan. The Mazari Group wasrepresentedbymybrotherMirBalakhSherandI,whiletheLeghariswere represented by membersof the late Sirdar Muhammad Khan'sfamily, Atta Muhammad Khan(thelateSirdar'sbrother)andFarooqAhmedKhan(thelateSirdar'sson).My friend,theTumandaroftheKhosas,ZulfiqarAliKhan,wasalsopresent.Atthe meetingwedecidedthatinmemoryofthelateSirdar-whom,despiteourpolitical differences, weheld inregard asathorough gentleman- wewouldnotputupa rival candidate against Sirdar Atta Muhammad Khan.

I wasreasonably surethatAttaMuhammad, onceelected would notjointhePPP. Sadiq Qureshi who had only recently met Atta Muhammad Khan, while on a PIA flight from Multan,hadtoldmethathehadbeenseverelyreprimandedbytheelderLeghariwho

hadaccusedhimofhavingthrowninhislotwithkaffirsbyjoiningthePPP.370During our meeting,for thesakeofreassurance,Iasked FarooqLegharifor acommitmentthat theirsuccessfulcandidatewouldnotjointhegovernmentparty.FarooqKhanprovedto bemorecircumspectthanhisuncleonthisissue.Hedeclinedtomakeany commitmentsandinsteadreplied,'Inpolitics,onecan'tbesureaboutanything'.Asa result of our decision our candidate, Farooq Gurchani, stepped down from the contest. Afterwards,muchtoeveryone'ssurprise,theproposedlocalPPPcandidatewasnot givenapartytickettocontesttheelection.LaterduringadinneratIslamabad,Malik MuzzaffarKalabagh^371mentionedtomethathehadbeenabletopersuadeBhuttoto allowtheLegharicandidatetostandunopposed.InreturnMalikMuzzaffarKalabagh had promised that the Leghari family would join the PPPen massealong with him. And so, once Atta Muhammad Leghari was independently elected as the local MPA he soon becameafull-fledgedmemberofthePPP.Suchwas,andis,thenatureofourrural politics. My brother Mir Balakh Sher was the next to go.

DespitethedesertionsofamajorityoflocalSirdarstothePPP,thegoverningparty faced an extremely tough battle ahead in the National Assembly by-election. The town of DeraGhazi Khanand thenorthernpart of thedistricthad littleinclinationtovotefor thePPP.DrNazirAhmed'skillinghadgalvanizedsympathyfortheopponentsofthe government.WhenthecombinedOppositionpartieshadagreedtosupportmyfriend Sirdar Zulfiqar Khosa as their candidate, his victory appeared a virtual certainty. Khar, the uncle ofthe PPPcandidate,waswellaware ofthedimprospectsthatfacedhis nephew and resolved to do something about it. At first Khar contacted my brother Mir Balakh Sher, now a PPP MPA, and asked him to use his influence to dissuade me from opposing his candidate. According to Mir Balakh Sher who met me a few days later on 21 August, Khar had told him that 'he would break ballot boxes to ensure his nephew's success'.Kharwentontothreatenthathewouldmakelifeimpossibleformyfamily and the Mazari tribe until I either changed my mind or left the district.

I had first met Khar in 1962 in Bhutto's company. He had only recently been elected to the National Assembly and had already adopted Bhutto as his mentor and role model. KharhadcomefromarelativelyminorruralfamilyinMuzaffargarh.Hisfatherhad beenafarmemployeeoftheGurmanifamily.WiththeforceddeclineinNawab MushtaqGurmani'spoliticalfortunesMustafaKharhadbeenselectedby theAyub KhanregimetodeposeGurmaniinhisownconstituency.Relativelyunculturedby urbanstandards,Khargroomedhispersonaonthestyleandmannerismsofhismentor. Hegradually improvedhiscommandofspokenEnglishandslowlylearnttocarry himself more confidently in refined company polishing his social graces mainly during hisexileintheUK.Irecallthatinlate1962hegothisfirstmentioninthepress.He carriedthe newspaperwith himfora numberofweeks,showingittopeople asamark

370SadiqQureshiwithhisusualartfulhumorrelatedhisencounterwithAttaMuhammadLegharitome.

371MuzzaffarKalabagh'sbrotherwasmarriedtoSirdarMuhammadKhanLeghari'sdaughter.

of new found distinction. Over the years his emulation of Bhutto would lead him to be ruthlesstowardsanyonewhoopposed hismaster'swill. Intimehisforcibleacquisition ofpowerinthePunjabwouldfeedtheinsecuritiesofBhuttoandwouldleadtohis downfall.Butin1972Khar,asgovernorofPunjab,attheheightofhispowerwas determinedtowintheDeraGhaziKhanby-electionbyproxy,inthenameofhisnephew.

Assoonasthedatefortheby-electionwasannouncedtruckloadsofpoliceweresent into the Mazari area in the southern part of the Dera Ghazi Khan district - an area which wasnotevenpartoftheby-electionconstituency.Withinaperiodofafewdays,over 150 people were arrested on an assortment of bogus criminal charges, some patently ludicrous.372A number of my relatives, including the PPP-supporting nephew of mine, Farhat,wereamongthosearrested.MuchtotheembarrassmentofmybrotherMir BalakhSher,despitehishavingjoinedthePPP,severalofhisfarmstaffwerealso hauled up by the police. Notables of the Mazari tribe and other prominent peoplebelongingtothelocalareawereharassedbythemaraudingpoliceandalargenumber of them were detained on false charges. The whole purpose of the police exercise was to showthepowerlessnessoftheMazarichiefsinfaceofthePPPgovernment.Nostone was left unturned intryingto achieve this objective.

On 11 October I was accused of possessing illegal weapons and charged under the OrdinanceActArms.IwasathomeatKarachiandspoketoM.Anwar,mylawyer,who advised me to go immediately to Lahore and apply for bail before arrest. On 12 OctoberIarrivedatLahoreandconsultedM.AnwarwhowasinsistentthatIavoid arrestbygoingintohiding,whichwasbynowacommonpoliticalpractice.That evening while I was at my sister's house my brother-in-law Bashir Mazari informed methatanumberofpolicemensittinginjeepswerekeepingawatchonhisresidence.On 13 October I went to M. Anwar's office where Shaukat Hayat joined me. That afternoonaftersomedelay,JusticeMaulviMushtaqHussainoftheLahoreHighCourtallowedmeagrantofbailbeforearrest.TheverynextdayIwasapproachedbyNazir Fatehuddin,theIntelligenceBureauchiefofLahoreandamemberofmyoldschool R1MC.HeaskedmetomeetwithKhartosettleour'differences'.Irefusedpoint-blank.

TheDeraGhaziKhanDeputyCommissionerhadbeenreplacedbyJivanKhan,whohad been the Secretary of the provincial Revenue Board. A new hand-picked Police SuperintendentnamedRiazAhmedSiprawasalsobroughtintodealwiththe opposition.Siprawasknownforhisbrutalityandloyaltytohispoliticalsuperiors.373

372For example, my farm manager Gamun Dushti - who had lost a leg to cancer - was accused of participating in a buffalotheft.

373There had been several incidents which had led to Sipra's notoriety. During the 1966 riots he dealt with journalists by confiscating all their cameras, which he then destroyed by having a truck driven over them. Later in 1970 he was involved in a well-publicized drunken brawl in one of Karachi's nightclubs before acquiring further infamy for brutality in East Pakistan.

All the policethanedarsin the constituency were supplanted by specially chosen newcomers.Aperiodofintimidationandterrorcommenced.Alargenumberof Oppositionsupporterswerearrested.Twomonthsbeforethedateannouncedforthe by-electionsKharsenttwoprovincialministers,MukhtarAwanandMumtazKahloon, toDeraGhaziKhantotakechargeofthePPPcampaign.Thepairofthembegan addressingpublicmeetingsofferinggovernmentbenefitstothosewhopledgedsupport tothePPPcandidate,whileatthesametimethreateningthosethatopposedhimwith dire consequences. Accounts, confirmed by newspapers, told of very poor attendance at these meetings. They were reported to be attracting crowds of no larger than 100 to 150 people.374On 23 October 1972 a large meeting was scheduled to be held at 4 p.m. at Gol Bagh in the Dera Ghazi Khan township. When the organizers became aware of poor attendancetheydesperatelypostponedthemeetingto5p.m.,latertheyputitoffuntil6

p.m.Eventuallywhenrealityofthesituationdawneduponthemtheywereforcedto call the meeting off altogether.

By now I had been elected convener of the election committee for the joint Opposition candidatefortheDeraGhaziKhanseat.Atthattimetherewasonlyonecertainty.The by-election was safely in the Opposition's hands-even if the ballot boxes were stuffed againstus-andthegovernmentwasawareofthisfact.Clearly,theywouldhaveto resort to other means to achieve their goals if they wished to be successful. Myinvolvementwiththeby-electionaffairswasinterruptedinmid-Octoberandasleader of the Opposition's Independent group Ihadto fly to Islamabadto attendthe constitutional talks between the government and the Opposition leaders. Despite a brief and heated flare-up on the second day of the session between Bhutto and myself, his behaviorduringthesemeetingsremainedextremelyjovialandfriendly,and surprisingly,especiallysotowardsme.Itwasasifnothinghadhappenedbetweenus. This was a facet of Bhutto's nature that bewildered a large number of people. To him politics was a game of poker and he believed that he could outwit everyone with his duplicity.ThesediscussionsbetweentheOppositionandthegovernmentledtowhat thenbecameknownas'theconstitutionalaccord'.Iwillsoondescribethese constitutional talks in more detail.

While at Islamabad I discussed the Dera Ghazi Khan by-elections with all the other opposition leaders. Mufti Mahmood said to me that he had received a delegation of JUI members from Dera Ghazi Khan insisting that as the Jamaat-i-Islami was supporting ZulfiqarKhosa,theJUIshouldnominatetheirowncandidate.Despitehisparty's resistance I, not only, got a commitment from the JUI leader that his party men would supportZulfiqarKhosabutalso,intheeventourcandidate'spaperswere illegally rejected, the JUI would boycott the by-elections. On 21 October, I came to know that my friendZulfiqarKhosahadbeenforcedtowithdrawfromtheDeraGhaziKhanby- election.Asanewspaperlaterreported'Hisnamebyfortunatecoincidencedidnot

374Jassrat,Karachi,16October1972.

happentofigureintheelectorallistandnoamendmentwaspermitted'.375Inreality,his namehadbeendeletedfromtheelectorallist.Afteralltheworkthatwehaddoneit cameasabitterdisappointmentbutitwasnotunexpected.Kharhadstakedhis reputation on the by-election and faced with a resounding defeat on his hands he took theonlycourseofaction'open'tohim.ThatverydayIflewtoLahoreandmetwith Mian Tufail, the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami andpresented him with a document calling for atotal boycottof the by-electioninprotestof the government'selectoral manipulation. ThedocumenthadbeensignedbytheleadersoftheNAP,JUIandJUP.Eventually,whenKhar'snephewwontheby-electionon16Novembertherewasacomplete boycott of the election by the Opposition parties.

On23October,whileIwasstillatLahore,I wasinvitedby Bhuttotomeethimatthe PunjabGovernor'sHouseatLahore.Iwastakentohissittingroomwherehewas waiting for me. Playing the role of an old friend Bhutto asked after my family. Then he said,'IsthereanythingyouwantorthatIcandoforyou?'ItoldhimthatinlifeallI wantedwastoretainmyself-respect.Nottaking'no'forananswerhethentoldmethat hewishedmetobethegovernorofBalochistan.Tomethisoffersmackedofanobvious ploy to create a rift betweenmy friends andIin the NAP and Iquickly declined it. Then he proceeded to apologize for Khar's actions in Dera Ghazi Khan, adding that it was all veryregrettable.Hesaidwordstotheeffectthat,'Khar[was]abitofanupstartwho stillhadtolearnhowtobehaveproperly'.ThenhesummonedKhar,andintroducedme as his 'dear friend'. In my presence he gave instructions to Khar. He told him to 'make suretoprotect Sherbaz'sinterestsfrom now on'. Ileftthemeetingconvinced that Khar had not been acting independently at all.

***

Theproposedconstitutionposedadilemmaofsortsforallconcerned.Undertheaccord of 6 March 1972 a twenty-five member constitution committee had been set up in the National Assembly. The committee had been assigned the task to provide a draft constitution that was acceptable to all concerned. With Bhutto at the helm of affairs thiswas to prove an exceedingly difficult task. It was clear to most that Bhutto was keen to adoptapresidentialformofgovernment,withhimselfattheapexwithsweeping powers. Most members of the PPP and its supporting parties, such as Muslim League (QayumGroup)wouldnaturallyhavefollowedhiswishes.TheOppositionwasinsistent upon a Westminster form of parliamentary government. With his two-third majority in the Assembly, Bhutto could easily have forced through a constitution in line with his wishes. But, skilled in politics as he was, he was well aware that a constitution chosenandpassedintoexistencebyasinglepartywouldlackcredibility.Togivethe newconstitution'legitimacy'itrequiredanimpressionofbroadnationalconsensus. Andtogainthis'nationalconsensus'heneededthecooperationoftheOpposition.

375Outlook,3December1972.

The initial resistance came from within the PPP. The chairman of the constitution committee,MahmoodAliKasuritheLawMinister,soonturnedouttobeanadvocate of greater civil liberties and fundamental rights. This led to serious divergence of views betweenhimandhisauthoritarianleader.Bhuttoavengedhimselfbyeffectively sidelining Kasuri from his ministerial responsibilities. In early October 1972 Kasuri resignedfromthecabinetinprotest.MuchtotheconsternationoftheOppositionhe was replaced by Hafiz Pirzada. Pirzada was then regarded as a Bhutto acolyte with no independent views of his own. Having failed to properly address the issues by the committee system Bhutto now decided to call for a meeting of all the parliamentaryleaders.

TheconstitutionaltalksbetweenthegovernmentandtheOppositionbeganon17 October1972.Iarrived inIslamabad on16October.AsmyrelationshipwiththeNAP leaders of Balochistan was exceedingly close at the time, I was picked up at the airport byGovernorBizenjoinhisofficialvehicle, whoinsistedthatI stayat BalochistanHouse withhimashisguest.Nextmorningtherewasameetingwiththevariousleadersofthe OppositionscheduledtomeetwithBhuttolaterthatday.Amongthosepresentwere ArbabSikandarKhalil(thentheNAPgovernoroftheNWFP),SirdarShaukatHayat, MaulanaNoorani,ProfessorGhafoor,GhousBukshBizenjoandGeneralJamaldar (representingtheFATAMNAs).Duringourdiscussionsitbecameapparentthatboth ShaukatHayatandBizenjowereextremelykeenthatourconstitutionalnegotiations withthegovernmentwentsuccessfully.Theybothpleadedwiththerestofusto exercisetoleranceandunderstandingtowardsthegovernmentproposals.Afterthe meeting we headed directly for the Presidency.

Bhuttogreeted us in a very friendly manner.Turning towards me he said tothe others, 'Sherbazisanoldfriendofmine.Unfortunately,intherecentpastweseemtohave drifted away from each other'. Then smiling, he added, Today I want to make up with him'.AccompanyingBhuttoonthegovernmentsidewereJ.A.Rahim,HafizPirzada, Sheikh Rasheed and Abdul Qayum Khan. The first day of our discussions went by in an agreeableandcongenialmanner.Aswe wereleaving,inadisplayofamity,Bhutto mentioned tome thathe would likethe twoof ustomeetsometime soon. Thatevening IaccompaniedArbabSikandarKhalilashisguesttoPeshawar.Wedrovebycarand were joined by Ajmal Khattak, Acting General Secretary of NAP.

OverdinnerattheGovernor'sHouseArbabSikanderrelatedaratherstrangeand unsettlingstorytome.ItseemedBhuttohadrecentlyvisitedPeshawarandwhile stayingattheGovernmentHousehadrequestedArbabSikanderforasupplyofwhisky. The Governor told me that he had politely informed Bhutto that as he did not imbibealcoholhewasunabletoprovidethepresidentwithliquor.Bhuttothensenthis airplanetoIslamabadtofetchwhisky.Whentheplanereturnedthateveningitnotonly broughtthealcohol butafederal minister'swifetokeepBhutto company. Imustadmit

I was quite appalled by the tale. Arbab Sikander was a man of sterling character and it wassimplynotinhisnaturetoindulge ingossip.Thepurposeofhisrelatingthis episodetomewasnotonlytohighlightBhutto'sarrogantdisdainforthefeelingsofone ofhisclosestsupporters,butalsotheabjectservilityoftheministerwhowillingly provided his wife.

LaterthatnightIreceivedatelephonecallattheGovernor'sHousefromthe presidency.ItwasBhuttowhohadsomehowdiscoveredthatIhadgonetoPeshawar withArbabSikandar.Laughingoverthephonehetoldme,'What'sthisSherbaz.First youinsistonmixingwiththe"beards",andnowIfindyouaretravellinginthe company of"traitors".' I gatheredfrom his conversation that he wasconcernedthat I mightnotbeplanningtoattendthefollowingday'ssession.IreassuredhimthatI would reachIslamabad intime for themeeting.

Thenextmorning,18October,wereturnedtoIslamabadandjoinedtheother OppositionmembersatthePresidency forourcontinuingconstitutionaldiscussions withthegovernment.Whenthegovernmentsideinsistedthattheproposed constitutionincludeatwo-thirdsmajority fordismissingagovernmentinavoteof confidenceinparliamentIwasvocalinraisinganobjection.Iratheremphaticallystated thatsuchaprocedurewasunheardofinanyotherexistingparliamentaryformof governmentwhereonlysimplemajoritysufficedfordismissalofgovernment.Atthis pointBhuttolostcontrol.Inarancorousandshrillvoicehebeganthreateningmein front of everyone present. He said, 'Youmight be a friend of mine but I will not spare you if you opposeme onthis'. Not being known for a cool temper I heatedly retorted, 'YoucandoyourworstforallIcare.IfearonlyGodandnooneelse'.Toreducethe levelofangryemotionsthathadsuddenlyarisen,Bizenjoquicklytookmeaside.Taking me to a corner of the room he pleaded passionately, 'For God's sake do not oppose this point.Don'tyourealize thatthe NAPneedsitaswell.BothinBalochistanandthe Frontier, our governments are at the mercy of the Mullahs. They can pull the rug from usatanytimeif westick toasimplemajorityvote'.Itnowdawnedonmethatifboth the PPP and NAP were agreed on this point, my opposition had suddenly become quite redundant.BizenjoandIthenrejoinedtheproceedings.FortherestofthedayI remained silent knowing my opposition held little value.

During this second session some valuable points of the agreement were made. Bhutto finallyaccededtoaparliamentaryformofgovernment.Someoftheothersalient features of agreement included: the designation of Islam as the State religion of Pakistan(as a concession to the religious parties), the creation of a council of common interests to rectifyprovincialgrievancesregardingthedistributionofwater,revenuefromthesale ofnaturalgasandminerals,andindustrialdevelopment.Inreturnandthisgratedwith me-theOppositionagreedthatforthenexttenyearsatwo-thirdsmajorityvotewould be required in the National Assembly to pass a motion of no-confidence against a prime minister.TheyalsoconcededtherightofaprimeministertodissolvetheAssemblyat

anytime-evenduringabudgetsessionorwhenamotionofno-confidencewasbeing debated. In short, it was my belief, the Opposition had virtually agreed to allow Bhutto an unstinted ten years of power.

That evening Bhutto invited me over for a chat over a meal. He led me through hisbedroom, where Nusrat and his younger daughter were sitting, into his dressing room. WhilewesatthereandtalkedhesentRafiRazatofetchdrinksandcrackedajokeover my usualrequest for a coke.Over the years Bhutto never approvedof my teetotalling habit.Isuspect it made him somewhat uneasyas mostdrinkers are prone to let their guard down after a number of drinks. After a few drinks Bhutto became surprisingly sentimentalandtalkedaboutoldtimes.The oddityofthesituationdidnothowever escape me. Here I was with an old acquaintance whose minions were engaged in persecutingmeandmysupportersinDeraGhaziKhan,even,asIlaterlearnt,tothe extent of trying to have me killed by members of my extended family.376Clearly, these actionshadbeendonewithmyhost'sapprovalandathisbehest.Butneitherofus alludedtotheseevents.Suchistheuniquelypeculiarnatureofoursocialculture.

Laterthat eveningBhutto triedto justifyhis dismissalofAirMarshalRahim Khan, knowing that he was a good friend of mine. Bhutto said that Iqbal Shahban had warnedhim that Rahim Khan had said that he and General Gul Hassan wouJd control Bhutto's Martial Law government from behind the scenes. As such a situation was totally unacceptable to him, Bhutto said, he had no choice but to remove the two armed forces chiefs. It turned out to be a congenial evening only marred by Bhutto's attempt topurposelyannoyhiswife,Nusrat.HeconfidedtomewithinNusrat'shearingthatthe wifeofseniorPunjabpoliticianinsistedonshoweringhimwithgifts.Whileheclaimed tobeannoyedbythislady'sattentionsitwasratherapparentthatitwassimplyan excuse to make his wife jealous. Bhutto was known to indulge in playing with people's emotions,evenhisclose familymemberswerenottobespared.

Thefollowingday,19October,theconstitutionalconsultationsbecamequite contentiousastheNAPgovernmentsofBalochistanandNWFPdemandedtheirshare of revenue from the federal government. It was finally agreed that Balochistan would receiveRs.7millioninroyaltiesandRs.55millioninexciseduty.NWFP,whosecase waspleadedbyGhulamFaruque,wouldbegivenroyaltiesanditsshareofelectricity from Tarbela and Warsak Dams. 20 October was the final day of our discussions. Both Bizenjo and Shaukat Hayat were determined that the rest of us go along with Bhutto's constitutional proposals. There was a lot of publicity given to the political accord. There was a photo session of all the participants and later both Arbab Sikandar and I were interviewed on TV. That evening Bhutto held a celebratory dinner at the Presidency. Hewas once more in a jovial mood. Before the evening was over he smiled broadly and announced,'Sherbazisonceagainmyfriend'.Bizenjoinahumorousrejoindersaid,'I

376IncidentisrelatedinChapter5.

hope that does not mean that I will lose his friendship'. In politics I was soon to discover that'friendship'isoftenahollowandmuchabusedword.

With the major Opposition parties in agreement there was little a leader of theindependent group of MNAs could achieve on his own, and thus, despite my sense of disquiet, I signed the document which represented the 'constitutional accord'. Bizenjo's effortsatachievingtheaccordmetwiththedisapprovalofmanymembersofhisparty. In November, both Attaullah Mengal and Khair Buksh Marri expressed their deep disenchantmentwithwhattheybelievedwasBizenjo'scompleteacquiescenceto Bhutto's demands. In December 1972 the national council of NAP forced him to resignfrom the Constitution Committee in the National Assembly. Perhaps Bizenjo had been trying to achieve some sort of political equilibrium with Bhutto for the sake of future harmonybetweentheNAPprovincialgovernmentsandthePPP,HindsightwouldprovethatwhateverchanceshehadofappeasingBhuttoweredoomedtofailure. Bhuttocouldnotabidesharingpowerwithanyone,letaloneelectedrepresentativesof thecountry'stwopoliticallyandeconomicallyminorprovinces.

***

UnlikeBizenjo, who was a versatile politician, Attaullah Mengal and Khair Buksh Marri werenotknownforbotheringoverlymuchwithpoliticaldelicaciesandwereopenly contemptuous of Bhutto. Earlier Attaullah Mengal had snubbed the ever sensitive PPP leaderbyrefusinganinvitationtoaccompanythepresidenttoSimlafortheIndo- Pakistansummit.ByOctoberevenMumtazAliBhutto,theSindhchiefminister,was complaining about him. In newspaper reports headlined 'Mengal Ignores Me', Mumtaz BhuttoprotestedthattheBalochistanchiefministernoton!}'ignoredprotocolby refusing toinformhimof theschedule of hisregularvisitstoKarachi and other partsof Sindh,butthathehadalsonotbotheredtorespondtoadinnerinvitationissuedbyhim.377ThesetwoBalochleadersdistrustedBhutto'sintentionstowardsthemrightfromthe outset. Their evaluation was not incorrect. In my meetingwith Bhutto in Lahoreon 23OctoberhehadmadearatherblisteringverbalattackonAttaullahMengalandKhair Buksh Marri.

Notinclinedtoobservetheformalitiesofdemocracy,Bhuttowantedallpowertobe consolidated in his own hands. The independent NAP governments in Balochistan and the NWFP remained a complete anathema to him. Consequently, the political situation in Balochistan remainedvolatilefrom thedate of the inception ofthe NAPgovernment. Within days of coming to power members of the NAP were complaining of attempts by IslamabadtodestabilizetheBalochistangovernment.Soonaftertheinstallationofthe newgovernmentapro-governmentpoliticalprocessionwaschallengedbyMuslim

377Leader,10December1972/Star,10December1972.

League(QayumGroup)supportersinthestreetsofQuetta.Aclashtookplace,resulting in one death and several casualties.

Qayum Khan's Muslim League (Qayum Group) had being spurred on by Bhutto to take onAttaullahMengal'sadministration.ThemainproxiesrepresentingtheCentre's interests in this confrontation were Sirdar Doda Khan Zarakzai, chief of the Zehri tribe and JamGhulamQadir ofLasBela.Thesetwotribal leadershad previouslybenefited as members of Muslim League (Convention) during Ayub Khan's ten year regime and had strongly opposed the emerging force of Baloch nationalists, who had later merged and become the Balochistan wing of NAP. But Doda Khan and Jam Ghulam Qadir were not the only ones already enlisted by Bhutto in his strategy to weaken the NAP provincial government. Therewas one other.In AkbarBugti, whowas yearning to gethis revenge fromhisformeralliesintheNAP,Bhuttowouldfindhimselfanextremelyusefulprotagonist.

AsIhavealreadymentionedBhuttohadalreadytriedtowidentheexistinggulf betweenmyfriendAkbarandmyselfbyofferinghimgovernorshipofBalochistanin earlyMarch1972whichAkbarhadwisely declined.AfewdayslaterAkbarBugti accompaniedBhutto,asamemberofhisdelegation,onastatevisittotheUSSR.Priorto theirdeparturethePressreportedthatsoon'PresidentBhutto,itislearnt,willconclude a "mutual friendship treaty" with Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti'.378Once in Moscow Akbar decidedagainstreturningtoPakistanandinsteadwentintoastateofself-imposedexile inLondon. Hehad leftthecountry inanembittered mood and wasconvinced thatafter years of serving the Baloch cause he had been betrayed by Attaullah Mengal and Khair Buksh Marri. Akbar was also extremely upset that his younger brother, Ahmed Nawaz, had opted to stay with the NAP government as the provincial minister for finance. On 28July 1972a worried NabiBukshZehricametoseeme.Heinformedme thatAkbar hadsentamessagetohissonSalim^379orderinghimtotakeratherdrasticmeasures against his uncle if he refused to resign hisministership and provincial assembly seat.

Afewmonthslater,inearlySeptember,Iwastoreceiveadeeplymovingand affectionateletterfromAkbarinLondon.Itwasapparentfromhismoodthathewas saddened by the state of events. After wishing me luck he ended the letter by saying, 'I don't think we will ever meet again ... love,Akbar'.380My friendship with Akbar wentas far back as my teens. I had always had great affection for him and after reading his letterIfeltgrievedatmy friend'scurrentplight.ButknowinghimasIdidI knewhis state ofdespondency wasjustapassing phase,hisfeelingsofangerwouldquickly resurface andI wasquite positive thatwewouldmeetagain.Andwe did,whenI receivedhimatKarachiairporton10Decemberthatyear.OnethingIthinkshouldbe

378TheStar,15March1972.

379NabiBukshZehri'sdaughterwasmarriedtoSalim,Akbar'seldestson.

380Theletterwasdated29August1972.

said about my friend: once he made up his mind, nothing could ever make him change it. He made an implacable foe.

ThedisruptiveforcesinBalochistansoonbegantheirattemptstodestabilizethe provincialgovernment.By3OctoberBizenjowasconfessingtonewsmenthatSirdar DodaKhanZarakzaihadformeda'parallelgovernment'inJhalawanareaofKalat district^381andwasinastateofnearrebellion.AforceofKalatlevieswassenttodeal withthesituation.InearlyDecemberSalimBugtisurroundedtheprovincialsecretariat with a large number of Bugti tribesmen in an attempt to force his uncle,the provincial ministerforfinance, Ahmed NawazBugti, toresignfromhisoffice. By3Decemberover ahundredBugtitribesmenhadbeenarrestedbythegovernment.OnthatdayI receivedAttaullahMengalandBizenjoontheirarrivalinKarachi.Theyinformedme thatSalimhadactually.enteredthesecretariatandhadthreatenedtobreakdownthe door to his uncle's office. After the arrest of most of his people Salim had withdrawn to Bugti House, Quetta, and surrounded himself with a dozen armed men.

Earlier,AttaullahMengalandAhmedNawazBugtihadtravelledtoLondoninan attempt to soothe Akbar Bugti's injured feelings. On their return in 8 October theyinformedmethattheyhadfailedintheirmissionasAkbarhadprovedtobe irreconcilable.ShortlyafterwardsSalimBugtiwentonthewarpathandaddresseda press conference accusing the Balochistan chief minister of trying to bribe his father in LondontojointheBalochistangovernment.382Atthepressconferenceitwasreported thatSalimhadbeenaccompaniedbyhisfather-in-law,NabiBukshZehri.AtIslamabad, on19October,whileIwasattendingtheconstitutionaldiscussionswiththe government, Bizenjo informed me that he had received a warning that Salim Bugti was engaged in a conspiracy to blow up the gas refinery at Sui. Concerned with the news, BizenjosaidthathisNAPgovernmenthadincreasedthesecurityattheplant.

Some days later, on 21 October, Salim Bugti called on me while I was passing through Lahore. I took the opportunity of trying to warn Salim of the dangers of playing into his father-in-law, Nabi Buksh Zehri's hands. Zehri, a member of Muslim League (QayumGroup), was an active opponent of the NAP's Balochistan and had suffered as a consequence.Zehri,whoaccordingtoonewriter,'[had]supportedsuccessiveIslamabadregimespoliticallyinexchangeforgovernmentlicensesandcredits',383held themonopolyofmarble-quarryinginBalochistan.InrecentmonthstheNAP government had cancelled a large number of his leases, further antagonizing the businessman turned politician. Salim, who was only a young man of twenty-five then, confessing to his helplessness told me that he had been acting directly on his father's instructions.InDecemberthatyear,afterthearrestofBugtitribesmenbentupon invadingtheprovincialsecretariatatQuetta,thegovernmentrefrainedfromtakingany

381Outlook,14October1972.

382Sun,15October1972.

383SeligS.Harrison,InAfghanistan'sShadow,CarnegieEndowment.York.1981,p.163.

directactionagainstSalimlargely outofrespectforhisfather. While Salim remained in thefortifiedBugtiHouseatQuettasurroundedbyarmedpolice,Bizenjodroppedinat myhouseatKarachiaskingmetoflytoQuettaandgetSalimtomeetwiththeNAP leaders so that 'they could reason with him'.I expressed my reluctance. As Salim wasacting more or less according to his father's wishes, I believed it would not be proper formetointerfereinwhathadessentiallybeenafamilydisagreementbetweenAkbarand hisbrotherAhmedNawaz.Besidesitwouldhavebeenpointlessdiscussingitwith Salimashe had littlealternative buttoobey hisfather'sinstructions.

On10DecemberIwenttotheairporttoreceiveAkbarBugtiatKarachiairport, accompaniedbymysonsSherazamandShehryar,whowasvisitinghomeduringhis university vacations in New Zealand. From the airport we went to Nabi Buksh Zehri's house where Akbar was being put up. At Zehri's house a large number of the anti-NAP group from Balochistan were present to welcome Akbar back to Pakistan, led by Doda KhanZarakzai.AtthisgatheringAkbaropenlyblamedAttaullahMengalandBizenjofor all his troubles. The next day Akbar came to see me at my house and we had a long andprivatediscussiononthesituationinBalochistan.MyfriendAirMarshalNurKhan,amanofprovenabilityandjudgment,alsojoinedus,andwebothtriedto persuadeAkbartoadoptamoreconciliatoryattitude.TheBugtichiefseemedtotally irreconcilable.Hewasadamantinwantinghisbrother'sresignationandnothingelse would suffice. I found myself caught in themiddle;while I wholeheartedly supported the NAP government of Balochistan, Akbar was one of my oldest of friends.

LaterafterattendingasessionoftheNationalAssemblyIleftIslamabadforQuetta whereImetAkbaragainon5January1973.Akbarhadlaunchedonarathervitriolic campaign of press interviews againstthe Balochistan governmentwhich had upsetme. AfterhisreturnfromLondonhemademanyannouncements.Hehaddeclaredthat duringsomeoftheNAPmeetingshehadattendedbeforetheirformationof government,thepartyleadershaddiscussedplansforthebreakupofWestPakistan. He further alleged that the NAPgovernment was smugglinga vast cache of arms which itplannedtouseinasecessionistmovementandwasarmingalargeprivatearmyin theBhambhorehills.ItoldhimthatwhileIrealizedtheextentofgrievancesheheld againsttheprovincialNAPleadership,someoftheseallegationswerewideofthemark. IwarnedhimthathewasunwittinglybecomingatoolinthehandsofBhutto.Akbar seemedirritatedwithmyratherbluntcommentsandinsistedthathewouldcontinueto do what he thought was right in the circumstances.

In early February there was an armed uprising in Las Bela at the instigation of Bhutto, with Jam Ghulam Qadir acting as the federal government's proxy. Communication was cutofffromtheareaastherebelsseveredthetelephonewires.PartsofKalatweresoon innearchaos.Whentheprovincialgovernmentrequestedassistancefromthelocal militia,thecommander,Brigadier(laterGeneral)NaseerullahBabar,refusedtoprovide anyhelp.Babarinformedtheprovincialauthoritiesthatasheandhismilitiacame

under the control of the central government he could only act under instructions issued fromIslamabadlaterhistorywouldrevealBabartobeanardentBhuttoloyalist.384Finding itself powerless against the intransigence of the federal government, the NAP government resorted to raising an irregular force of levies from local tribes to quell the rebellion.Thousandsof'volunteers'frompartisantribeswereinductedandarmedby the provincial government. When this body of men arrived in the Las Bela region thefederal government denounced the provincial government for participating in 'an inter- tribaldispute'.AttaullahMengalwasaccusedofraisinghisownprivatelushkar.Having masterminded the scenario Bhutto now chose to play his counterstroke. HeorderedthearmyintoLasBelatodealwiththeprovinciallevies.

On7February1973,AttaullahMengalsufferedaseriousboutofillnessandthechief ministerwasflowntoKarachifor treatment.I methimat Karachi'sOMIhospitalon the followingday.AttaullahMengalwasenragedwithBhutto.Hehadbeenwellaware thattheuprisinginLasBelahadbeendeliberateandatthebehestofIslamabad.His retaliatory action of sendingprovincial levieshad conveniently provided Bhutto with a pretexttosendfederalforcesintoBalochistan.Facedwithacrisis,ashe lay onhis hospitalbed,Ihelpedhimtoprepareapressstatement,whichwaslaterissued.The statementharshlycondemnedthedispatchofthearmyandcriticizedthegovernment for falsely justifying that the armyhad beensent to disarm illegally armed volunteers. By9February,Kalatwaseffectivelyisolatedfromtherestoftheprovince.Whenthe governoroftheprovince,Bizenjo, triedtocontacttheDeputyCommissionerhefound himselfunabletodoso.Therewereboldthree-inchheadlinesinoneofKarachi's afternoon papers the following day announcing 'Kalat Cut Off'.385

Onthemorningof9FebruaryaverydepressedBizenjocalledonme,afterwhichwe bothwenttomeetAttaullahMengal.ThesituationinBalochistanlookedincreasingly bleakandthereappearedtobe littletheprovincialgovernmentcoulddotoresolveit. LatestreportsindicatedthatthearmyactionwasnowspreadingfromLasBelato adjacentareasinKalat.Thateveningweoncemoregottogethertodiscussthesituation. Thistimewewere joinedby AirMarshalNurKhanandMaulanaNoorani.RasoolBukshTalpur,thenthePPPgovernorofSindh,alsoarrivedtheretoexpresshis sympathy.386Duringthemeeting myfriendNurKhanused all hispowersof persuasion to try and convince Attaullah Mengal to be less unyielding in dealing with Bhutto and becomeagreeabletoattendingtheimpendingGovernorsConference.Hedidnot succeedasAttaullahMengaldistrustedBhuttoandsawlittlepointinmakingcompromises.

384General (retd.) Naseerullah Babar would later serve Bhutto's daughter Benazir, as her steadfast Minister of theInterior.

385Leader,Karachi,10February1972.

386RasoolBukshTalpursoonresignedhisgovernorshipasamarkofprotestagainstIslamabad'sactionsinBalochistan.

Afewdayslater,on14February,Attaullah Mengal,havingrecoveredvisitedmeand disclosedthatthearmyhad takenoverKalatdistrictand hadspreadoverBalochistan asfarastheChamanborder.HenowbelievedthatBizenjo'sdismissalfromthe Balochistangovernorshipwasimminent.LaterwecalledonPirofPagaro.ThePir seemedwaryofconfrontingthePPPgovernmentbypoliticalagitation.Hewasofthe opinionthatweshouldtakeuptheissueintheNationalAssemblyonconstitutional groundsandshouldnotresorttopublicdemonstrations.Butbynowtheeventshad rapidlymovedpastus.Thefollowingday,15February1973.Bhuttodismissedthe governorsofNWFPandBalochistan.IntheNWFPArbabSikanderwasreplacedby AslamKhattakandinBalochistanBizenjohadbeenreplacedbynoneotherthanmy friend and brother-in-law, Sirdar Akbar Khan Bugti. In Balochistan Attaullah Mengal's ministrywasdismissedandathirtydaystateofPresidentialRulewasimposedupon Balochistan.AdaylatertheNAP-JUIgovernmentoftheNWFPresignedinprotest. LargecontingentsofthearmypouredintoBalochistan.WithintendaysaBritish newspaperreportedthatthreedivisionsoftheArmypassedthroughQuettaandthe soldiershave been spread out in the mountainous areas.387

On 10 February a cache of arms was found in the Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad. The Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) was aware of the arrivalof the cratesof arms assoon asthey had landed and provided Bhutto with photographic evidence. The likely destination of weapons was Iran where Iraq was keen to incite insurgencies. Iraq and Iran, as the subsequentbitterwarbetweenthemwouldreveal,were engaged inadeadly feudover theShat-al-Arabwaterway.Neithergovernmentwasaboveaidingdissidentsinthe other's country. The timing of the raid on the Iraqi embassy coincided with the PPP government's actions to destabilize the government of Balochistan. Taking a page out of history Bhutto decided to place the blame for the smuggled arms on the NAP leaders of Balochistan. It was eerily reminiscent of Hitler's plot of burning down the Reichstag and usingitas anexcuseto banallformsofpoliticalopposition.388

WhileBhutto may not have had a hand in theimport of the arms he certainly madefull useoftheopportunitythattheirdiscoveryprovidedhimwith.Withoutashredof evidencethegovernmentinstantlyorchestratedacampaignaccusingtheBalochNAP leadersofplanningtoarminsurgentsinBalochistanwiththeseweapons.Bythevery next day the government controlled Press went on the rampage.In one newspaper the editor sycophantically wrote:

we would be failing in our duty if we do not warn the Central Government thatifitwaiverstocleanthecountryofforeignagents,theirlocalhirelings(sic)and

387TheGuardian,22February1973.

388In February 1931 Hitler's storm troopers engineered a plot and burn down the German Parliament (Reichstag). Hitler placed the blame of the fire on his political opponents. Within a few weeks he had arrested most of the Opposition,dissolved parliament and had himselfinstalledassupremeleader.Once Hitler had obtained all powers he banned all Opposition parties and enforced the ruling by means of concentration camps and systematic terror.

does not effectivelycheck political parties and individualsin the payof Moscow, itwouldbedoingthegreatestdisservicetothepeopleofPakistan.Inthistask, thoughenerous(sic)asitis,PresidentBhuttoshallhavethesupportofall patriotic elements.389

TheeditorialdemandedthatquestionsoughttobeaskedoftheNAPleadershipwhom it openly insinuated to be parties to this 'sinister conspiracy'. Using Doctor Goebbels's conceptofthe'biglie',390thePPPgovernmenttarredtheNAPprovincialgovernment with this accusation and then used it to arrange for its dismissal. In time Bhutto would further imitate Hitler by not only creating his own concentration camp at Dalai, but also setting up his own 'storm troopers' in the guise of the notorious Federal Security Forces(FSF).

***

ThearbitrarydismissaloftheBalochistangovernmentgalvanizedtheOppositioninto joiningforcesandforminganalliancewhichcametobeknownastheUnited Democratic Front (UDF). On 28 February 1973 a meeting was held at Islamabad which was attended by all the leaders of various Opposition groups, the only exception being Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who declined to attend.391It was decided at the meeting that acoalitionof Oppositionpartiesbeformed whichwould unitedlydemand thereturnof democratic norms of government. After lengthy discussions a number of items of issue were agreed upon and included in the UDF agenda. In general our demands were.

(1) ajudicialenquiryintotheIraqiembassyarmsconspiracy;

(2) liftingofthestateofEmergencywhichhadbeeninoperationsince1971;

(3) firmguaranteeoffundamentalrightsandcivilliberties;

(4) releaseofallpoliticalprisoners;

(5) endingofthepersecutionofthePress;and

(6) withdrawalofthearmyfromBalochistan.

Along with our outrage at the manner in which the Balochistan Government had been autocraticallydismissed,wewerealsoseriouslyperturbedbythewayinwhichthePPP

389DailyNews,12February1973.WajidShamsulHassanwastheeditorthattime.

390Thetheorywasthatthemoreoutrageousthelieandthemoreoftenrepeated,themoreitissuccessfully accepted as 'truth' by gullible masses.

391ItwasreportedthatAsgharKhanhadrefusedtoparticipateinthembecausehedidnotrecognizethe representativecharacter oftheNational Assemblyand offered instead tosendan observer. His offer wasrejected.

governmentwasridingcallouslyroughshodoverhumanrightsandPressfreedom.Asa condition of the Opposition's acceptance ofthe interim constitution, we had asked forand received a commitment from the government that fundamental rights of the people wouldnotbeviolated.Itwasalsouponthisassurancethatwehadagreedto constitutionalconcessionsatthetimeofthe'ConstitutionAccord' inOctober1972.And so, the UDF was formed with these most basic and fundamental issues at the core of itscreation.

SoonadecisionhadtobetakenastowhowouldleadtheUDF.Tomysurprisea numberofpeoplefeltthatI,notbeingaffiliatedwithanyparty,wastheappropriate choicetoheadtheunitedcoalition.OnthewaytoameetingatZahoorEllahi'shouse, WaliKhanandBizenjomentionedtomethattheyhadputupmynameforthe leadership, and had been supported in this move by JUI, JUP and the Jamaat-i-Islami. ThoughIwasgratefultothemfortheirfaithinme,Iwasreluctantbutcouldnottell themsoinplainwords.AtthemeetingChaudhryZahoorEllahiopenlyfavoredPir Pagaro for the position. He stated that as Bhutto was a Sindhi, it was important for the Opposition to select a Sindhi to head the UDF. I gladly withdrew in favor of Pir Pagaro.WiththebenefitofhindsightIcansaywemighthaveerredthatnight.ThePir's fondnessforactivitiessuchashorseracingfaroutweighedhispenchantforpolitics. SoonhemadeitclearthathewouldbeotherwiseoccupiedonSaturdaysandSundays. OnseveraloccasionsUDFmeetingshadtobepostponedbecausehewasunavailable. Evenwhenpresentatmeetings,thePirwouldoftenloseinterestandwishtoadjourn for coffee and chocolates.

AnotherfactorthatdidnothelptheUDFwasthecomponentofitsmembership.A number of small and relatively less known parties, such as Tehreek-e-Khaksar, AhleHadees and the Ahrar - all three of whom had been inducted into the UDF by Nasrullah Khan'smaneuvering-insisteduponhavinganequalsayinUDFaffairs.Whilethese parties had no representation in the National Assembly their votes were given the same weightasthoseofanymajorparty,suchasNAP,JUI,etc.Bycurryingfavorofthese minorpartiesandenlistingtheirsupport,highlypoliticalindividualssuchas Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan would succeed in getting themselves foisted on the UDF leadership. It was sad to see petty power politics take place when much greater issueswere confronting us on a national level. At times even some of the larger parties feltobligedtodrawsupportfromtheseinsignificantpartiessimplytobolstertheir positionsduringvotesonpolicymatters.Thesemaneuveringsdidlittletostrengthen theobjectivesoftheUDFandonoccasionevendetractedfromthem.

Bhutto's reaction tothe formation of the UDF was bilious. On the eve of the formation of the UDF he issued a front page diatribe in the National Press Trust newspapers. Allofuswerecastastraitors.HebeganhisattackbydeclaringNAP,JUIandJamaat-i- IslamiasopponentstothecreationofPakistan.Heevenlambastedthefactionsof MuslimLeaguewiththeOpposition,whomheaccusedofbeingone-timemembersof

IskanderMirza'sRepublicanPartyandopposedtothecreationofPakistan(quite overlookingthefactthathehimselfbeganhispoliticsasastaunchRepublicanParty member). Among this heated rhetoric he even found time to single me out. I, who as a headstrong sixteen year old, had incurred the wrath of my local Deputy Commissioner andlatertheschoolauthoritiesatDehraDoonbymyardentwavingofthegreenStar andCrescentbanner,wasnowbeingcastasyetanothertraitor.TheMorningNews reported,'Theindependentmember fromDeraGhaziKhan,whoisalsoattendingthe convention,wasalsoopposedtothePakistanMovement'.392Ironically,these accusationsofdisloyaltytoPakistanwereemanatingfromamanwhohadhimself optedtoreturntoPakistanaslateasinNovember1953,393Truthwasacommodity never highly valued by Bhutto.

InmemeantimetheBhuttoregime'spoliciesofsystematicterrorcontinuedunchecked. On 22 February Mian Tufail, the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami wasscandalously manhandled injail.AweekearlieranumberofOppositionmembershadbeenarrestedincluding ChaudhryZahoorEllahiwhowasabsurdly chargedwithtakingpartinatheftoftwo buffaloes, and would bearrestedacoupleof monthslaterforarelatedoffence.About thesametimeAltafGauharwasre-arrested.AfewweekslaterthenewspaperJasaratwasbannedfortwomonths.On23March1973thegovernmentpolicyofrepression struck a new peak, at UDF's first public meeting held at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi.

On 22 March the Opposition had sought and received permission to hold the publicmeeting the next day. However, later that evening we received reports that Khar, the governorofPunjab,hadsentalargenumberofpeopletodisruptthemeeting.Camps hadbeensetupinRawalpinditoaccommodatethesegovernmentsanctionedhooligans. It was only later that we were to discover that a large number of thesedisrupters were members of the PPP's newly formed storm troopers, the FSF, who hadbeen instructed to discard their uniforms and show up in plain clothes but with their weapons. The government had planned this covert action under the name of 'Operation Pastry'. Despite being forewarned of the threat of severe disorder we were resolutely determinedtofacethemandproceedwithourplannedmeeting.

PriortothemeetingWaliKhan,Bizenjo,ShaukatHayat,andImetforlunchbefore proceeding toManto's house where all the Opposition leaders were meantto assemble at2p.m.PirPagarowasthelasttoarriveandheappearedabitdistraught.Wewere told by him that Khar had contacted him over the telephone athis hotel. According to Khar,'thepublic'washighlyincensedandwoulddisrupttheOppositionpublic meeting.KhardidnotwishthePirtobesubjectedtoinsultsorhumiliationand appealed to him not to attend.

392MorningNews,28February1973.

393See,Chapter5forgreaterdetails.

Soon after the Opposition leaders arrived at Liaquat Bagh, as we were making our way to the stage, gunfire began. Undeterred we made our way on to the platform and stood therefacingthepandemoniumthathadsuddenlybeenunleashed.Gunfireandthe sound of bullets whizzing could be clearly heard around us. People, in their hundreds, soonpanickedand began toflee.A number ofenraged NAP workers fromthe NWFP beganchargingthedisrupterswithsticksandshovelswhichtheyhadbroughtwith them having been forewarned about the disruption, but they were clearly ill-equipped to face automatic machine-guns. The meeting for all intents and purposes was over. In the ensuing chaos we made our way out. Only a couple of feet away from me a person was hit by bullets. I saw him writhing on the ground covered in blood.

TheviolenceatLiaquatBaghledtothedeathofelevenpeopleandmanywereseriously injured. The next day a number of us, including Mian Tufail, Mufti Mahmood, Shaukat Hayat,BizenjoandI,visitedtheinjuredinthehospitals.'MostofthemwereNAP supportersfromthe NWFP.WaliKhanhadalready returnedtoPeshawar accompanying the bodies of hisparty workers. Later, the UDF was condemned by the governmentforallowingWaliKhantobringinhisNAPsupportersfromtheNWFPintoPunjab.Todeflectfromthegovernment'sdirectroleinthekillings,effortswere madetogivetheeventdangerousethnicovertones.Officialsuggestionsweremadethat theviolencehadbeenengenderedbytheresidentsofRawalpindiwhohadresentedthe intrusion of the Pathans into their province with the avowed aim of creating trouble to humiliatethePunjabis.ItwasacredittoWaliKhanthathemadeitclear,whenhe visitedthehomesofthebereavedfamiliestoofferfateha,thatthekillingshadnothingto do with Punjabis.

After the Liaquat Bagh incident the Opposition unanimously decided to boycott all proceedingsoftheNationalAssembly.Thiscausedadilemmaforthegovernment whichwaskeentohavetheconstitutionaldeadlockresolved.WithindaysI,alongwith six other members of the UDF's Action Committee,394was to receive an invitation from Bhutto for discussions on the constitution to be held on 2 April. These invitations led to muchdebatewithintheranksoftheOpposition.Whenwegatheredon1Aprilat Zahoor Ellahi's house in Islamabad to discuss the invitation's, wide differencesimmediatelyeruptedamongthosepresent.Therewasastronglobbyadvocatingthat theUDFrejecttheinvitations.Surprisinglymostoftheseadvocatesofnoncooperation didnotevenbelongtotheUDF,395ProfessorGhafoor,MaulanaNooraniandI,onthe otherhand,felt it wasimportant that theUDF'sviewpoint onthefutureconstitutionbe putforwardtothegovernment.InitiallyevenWaliKhanwasquitereluctantonthe issueofsendingtheUDFrepresentativestomeetwithBhuttobutthethreeofus managedtopersuadehimtosendaNAPrepresentativetothemeeting.Itwasmy strongbeliefatthattimethatthefutureconstitution.wasnotjustthepreserveofthe

394The others invited by Bhutto were Shaukat Hayat, Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Noorani, Professor Ghafoor and a NAP representative to be chosen by Wali Khan (who nominated Amirzada Khan).

395TheyincludedMalikQasim,MahmoodAliKasuri,BarristerM.AnwarHassanMahmood.

existingmajoritygovernmentbutbelongedtothepresentandcominggenerationsof Pakistanis.And,assuch,itwasincumbentonustotemporarilysetasideourgrievances and animosity with the PPP, and try to ensure that the new constitution provided for a democratic system of governance.

On2AprilthesixUDFActionCommittee membersmetwith Bhuttoandhis team.396Bhutto appeared grim when we met him. It appeared to me that the Opposition's sharp campaign against him seemed to have met with some measure of success. The meeting lasted for over three hours. At an early stage the NAP representative, Amirzada Khan, voicedan objection toRafiRaza's presence at the meeting,on the groundsthat as Rafi Razawasnotanelectedrepresentativehewasnotentitledtoparticipate.Bhutto concededthisdemandandaskedRafiRaza,whothenheldthepositionofspecial assistant to the president, to leave the room. While the meeting ended inconclusively, Bhutto made it obvious that he was quite desperate to see the UDF end its boycott of the National Assembly proceedings. He wanted the constitution to be in place as soon as possible. Passing the constitutional bill in parliament without the presence of the Oppositionwouldhavedeprivedtheconstitutionofitslegitimacyintheeyesofthe public and the world at large.

On4ApriltheUDFActionCommitteeheldameetingtodiscussourposition.Once againanumberofnon-UDFpoliticiansinsistedonjoiningandvoicingtheirdivisive views. Malik Qasim and Hassan Mahmood (both Convention Muslim Leaguers), and MahmoodAliKasuri(representingTehrik-iIstiqlal-apartywhichhadrefusedtojoin theUDF)nowinsistedthatallnegotiationswiththegovernmentbebroughttoan abrupt end. Fortunately better sense prevailed. Shortly afterward the Action Committee memberswentoncemoretothepresidencytomeetwithBhutto.Atthemeetingwe were presented with anaide-memoirewherein Bhutto conceded to some of our demands which he had earlier rejected. Later, after the meeting, we were rather surprised to learn that a statement had been issued from the president's office that none of the UDF's demandswouldbeacceptedunlesstheyattendedtheNationalAssemblysession.

WehadalsobeguntoexperienceproblemswithintheOpposition.Oneofthesenior members of my group of independent MNAs, Maulana Zafar Ansafi, had earlier voiced opendisapprovalofsomeofthecomponentpartiesoftheUDF.Hiscriticismofthe Jamaat-i-Islami,JUI and the secular NAP hadincreased with time. Hehad threatened to attend the National Assembly in defiance of the UDF boycott. Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi andItriedourbesttopersuadehimnottodosobutheremainedadamant.Whenhe brokeranksandparticipatedintheproceedingson7April,itreflectedpoorlyonour imageof solidarity. LaterIwastolearnthatAnsari had metwithbothKharandBhutto. It was they who had managed to convince him that it was in his best interests to break with the Opposition at this crucial phase.

396Bhutto'steamconsistedofAbdulHafizPirzada,SheikhRasheed,MalikAkhtarandAbdulQayumKhan.

Kharusedallhispowersofpersuasion -both pleasantandunpleasant- toprevailupon anumberofOppositionmembersinthePunjabtoadoptalessbelligerentattitude.In thistaskhewasassistedbysomeseniorLahorenewspapermen.AtthesametimeHafiz PirzadawasholdingnegotiationswithProfessorGhafoorandmakingconciliatory gesturesonBhutto'sbehalf.Itwasbecomingapparenteventothemorebellicose members of the UDF that an understanding would have to be reached. On the basis of theaide-memoireasettlementwasfinallyreachedbetweentheUDFandBhutto.In returnformeeting some ofourdemandsthe UDF nowagreedtoparticipate inthe National Assembly proceedings.

On 10 April, the day the constitutional bill was passed in the Assembly I was in Karachi attending a bail hearing of Attaullah Mengal. The boycott of the National Assembly had broughtaboutanewwaveofrepressionthroughoutthecountry.Inmyhomedistrict all the cases that had been registered against my family and supporters during the Dera GhaziKhanby-electionhadbeenrevivedonceagain.Khar'sbrother,GhulamMiladi, hadbeentouringtheRojhanareaencouragingandincitingpeopletoforciblyoccupy theMazarichiefsfamilyagriculturalproperty.AstrongrumorwascirculatingofAsghar Khan's impending arrest. I was informed by journalists that one of his Tehrik-i- Istiqlalpartymen,MushirPeshImam,fearingarrest,hadalreadyfledthecountry.In April, as the days went by, more and more people were arrested. One of the victims happenedtobeEllahiBukshSoomro,whowaspickedupbythepoliceinhis hometown of Shikarpur. I was in Sonmiani at that time which was not too far from Shikarpur.IwentovertomeetEllahiBuksh'sfatherMoulaBukshSoomro,an independentMNA,whomIhadknownovertheyears,toofferwhateversupportI could. Later, at the end of April, I attended Ellahi Buksh's court hearing at Karachi to providemoralsupport-whichinthosedayswasthemostonecoulddogiventhe political circumstances.

On12AprilIflewtoIslamabadandjoinedmyMNAcolleaguesinsigningthe constitution.Tomyknowledgetherewereonlytwoabstainers,MakhdoomNoor MuhammadHashimiandMianNizamuddin.Theirobjectionswerebasedonthefact thatBahawalpurhadnotbeendeclaredaseparateprovince.Laterthatday,inaspiritof generosity, Wali Khan, Bizenjoand Iwenttothepresidency towitnesstheceremony of Bhuttoaffixinghispresidentialsignatureonthenewconstitution.Thateveningthere wasaspecialdinnergivenbythespeakerof theAssemblytocommemoratethesigning oftheconstitution.Bhutto,whoseemedquitedelightedattheoutcome,askedmeto joinhimathisspecialtable.Hechattedwithmepleasantlyandthankedmeformy supportinbreaking the deadlock.I toldhimI didwhatI believedwasinthe best interests of the country.

Theimportanceofapermanentconstitutioncouldnothavebeenunderestimated. The memoryoftheeventsinEastPakistanwerestilluppermostinourminds.Despiteour

deepestreservationsaboutthestateofPPPgovernance,nationalinterestdemanded that the Opposition participate in the constitution making process. The UDF had stuck toa number of democratic demands which under the terms ofaide-memoireBhuttohad accepted. Concessionshad beenextracted frombothsides. Oursweremore permanent in nature, while Bhutto's would sadly prove to be more ephemeral.

***

Akbar Bugti,asthenewgovernorofBalochistanwasfindingitexcessivelydifficultto formanewmajority government.Earlier,on6March1973,Ihadmetwithhimat Islamabad while he was on a visit to the capital. It was my first meeting with him since thedismissaloftheNAPgovernmentandhisappointmentasgovernor.InMarch, Akbarappearedtotallyunrepentantandexpressedcompleteconfidenceinhisabilityto run the province. He told me that he was convinced that I was being misled by Bizenjo. InhisviewbothAttaullahMengalandKhairBukshMarrihadearlierfallenintothe sametrap.AsfarashewasconcernedBizenjowasanarch-intriguerwhohad deliberatelycreated misunderstandingsbetween him and hiserstwhile companions.

By late Aprilthe situation in Balochistan hadturnedgrave.Army action hadbegun in Marri and Mengal tribal areas! I was convinced that the use of the armed forces in the provincewasafatalblunder,especiallysoafterthebitterharvestreapedinEast Pakistan.Thearmymind,aswasprovedintheEasternWing,wasstodgybynature and tended to view complex issues in simplest of terms. Led by General Tikka Khan, a sycophanticBhuttoloyalist,thearmyhadnowbeenunleashedinlargenumbersto pacify Balochistan by brute force.

Time and time again I raised the issue of Balochistan in the National Assembly. Withinafortnightafterpassingoftheconstitution,IaskedtheNationalAssemblytopassa resolution calling for an immediate halt to the army operation. I told the House:

Itbreaksone'shearttoseeourbravejawans, whosesworndutyistoprotectour bordersfromenemyaggression,beingusedbythepartyinpowertoshootdown our ownkithandkin,for afterall,weareall Pakistanis. ForGod'ssake,letusput astoptothissenselesskilling,ortherewillbeawaveofoutrage,notonlyagainst thegovernmentinpower,but,whatwillbemorehurtful, againstour brothersin uniform.Iappealtothehonorablemembersofthisaugusthousetopassa resolutiondemandinganimmediatestoptoallatrocitiesbeingcommittedbythearmy.397

Myappealfellondeafears.

39730April1973.

InanefforttoboostthemoraleofthepeopleofBalochistanUDFdecidedtoholda public meeting at Quetta on 27 April. A few days before the scheduled meeting Bizenjo called on Bhutto and reminded him that NAP still retained a majority in the provincial parliament.HeurgedBhuttotorestrainthearmyandsettletheissuebynegotiations. Bhuttobelievedthathehadthewhip-handandsawnoreasontosettleforanythingless than total control of Balochistan.

IarrivedinQuettaon26AprilandwasreceivedattheairportbyAttaullahMengal, AhmedNawazBugti,Bizenjoandothers.Theprovincialcapitalwasemotionallytaut with an air of heightened expectation. NAP banners were in evidence all over the city. As expected, there was an overwhelming presence of police everywhere. I learnt that a largenumberofNAPandUDFsupportershadalreadybeenroundeduptoprevent themfromwelcomingthearrivingUDFleadership.AkbarBugti,learningofmy presenceinQuetta,contactedmewithaninvitationtovisithimattheGovernor's Houselaterthatday.DuringlunchwithmyBalochNAPfriends,BizenjomentionedthathehadlearntthatAkbarBugtiwasbecomingincreasinglydisillusionedand disenchantedwithBhutto.Hethensuggestedthatitwasperhapstimetotryfora reconciliation.Itwasnoticeablethattheotherspresent-AttaullahMengal,KhairBuksh Marri and Ahmed Nawaz Bugti - were not at all averse to the idea. I told them I would do my best to bring about a reconciliation.

That afternoon Akbar received me warmly at his formal residence which he insisted on usingonlywhilehewasperforminghisofficialduties.Notonlywashisfoodstill cooked in his own private home and brought across, but he also insisted on returning to Bugti House at night. It soon became apparent that he was not particularly happy with BhuttoandwhenIbroachedthepossibilityofareconciliationwithhisformerfriends and colleagues, he seemed quite willing. He said that if Attaullah Mengal, Khair BukshMarri and Bizenjo came to him and offered their regrets for the behaviour meted out tohim after the 1970 elections, he would not only let 'bygones be bygones' but would immediatelyswearinAttaullahMengalasthechiefministerofBalochistan.As governor he had the constitutional authority to do so and as far as Bhutto's expected 'tantrum'wasconcerned,Akbartoldme,thathewoulddealwithithimself.Hetoldme inplainwords,'TohellwithBhutto.Icouldn'tcarelessabouthisviews.OnceI've restoredAttaullah'sgovernmentI'llresignandthatwillbethat!'ItoldAkbarthatI wouldconveyhismessagetotheNAPleadersbutaddedthattheymightobjectto visitinghimat theGovernor'sresidencebut I sawno difficulty inthemvisitinghimat BugtiHouse.Thevitalissueofsyaliortribalpridecouldnotbecompletelyoverlooked. ButAkbarwasadamantthatthevenuewouldbehisofficialresidenceornothing.

WhenIspoketotheNAPleadershipbothBizenjoandAhmedNawazBugtiwere agreeabletotheidea,butasIhadapprehendedAttaullahMengalandKhairBuksh Marri expressed their willingness to go to Bugti House but rejected outright the notion ofvisitingtheGovernor'sHouse.BizenjowasnotatribalsirdarandasfarasAhmed

Nawazwasconcerned,Akbarwasafterallhisbrothersotheconceptofsyalididnot arise.The same didnotholdforeitherAttaullahMengalorKhairBukshMarri.As sirdarsoftheir tribestheysaw nothingdemeaningin visiting a brothersirdar'shouse, buttheideaofgoingtoagovernor'sofficialresidencewas,notsurprisingly,quite unpalatabletothem.ThusonanissueofBalochtribalpride,ratherthanpolitics,the chance of a valuable compromise was lost.

On the morning of 27 April at a gathering of the assembled UDF leaders, twelve out of theelectedtotaloftwenty Balochistanprovincialassemblymembersassembled inour presence and signed a document declaring their avowed support for Attaullah Mengal aschiefminister.398NothingfurthercouldhavehighlightedBhutto'stotaltravestyof democracythanthesightoftheangrybutpowerlessparliamentarymajoritygathered beforeus.ThespeechesmadebytheUDFleadershipevokedastrongresponsefromthe large crowd that had gathered to hear them. Wali Khan severely criticized the Shah of Iran-whohadcalledonthe governmentsofIndiaandPakistantohelp'crush'the autonomous movements in Balochistan and the NWFP - for interference in the internal affairsofPakistan.NooraniandAttaullahalsospokeveryforcefully.Notsurprisingly Attaullah Mengal's address drew strong emotional sympathy from the public. When it was my turn to speak, as soon as I began loud firecrackers were let off. Thinking it was gunfirethecrowdpanickedandtherewasinstantpandemonium.NotlongafterwardsI cametotheconclusionthatthedisturbancehadbeentimedspeciallyforme.Akbarhad notatallbeenpleasedthatI,afriendofhis,hadinsistedonsupportingandkeepingthe companyofpeopleheclearlyperceivedtobehisrivals.Hewasinthehabitofindulging in his own peculiar brand of black humor.

In the meanwhile army atrocities against Pakistani civilians continued to take place in Balochistan in the guise of 'patriotism'. People whose loyalties lay with their dismissed electedgovernmentandwhowerenowbitterlyopposedtothegovernmentin Islamabadwereadjudgedtobe'insurgentsandtraitors'.Buttherealitywasnotof course what it seemed. The army was not acting on behalf of the state but clearly oncemore as an arm of the central government. After years of subjecting the country to army rule,mediocremilitarymindssuchasthatofGeneralTikka's,couldnolonger distinguish between defending the state and protecting the interests of the central government.Unfortunately,at thistime,theonlylessontheseniormilitaryofficers seemed to have learnt from the debacle of East Pakistan was now to choose to dutifully obey the civilian martial law administrator - in other words, Bhutto - as opposed to previousincompetentmilitaristssuchasYahyaandAyub.Thesemilitarymindsonce

398The twelve MPAs were: Sirdar Attaullah Mengal, Sirdar Khair Buk Marri. Gul Khan Naseer, Agha Abdul Karim, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, Abdur Rehman, Dost Muhammad, Narvabzada Sher Ali, Maulvi Saleh Muhammad, Maulvi Shamsuddin, and Miss Fazila Aliani. On 6 June these twelve signatories also sent a signed notice to the Governor requisitioning the Provincial Assembly to pass a motion of no-confidence against the chief minister, Jam Ghulam Qadir. Akbar Bugti chose to ignore the notice.

moredivorcedthemselvesfromtherealitiesoftheday.Theneedlessbrutalityapplied on the Bengali citizens of Pakistan was now being replicated on the Baloch citizens of Pakistan. With the army acting as the instrument of a despotic government it was not surprising they found resistance. Pushed to the wall a simple Baloch tribesman, whose world view was then still fixed by centuries of tradition of loyalty only towards his own family and tribe, resists and takes up arms. The act of tribal resistance was soon being proffered as proof of 'treason'. Tragically, yet once again the vast majority of people ofwhatuntilrecently hadbeenWestPakistan,remainedcompletely apathetictothe miseries of yet another subjugated province.

***

Thenextfewmonthsprovedtobepoliticallyquitehectic.Therewerenumerous meetings of the UDF as we launched an aggressive drive against the government. In my homedistrictgovernmenteffortstoharasstheMazarifamilyanditssupporters continuedunabated.On 16 May my brother Mir Balakh Sher contactedme andtoldme thatAkbarBugtihadspokentohimandaskedhimtowarnmethatBhuttoandKhar wereextremelyangryatmybehaviorandhaddecided'tosortmeout'.Aweeklater,on 23 May, Bizenjo and I chanced upon Hafiz Pirzada on a flight between Lahore and Islamabad.ItoldPirzadatoinformhisleaderthatheshouldinstructKhartodesist from victimizing my poor and hapless supporters and instead Bhutto should aim his resentment directly at me. On the flight home to Karachi a few days later I found myself seatednexttoAbdulQayumKhan;theinteriorminister.MuchtomysurpriseQayum Khan paid me a number of compliments and then proceeded to invite me to join the government.Adoptingtheroleofanexperiencedpolitician-whichheundoubtedlywas-heventuredtoadvisemeontheimportanceofgovernmentpatronage.WhenI told him that I could do without the government's beneficence, he shook his head and retorted: 'You'rea youngman. When you grow older and mature youwill then realize what politics is all about.'

AtKarachi,on29May,IcalledonPirPagarowhoinformedmethathehadreceived fairlyauthenticinformationthatthegovernmentwasplanningtoeliminatetheNAP leadershipas well as me. All Icoulddo was to shrug my shoulders. Thedie had already beencastandIwouldnowleaveittothewillofGod.InthemeantimeIwasdeterminedtodowhateverIcoulddotoachieveafreeandliberalpoliticalenvironment.

Onthenightof31MaythecentralUDFleadershipdepartedKarachionKhyberMailforanationwidetrip.IhadcometorespectthecharacterandcourageofWaliKhan, whotoweredabovemostotherleadersoftheUDF.Myfeelingswerereciprocatedby thePathanleader,asweperhapsrealizedwehadmuchincommonbelongingaswedid to tribal communities. We shared a coupe during the train journey. At Hyderabad a largecrowdhadgatheredatthestationtoreceiveusbutitwasnearmidnightandtoo

latetoaddressthem.AtdawnwemetwitharousingreceptionatRohri,followedby similarresponseinthetownsofsouthernPunjabsuchasSadiqabadandRahimyar Khan.Inthelatemorningof1JunetheMultanstationwassocrowdedwithUDF supportersthatwehaddifficultydisembarkingfromourcarriage.Eventhenewspapers reported that, 'the platformwasjam packed. The people raised full-throated slogansas thetrainenteredthestation.Manypeopleclimbedtothetopofthebogiestogeta glimpseoftheleaders'.ThegovernmentrespondedthenextdaybysabotagingUDF's plans to hold a public meeting at Multan's Qasim Bagh. Many bus loads of PPPgoondaswere brought in from outlying areas such as Jhang, Mianwali and Dera Ghazi Khan and assembledatQasimBaghunderpoliceprotectionafewhoursbeforethe scheduled meeting.Notonlydidthishiredmobsuccessfullyintimidatemembersofthepublic wishingtoattendthemeetingbuttheyalsowentaboutdismantlingthepodiumthat hadbeenpreparedspeciallyforthemeeting.Withourplansinsuddenshamblesthe UDF was left with little choice but to call the whole thing off.

Thefollowingday,2June,wecontinuedwithourtrainjourneytoLahorewherewe planned to address the publicat Gol Bagh thenext day. By the earlyhours of 3June the Punjab police had taken complete possessionof Gol Bagh and encircled it with barbed wire. As an added measure a mixture of police,FSF and hiredgoondashad been given thetaskofimpedinganyattemptmadebytheUDFleaderstoapproachthemeeting ground.We managedtoreachtheMallonlytofindthatbarriershadbeenerected acrosstheroadtopreventusfrommovingfurther.Anenormouscrowdofangry supporters blocked by the barriers appealed to us tocross the blockades and continue. Insteadwetookturnsbymakingshortemotionallychargedspeechesfromthecarroof. Thepolicetriedtopreventthisimpromptumeetingbyresortingtolathicharges,and teargassoondispersedthe crowd.Unhappilywewereleftwithlittle choicebutto abandon this meeting also.

A few days later I left for Islamabad by road. On 6 June I attended another meeting of theUDF.BynowIwasgettingslightlydisillusionedwiththiscoalitionofOpposition parties. Faced withavengeful governmentitmadesenseforus- tosinkourdifferences and unite as one, but to my mind it was proving to be an arduous task. It was not as if anyofthemajorcomponentpartiesofthe UDF,suchasNAP,JUP,JUIorJamaat-i- Islami,werethecauseofmydissatisfaction.Rather,mysourceofdiscontentment stemmedfromtheminorplayerswhonowwishedtoassertthemselvesonthecentre stage of the Opposition movement. While the senior leaders of UDF such as Wali Khan, ProfessorGhafoorandothersplayedtheirrolesinalargelyaltruisticmanner,suchwas notthecasewithanumberofotherparticipants.Someoftheseparticipantsdidnot even representparties within the UDF and the majority of them had noteven managed togetelected.Thesepeopleoftenignoredthelargerproblemandinsteadthrivedon pettypolitickingandmanipulatingsituationstotheiradvantage,HassanMahmoodwastryingtousehisstatusasbrother-in-lawtoPirPagarotoestablishhimselfasa 'kingpin'ofsorts.TherewereotherssuchasNawabzadaNasrullah,MalikQasim,

Abdul Sattar Niazi, all with personal agendas of their own. Unfortunately even Zahoor Ellahi,whowassuspectedofusinghisfinancialcloutwithPirPagaro,triedtodominate eachmeetingbyspeakingasloudlyaspossible,IntimeIbecameawarethatmy associates in the NAP, Jamaat-i-Islami, JUP and JUI held views similar to my own, but for the sake of unity we determinedly slogged along.

Inearly June I receivedamessage fromBhuttorequesting me tomeetwithhimto discusstheBalochistanissue.On8JuneI calledonhimatthepresidency. Duringour discussionsBhuttomadeitclearthathewasgettingfedupwithAkbarBugti's bullheadedness and refusal to follow dictates. He gave the appearance of sounding me outforideastoassisthiminresolvingtheBalochistandilemma.Bhuttoinformedme thatMengaltribesmenwerecuttingtelephonewiresandwerenowengagingin subversive activities.Soonhe wouldhave toask the army toadoptsterner measuresto dealwiththem.Thenoutofthe bluehesuggestedthatas'wehavebeenfriendsandthe factthatyouareonveryclosetermswiththeBalochNAPleaders'perhapsIshould consider'shoulderingtheresponsibility'oftheBalochistangovernorship.Itappeared thatthefactthatonlyafewdaysearlierIhadsupposedlybeenonhis'hit'listnever seemed to have entered his mind.

I found myself placed in an awkward position of refusing Bhutto's offer for the second time.WhileIfeltgiventhestateofaffairsinBalochistan,myinterventionmightassistin resolvingthedispute,atthesametimeIwascertainthatmyacceptanceofthe governorshipwouldbeseenasbetrayalbymycolleaguesinBalochistan.InsteadI suggestedthatheseekarapprochementwiththeBalochleadersof NAP.Surprisingly Bhutto now revealed his growing state of despondency. He said, 'Who should I talk to?' HethenpointedoutthatAttaullahMengalopenlyused'thefilthiestoflanguage'against him, adding that it was not just directed at him, 'but also on my office,as after allIamthePresidentofPakistan'.ThenhecriticizedKhairBukshMarri.TheMarri sirdar, he said, 'is so arrogant that when I talk to him he turns his face away. I find his behavior intolerable',Bhuttokept hisworst venomfor hislast target. Hebeganventing his spleen againsthis own appointed governor of Balochistan. In an emotional voice he lashedoutatAkbarBugtiandcalledhim'anegomaniac'and'aschizophrenic'.Inoticed he made no mention of Ghous Buksh Bizenjo.

Bhutto could hardly blame the Baloch leadership for opposing him. He had created the Balochistan tragedy by his own overwhelming egomania. I had little regret for refusing the governorship as holding high offices has never meant much to me, besides I placed immeasurablevalueonretainingtherespectandtrustoffriends.Ineverletontomy NAP colleagues about the offer, but many years later I was to discover that Bhutto had alreadydiscussedmynameasapossiblegovernorwithNAPandtheBalochleaders had happily given it their blessing, before hemade the offer to me. Bhutto would never have considered telling me that the NAP was involved in the offer as he always wished tobeseenastheultimatedispenserof'gifts'.IfIhadknownIwouldhavemost

probably accepted his offer and maybe - and just maybe - the prolonged misery and sufferingexperiencedinBalochistanmighthavebeenavoided.TheonlypersonI confidedthefullfactsofmymeetingwithBhuttowasProfessorGhafoorAhmed,whomIhavealwaysfoundtobeamanpossessedwithdistinctqualitiesofhonesty, trust and decency.

The next day I called on Bizenjo and told him about Bhutto's views on Balochistan and histhreattodealharshlywithrecalcitrantMengaltribesmen.Bizenjoappearedvery despairing. He confided in me that he had been trying his utmost to bring about some sortofresolutiontothepoliticalcrisis in Balochistan.All his efforts, hesaid, had been rendereduselessbytheintractableattitudeadoptedbyAttaullahMengalandKhair BukshMarri.Bizenjoblameditonwhathereferredtoastheir'sirdari'mentality,which dictatedthatonecouldonlynegotiatefromapositionofstrength.Negotiatingfroma positionofweakness,Bizenjomaintained,wasperceivedbythemtobeanexercisein humiliationandhadtobe avoidedatallcosts,evenwhenfacedwithatragedyof immenseproportions.BhuttohadcontinuedtomaintaincontactwithBizenjo.Asan accomplishedpoliticianBizenjoalwayspreferrednegotiationtoconfrontation.He believedthat'adoor'foracompromiseshouldalwaysbeleftopen.Someyearslaterhis morefunctionalapproachtopoliticswouldalienatehimfrommostofhisunyielding colleagues, but that was to take place in the future.

***

Over the weeks and months members of the UDF had I vociferously berated the government at every opportunity for its policy in Balochistan. Finally, to pacify the Opposition the government finally allowed a resolution to be passed in the National Assemblycallingfora'FactFindingMission'tobesenttotheprovince.Thenine- memberteamconsistedofMinisterofLaw,HafizPirzada,asleader,GhousBuksh Bizenjo,ProfessorGhafoor,myselfandfivestalwartsoftherulingparty.399Theteam was given the responsibility of visiting Balochistan and reporting its findings to theNationalAssemblywithinatwo-weekperiod.On15JunewewereflowntoQuettaon anair forceC130andputup atLourdesHotel.

LaterthatdaywewereflowntoSibiandfromthereweweretakenbyhelicopterto Maiwandin the Marriarea. As weweredisembarkingfrom the helicopter wewere met with an organized crowd of about ten youngsters, all of whom were shouting slogans. I hadanticipated'Bhuttozindabadbut'14thPunjabRegimentzindabad'400cameasabitof asurprise.Iftheplightofthelocalsnowunderstrictmilitarycontrolhadnotbeenso pitiableImightwellhavebeenamused.ThereceptionatMaiwandhadbeenwell organized.AsHafiz Pirzadaalightedfromthehelicopter the provincialPublicRelations

399Thefive PPPMNAswereHanifKhan(deputyspeaker),Choudhry MuhammadAsiam,ChoudhryJehangirAli, Chaudhry Abdul Wahid an Niamatullah Shinwari.

400Itcouldhavebeen12thPunjabRegiment,mymemoryisunclear.

Officerpromptlytiedaturbanonhishead.Ironically,thePRO,aswellastheturban, hadflownwithusallthewayfromQuettaespeciallyfortheoccasion.Theofficially nominatedspokesmanayoung schoolteacher,hadalsobeenwelldrilled.Atsomeone's promptinghepointedatBizenjoandmyselfandaskedthedelegation'Whyhaveyou broughttheseanti-Pakistantraitorswithyou?'Infuriatedwiththisimpudenceboth BizenjoandI walked outofthegathering. Weonly returnedafterhe apologizedtous on Pirzada's instructions.

The PPP government had given much publicity to its development and aid work in the Marri area. Prior to ourdelegation's arrivalfood and cloth hadbeen distributedamong the people of Maiwand. The army had forcibly encircled all routes leading to the Marri areaandblockadedallsuppliesfromentering.Therehadbeenachronicshortageof foodandbasicessentialsasaconsequenceofthisaction.Inoticedthatallthetribal people,whohadbeenforceddownfromthehillsbynearstarvation,wereintattered clothes.Despitethehastyprovisionofclothpriortoourarrival,noclothingcouldbe stitchedduetotheabsenceofsewingmachines.Aftertalkingtosomeofthelocal peopleIdiscoveredthatthemuch-publicizedroadbuildingexerciseintheareawasa sham.UndertheMengalministryrepairworkhadalreadycommencedonthe dilapidatedroadsbuiltoriginallybytheBritishandthenneglectedforaquarterofa century.Withthesudden influxof thearmy theworkershadfled. Nowthearmyhad taken up the task under a barrage of official publicity.

OnourreturntoQuettathateveningIreceived atelephonecall fromAkbarinvitingme over for tea, followed by dinner with Bhutto, who was staying with him as his guest. I wasgreetedbybothofthemandtakentotheterraceoverlookingthegarden,whereWe satdownonchairslaidoutforus.Bhuttoproceededtoaskmeaboutourtripto Maiwand. I candidly expressed my dissatisfaction at the manner in which our visit had beenorganized.Bhuttonoddedsympatheticallyandsaidhewouldlookintoit.His attitudewasoneofextremefriendliness.Heenquiredaboutmyfamilyinamanner commonamongfriends.Whileweweretalkingwecouldhearthedinofchildren playingonthelawnin frontofus.It wasAkbar'ssonSallal, stillonlyachild,playing with a group of children. Irritatedby thenoise Bhuttoturned around toAkbar and said 'Isn'tthatalotofnoise?'ToBhutto'ssurpriseAkbarsnappedback,'Heisachildand having a goodtime.Why should I stophim? If you are allergic to noise let'sgo inside and sit in the drawing room'. Then in a defiant mood, Akbar who was sitting between us, lifted his feet up and casually placed them on the coffee table in front of Bhutto and disdainfullylitalarge Havanacigar.Bhuttoinhisroleasheadofstatewasnolonger accustomed to people taking such liberties in decorum, but he was wary of Akbar and quietlybackedoff.Therestoftheeveningprogressedmorepleasantly.Bhuttowasonce moreasfriendly, charmingand affableashehad everbeenwithme. Atdinnerwewere servedatourowntable,awayfromBhutto'saccompanyingministersandotherVIPs. ThePPPleadercouldnot,attimes,resistlettinghisjuniorsknowwheretheystoodwith

him.Laterasamoviewasbeingshown,wewerejoinedbyHafizPirzada,Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Rafi Raza.

On 17 June at a meetingheldin my room, Attaullah Mengaland sixleading membersof theBalochistanprovincialassemblyjoinedus.401Infrontoftheparliamentary delegationtheseMPAspresenteda documentsignedbytwelveMPAs demanding the endofpresidentialruleandtherestorationoftheprovincialassembly.Inthedocument theseMPAshad alsoexpressed theirfull confidenceinAttaullahMengal'sleadership.It isworthnotingthatthesetwelveMPAsignatoriesrepresented60percentofthetotal provincialassemblymembershipoftwentyMPAs.TheMPAstoldthedelegatesthatthearmyhadimposedafoodblockade intheoutlyingareasoftheprovince,with particularseverityintheJhalawanandMarriterritories.Peoplelivingintheseareas were facing a dire shortage of basic foods such as grainand sugar - aswell askerosene andmedicalsupplies.ThateveningwewereinvitedtotheGovernor'sHouseforan addressbyAkbarBugti.AsweenteredtheresidenceInoticedGeneralTikkaKhan sitting ontheterrace.Akbargave usavery confidentexplanationoftheprovincial situation. He used charts and diagrams with great flourish - even I was impressed with thestyleofhisdelivery,thoughnotnecessarilywithitscontent.Heaskedmetostay back for aninformal chat, which Idid.Hewaslessformaland morefriendly than atour meeting the previousnight.Itseemedthatourrelationshipwasslowlyreverting to normal - despite our serious divergence of views.

The next scheduled visit for the delegation was Jhalawan on 21 June,so the delegation wasflown toKarachi. While IwasatKarachimy brother Mir Balakh Sherdropped in to seeme.HeinformedmethathehadameetingwithBhuttowhowasonceagain enragedbyme.AccordingtomybrotherBhuttohadjustreceivedareportfromhis intelligenceservicesthatIhadreferred tohimas'adictator far worsethaneither Ayub orYahya'.Icouldnotrecallhaving madesuchastatement,butnowitseemed Bhutto wasdeterminedtogetevenwithmeandhad instructedKhartoarrestmysonstoteach mealesson.Asmyyoungereighteenyear-oldsonSherAliwasinQuettawithhis maternaluncle Akbar,itwasprobable thatthe firsttargetwastobe my eldestson Sherazam,thennineteenyearsofage.Itoccurredtomethatitwasintheverynatureof themantoturnonhisfullcharmononedayandpurevenomonthenext.Iwarned Sherazam to take care and also contacted Sher Ali by telephone and asked him to take precautions.AfterspeakingtoSherAliIalsospoketohisuncle,AkbarBugti,and informed him of my outrage at Bhutto's behavior.

On 21 June I once more took part in the parliamentary delegation's tour of Balochistan, FromKarachiweleftforWadh,thecapitaloftheMengaltribe,byhelicopter.Onthe waywestoppedoveratLasBelawhereweweremetbyapre-arrangedcrowdofPPP

401TheotherMPAswereKhairBukshMarri,AhmedNawazBugti.AghaAbdulKarim, MaulviSalehMuhammad Shah, Dost Muhammad and Abdul Rehman (the latter three were from JUI).

supporters, all of whom were chanting slogans such as 'Bhuttozindabad', 'Bizenjomurdabad,'etc.WhenthehelicoptertookoffforWadh,theplotannouncedthatitwas 'too dusty' to land there and immediately headed back to Karachi. Neither Bizenjo nor I wereconvincedbythepilot'sassertion.Toourmindsthegovernmentwasdetermined nottoallowustovisitWadh.Notonlywouldithavebeenimpossibleforthe

government to arrange for willing PPP supporters to meet us at Wadh, but we hadexpected the reception there to be extremely hostile towards the PPP MNAs in the delegation. The Mengal area had also been recently subjected to a cold-blooded army blockade and regular harassment. The people there were also suffering from a direshortageoffoodandothernecessarysupplies.Confirmingourview,anewspaper report later stated that the PPP members of the delegation had made it plain to the authoritiesthat'theywerenotreadytorisktheirlives'byvisitingtheMengalarea.402

OnourreturntoKarachiProfessorGhafoorandIhadalengthymeetingwithHafiz Pirzada and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the army from Balochistan. Hafiz assured us that he had already spoken with his leader and that Bhutto was now keen to negotiateasettlementonanurgentbasis.We,inreturn,suggestedthatwewould arrangeforBizenjotobegiventheauthoritytodiscussthematterdirectlywithBhutto on behalf of the Opposition. We also agreed to temporarily call off the Balochistan fact- findingmissionandallowthediscussionstobeheld.ButwemadeitcleartoPirzada that in the event the two sides failed to reach a settlement, then the parliamentary tour wouldhavetoberecommencedandafinalreportonBalochistanwouldhavetobe handedovertotheNationalAssembly,allaccordingtothetermsofourearlieragreement.

Bhutto's sudden change of heart on the Balochistan crisis had been clearly caused by his growingfrustrationwiththefailureofhisBalochistanpolicy.TheinabilityofAkbar Bugtitocobbletogetheramajoritygovernmentintheprovincewasaglaringreminder ofBhutto'slackofsuccess.Ontopofthisfailure,majorriftshadappearedwithinthe ranks of the government supporters. Governor Bugti's political faction called the Baloch WarnahadopenlyclashedwithDodaKhanZarakzai'sMuslimLeague(Qayumgroup). At Quetta Airport as a crowd had gathered to welcome Bhutto in Balochistan the Baloch Warna had attacked Nabi Buksh Zehri's car and chanted anti-Qayum League slogans.DuringBhutto'stourofBalochistaninthemiddleofJune,despiteamassiveofficial effortto'organize'Bhutto'spublicmeetingsintheprovince,expressionsofpublic hostilitywerehardtosuppress.AtNaalBhuttowasreceivedwithahostofblackflags and anti-government slogans. At Khuzdar pistol shots were fired while Bhutto was speaking. To make matters worse, during this period two major clashes had also taken place between the army and Baloch tribesmen at Baran Lak and Jhal Jao in which the federalforceshadsufferedlargelossesintermsoflivesandequipment.

402FrontierGuardian,30June1973,p.2.

With the opportunity of new negotiations on Balochistan the extent of the government's hostilitytowardsmesuddenlydropped.OnmyreturntoIslamabadthenextday,out of the blue I learnt from my brother that he had just been asked to meet the president's military secretary to be questioned for allegedly 'misreporting' the details of his conversationwithBhuttotome.AtmomentssuchastheseI,notsurprisingly, wonderedifBhuttohadasinglehonestboneinhisbody.

By 24JuneBizenjohad begunhismeeting withBhutto. Bizenjokeptinclosetouchwith meandon27JuneIhappilynotedinmydiary'metGhousiwhoseemsveryhopeful with his talks with the president'. With the arrival of the NAP leaders to Islamabad on 28JunetomeetwithBhuttothechancesofasettlementwerelookinggood.403Imet them in Islamabad before they left to meet with the president at Murree. Later they all joined me at Nathiagali for discussions at 'The Retreat', a rest-house,where I had been staying.Therewasacloudofdisappointmentoverdinner.Bhuttohadpromiseda returntomajorityruleinBalochistanbutonlyafter14August1973-adate overa monthandahalfaway.Untilthen,onBhutto'sinsistence,thestatusquowastobe maintained.MostoftheNAPleadersexpressedlittlefaithinBhutto'sassurances. Attaullah, who had the least confidence in Bhutto, referred to him as 'a liar' who would renegeonhiscommitment atthevery firstopportunity. Thenextevening I metBhutto, alongwithotherparliamentaryleaders,atanofficialmeetingatMurreetodiscuss nationalaffairsandtherecognitionofBangladesh.Afterthemeetingheinvitedmein for a private session with him. I took this opportunity to impress upon him the urgent need for a satisfactory settlement in Balochistan. He assured me that he was willing to dohisbest.Atthesametimeheconveyedhisregretatmyrefusaltoaccompanyhimon hisstatevisittotheUSA^404andreassuredmeofhisfriendshipandgoodwishes, insistingthatmybrotherMirBalakhSherhad'misrepresented'whathehadtoldhim duringtheirmeeting.On1July, Iwasagain invitedby Bhuttotomeethimathisrest house in Murree. He was once more full of charm and geniality. I tried to convince him tomakeatleastonepositivegesturetowardsBalochistanbeforehedeparted for USA. I told himthatitwasessential thatasemblanceoftrustberesurrected betweenhimand theNAPleadershipbuthebecamequiteevasiveandtomydisappointmentbeganto prevaricate each time I attempted to raise the issue. All hewas doing, as it later turned out,wastoprocrastinateeventsuntilthenewconstitutiontookeffecton14August1973.

403The NAP leaders consisted of Wali Khan, Arbab Sikandar, Attaulla Mengal, Khair Buksh Marri and Bizenjo (who was already present at Islamabad).

404I had been invited by Bhutto to accompany him on hisstatevisit to US. Later Iwasto discover thatit wasin fact the US State Department that had asked Bhutto to bring me with him as a representative of the Opposition. Between the Moscow-supporting NAP and the right-wing religious parties my more moderate position probably made me more appealing to the US. I declined Bhutto's invitation because of his intransigence on the Balochistanissue.

TheideaofmaintainingstatusquoinBalochistancouldhardlyhaveappealedtothe NAPleaders.ForafullfivemonthstheNAP-JUIOppositionpartieshadwaitedpatientlyforaprovincialassemblymeetingtotakeplace.Inreturnalltheygotwas intimidatoryattemptstobreaktheirunity.Bhuttowasdesperatelytryingthroughthe servicesofAkbarBugtitoconverthissuper-imposedminoritygovernmentofJam GhulamQadirof LasBela intoa'majority'one.Atthesametimenoonecouldignore thepresenceofoversixtythousandtroopsactivelyengagedintheprovince.Thearmy's callousstrategyofdeprivingPakistanitribesmenandtheirfamiliesoffoodsupplies washardlythewaytowinthemover.Alargenumberofthehardiermensenttheir women,oldfolkandchildrentosettledareastofindfoodandshelterwhilethey themselvesstubbornlytooktothehillswiththeirriflesandshotguns.Bymid-July Attaullah Mengal, without bothering to mince his words, boldly stated the obvious at a pressconferenceheldatKarachiatwhichProfessorGhafoorandIwerepresent.TheDawnreported:

Mr. Mengal told a questioner forthrightly that the fight for democracy inBaluchistanhadnowbeenshiftedfromtheflooroftheHousetothe'mountains ofthe interior'...He said that both the Federalandthe ProvincialGovernments have, through consistent pressure tactics, intimidatory methods and repressive measures, pushed the people of Baluchistan 'to the wall' and forced them tostruggle for their very existence.405

At the end of July the UDF held a convention at Lahore. Duringits second session on 30 Julyaheateddebatetookplaceoverthedecisiontolaunchanation-widecivil disobedience. TheJamaat-i-Islami unfortunately proved tobehesitantontheissue, but toourgoodfortuneonapointofdisagreementtheAhrarpartydecidedtoleavethe UDFonceandforall.LateranothermeetingwasheldinMuftiMahmood'sroom.Atthis meeting Wali Khan was officially elected as the leader of the Opposition, Maulana Nooraniasthesecretary-generalandIwasassignedthetaskofchiefwhipforthe OppositionintheNationalAssembly.Itwasfinallyagreedthatthecivildisobedience movement would be launched on 24 August.

On7AugustaneventtookplaceatMali,avillageinBalochistan,whichwouldsoon become partofBalochfolklore.I came toknowaboutitthe very nextdaythrough Attaullah Mengal. The tragic incident was later vividly described by a foreign author:

Seeking toavenge anambushinwhich[the army] had suffered heavy casualties, an army unit stormed into the village of Mali. The soldiers set up an improvised fortressinonecornerofthevillageandthenbegantoransackhutsonebyonein searchofconcealedweapons.Menandwomenalikewereroughlylinedupinthevillagesquare.Shooroutsoccurredwiththosewhoresisted.Someofthe

405Dawn,Karachi,18July1973.

older.villagerswerebeginningtosurrenderwhenseventy-two-yearoldMir LuangKhan,elderbrotheroftheBaluchpoetandpoliticalleaderGulKhan Nasir,hobbledoutofhishutoncrutchestothecenterofthesquare.Shouting thathewoulddiebeforepermittingthetroopstoviolateBaluchhonorby intruding on the female members of his family, he picked up his outmoded muzzleloaderandstartedtofireatthesoldiersintheirfortifiedhuts.Soonmost oftheable-bodiedmeninthevillagehadjoinedhiminhand-to-handfighting that lasted for four hours. Army sources concede that reinforcements had to be calledinbeforethevillagecouldbesubduedbutdenyBalucheyewitness accountsclaimingthatfourteensoldierswerekilledbeforeLuangKhanwasshot in the head while hiding with his followers in the village mosque. The Baluchbitterlyacknowledgethatthirty-fiveMalivillagerswerekilledby[army] machinegunandartilleryfire,manyofthemwomenandchildren...406

Onlyfourdayslater,on11August,IwasinformedthatAliMuhammadMengal,the leaderoftheJhalawananti-Ayubguerrillamovementofthe1960s,waskilledbythe troops of the Pakistan armed forces.

Theyearsofbitterness,miseryandrageamongthetribesinBalochistanhadbegun.A year later the events in the Marri area of Chamalang valley in September 1974 would eventuallyeclipseallthathadprecededit.Asalways,itwasthepoorordinary tribesmen who would suffer immensely. They followed an age-old instinct. When facedwith the threat of anoverwhelming marauding force - whether it be the Mughals,theSikhs, the British or the Pakistan army - this instinct called for a retreat to the steep redoubtsfromwhere theycouldrallytodefendthemselves.Islamabadandthearmy calledthem'insurgents','rebels'and"traitors',buttothesesimpletribesmenallthat they were doing was protecting their homes, families, and honoring their concept ofloyalty to their tribe and their sirdar. And, in the meantime the Pakistan army was once more busily engaged in killing its own civilians - its senior generals had learnt nothingfromtheirdisastrousattempttosubjugatetheBengalisofPakistan.However,thistime the numbers were on their side. In reality there were only a few thousand poorly armed Baloch tribesmen facing the full might of a modern and well-equipped army servilely followingthewishesofanoverambitiousZulfikarAliBhutto.

WhilepartsofBalochistanwerereelingunderaferociousarmedonslaughtin Islamabad it was politics as usual. On 10 August the feeble Choudhry Fazal Ellahi was nominated as the future president.407Two days later Bhutto was nominated as prime minister,winning109votesintheHouse,against MaulanaNoorani's28votes.Muchto our disgust three JUI MNAs - Hazarvi, Abdul Hakim and Abdul Haq - deserted the OppositionbenchesandsupportedBhutto.Laterintheafternoonanumberofusmetin

406SeligS.Harrison,InAfghanistan'sShadow,op.cit.,pp.36-37.

407Fazal Ellahi received 139 votes in the National Assembly. His rival, Opposition candidate, Amirzada Khan, got 45votes.

MuftiMahmood'sroom anddecidedto boycott theplannedswearing-in ceremonies for the president and prime minister due on 14 August unless our demands were fulfilled. AwarethatBhuttowasnotgoingtoconcedetoanyofourdemandsIreturnedto Karachiwhereon14AugustIwatchedtheswearing-inceremoniesontelevision. Bhutto'sspeech,as Inotedin mydiary,'seemed,as usual,so reasonable'.Accordingto him, it was the Opposition which was to be blamed for its unreasonable obstinacy incoming to terms with his majority government. During his speech he hinted that his patience was running out.

The results of Bhutto's impatience became apparent the following day. On 15 August awave of arrests took place. Among the detained was the senior hierarchy of theBalochistanNAPleadership-thetriumvirateofAttaullahMengal,KhairBukshMarri andGhousBukshBizenjo.Morearrestswereexpected.SoonIreceivedacallfrom Quetta informing me that the provincial government had also issued arrest warrants for Ahmed Nawaz Bugti and me.408I did the only thing I could do in such circumstances. I packedasmallbagcontainingessentialtoiletriesandasparesetofclothesandcarried onwithmyusualactivities.ThatafternoonIreceivedatelephonecallfromAhmed Nawazwhotoldmethat,likeme.hewaswaitingtobearrested.

ThefollowingdayIissuedablisteringattackonBhuttoandhisgovernmentfor arresting the Baloch leadership. Even though the NAP arrests was the major news story throughout the country, my statement managed to make an appearance in only two newspapers -HurriyatandJasarat.409Unhappily, most of the other newspapers were, by now, too cowed down to risk the wrath of Bhutto. On 18 August Ahmed Nawaz Bugti arrivedinKarachiandthefollowingdaywebothleftforLahoretoattendameetingof the UDF action committee.At the time serious flooding hadtaken place in Lahore andotherpartsofPunjab,includingmyhomedistrictofDeraGhaziKhan.On20August aftervisitinganumberofthefloodeffectedpartsofLahore,weheldameetinginwhich it was decidedto proceed withthecivil disobediencemovement.At onestagenot everyone had agreed to participate in the movement. The Jamaat-i-Islami, who wished insteadtotakepartinorganizingfloodreliefwork,wereangrilycondemnedby MaulanaNooraniwhoaccusedthemofcowardiceandbetrayalofourcommoncause.Anumberofpeoplewereassignedthetaskofleadingtheprotestmovementinthe variousprovinces.WaliKhan, ArbabSikandarand MuftiMahmoodwerenominated to leadthecampaignintheNWFP,NasrullahKhanandZahoorEllahiinthePunjab, GhafoorAhmedandNooraniinSindhandKarachi,andIwasassignedtheleadership of the movement in Balochistan.

On 22 August, after much trouble and inconvenience Ahmed Nawaz and I managed toboardaPIAflightleavingLahoreforQuetta.Instructionshadbeenissuedtopreventus

408Anumberofnewspaperspublishedsimilarreportsaboutmyimpendingarreston17August1973.

409Publishedinthesetwonewspaperson17August1973.

from reaching Quetta. The authorities at Quetta were already on the alert. We were recognizedonarrivalandalargepolicecontingentridingonanumberoftrucks, followedus from the airport.I stoppedoff at Attaullah Mengal's house where I had plannedtostay,whileAhmedNawazcontinuedonwardstohisbrother-in-law,Mir Hasan Bugti's house. Soon after my arrival at Mengal House I received a telephone callfromtheprovincialhomesecretaryaskingmetopresentmyselfathisoffice. Controllingmytemper1didallbuttellhim'togetlost'.Iinformedhimthatifhe wished to detain me, then he'd better send the police with a lawful warrant of arrest to MengalHouse.LaterIwastolearnthatatthisstageAkbarBugtisteppedin.According tothereportIreceived,AkbarhaddecidedthatasIwasa'guest'inhisprovince,it wouldbecontrarytoBalochtraditiontohavemearrested.Tomymind,Ihadcome with an assigned task of leading a civil disobedience campaign against a federalgovernmentrepresentedintheprovincebymyfriendAkbar,andwasnoone's'guest'.

Akbar seemed convinced that I would not be very effective in Quetta in the absence of AhmedNawaz.Unbeknowntome,hehadhisbrotherarrestedthatverynight.The policepickedAhmedNawazfromhisbrother-in-law'splaceandtookhimtothe airport,wherehewasmadetowaitanhour,forhisnephewSalim'sarrival.Hewas then placed in Salim's custody and flown by helicopter to Dera Bugti. At the Bugti tribal headquarters he was confined in his brother's house. His solitary room was guardedaroundtheclockbyateamofBugtitribesmenloyaltohis brother.

Early in the morning of 23 August, when I learnt about Ahmed Nawaz's arrest, I held a press conference condemning it and, rather than let it dampen my spirits, immediately involvedmyselfinorganizingtheprotestmovement.AtagatheringofBalochistan's UDFmembers,thenextday,Iwasdisappointedtolearnthatmostofthemwerenot very keen to join a protest movement and instead wished to seek a settlement with the government.Iralliedthe NAPandJUImembers-whotomymindwere theonly effectivepoliticalforceintheprovinceandaftermuchpersuasion,theyreluctantly agreed to abideby any instructions received from UDF's central action committee.

On25August,indefianceofthegovernment'simpositionofSection144,410Iledagood crowdofUDFsupporterstoQuetta'sMazaanChowk.Despitehesitationonpartofa large number of UDF members and efforts by the police todiscourage participation, it provedtobeagoodstarttoourcampaign.InthemeantimeAghaKarim-whohadbeendelegatedthetaskofconvincing AkbarBugtitodesistfromusing violenceto suppressthemovement-returnedwiththeinformationthatAkbarwasfuriouswith me.The next day I read out a copy of the UDF resolution - which I had just received - authorizingmetoleadtheprotestmovementinBalochistan.AfterthemeetingIled anotherprocessiontoMazaanChowk.OnthisoccasionIwasaccompaniedbyallthe leadingmembersofbothNAPandJUIwhoremainedatliberty,eventhelocalamirof

410Restrictingtheassemblyofmorethanfourpeopleinapublicplaceforceoflaw.

Jamaat-i-Islamijoinedin.Theseprotestssoonbecameadailyfeaturemuchtothe annoyance of the local government.

Ononeoccasioneventheladiesjoined ina first-everwomen'smarchinthehistoryof Balochistan. The ladies were led by Jennifer Musa MNA and widow of Kazi Musa. who wasaccompaniedbythewifeanddaughtersofKhairBukshMarri.thedaughtersofGul Khan Naseer and Colonel Sultan Muhammad Mengal. Even the Mazari family was representedby my cousinSaif-ur-RehmanKhan'swife,whohappenedtobe ahalf- sister of the Marri sirdar.

These valiant ladies marched up to the official Governor's House to hand a petition toAkbar Bugti, requesting him in honour of the people of Balochistan to resign his office forthwith. Probably aware of the ladies' demands Akbar had the gates of the buildingclosedandrefusedpoint-blanktomeet withanyofthem.

InthemeantimeAkbaraudaciouslydeniedeverhavingarrestedhisbrother.A statementissuedattheGovernor'sHouse,attemptingtorefutethedamningevidenceof Ahmed Nawaz's detention stated:

Thisistotallyfalse.AsamatteroffactMrAhmedNawazBugtiisinhis hometownforthedualpurposeoflookingafterhispropertyandhishealth whichhasrecently deteriorated tosomeextent.If anyoneis solicitousabouthis welfare he can communicate with him or visit him in his hometown.411

Thefollowing dayamemberofAkbar'sownfamily informedmethatAhmedNawaz had briefly managed to flee custody and escape on horseback. He was later caught and tied with ropesbeforebeing placed backin the confinement of the solitaryroom.

Theweekofdailyprotestprocessionshadbecomerathergruelingforme.On26August Icaughtthefluanddespiteatemperaturethatremainedextremelyhigh,persistedwith theprotests.OneveryoccasionatreachingMazaanChowkfieryspeecheswouldbe given against Bhutto and Akbar, and, on the odd occasion, against the ineffectual chief minister, Ghulam Qadir of Las Bela. There was much fury among the NAP supporters whowereconvincedthatAkbarBugtihadbetrayedtheBalochcausethathehad himself forsolongespoused.Theytookeveryopportunitytopubliclycondemnhimfor it.SittingintheGovernor'sHouseandreceivingdailyintelligencereports,Akbarwas hardlypleased with the criticism publiclybeing heaped upon him, andwith myleading role init. On 31August he addressed apressconference attacking me for interfering in Balochistan affairs.

411Dawn,31August1973.

Thepublicdemonstrationsculminatedinalargepublicmeetingonthelastdayof August.ThismeetingwasalsoattendedbyotherleadersoftheUDF,includingWali Khan and Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, who had flown in to Quetta for the day. The next day I left for Karachi, along with Wali Khan and Ghafoor Ahmed, to file a writ ofhabeas corpuson Ahmed Nawaz's behalf. The following day at a meeting held at my house at KarachiwedecidedtoboycottboththeNationalAssemblyandtheSenateuntilthe politicalsituationimproved.Anumberofthosepresent-notablyWaliKhanand ProfessorGhafoor-expressedtheirdisappointmentwiththeheadoftheUDF,Pir Pagaro. Itwas felt that hewas not takingsufficient interest inour protest movement.

On 4 September I was able to file the writ ofhabeas corpusin the High Court calling for Ahmed Nawaz Bugti to be produced. The next day I received a telephone call from Mir Hasan Bugti - Ahmed Nawaz's brother-in-law - telling me that Ahmed Nawaz has been onahunger strikeinDeraBugtifor anumberof days.Later oneof mydrivers,whohad justreturnedfromSonmiani,toldmeinastateofagitationthattruckloadsofarmed policehadbeenmaraudingmyhomeareaarrestingandterrorizingthelocals.Ifelt quite helpless as there was nothing I could do to protectmy people from Bhutto's and Khar'sintimidation. These harassmentsfurther strengthened my resolve and made me more determined to continue with what I was doing.

On8"SeptemberasIwasattendingtheHighCourtpursuingmywritforAhmedNawaz,IcameacrossDr.AbdulHai,theNAPMNAfromBalochistan,beingescorted inhandcuffsbythepolice.Itdeeplyupsetmetoseehiminsuchacondition.He informedme thathehad applied totheHighCourttobetransferredtoan'A'classto which he was entitled as an elected MNA. I learnt that at thetime of his arrest hehad notbeenallowedtobringanythingwithhimapartfromtheclothesthathewas wearing. I made a listof things that he needed and later had them senttohim. Over the following daysI madesure toattendhisapplicationwhichwasbeing heardbefore Justices Abdul Qadir Sheikh and Khuda Buksh Marri. While the police were ordered to removethehandcuffs,theywerereluctanttotakethepersonalriskofupgradinghimto an 'A' class cell and accordingly, dismissed his application.

On9SeptemberAhmedNawazwasfinally releasedfromhisincarcerationatDera Bugti. He arrived by train at Karachi the very next day. Ahmed Nawaz had lost a great dealofweightasaresultofhishungerstrikeandappearedphysicallyquiteweak.Later intheafternoonheheld apressconferenceatmyhousegivingadetailed descriptionof theimprisonmenthehadsufferedinaprivatejailatthehandsofhisownbrother.It appearedthatmy HighCourtwritcombinedwithhishungerstrike hadforcedhis suddenandunexpectedrelease.Akbar'srejoinderwasnotlateincoming.HissonSalim issued a ludicrously absurd press statement that both Ahmed Nawaz and I had wished toavoidparticipatingintheBalochistancivildisobedientmovement.Accordingto Salim'smendacioustale,whileAkbarhadacquiescedtohisbrother'srequestthat'a helicopter...bearranged...totake himtoDeraBugti',hehadturneddownmyrequest'to

be sent to Rojhan'.412The statement was so puerile and ridiculous that I did not deem it worthy of a reply.

Bymid-SeptemberBhuttohadoncemoreadoptedaconciliatoryguise.Attaullah Mengal and Khair Buksh were flown to Rawalpindi and were placed with Ghous Buksh BizenjointheSihalarest-house,whichhadbeendeclared asub-jail.Emissaries^413were senttomeetwiththembybothBhuttoandAkbarBugtiwhohadbeencalledbythe primeministertoIslamabadforspecialdiscussionson13September.TheBalochistan Governor publiclyexpressedhis optimism that 'some understanding would bereached withtheNAPleaderstothesatisfactionofallconcerned'.414ButtheBalochleaders provedmorerigid.AhmedNawazBugti,whohadalsovisitedthethreemenatthe Sihalarest-house,toldmeonthetelephonethatthethreeNAPleadershadflatly refusedtoholdanytalkswith Bhuttountilandunlessheimplementedtheagreement reachedbetweenthematMurreeon28June1973,i.e.,Bhutto'spromiseofareturnto majorityruleinBalochistanafter14August1973.Inthemeantime,thejailed triumviratehadstated.ifthegovernmentwasinthemoodfordiscussionsthentheUDF was always available to them.

On 17 September a meeting of the UDF action committee, of which I was anexecutive member,washeldatLahore.Iwasnotinvitedandonlycametolearnaboutitafter readinganewspaperreport.Angeredby thistactlessgesture I consideredresigning from the UDF. I held an urgent meeting with other members of the independent group todiscussmy intentionsbuttheyalladvisedme againstit.AfewdayslaterI was informedthattheUDFhaddecidedtowithdrawfromtheprotestmovementonPir Pagaro'sinstructions.Inowunderstoodwhymyabsencefromthemeetingwasdeemed to be necessary.

Despitethegovernment'sattemptatdownplayingthearmedstruggletakingplacein Balochistanthesituationhadnotimproved.Ireceivedreportsofmanyencounters betweenthearmyandarmedBalochtribesmen.Takingadvantageoftheruggedterrain thetribesmenhadbecomeadeptatambushingunsuspectingsoldiers.Inonesuch incident,which took place on 27August, aband of Marris attackedan armypicket near Kohlu and killed a large number of soldiers and carried away their stored ammunition. Even the army later admitted to losing twenty of its soldiers, but the actual figure was suspectedtobemuchhigher.Suchincidentswerebecomingincreasinglycommon. Greatlyoutnumbered,thetribesmenhadbeenforcedtoadoptguerrillatacticsof sudden attacks and quick disappearances. Over a period of four monthsthe army had begun to suffer a large number of fatalities.

412Dawn,13September1973.

413Bhutto'semissarywasFazilaAliani,whileAkbarBugtisenthisownsupporterAminKhosa.

414Star,14September1973.

AhmedNawazBugti,whowastheactingleaderoftheBalochistanprovincial Oppositionwasstilltryingtofindawayoutofthecrisis.On30Octoberheinformed me that he had phoned Bhutto in the hope of meeting with him, but Bhutto had refused, insistingthathewouldonlymeetwithAttaullahMengalandKhairBukshMarri.These two jailed leaders still obdurately refused to meet Bhutto until he honored the pledgemadetothem.WhenfinallyBhuttodidagreetomeetwithAhmedNawaz,itseemsall he did was to criticize Akbar Bugti.415I later learnt from Ahmed Nawaz that, during the meeting,Bhuttohadalsoexpressedhisunhappinesswithme.Bhutto,asitturnedout, wasnotasmuchupsetwithmeformyanti-governmentactivity,ashewasbymy votingforNoorani,insteadofhim,duringtheprimeministerialelectionsheldinthe House in August. Bhutto said that as he still considered me to be a friend, I had let himdownbadlybyvotingfora'beard'insteadofhim.ByOctober1973opendifferences hadarisenbetweenBalochistan'sGovernorandChiefMinisterovertheinductionof AbdusSamadAchakzaiasaprovincialCabinetminister.Achakzaiwasdesperatelykeen to join the Cabinet and had been stirring up trouble in the provincial assembly to blackmailthegovernmentintoaccedingtohisdemand.Atthesametime,AkbarBugti was becoming increasingly unhappy with Bhutto. He regarded the NAP problem as an internal Baloch one. Akbar adamantly believed that all negotiations between the government and NAP were his personal responsibility and would brook no interference from Islamabad in the matter. Bhutto clearly disagreed with this view, much to Akbar's annoyance.InNovemberAkbargaveanangryspeechatthearmy'sStaffCollegeat Quetta, in which he severely berated the federal government for purposely creating divisionsbetweenBalochtribes.Thefederalauthoritiesorderedthatthepress conference be 'blacked out'. The next day there was no mention of the governor's conference in any newspaper in the country. That day Akbar learnt the limitations of his power, but it was all too late. Bhutto now wanted the Constitution to be applied in Balochistan. This meant that all executive power would now be vested in the chiefminister.FacedwithapowerlesssymbolicroleAkbarBugtisubmittedhisresignation to Bhutto on 31Octoberwhich he describedas simplya letterfrom 'afriendto afriend and not from a Governor to a Prime Minister',416Bhutto accepted the resignation on 11 November,butaskedAkbartocarryonasGovernoruntilasuitablereplacementcould befound.Akbarnowwishedtobecomethechiefminister,butnowthathehad achievedallthathadbeenexpectedofhim,Bhuttonolongerrequiredhisservices.

Acreatureofhabit,Bhuttocouldnotresisttakingadvantageofthechangedscenarioby settlinghispersonalscoreswithhisgovernor.InaninterviewhegavetoaEuropean televisionstationhe publicly spokeofAkbarBugtiinparticularly harshterms:'The presentGovernorissufferingfromschizophrenia.He'sfrightenednowbecausehe betrayed his old friends, 'Politics is a game of chess', said thePrim'e Minister, 'andMr Bugti played his chess badly'.417

415AhmedNawazhadphonedmewiththisinformationon11November1973.

416Dawn,12November1973.

417Thetelevisioninterviewwasquotedin:TheChristianScienceMonitor14December1973.

CHAPTER7

BhuttoattheHeightofhisPower

In his speeches Khan Abdul Wali Khan once referred to the PPP leader as Adolf Bhutto. WhileatthattimeWaliKhan'sreferencetotheNazileadermighthaveappeared ludicrous to many, subsequent disclosures would suggest that this allusion was notso wideofthemarkafterall.Inhismemoirs,RafiRaza,whowasacloseconfidanteof Bhutto,revealsthat:'[Bhutto]hadapenchantforcomparisonswithHitler:hewould urgeKausarNiaziasInformationMinistertooutdoJosephGoebbels,MumtazBhuttoin Sindh to be Heinrich Himmler, and [Rafi Raza] as Production Minister to be another Albert Speer.'418

RafiRazawasamemberofacommitteethatwassetupinJanuary1975toensurethat the members of the Federal Security Force (FSF) were given 'scientific and correct motivation'AccordingtoRaza,oneoftheothercommitteemembers-eitherYusufBuch or Kamal Azfar - proposed that all the FSF troopers be made to take a personal oath of loyaltytoBhuttoonthelinesoftheNaziSS.WhenRafiRazadisallowedthisproposal he admits to having earned Bhutto's displeasure.419

Bhutto'sfixationwithHitlerwasmanifestbyasimilarityincoincidences.Apartfrom usingthearmsdiscoveredat the IraqiEmbassyagainstthe Balochleaders,withoutany shredofevidence,inthemannerreminiscentofHitler'sReichstagfire,therewere numerous more subtle examples. ApingHitler, Bhutto chose to use a policy of systemic terrortobrutalizehisopponents.TheconcentrationcampatDalaiandtheFSF'storm troopers'wereclearlycreationsofBhutto'sHitler-fixatedmind.Buthisaspirationsto match the Nazi leader finally came apart when it came to dealing with his generals.

The Nazi Fuhrer and the PPP Chairman had one thing in common: they were both completelyamoralwhenitcametomisusingtheirpower.Bhuttoadoptedhisown brandofterrortoachievehisends.IntimehehadmanagedtosilencethePressand cow down a large number of his opponents. Edmund Burke, the eighteenth centurypolitical theorist, once said: 'It is necessary for the good man to do nothing for evil to triumph.' In the Opposition we were beginning to realize that the sheer dread of Bhuttowas causing a large number of people to avoid confrontation altogether. It is worthrecallingsomeofthehappeningswhichledtothecreationofthisclimateoffear.

418RafiRaza,ZulfikarAllBhuttoandPakistan1967-1977.op.cit.,p.3

419RafiRaza,ibid.,p. 308andfootnoteno. 54,p.315.

By1974fourpoliticalactivistswerevictimsofpoliticalassassinationduringthetwenty- ninemonthperiodbetweenJune1972andNovember1974.Thefifth,wasabotched attempt at killing a man Bhutto had grown to hate:Dr. Nazir Ahmed, Jarnaat-i-Islami, MNA - shot dead at his clinic at Dera Ghazi Khan on 8 June 1972; Khawaja Muhammad Rafiq,leaderofIttehadParty-shotdeadbyasniperduringananti-government demonstrationinLahoreon20December1972;AbdusSamadAchakzai,leaderofthe NAP Pakhtoonkhwa of Balochistankilled in his house in Quetta by a grenade attack on2December1973;Maulvi Shamsuddin,JUI MPA andDeputy Speakerof theBalochistan Assembly - shotinhiscar onhisway toFortSandemanon13 March1974; Muhammad Ahmed Kasuri, father of Ahmed Raza - killed mistakenly, during a bungled attempt to assassinatehisson,whowaspresentinthecaralongwithhim,inLahoreon10 November 1974.

Otherswerekilledaswell.On28SeptemberaseriousattemptwasmadeonWali Khan'slifeashewasdrivingtoSwat.BothhisdriverandguardwerekilledbutWali Khanluckilyemergedunscathed.ThisincidenthadlittleeffectontheNAPparty president.Heremained undauntedand continued steadfastlywithhisroteasLeader of the Opposition.

On 5 October 1973 Ali Buksh Junejo - a formerKhalifaof Pir Pagaro, who had joined the PPP,was murdered in Sanghar in broaddaylight. The next day six supporters ofPir Pagaro.whowereattendingacourthearingagainstthem,weretakenfromprisonby the police to a deserted location and murdered in coldblood. The man given the job of takingPirPagaro'smentotaskwasaformerPagaroloyalist,JamSadiqAH.JamSadiq wasgivencompleteadministrativechargeofSanghardistrict.420AfewweekslaterI wasinformedbyaSindhipoliticianthatthePir'hadbecomereallyscaredandfeared that he and his eldest son would soon be murdered by the PPP'.421Unfortunately the Pir wasnottheonlyone,anumberofOppositionpoliticianshadbeguncrossingoverto thePPPinfearoftheirlives.However,whilethePircontinuedtoofficiallyheadthe UDF, his heart was no longer in the job. In the absence of any direction, bit playersassumed a role beyond their political support or position and the unity within the UDF began to unravel.

Apart from the killings, during this period, thousands of people were detained from all over the country. As I have already mentioned, in just my home district of Dera Ghazi Khanalone-overahundredandfiftypeople-membersofmyfamily,staffand supporters-weredetainedonfictitiouscharges.Mostpeoplewerelaterreleasedonbail on my writ in the High Court, but others did not get off so leniently. There were those likeKaswarGardezi, Secretary-GeneraloftheNAP, whowere sadistically torturedby thepolicewhileindetention.InavoicebreakingwithemotionGardezilaterrelatedhis

420JamSadiqAliexercisedcontrolinSangharindependentlyofMumtazBhutto,thenchiefministerofSindh.

421ThisnewswasgiventomebyHajiMowlaBakshSoomro,on20November1973.

horrifyingexperiencetome.Thepolicepresentedhimwithanegg,apotatoandan onion,hesaid,andthenaskedwhichofthesewouldheprefertobeinsertedintohis anus.Afterundergoingthishumiliatingandbarbaricordeal,hewasthenthreatened withsodomy-buttohisgoodfortunethisthreatwasnevercarriedout.422Instead,he wasbadlybeatenwithastoutcane,afterwhichhewasforcedtolienakedonasolid slabofice.Gardeziwasoneofmanytosuffersuchviciousbrutalityontheinstructions of higher authority.

Apart from oppressing political opponents the regime had continued with its violent campaign against the Press. During this period the government generally used twomethods to control the independent news media - by arresting their staff and placing atwo-month ban on the newspaper. On some occasions these bans were made permanentby forcibly shutting down the newspaper.423There were times when violent methods wouldalsobeused,suchaswhenagangofmaskedmenransackedtheofficesofJangin Quetta in February 1972. On occasion the violence would be directly targeted at individuals. Such was the case when in September 1972 Khwaja Mana Rahman, of theDawnGroup,wasshotattheKarachiBoatClubbyhiredassassinswhomadetheir escape. Khwaja Rahman survived luckily, but the police did little to apprehend the criminals.424A fewmonths later an attempt was made to shoot at Mana Rahman'sdaughterwhileshewasdrivinghercar.425GiventhecircumstancesIwasdisappointed, but not surprised, when, in September 1973, Mana Rahman called on me to tell me that bothheandhisbrother-in-law.MahmoodHaroon,hadsoughtandreceivedforgivenessfromBhutto.Manasaidtomethattheyhaddonesobecausetheyhad 'lacked the courage to continue to oppose him'.426The people who stood firm against Bhutto'sautocracyweregettingsmallerinnumberandintimewouldshrinkevenfurther.

422Many other people were not quite as fortunate. I was reliably informed two politicians who were brutally sodomized bythe police whilein custody.One wasa seniormember of areligiousparty,the other onew a Muslim League Leader, who later joined the PPP. This depraved crime which was conceived at the highest of levels, was intended to humiliate the individual and break his spirit.

423TheseincludedJasarat(1973),Outlook(1974)andUrduDigest(1975).

424Many years later a case was registered against three people; Mumtaz Bhutto, who had been Chief Minister of Sindh at the time of the attack, Khanzada A. Waheed, a Karachi businessman (and maternal uncle of Farooq Leghari, later President of Pakistan) and Malik Ghulam Sarwar, one-time labour leader in the Karachi Shipyard.Even the former provincial Home Secretary of Sindh, Muhammad Khan Junejo would later state, 'Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto had one Khanzada as a constant companion who was feared by all and I was all the time afraid of him as I believed that he was a goonda kept for terrorizing anybody who opposed the wishes of Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, I believe Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto was responsible for throwing some explosives in the house of A. K. Brohi and for firing on Mr. Mana Rahman of Dawn through Mr. Khanzada'. The Government WhitePaper on Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Volume in, 1979.

425Theincidenttookplaceon26April 1973,theassailantsfiredather fataxi whichthendisappearedinthetraffic. The police, as usual, were unable to track them down.

426BhuttowouldappointMahmoodHarooriasthefirstPakistaniAmbatoBangladesh.

By now the majority ofthe Presshad been reduced to being mere mouthpiecesof the government.Bhuttousedthe controlledPresstoportrayhimselfasanexceptionally capabledemocrat,whosepatiencewasbeingunreasonablytestedbythequestionable aims of a discredited Opposition. The forthright journalist Zamir Niazi mentions in his book thatthe AssociatedPressofPakistan(APP),whichwasownedby the federal government,wouldissueregularinstructionstothenewspapersonwhattheycould and could not publish. Describing the situation as it was then, he adds that:

Oninstructionsfrom'above'theAPP'orders'themto'kill'certainitemsordelete somesentencesorparagraphsfromcertainstones,particularlythespeechesof theoppositionleaders.Theagencyhadtheaudacitytoaskthenewspapers duringtheBhutto[regime]eventodeletecertainportionsofspeechesmadeon the floor of the National Assembly...427

ZamirNiazialsoprovidesinformationonhowthePresswasusedtocreate misinformationabouttheOppositionleaders.ManyPakistanis,mostlyinthecentral Punjab,hadbeguntovilifyWaliKhanasatraitortoPakistan.Muchhadbeensaidaboutthe'Pakhtoonistan'issueandallusionswerecontinuallymadeaboutNAP's ambitions to carve up Pakistan into smaller nation states. All that NAP had demanded was greater provincial autonomy and whenWali Khan took the opportunity at a public meeting,on19October1973, tocandidlyerasethemisapprehension,thisis whattookplace:

APPreceivedaPressadvicethatthewholespeechhadtobeblackedout. Instead, they were told, a small paragraph would go out stating that Wali KhaninhisspeechhadsaidthatthepeopleoftheNWFPwouldshiftthebordercheck- post from Torkham to Attock bridge and would be able to enjoy fruits grown inAfghanistan.428

Ten days later on 30 October another fabrication was inserted into a newspaper quoting WaliKhanashavingsaid:'anewcountrycomprisingNWFP,Balochistanand Afghanistan would come into existence and the border line at Torkham would not be shiftedtoAttockbridgebutwouldbelocatedattheMargallaHillsofIslamabad'.429Bhutto knew the power of the printed Press and used it to destroy the image of his opponentsintheeyesofthegulliblepublic.WaliKhanwastocarrythis'markof treason'formanyyearstofollow,until sectionsofthePress,supporting thegovernment of the day, decided to exonerate him.430

427ZamirNiazi,PressinChains,publishedbyKarachiPressClub,1986.p.128.

428Zamir Niazi,ibid.,p.127.

429Mashriq,Peshawar,30October1973.

430Theverysame Wali Khan, twenty yearslater,would be welcomed political partner bya prime minister from central Punjab and be hailed him as a Pakistani patriot.

Bhuttohadalsoensuredthatthegovernmentpartyremainedwithinhistightgrip. AnyonewhostrayedevenslightlyfromBhutto'snarrowandsuspiciousstandardof loyaltywassummarilydealtwith.OneofhisministerslateradmittedBhutto'snotionof loyalty'flowedonlyone-way,towardshimandnotfromhim'.431Ifanyoneofhis subordinatesthreatenedBhutto'sinherentinsecuritiesbyshowingevenamodicumof independencehe wouldbe swiftlypunished. InDecember1973he dismissedMumtaz BhuttoaschiefministerofSindhandreplacedhimwithMumtaz'srival,Ghulam MustafaJatoi.432Thenitwastheturnofhisownprotégé,Khar-whohadestablished himselfsofirmlyinPunjabthathisownsycophantswerereferringtohimasSher-i-

Punjab.InMarch1973Kharwassackedaschiefminister.433Bhutto'sobsessionwith

maintaining an auraof invincibilitywas sostrong thathe would spare noone, noteven thosewhohaddonehimvaluableanddevotedserviceovertheyears.Nothingcould ever justify the savage brutality that was meted out to his senior Federal Minister, J. A. Rahim, the man about whom, in 1968, Bhutto had himself told mewas his 'mentor andguru'.

On the evening of 2 July 1974 Rahim was invited, along with the senior hierarchy of the PPP,toadinneratthePrimeMinister'sHouse.Theinvitationwasfor8p.m.butthe host,Bhutto,hadfailedtoshowup.Bymidnighttheseventy-plusyear-oldRahimlost his patience. He announcedto someof theother gueststhatBhuttowas insulting his guests and behaving as if the country was his personal royal dominion -Rajwara, inRahim'sownwords.Headdedthathecouldnolongerwaitforthe'RajaofLarkhana' and was heading home. When Bhutto finally put in an appearance he was informed byHafiz Pirzada of Rahim's outburst.

In the early hours of the morning as Rahim lay sleeping he was woken up by a servant who informed him that there was a posse of men at his front door demanding to be let in. Rahim went to his front door to discover that it was Saied Ahmed Khan, the Chief of the Prime Minister'sSecurity,whotoldhimthathe hadcome todeliverapersonal messagefromthePrimeMinister.Whenheopenedthedoorthemessagewasdelivered by brute force. Saied Ahmed Khan leading a large group of armed and uniformed FSF trooperschargedintoRahim'shouse.Bhutto'sSecurityChiefbeganbypummeling Rahim's face and body with his fists until Rahim fell to the ground. Then Saied Ahmed allowed one of his men to hit the elderly man with his rifle butt while he lay prostrate. Rahim'sson,Sikander,whorushedintointervene,wassoonbeatenunconsciousbythe FSF troopers. Having delivered Bhutto's message, they then dragged Rahim by his feet andflunghimintoajeep,alongwithhisson.andtookthemtoapolicestation.Rafi

431RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.301.

432Sometimeafter Mumtaz Bhutto'ssacking,Jam Sadiq Ali,with the Minister'sblessing,hadthe homesofMumtaz Bhutto's brother and sister raided by the police.

433With the implementation of the Constitution, whichdevolved executive powers on the chief minister, Khar had earlier vacated his post as governor and become the chief minister, replacing Meraj Khalid.

Raza arrived at the police station a couple of hours later and rescued him.434More punishmentforBhutto'sone-time'mentorandguru' wasyettocome.435

J. A. Rahim'spunishmentsenta clear message toall membersof the PPPhierarchy that theywerenotexemptfromtheruthlessnessofBhutto'swrath.EvenBhutto'sclose associatesandcabinetministersnowlived in dreadand fear oftheunpredictability of their master's temper.436

Insecure,ashewasbynature,hepreferredthecompanyofthosewhocringedbefore him and flattered his ego. As Kausar Niazi, his Minister for Information, later wrote: '[Bhutto] liked those people who constantly tried to prove themselves "more Christian" thanChristhimself!Assuchthoseweretheoneswhowerehisfavorites.'437His ministers were well aware that Bhutto could not brook any form of criticism. Rafi Raza reveals that Dr. Mubashir Hassan told him that when he wished to speak to the Prime Minister he would do so only privately 'in order to avoid ugly consequences'. Raza also mentionsthatBhuttoforbadehimtospeakopenlyatCabinetmeetingstoprevent others from becoming 'too independent and "contrary"'.438

Bhuttowas,bynow,confidentofthearmy'ssubmissiveness.Aftergettingridof GeneralGulHassan,thearmyhadbeenplacedinthehandsofGeneralTikkaKhan,who,whenhelaterbecametheMinisterofDefence,wasdescribedbyhisCabinet colleague, Kausar Niazi, as a man who 'considered licking the shoes of Mr. Bhutto to be thestraightpathtosalvation'.439LaterwhenTikkaKhanwasdueforretirementBhutto wouldchooseanother'worthy'generaltoreplacehim,amanwhohadalsodisplayed all the necessary signs of complete obsequiousness General Ziaul Haq.

Inthebeginningof1974-havingbrowbeatenalargepartoftheOpposition,turnedthe Presslargelyintohisownmouthpiece,terrifiedhisPPPsubordinatesintototal submissionandthearmyplacedunder asubmissiveTikkaKhan-Bhuttowasinnear totalcommandofallthathesurveyed.Allthatopposedhimwasadisintegrating coalitionofoppositionpartiesintheUDF.AtthetimeoftheIslamicSummitin

434From J. A. Rahim's press statement issued on 9 August 1977 (published verbatim in The Government White Paper on Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Volume in, 1979).

435On 2 May 1976 J. A. Rahim and his son once more underwent a horrifying ordeal; Rahim was blindfolded and taken from his Karachi house to an unknown destination where he was punched in the kidneys, repeatedly throttled until he reached the point of unconsciousness and even burnt b cigarettes. His poor son, was brutally sodomized. From the press statement and the accompanying published evidence, it is clear that this action taken against Rahim was masterminded by Jam Sadiq Ali on instruction from Z. A. Bhutto. From J. A. Rahim's Press Statement issued on 9 August 1977 (published verbatim in The Government White Paper on Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Volume in, 1979).

436And yet,he never retaliatedinsuch amanner against people whoop expressed their scorn towardshim-suchas the Baloch sirdars. It is possible likemost tyrants he only feared those who were not afraid of him.

437KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,JangPublishers,Lahore,1991,p.51.

438RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.301.

439KausarNiazi,op.cit.,p.65.

February1974Bhuttowasattheveryheightofhispower.Attheconclusionofthe IslamicSummit,accordingtoKausarNiazi,BhuttoplannedtodissolvetheAssemblies andholdelections.Butlater,ontheadviceofhis'teamofintellectuals'-uponwhom Niazipoursmuchscorn-hechangedhismind.

Mr. Bhutto had succeeded in getting the occupied territories of Pakistan vacated. The processofrepatriationofthePOW'shadalsobegun.Thesewereverypleasant moments.Thenationhadshedoffitssenseofshame,fear,hopelessnessand despondence. All this had taken a period of two years to materialize. Undoubtedly the IslamicSummitwastheclimax,forithelpedthedefeatednationtoseetheentire Islamic world standing shoulder to shoulder with it. Had the elections been held at that momentthePeople'sPartywouldhavegotthemandatetorulethenewPakistan.It wouldalsohavebeenabletoavoidthepitfallswhichlaterledtoitshumiliationand defeat of its government.440

If Bhutto had really been the political genius his supporters proclaimed him to be, hewould have called for early elections. Instead he chose to rely on the advice of a 'team of intellectuals' of his own appointment. When he later opted for elections in 1977 he recoursed to widespread rigging to obtain a win. To paraphrase Bhutto himself, he had 'played his chess badly'.

***

On3November 1973I attended theboxingtournamentatKarachi Grammar School.As akeenboxerduringmy schooldays,I usedtoenjoy thisannualeventatmy sons' school.ThateveningIcameacrossanewphenomenon.Alargenumberofpeopleatthe schoolfunction-otherparentsandlocaldignitaries-whomIhadknownovertheyears avoidedmeetingorbeingseennearme.ApparentlymyoppositiontoBhuttoboth withinthe Assembly andinthe publicdomainhadrenderedmeasocialoutcastto some.ThatdayI madea ratheracerbicentry inmy diary,'Inoticehowscaredpeople aretotalktome-showswhatourpeoplearemadeof.Fearhadbeguntopervade amonglargesectionsofthe society.Whilenothingwasevermentionedinthe newspapers, storiesabout thevindictiveness of Bhutto'srulehad beenspread by word of mouth. InKarachi, Mumtaz Bhutto'sroughneck anticsaschief ministerwere also, by now, an open secret. People had become scared.

EarlierthatdayIhadmetShahAhmedNooraniandfoundhimextremely depressed. TheOppositionhadbeendealingwithBhuttofortwoyearsnowandfacedwiththe harshness of the regime's rule, Noorani saw little light emerging in the darkness of our tunnel.ThefeelingofgloomanddepressionwasnotjustaffectingNoorani,itwas becomingquitepervasive.Therewereothervexationsaswell.Iwasbecoming

440Ibid.,p.13.

increasinglydisenchantedwiththemannerinwhichUDFwasbeingrun.Even overlookingPirPagaro'spreoccupationwithhorseracingonSaturdaysandSundays and his general lack of commitmenttothe UDF, what was most annoying was havingto deal with the petty personal ambitions ofpoliticians at the sacrifice of vital national issues. On 5 November I had a meeting with a number of MNAs from my independent group in which we resolved to leave the UDF at the first reasonable opportunity. Some dayslater,IreceivedadelegationfromtheJamaat-iIslami-ProfessorGhafoorand Munnawar Hussain - with the mission of persuading us to stay with the UDF. Professor Ghafoor, who was himself critical of the trivial politicking taking place within the UDF, felt that, for the moment, unity of the Opposition against Bhutto was more important. I reluctantlygaveintohiswishesbutinsistedthatwewouldreconsiderourposition once again in the future. At the very next UDF meeting I made my feelings abundantly clear.Inmy diaryIwrote'Itookafirmstandandtoldthemoff forlackof leadership andinspiration'.Ialsowarnedtheassembledleadersthatthemannerinwhichsomeof the UDF members had been conducting themselves was incompatible with our original purpose.IamsureIannoyedanumberofpeoplepresentthatday,butmostofthe moreprominentleadersandtheirpartieslaterletmeknowthattheysupportedmystance.

In early November I received a telephone callinforming me thattwo more charges had beenfiledagainstmeinDeraGhaziKhanformakinginflammatoryspeechesagainstthe government. Ten days later, while I was in Lahore,Mahmood Ali Kasuri and Latif Khosa,bothactingasmylegalcounsels,presentedawritpetitiontoChiefJusticeSirdar Muhammad Iqbal of the Lahore High Court. Four days later I was granted anticipatory bail by the Chief Justice.

On26NovemberafterathreeandahalfmonthabsencetheOppositionattendedthe wintersessionof theNationalAssembly. Thedaywasmarkedbytwoevents: myfriend PirSafiuddinofMakhad'sdesertionfromtheCouncilMuslimLeaguetojointhePPP benchesandOppositionfearsthatZahoorEllahi,whohadbeenimprisonedin Balochistan,wasabouttobemurdered.441WhenHafizPirzadaannouncedthatthe Government of Balochistan was responsible for the safety of Zahoor Ellahi, I was given anopeningtodenouncetheminorityBalochistangovernmentasafacadeandremind the House about the fate of another MNA, the murdered Dr. Nazir.

Iwas determined thatwheneveranopportunityarosein theAssembly I wouldattack the government on the Balochistan issue, As the government had persisted in claiming thatthe confinementofthe jailedBalochleadersrelatedtoa'criminal'matter,I got anotherchancetoputthemonthedefensivewhenMehmoodAzamFaroqimadean

441Zahoor Ellahi had been arrested in Punjab on 12 November 1973 an was then taken to Balochistan, where he was detained on a charge of aiding rebel Marri tribesmen. He was later convinced that there had been a plan to murder him and that only Governor Akbar Bugti's intervention had saved his life. He was released two monthslater in January 1974 when the Supreme Court ordered his release.

adjournmentmotionasking aboutrecentmeetingsbetweenthe governmentandthe jailedBalochleaders.IaskedtheHousethatifAttaullahMengal,KhairBukshMarriandGhousBukshBizenjowereindeedcriminals,thenwhyhadBhuttorecentlysent JatoitoSihalatonegotiatewiththem.The LawMinister, HafizPirzada, responded by announcinguntruthfullytotheAssemblythatJatoihadneverbeensenttomeetwith theBalochleaders.IthenchallengedhimbyaskingtheSpeakertobegiventhe opportunity tomeetwiththejailed mensoastogetdocumentary evidenceproving the LawMinistertobea liar. TherewasprolongedperiodofhushedsilenceintheHouse which was only broken by the Speaker disallowing the motion.

TheBalochistanissueremainedintheforefrontofmyconsciousness.Iwasdeeply concernedattheplightofordinarytribesmenandtheirfamilies,whofornofaultof theirown,were beingtyrannizedbyapoliticallyimposedarmyofoccupation.My democraticconvictionscouldnotalsotoleratetheimprisonmentofmyfriendswhohad onlyrecentlyledanelectedmajoritygovernmentintheprovince.Bhuttobeingawareof my concern, would often attempt to allay them, for reasons known only to him. On 21 DecemberhemadeaspeechintheNationalAssemblyinwhichhedecidedtoonce more refertome ashis'personalfriend'.The nextevening atadinnerheldby the Speaker for alltheMNAsBhuttoinsisted thatI joinhimathistable.Duringthemeal, he wasfullof charmand friendshipand assuredme thatthe Balochistanissue wouldsoon besolved.Inreturnheaskedmetoadoptalesshostileapproachforthetimebeing.The verynexteveningweoncemoremetatadinnerhostedbyPirSafiuddinofMakhad. The entry in my diary sums it up: 'Bhutto calls me and is very charming as usual - says he willsettle Balochistan issue within 4or 5days. Wantstosee meinLarkana.'442

Bhutto, having detained the Baloch leaders, now believed that he had gained the upper handinhisdisputewiththem.Hewasonlyinterestedinresolvingthedisputeonhis own terms, convinced, as he was, that those ruling in the provinces be subservient to his will.BhuttohadnotcountedonthedoggeddeterminationofAttaullahMengaland KhairBukshMarri.Thesetwoinsistedthatthreeconditionswouldhavetobemet before they would consider entering upon negotiations with the central government: release of all political prisoners, the withdrawal of the army from Balochistan and restorationofmajorityprovincialgovernmentsaspertheMurreeAccord.Bhutto,the everhopefulpolitician,believedthathecouldsomehowmakethemsoftentheirstand and sent a number of his emissaries, including Fazila Aliani and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi - later,evenAhmedNawaz Bugtiwasdeputedforthistask-butMengalandMarri remained implacable in their defiance.

Among the Baloch a sense of disillusionment had begun to seep in. Towards the end of December at Karachi, a delegation from the Baloch Students' Organization (BSO) came tocallonme.TheyweredeeplyfrustratedbythelackofprogressontheBalochistan

442Diaryentryof23December1973.

issueandbeganaccusingWaliKhanandNAP'sPathanleadershipofnotdoingenough fortheircause.TheysaidtheywishedtobreakawayfromNAP.Iurgedthemto exerciserestraint andremindedthemthat unitywas all important.Onthefirst dayof 1974 I was invited by the BSO to address a student gathering at Dow Medical College. I madeanimpassionedspeechabouttheinjusticedonetothepeopleofBalochistanbut as I notedin my diary 'I did not say anything bitter or controversialas Bhutto hadasked me not to, but I had to refute his charges against the Baloch leaders'.443But Bhutto's promiseofsettling theBalochistan issue'in4 or5 days'soonexpired. Theonly change that took place during this period was that Akbar Bugti who had resigned had been replacedasGovernorbytheKhanofKalat.

Afewdayslater,on12January,whenIlearntthatthePakistanAirForcehadbeen engagedinbombing and strafing tribalpeoplearound theBhambhorehillsintheMarri area, I wasback on thepolitical war - path. I wasdeeply angered by thesavagery of the response.OnreachingIslamabadIpressedforaparliamentarydebateonBalochistan andlobbiedotherMNAs,includingProfessorGhafoorandShaukatHayattopushforit.

The debate on Balochistan was scheduled for 14 February and I spent a number of days preparing my opening address on Balochistan in the National Assembly. Yet when the appointed time came I was so charged with emotion and anger that I pushed "my notes aside. Instead I made a passionate extempore speech of which the only record I have isfrom anewspaper report the following day.

Mr. Sherbaz Mazari (Ind-D. G. Khan) was the first speaker from the Opposition. Hebeganonanangry[note]andregrettedthatforeightmonthsthereportsof thedelegationmembershadnotbeenconsideredwhilepeopleinBaluchistan,he alleged, were suffering.

ThesituationinBaluchistan,hesaid,couldnotbeignoredfortoolong.

HesaidtheNAP-JUIgovernmentinBaluchistanwasdismissedillegallyand unethicallyandinspiteofsending[the]Baluchleaderstojail,thefederal governmenthadnotbeenabletoformamajoritygovernmentthere.Membersof the Baluchistan Assembly had shown courage 'which many of us lack'.

Mr.Mazarisaidthe'so-calledintelligentsia'ofthecountrywasindifferentwhile the people in Baluchistan were 'actually starving' and being suppressed by armyand militia.

443Diaryentryof1January1974.

Speakingasthemainspokesman,MrMazarisaidthatpeoplewerebeingshot like dogs in Baluchistan, the Army had blockaded sizeable populations, persons of[all]ageswerestarving.[The]PakistanAirForcehadbeenusedtostrafe people.Iranianammunitionwasbeingusedagainstthelocalsandthat 'thousands'ofpoliticalworkershadbeenjailed.He demandedthattheNAP Government in Baluchistan be reinstated.

WhileappealingtotheHouseandthegovernmenttogivethematteracool thought,asasolutionwouldbeinthebestinterestsofthecountry,hesaidit wouldbeagoodgestureifthegovernmentreleasedallpoliticalprisonersbefore the forthcoming Islamic Summit conference in Lahore.444

ThatnightIwastoreceiveacallfromBhutto.Hetoldmethatitwas'hisgenuinewish tosettlethismatter'445buthejustneededalittlemoretime.Ilistenedtohimbutbynow I had little faith left in his words.

At the time overthrow of the NAP government in February 1973, six NAP-JUI members of the provincial Assembly had been detained,446the other eight members of the NAP- JUI coalition had been left at liberty. Among them, the first MPAs to desert their party was Fazila Aliani and Muhammad Khan Barozai, the former Speaker of the Balochistan Assembly. The by-elections held following the murders of Abdus Samad Achakzai and MauiviShamsuddinprovidedafurtheropportunityforthecentralgovernmentto increaseitsMPAs.Bynow,aswasthecaseintherestofPakistan,by-electionshad become a contemptuous parody of democracy.

WithKhairBukshMarrioptingforhisprovincialseat,hisMNAseatfromtheMarri- BugtiareaofSibidistricthadbecomevacantandaby-electionwasscheduledfor18 February 1974. The former Governor Akbar Bugti put up his son Salimfor the seat and to his chagrin found his son being opposed by a PPP candidate, Taj Muhammad Jamali. NowitwasAkbar'sturntofacehisformercolleaguesinthegovernment.Afew days beforetheelectionagrenadewasthrownnearAkbar'shouse.Twodaysbeforethedate oftheby-election, on16 February,a PPPprocessioninQuettawasattacked by Bugti's supporters and as a result one was killed and two wounded. The PPP campaign in the electionareawassupervisedbynoneotherthanthedutifularmychief,TikkaKhan, himself.447I learntsubsequently,thatonelectionday allthe polling boothsinDera BugtiandSuiweresurroundedbyarmouredcarsandsandbaggedmachinegunposts.

444ThePakistanTimes,15February1974.

445Diaryentryof14February1974.

446The six were Sirdar Attaullah Mengal, Sirdar Khair Buksh Marri, G Khan Naseer, Sher Ali Khan Nowsherwani,Dost Muhammad and Agh Abdul Karim. Another NAP MPA Abdur Rehman, had gone into prolonged hiding toavoiddetention.

447Ahmed Nawaz Bugti described the by-election events to me in person when he arrived at Karachi on 20 February - only two days after the election.

ThesettledareasoftheadjacentMarriterritorywerealreadyinthefirmgripofarmy occupation.Thelikelihoodofanyonewinningagainstthegovernment'sarmedmight was unthinkable and not surprisingly, Taj Jamali won easily.

After the defection of Fazila Aliani, Muhammad Khan Barozai and others, the killing of Maulvi Shamsuddin in March depleted the Opposition ranks even further. In the 1970 elections JUI had won three seats to the Balochistan Provincial Assembly. By early 1974twoofthethreeJUIMPAsdesertedtheirparty'sstanceandhadbecomeministersin Jam Ghulam Qadir's coalition government. Only the young thirty-two-year old Maulvi Shamsuddinhadstucktohisguns.Despiteaspellofimprisonmentandlateroffersof high offices, Shamsuddin had refused to compromise his conscience. On 13 March 1974,thestaunchlycommittedJUIMPApaidwithhislifeforhisprinciples.

Duringtheby-electionsheldfortheseatsbelongingtotheassassinatedAbdusSamad AchakzaiandMaulviShamsuddin,thegovernmentensured,throughblatantlyovert means,thattheircandidatesgotelected.Bythesummerof1974thePPPQayumLeague coalition had the supportof nine ProvincialAssembly members out ofthe fifteen who wereatliberty.Whilethemannerinwhichthishadbeenachievedwastotally deplorable, the minority government was finally able to get a vote of confidence in the reducedAssembly.Inthebackdropofthispoliticalactivity,thearmyactionwas moving forward relentlessly.

***

On 10 March Khar was removed as Chief Minister of Punjab and in my diary I commemorated this event by writing 'good riddance to a tin pot tyrant'. It was rare tocome across a person of such moral and ethical decrepitude. During his reign in PunjabnewandappallingstandardsoftortureandterrorhadbeensetbythePunjabpolice. Mydislikeofhimwasnotlinkedtohisreportedattempttoarrangemymurder-my tribal background has enured me of such events - instead it was directly related to the innumerable firsthand testimonies of people who had suffered barbaric and inhuman treatmentunderhisrule.NorcouldIforgettheassassinationofDr.Nazir.Butwith Bhutto in charge,Khar's sacking hadlittle todo with his reign ofoppression -which Bhutto had hardly discouraged. He was dismissed because he had become too powerfulandhadreducedtheprovincialPPPorganizationtoastateofshamblingchaos.

AlargepartofthePPP'sorganizationalproblemsstemmedfromBhuttohimself.Bhutto didnottrusteventheclosestofhisassociatesandkeptthemincheckbypittingone against the other. In Sindh he had controlled his cousin Mumtaz through his rival Jatoi. Jatoi inturn, aschief minister, had no control of JamSadiqAli, whoreported directly to thePrimeMinister.JamSadiqAli,hishitmanhadtotalcontrolofSanghar,Pagaro's votebank.LarkanawasmadeintoadivisionandKhalidKharralbecameitsfirst

CommissionerandwasreportingdirectlytoBhutto.448Ratherthantryingtobringhis warringsubordinatestogether,Bhuttoencouragedthemtosquabbleevenfurther,all the while'enjoying the complaints of onecolleague about another'.449In time Icame to learnthatMumtazBhuttoandHafizPirzadaloathedKhar,450andduringameetingwith Rafi Raza he had made his dislike of Khar and Pirzada quite clear to me. And they werenottheonlyoneswithaxestogrind-theseniorhierarchyofthePPPwasrifewith discord.CreatingrivalriesbetweenhissubordinatesgaveBhuttoasenseofsecurity.As hisconfidantRafiRazahimselfadmits:'Bynaturesuspicious,hesoughttohave'dirt' available against his Ministers and leading Party members, and in early 1976, assigned tohis[intelligencechiefs]thetaskofpreparingsecretdossiersaboutthem,tobeused [againstthem]incaseofneed.'451AccordingtoRazaagain,this'suspicionwas reciprocated' by all of Bhutto's subordinates.

InPunjabthePPPwasrivenwithfactionalism.WhenKharbecameGovernorin1972, SheikhRasheedwasPresidentofthePunjabPPP.UsinghisfullpowersasGovernor, Khar unleashed an attack which put an abrupt end to Rasheed's political ambitions.

During1972andthefirsthalfof1973,manypro-Rashidelementswereharassed, intimidated, 'and/or thrown out of the party throughout the province. Only one branch organization in the city of Lahore - the one in Baghbanpura - was said to haveanypro-Rashidfunctionaries.Kharwasabletotakethesemeasuresbecause as governor he controlled not onlythe government but the police.452

In 1973 Khar replaced Sheikh Rasheed with one of his own men - Afzal Wattoo - as provincialpartypresident,therebyensuringthatboththegovernmentandPPPof Punjab remained in his hands. As a minor landlord, Khar had the support of the feudalwing of the party and by crushing the left-wing elements of his own party, he had powerfullyestablishedhimselfwithintheprovince.Khar'scompletecontrolofPunjab andtheprovincialPPPdirectlyimpactedonhismaster'sinsecurities.Bhuttosuddenly felt threatened. Announcing that Khar had become 'too big for his boots',453he began activelyencouragingPPPMPAstocomplaintohimaboutKhar.Respondingtothis, fortyPPPMPAssubmittedapetitiontoBhuttocomplainingaboutKhar'scorruption andviolentabuseofpower.ByearlyFebruarysomeMPAs,onBhutto'sprompting, beganabusingKharinbaselanguageonthefloorofthePunjabAssembly.Somedays lateranumberofthemopenlycirculatedaprinteddocumenttitled'WEACCUSE'in whichtheylistedthirtyaccusationsof'corruptionandmisconduct'againstKhar.The

448PreviouslyKharralhadbeenDeputyCommissioner,LarkanaDistrict.

449RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.299.

450IwasinformedinNovember1973thatataKarachidinnerpartybothMumtazBhuttoandPirzadaopenly 'abused' Khar, who of course, was not present at the scene.

451RafiRaza,op. cit.,p.302.

452AnwarH.Syed,TheDiscourseandPoliticsofZulfikarAliBhutto.Macmillian,London,1992,p.208.

453RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.299.

accusations included the amassing of millions of rupees and hundreds of acres of 'thefinest' and 'best agricultural land in Muzaffargarh District', building a 'palatial' home in Lahore anda 'large house'in Islamabad,and 'a fleet of 6 carsincluding a Custom-built (sic),air-conditionedMercedes280S...'.Theyendedtheirplaintwithuseofthe followingwords:'WeareconfidentthatourbelovedPrimeMinisterandhis Government shall not allow these acts of corruption and high-handedness and abuse of officialpowerandinfluence,togounpunished.'454Ratherpatheticallynoonedaredto signthisdocument,butitachieveditsintendedresults.OncesatisfiedthatKharhad beensufficientlybroughtdowntosize,Bhuttosackedhim.On10MarchHanifRamay was made ChiefMinisterof Punjab.

ForawhileKharbelligerentlywentaroundtheprovincerousingsupportforhimself. HeevenattemptedtomakecontactwithsomeOppositionmembersandmadeclaims that some of Bhutto's lapses in power were far worse 'than anything Ayub Khan might have done at Tashkent'.455But within two months he had made his peace with Bhutto, butnotbeforeBhuttodissolvedthePunjabPPPorganizationandappointedMeraj MuhammadKhalid,oneofKhar'sopponents,asprovincialpartypresident.Tenmonthslater,BhuttomadeKharresignhisprovincialseattobemadegovernorof Punjaboncemore.Fourmonthslater,inJuly1975,hesackedbothRamayandKhar. This time Khar, lacking even a provincial seat, had no role to play inlegislative politics. He had effectively been cast out into the cold.

Khar'suncontrolleduseofviolence toachievehisaimshadhelpedcriminalize provincial politics. His choice of political henchmen - such as Iftikhar Tari, reputedly a ganglandmemberfromLahore'snotoriousred-lightareaofHeeramundi-didmuchto reducePPPparty'sesteemintheeyesofthegeneralpublic.Storiesaboutgrossfinancial corruptionofKharandthePPPprovincialCabinetonlyaddedtothedamageinthe party'sstanding.Further,rentbyfactionalismandstrife,theaffairsofthePunjabPPP wereincompleteshambles. Alargenumberof partyworkershadbecomedisillusioned by Khar's actions. They had either left the PPPor had chosen to quit active politics.

The disunity within the Punjab PPP could not be blamed on Khar alone. The PPPleadership structure was by its very nature highly personalized: all authority remainedwith Bhutto who stood at the party's apex. This led to each faction clamoring andcompeting for his personal blessing, which would then provide it with power and precedence over its rivals. As, one writer put it: 'Legislators and party officials at thedistrictandlocallevelsmadeestimatesofwherecontendingdignitariesstoodin Bhutto's esteem, and they shifted support accordingly'.456

454QuotedfromthecopyofthisdocumentinmyrecordswhichwasissometimeinMarch1974.

455AnwarH.Syed,op.cit.,p.210.

456Ibid.

The party disunity combined with the brutal violence that Khar had introduced intoPunjab politics with Bhutto's blessing, and the open corruption that had now come to permeatethenewpoliticalelite,costthePPPconsiderablesupportwithintheprovince. As a consequence, the large backing that Bhutto received from Punjab in the previous election (41.66 percent of the Punjab voters during the 1970 National Assembly election) was no longer there on the ground.

ThepoliticalsituationintheNWFPwasnotanybetterthaninthePunjab.Inthe provincial elections of 1970 PPP had only won three seats in an Assembly total of forty representatives. With Aslam Khattak as governor they managed to form a majoritycoalitiongovernmentunderInayatullahGandapur,anindependentMPA.The governmentwassupportedbytenMPAsoftheQayumMuslimLeague,thePPPanda host of independents who had been either bribed, cajoled or intimidated. Khattak and Gandapur soon proved to be more self-serving and servile to Bhutto than even the localPPPleaderssuchasHayatSherpao.Describingthesetwomen,awriterstated:

[AslamKhattak]assuredBhuttothatheandGandapurwouldcarryout [Bhutto's]wishesmoreeffectivelythanSherpaocould.Toprove theirpoint,as it were,theysurpassedthePPPleadersinmaligningtheNAPanditspresident, Abdul Wali Khan, jailed more than 300 NAP workers, banned a NAP newspaper (Shahbaz),closeddownamoderately pro-NAPweekly (theFrontierGuardian), and arrested its editor.457

WhilethecoalitiongovernmentwascreatedatBhutto'sbehest,KhattakandGandapur didtheirutmosttoweakenthePPPintheprovince.InreturnSherpao,onlysupported the government within the limits of the provincial Assembly. Outside the Assembly he activelyworkedagainstit.Thecoalitiongovernment,sufferingasitdidfromintrigue and disunity, was hardly a success. Bhutto's Federal Minister for Production, Rafi Raza, admitted that 'the performance of the new Provincial Government was even worse than that of its predecessor'.458One could hardly expect Raza to see the previous NAP government in a less hostile light. While the Gandapur government achieved Bhutto's purpose of keeping the NAP out of government, it turned out to be a failure for the provincialPPP.Havingwononlythreeprovincialseatsinthe1970electionsthePPP wasweakintheNWFP.TheestablishmentoftheGandapurministrydidlittletoadd new converts to the party in the province.

TheonlyprovincewherePPPenjoyedarelativedegreeofpopularitywasSindh,and that was - as a result of the 1972 language riots - largely restricted to the rural parts of theprovince.Inthe1970electionsBhuttohadcultivatedtheSindhilandedgentrytohis ownadvantage.Usinghisownpopularityasanative-bornSindhiandenhancinghis

457Ibid.,p.187.

458RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.275.

supportbycultivatingthetraditional'feudal'leverage-bygettinglocalpersonalities suchasMakhdoomTalib-ul-Maula,theJatois andtheTalpurs,PirofRanipurandotherpirsandwaderasof Sindh to join his party - the PPP won 28 out of the total of 60 seats allocated to the Sindh Provincial Assembly. After the PPP entered into power, a large number of independent MPAs eagerly joined the party, making the task of forming a majoritygovernmentthatmucheasier.Intheruralareas,withthemajorityof'feudal' votebankinhispocket,Bhuttowasinnearcompletecontrol,thoughhecontinuedto fearPirPagaroandhisHursupporters,Intheurbanareas,wherethemuhajircommunity and the non-Sindhi elements were in dominance the situation was quite the opposite.Asaresult ofthelanguageriots,thejobquotasystem- which limitedthe numberofgovernmentjobsavailabletothemuhajirs-andtheexclusionofthe metropolis of Karachi from the power structure, there was strong resentment of the PPP and its policies in the urban areas of Sindh.

***

InthemeantimeBalochistancontinuedtobeontheboil.On18May1974Bhutto arrangedforGhousBukshBizenjotobebroughttothePrimeMinister'sresidenceto meetwithhim.BhuttohadalwaysfoundBizenjotobeamenabletodealwithbutwith theunyieldingstandtakenbyMengalandMarritherewaslittleBizenjocouldofferto him.LateradelegationofBalochrepresentativeswenttoSihalaJailandmetwith AttaullahMengalandKhairBukshMarri.459Theyweregivenafirmmessagebythe twojailedleaders.First,theyinsisted,thatBhuttooughttogetmoreseriousinhis negotiations andnotresortto half-bakedattempts atsettling differences.Secondly,they maintained,thatinviewofallthathadtakenplaceitwasnolongeranissueof Balochistanalone,butafightforthesurvivalofdemocracyandtheimplementationof the1973Constitution.MengalandMarrialsosentamessagetotheirPathancolleagues intheNAP,aswellastoothersintheUDFleadership.Istillhavetheoriginalletterthat waswrittentomebyAtaullahMengalwhichhadbeensmuggledoutbyasweeper.It wastime,theybelieved,thatadecisionwastakenbytheUDForiwhetheritwouldtake afirmstanceontheissueofpoliticaldetentionsandtheuseoftheArmyinBalochistan. InJunetherewasanacrimoniousBudgetSessionintheNationalAssembly.Tempersbecamefrayedandonoccasionthelanguageusedwasfarfromparliamentary.Inone particularverbalexchangebetweenZahoorEllahiandKhurshidHasanMeerthe languageunfortunatelydescendedtoalevelofcoarseabuse.Therewas afeelingamong someoftheolderparliamentarians -thevery fewthat were left intheAssemblythat the 1970electionshadbroughtinalargenumberofanewbreedofpoliticians.Traditional parliamentarycourtesiesseemedtobeinsuddendecline.460On17JuneImadeaforty- fiveminutespeechintheHouseontheforthcomingBudget.InmyspeechIaskedfor increasedtaxationonluxurygoodsandforgreaterausterityinourdailylives.Two

459Thisdelegationincluded:AhmedNawazBugti,SenatorWahidKurdSenatorHashimGilzai,leaderofthe Opposition in the Senate.

460Unfortunatelythecoarsenessofparliamentarydebatehasonlyworsenedfurtheroverthesubsequentyears.

days later I received a telephone call from Bhutto congratulating me on my speech. My diarynotestates'onceagainhepromisesanearlysettlementoftheBaluchistanissue andendsourconversationbyofferingmeuseofhisofficialresthouseatNathiagali'.461

On 25 June while I was at Karachi I read in the evening papers that over nine hundred peoplehadbeenslainbytheArmedForcesintheMarritribalarea.Thenewspapers mentioned the use of the PakistanAir Force inaerial bombing of the haplesscivilians. I wasdeeplydisturbedbythereportandleftthenextdayforIslamabadtodiscussthe incidentwithotherOppositionleaders.BasedonanofficialtelegramsentbyAbdul Wahid Kurd, a NAP senator about the massacre which I received, I called for a debate ontheBalochistanissuethefollowingday.ThespeakersincludedMahmoodAliKasuri,WaliKhan,ProfessorGhafoor,MuftiMahmood,AliAhmedTalpurandme.When it was my turn to speak I harshly criticized what I perceived had been a planned military exercise at the behest of the government.

Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari said that after failing to subdue the Baluch people, the Government had resorted to bombing and strafing.

Healleged thatunarmedBaluch,includingwomenandchildren,werekilled.

TheGovernment,hesaid,shouldrestore'democracyandfreedom,whicharethe just rights of the people of the four provinces ofPakistan'.462

The Governmentdecided towhitewashthe eventaltogether. The InformationMinister, HafizPirzada,referredtoitasnotmore thanaminor'retaliatory action'inLoralai District on 12 June. The facts that emerged later confirmed our worst fears. Faced with anArmyencirclement,alargenumberofMarritribesmenandtheirfamilieshadfled theirhomesandtakenrefugeintheChamalangValley,northofMarriterritory,inan areaoccupiedbythePathantribesofBalochistan,suchastheJaffarsandtheMusakhels. Inretaliationforanattackononeoftheirpatrolsbyabandofguerrillas,theArmy decidedtoavengethemselvesuponthehaplessMarristemporarilycampedatChamalang.

On1JulyIflewtoQuettaandjoinedWaliKhanonashortfact-findingtripto Balochistan. On 2 July, after visiting Fort Sandeman to offer our condolences to Maulvi Shamsuddin'sfamily,weleftforLoralai.IwasgivenpermissiontoseetheMarri prisonersatLoralaiJailwhereAhmedNawazBugtiandIweregivenfirsthandeye- witnessaccountsoftheatrocitiesoftheArmyattackonChamalangfromtwoPathan Musakhelmothaburs(tribalelders).LatertheDeputyCommissionerwasremoved from his post forhavinggrantedus permission to meet with the prisoners whotold us:

461Diarynote:19June1974.

462Dawn,28June1974.

RecentlyweheardthatanArmyconvoywasambushedbetweenDukkiand Ziaratby Marritribesmanandthat15Army personnelwere killed.Thenwe wereinformedthatfourunitsoftheArmyhadcometoreinforcetheexisting forceonthebordersoftheMarriterritory.Acoupleofdayslatertwoyoung MusakhelPathans,ZahirKhanandNadirKhan,bothsonsofNasirKhan,who weregrazingtheirsheepneartheirvillagewerestoppedbyanArmyplatoon. TheywereaskediftheywereMarris.Whentheyidentifiedthemselvesas MusakhelPathanstheywerethenaskedtoguidetheplatoontothenearestMarri settlement.Whenourboysrefusedtocomgly,theywereorderedtohandover theirriflesaswellasallthe livestock tothe soldiersinpunishmentfortheir refusal.Whenthetwobaysrefusedtoobeythesoldiers'commandtheywere bothshotincold-blood.One ofthemdiedinstantly.Theothersurvivedlong enoughtotellhisrelatives,whosoonreachedthereuponhearingthegunfire, what had taken place.

We are not sureofthe exactdate,but it wasmost likely16 June when at about 10 or 11 a.m. we saw two low flying jets streaking in from the east, another similarly headedinfromthewest.Wealsowitnessedalargeconcentrationofheavily armedtroopsheadinginthedirectionofChamalang.Abriefwhilelaterwe heardaconstantseriesofexplosionswhichlastedforalongperiod.Welater cametoknowthathundredsofMarrimen,womenandchildrenwerekilled alongwiththeirlivestock.ThreeMarriwomenwhowerecollectingfirewood away from their settlement later took refuge in the house of Malik Tajuddin Luni Pathan.Forallweknowtheyweretheonlysurvivors.

We later heard from some Army jawansat alocalchaikhanathatthis attackwas in retaliation of the earlier ambush of the Army convoy. The governmentforces were determinedtoliquidateallanti-Pakistanelementsbuthadcalleda temporaryhahduetotheimpendingvisitofOppositionleaderstothearea. From9JulyonwardsthecombinedArmy andAirForce wouldrecommencetheir action with the intention ofannihilatingall tracesof Marriresistance.

TheseniorofthetwoMothabarstheninformedus:

OnaveryrecentvisittoHarnaiImetwithanArmysubedaratalocalchaikhanawhotoldmethathewasaparatrooperwhohadparticipatedintheaction against theMarris. Thesubedarsaidmany members ofhis section had been droppedbyparachuteatnighttimenearidentifiedMarrisettlements.Atdawn they surrounded the settlements and attacked them killing all those who resisted. After burning down their homes, they arrested all the able-bodied men and took awayalltheirlivestock.WhenIaskedthesubedarabouttheMarriwomen,he toldmethattheytookwiththemonlytheprettyonesforobviousreasonsand

lefttheotherstofendforthemselves.TheseniorMothabarthenconfirmedthat inhispresencealonehesawtheArmyauctioningoffover15,000headof captured cattle.

The juniorMothabarcorroborated his colleagues account and added: 'At the end of lastyear [1973] it was common knowledge in the Loralei Bazaar that eight young Marri girls hadbeenforciblykeptintheArmybarracksforsexualamusementofthetroopsand thatgenerallycapturedBaluchwomenwereregularlysubjectedtosexualassault.'

DespitebeingsickenedbytheseaccountsIhadthemtypewrittenandhandedover copies to the Press and to any politician with a modicum of objectivity but nothing ever came of it. On our return to Islamabad a number of us in the Opposition, including Wali Khan. Pir Pagaro and I sent separate similarly worded telegrams to Fazal Ellahi. thePresident.

[T]he Action Committee of the UDF hereby brings toyour notice thatthe actions takenbythefederalgovernmentinBaluchistanareunconstitutionaland unlawful.IncompliancewithsuchordersthePakistanArmyandAirForceare indiscriminatelyshelling,strafingandkillinginnocentinhabitants,including womenandchildren.Theirpropertiesarebeingdestroyedandtheirlivestock looted.Concentrationcampshavebeenestablishedwhereinnocentandpatriotic peopleofBaluchistanarebeingkeptandmaltreated.Theirwomenare dishonored and innocent children tortured.

Implementation of such orders of the federal government by the Pakistan Army andAirForceisdamagingtheunityofthecountryandmayleadtoitsfurtherdisintegration.

Thusareignofterrorisprevailinginthewholeprovinceforthesimplereason thatthepeopleofBaluchistandidnotvoteforthePeople'sPartyinthelast general elections.

WeremindedEllahiofhisoathofofficeandrequestedhimtointervene.Forallthe good that came of it we might as well havebeen whistling in the dark. In the meantime theArmyblockadeoftheMarriareacontinued.NoonecouldcrosstheArmylines without express permission. I still have in my possession a slip of paper issued by one Captain Zahid Mahmood, Adjutant of Kahan Camp to Khair Buksh Marri's brother, Ali AhmedKhan,anddated28August1974.Itstatesratherturgidly,'[AliMarri]is permitted to go to Kohlu with four servants and come back'.

In the meantime efforts began anew to win me over. On one occasion, on 17 July, Aziz Ahmed, the Foreign Minister, made a special effort to talk to me during a break in the Assemblysession.HewalkedacrosstowhereIwassittingandexpressedhisregrets

thathefoundmesittingwiththeOpposition.Heproceededtoinformmethatthe PrimeMinisterhadanextremelyhighopinionofmeandsuggestedthatIshouldplay my role of an independent MNA 'more constructively'. I replied that as far as I was concerned I was doing only what my conscience told me to do. While we were talkingAbdulQayumKhan,theInteriorMinisterjoinedus.QayumKhanproceededtotellme thatthesituationinBalochistanwas'extremelycruel',andthatIshoulddomyutmost tohelpfindacompromise.TheArmy,accordingtohimhadalreadylostalargenumber ofofficersandmenandhadnowadoptedavindictiveattitude.

Only two days later I received a report from Mukhtar Hassan,463a newspaper correspondent who hadjustreturnedfrom Balochistan.He toldme that while he was theretwoMarriwomenwererapednearBalpatstationbysoldiers.Theculpritswere later caught and given only extra drill as punishment. In another incident, one Lai Han Marri'swifewasabductedinKohluandrapedbyseveralsoldiers.Rapeinanysociety is a most reprehensible crime. But when a country's Army, whose sworn and only legitimateroleisthattodefendthebordersofacountry,indulgesincriminalrapingof itsownhaplesscitizensitisnothinglessthananactoftreason.Whatdisgustedme most was the fact that only token punishment was being awarded by the Army for the perpetrators of this most monstrous of crimes. The Pakistan Army was behaving as if ithadoccupiedaforeigncountry,andaniniquitousoccupationatthat.Itremindedone oftheatrocitiescommittedbytheArmyinEastPakistan.AfortnightlateraPPP MinisterofStateTajMuhammadJamali,admittedtomeinpersonthathewasshocked byatrocitiesbeingcommittedbytheArmy.HealsoconfirmedthatanArmycolonel hadbeenkillednearDeraBugti.Anothercolonel,Ilearnt,hadbeenkillednearDuki.

Duringthisperiodtherewasanintermittentbombingcampaigntakingplaceinthe urbanareasofBalochistan.Theseterroristbombexplosionsresultedinthedeathsof numerousinnocentciviliansandreceivedwidecoverageinthemedia.Muchwas writteninthePresstocondemntheOppositionwhowerechosentocarrytheblamefor these events. Muchlater it wasrevealed thatin fact itwas theFSF behind these'dirty'operations.

On 13 October 1974, two bomb explosions were caused by one Taj Muhammad,whowassupplied 8dynamitesticksforthispurposebytheFSF. Hewasarrested bythe Quetta police,but was releasedafterthe intercession ofthe Director- GeneralofFSF.TheideawastodiscredittheOppositionintheeyesofthepublic for indulging in arson and terrorism.464

Itwasevidentthatthatthelivesofcivilianswereoflittlevalueincomparisonto gaining political objectives.

463MukhtarHassan,thenseniorcorrespondentoftheUrdumagazine,coveringBalochistan.

464TheGovernmentWhitePaperonPerformanceoftheBhuttoRegime,VolumeIII,1979,p.30.

On 7 August I visited Gul Aurangzeb of Swat and his wife Naseem to offer condolences at the death of her father, the former President Ayub Khan. While there I met a serving Brigadier who informed me that the Army Intelligence strongly suspected that I was a conduit for foreign funds meant for the Baloch guerrillas. The very next day this news wasconfirmed bymy wife.Itappearedthatrecentlymybrother-in-law Bashir Mazari had sentRs. 85,000 from Lahore to mybankaccountin Karachi for acar hewished to purchase inKarachi.My wife,Souriya,toldme thatshehaddiscoveredthatArmy Intelligencehadarrivedatthebanktotracethesourceofthesefunds.SubsequentlyI came to learn that in a small building directly behind my Karachi house, on a property belongingtotheCollegeofPhysiciansandSurgeons,theArmyhadsetuphigh-tech devicesdirected atmonitoringconversationsheld in myresidenceeven outdoors,and totapallmytelephonelines.Thiswashardlythefirsttelephonetap,thegovernment had been monitoring all my telephone conversations for quite some time now. Or? one occasion my eldest son Sherazam picked up the phone to make a call, only to discover hisyoungerbrotherSherAfzalwasspeakingontheline.Itmomentarilybewildered him as he could see Sher Afzal sitting on a nearby table eating asnack. Apparently, one oftheagenciesmonitoringthephone,haddecidedtoreplayapreviousconversation, for reasons known only to them.

InlateAugustIcametolearnthatBhutto-alongwithPirzada,Jatoi,RafiRazaand AzizAhmed-hadhimselfmetwiththeBalochleadersatSihalajail.Hehadoffered them coalition governments in Balochistan and the NWFP. His offer had been swiftly rejected, A day or so later I was asked by Bhutto to meet with him in Karachi. On the eveningof30AugustImethimatKarachi.Itooktheopportunityofremonstrating withhimaboutthecontinuingmilitaryactionagainstthetribesmen,especiallytheuse of aircraft against them. It was then, in my solitary presence, that Bhutto, finally, openly admitted that military aircraft had been used in Balochistan, but he insisted that no bombing had taken place, the aerial attacks, according to him had been restricted tostrafing and rockets.465He then asked me to meet with the Baloch leaders, once again, totryandarrangeforasettlement.Itappearedthathisownmeetingwiththemhadnot gone too well.Accordingto Bhutto,Attaullah had been totally inflexible. He hadtold Bhutto that their 'paths now went in two totally different directions' and then asked to leave the meeting. Bizenjo had called Bhutto 'insincere' to his face. And in Bhutto's own words, Khair Buksh had 'stared at him unblinkingly, with folded arms throughout the meetingandnotutteredasingleword'.AfterlisteningtoBhuttodescribehismeeting withtheBalochleadersItoldhimfranklythatIsawnoprospectsofanyagreement unlesshemadeamagnanimousgestureofsomesort.Withoutcommittinghimself Bhutto indicated that a gesture from him was possible but was insistent that I meet withthethreedetainedleaders toseeifsomething couldbe workedout.

465Thegovernment had repeatedly denied theuse of military aircraft in Balochistan on several occasions in theNational Assembly, as well as in the Press.

Within weeks of the dismissal of the NAP government in Balochistan in February 1973 adisparate groupof Baloch guerrillas hadsprunguplargelyin theMarriand Mengal areas.AmongtheMarris,afterthearrestofthePararileaderSherMuhammadMarri, theleadershiphadpassedontoHazarKhanMarri.Theseguerrillagroups,despitetheir meager numbers - only a few hundred men divided into separate geographical bands - constantlyharassedArmyconvoys.Adoptingtheclassicalguerrillaapproachof avoiding any large-scaleencounterswiththe Armed Forces, they used their knowledge oftheirlocalmountainterraintogreatadvantage.According toalatergovernment report,betweentheperiodof1973and1975,therewere178majorrecordedArmy encounterswiththeguerrillas.Eighty-four oftheseclashestook placeintheMarri area and theremainingwerescattered widely over theBalochinhabited area-inparticular, KhuzdarandJhalawan.466DespitetheArmy'senormous80,000manforceitwouldfind itselfincreasinglyfrustratedwithitsinabilitytodealwithsmallgroupsofmenwho attacked at unexpected moments and then swiftly melted away into the mountainside. The Army's heavy-handed approach of avenging itself on the innocent, ordinary tribal folk only worsened the situation.

Onerelativelylesserknownpartof thistragicepisodeof ourhistoryistheinvolvement of fiveidealisticyoung menwhodecided thatthey would helpchangetheworld for the better. It must be borne in mind that the early 1970s was a period of youthful idealism aroundtheworld.ItwasatimewhenthelikesofCheGueverawereeulogizedanda greatmanystudentsatUSandEuropeanuniversitieshadbecomepreoccupiedwith anti-Vietnamwarmovement.Thepoliticizedatmosphereintheseforeignuniversities haditsaffectonPakistanistudentsstudyingthere.ThesavagebrutalityoftheArmy crackdowninEastPakistanhadbeengivenwideanduncensoredcoverageinthe WesternPress,moreparticularlytheBritishnewspapers.Itisnotsurprisingthatasmall band of Pakistani students soon became embroiled in revolutionary zeal.

Theselads-someatCambridgeandothers atthethensocialisthotbedoftheLondon SchoolofEconomics-cameundertheinfluenceofMuhammadBhabha-afirebrand advocateofMarxistliberationdoctrine-whobelongedtoawealthyIsmailifamilyfrom Karachi.Theseyoungmenallcamefromelitefamiliesandeducationalbackgrounds. Duleep 'Johnny' Dass, was the son of one of the senior-most officers of the Air Force in the 1950s, my friend Air Commodore Balwant Dass, and had been educated at Karachi Grammar School. The two brothers Asad and Rashid Rahman were sons ofthe retired SupremeCourtJudge,JusticeS.A.Rahman.ThefourthwasAhmedRashid,nowa well-knownLahore-basedwriter.LatertheywerejoinedbyMuhammadAliTalpur,a

466'Lists of Incidents Showing Firing Cases in Baluchistan from February 22, 1973 to December 31, 1975', Annexure G-5, pp. 108-13, and 'Details of Firing and Other Acts of Sabotage/Terrorism in Baluchistan during 1974-75', Annexure G-3, pp. 99-103, in State v. Abdul Wali Khan and Others. Special Court, Hyderabad, 15 April 1976. (Quoted in Selig S. Harrison,In Afghanistan's Shadow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1981, p. 39.)

youngBalochnationalistandsonoftheMNAMirAliAhmedTalpur,whohadbeen greatlyaffectedbytheeventsinBalochistan.Thefiveofthemjoinedthearmedguerrilla campsledby HazarKhaninthe Marrihills.AllofthemdonnedtraditionalBaloch clothing,learnttospeakfluentBalochiandsomeevenadoptedBalochnames.They abandoned the comfortsthatthey had beenaccustomed toand beganliving the rugged existence ofsimpleBalochtribesmen,eatingthe austere dietthataccompaniedtheir newchosenlifeinthebarrenhills,sleepingonhardgroundandtravellingbyfootinthe tough mountainous terrain. I was later told that their mentor Muhammad Bhabha only joined themfor abrief whileinthehills. Hesoonfound himself unableto copewith the harsh existence.

These youngsters soon began actively participating in the guerrilla campaign. Within a shortwhiletheMilitaryIntelligencecametohearaboutthemanddiditsbesttocapture them.Somemonthslater,accordingtoreportsthatreachedmemuchlater,JohnnyDass was caught near the Sindh border as he was making his way to Karachi for a visit. He is said to have beenbetrayed by a Quettabusinessman by thenameof Ghulam Dastagir whohadclaimedtobe asympathizerbutwasinfactinthe payoftheintelligence services.467InArmycustodyyoungJohnnywassobadlytorturedthathediedsoon after. Sadly, to this very day his parents, my dear friends Air-Commodore Balwant and Mavis Dass, have no knowledge about where their eldest son was buried.

I suppose a large numberof peoplewould have calledJohnny 'a traitor', but to him and hiscompanionswhatsomemembersofthePakistanArmyhaddonetothemajority civiliansofEastPakistanwouldprobablyhavebeendeemedtobeagreaterformof 'treason'.Isupposeabstractconceptssuchas'patriotism'arelargelyamatterof individual perception. WhatJohnny Dass and his companions considered tobe a better futureforhiscountrymenwas,Isuppose,hisversionofPakistani'patriotism'-even thoughitwentagainstthemajorityheldview.Filledwiththeidealisticenthusiasmof the young he had chosen to leave the comforts of his privileged existence and fight for therightsofwhathebelievedweretheoppressedpeople.Intheendhe madethe ultimatesacrificeforhisbeliefsfightingwithcourageandcommitmentagainstinjustice and oppression.

***

In August 1974 a BSO student named Majid died in a grenade explosion during a failed attempttoassassinateBhuttoinQuetta.IwastolaterlearnthattheAfghanshad trained a team of Baloch extremists to kill Bhutto during his visit to the province. Majid must have been a member of that team. Sadly, by now the Balochistan situation hadbecomeaplaygroundforcompetingregionalinterests.Afghanistan,assistedbyUSSR,

467ThispersonissaidtohavealsolaterarrangedAsadullahMengal'sassassinationandAhmedShahKurd'smurder.

wishedtoconvertwhathadbeenpurelyanactoftribalresistanceagainstfederal despotismintoawarofliberation.AfghanistanhadalongheldenmitywithPakistan overtheDurandLineissueandthesituationinBalochistanprovideditwithan opportunitytosettleoldscores.TheUSSR'srolewasmoreambivalent.Despitethe contentionofthoseconvincedthattheRussianwishedtograbBalochistanintheir century-longobsessiontofind awarmwater port,theUSSRplayed arelatively minor roleinthecourseofevents.FutureeventswouldonlyprovethattheUSSRwasmore concernedwithprotectingitssoftunderbelly -theCentralAsianRepublics-fromthe threatenedinflux ofradicalIslamicinfluence fromthe south.The USSRwasclearly alliedtoPakistan'srivalsintheregion-IndiaandAfghanistan-andassuchwasina positiontoofferthemassistancewhenevercalledupon.ButAfghanistanwasnotthe onlyplayerinBalochistan.Iran'sMuhammadRezaPahlaviwasalsodeterminedto make his own forceful imprint on the region.

Muhammad Reza's grandfather had been an illiterate peasant named Savad-Kuhi who hadjoinedtheArmyasanordinarysoldier.468HisfatherRezaKhanhadjoinedthe PersianCossackBrigadeasanilliterateboyoffourteenwhorosetotherankofacolonel before forcingAhmedShah,thelastQajarruler,toappointhimcommanderofthe Cossack Brigadein1921andafewdayslatercommanderofallthe PersianArmed Forces.469WithinfiveyearsRezaKhanhaddeclaredhimselfShahenshahofIran.Hisson, MuhammadRezawas,unlikehisfather,weakandhesitantandacutelyawareofhis family'shumbleorigins.Afterinitialpoliticalsetbacksinthe1950s,hetriedtoovercome hisinherentinadequaciesby usingdespotism,grandiose gold-braideduniformsand theatricalpomp-anestimated$300millionwasspentonstagingtheextravaganza celebratingthe'2,500thanniversaryofIranianMonarchyatPersepolisin1971'.470With theexplosionofoilpricesintheearly1970sIransuddenlyacquiredenormouswealth andasadirectconsequence,MuhammadRezafoundhimselfpropelledontothe internationalstage.Takinguponhimselfthetaskofbecomingtheregion'spolicemanhe startedtoseethreatseverywhere.Henowfearedthatthe'contagion'ofBaloch nationalismacrossIran'seasternbordersmightspreadsecessionismwithinIranianBalochistan.

In 1973 the Shah had told a New York Times columnist C. L. Sulzberger: 'If Pakistan disintegrates another Vietnam situation could develop. We must see to it that Pakistan doesn't fall to pieces. This would produce a terrible mess, an Indochina situation of newandlargerdimensions.Idreadtothinkofit.'AccordingtoSulzbergertheShahmadeit

468RyszardKapuscinski,ShahofShahs,HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1882.p.18.

469SandraMackey,TheIranians,Dutton,USA,1996.p.166.

470Ibid., p. 236. (At this gathering of Heads of States and governments. General Yahya Khan is said to have caused muchembarrassmentbyhisexcessivedrinking.Inanattempttoprecludehim from attendingthemainfunctionan attempt was made to hide his dress clothes.)

clear that if Pakistan fell apart he planned to 'seize [Balochistan] before anyone elsedoes'.471

ItisbelievedthatitwaslargelyasaresultoftheShah'smilitaryassistancethatthetide ofwarchangedintotheArmy'sfavor.Inmid-1974IransentthirtyAmerican-made HueyCobrahelicoptergunshipsalongwiththeirIranicrewtoPakistan.Developedfor theVietnamwartheCobragunshipshadformidablefirepower,whichincludeda20mmcannonwhichspewedout750roundsaminute.Previouslythetroopsattempted to block off guerrilla escape routes by concentrating soldiers at key points on the trails. Thesetacticswereeasilyovercomebytheguerrillaswhousedtheirsuperior knowledge oftheterrain.WiththeCobragunshipstheArmycouldsendthemaheadofthe guerrillas sealing off their escape.

WiththepossessionoftheCobragunshipstheArmyplannedanewcampaign.Once againitchosethefifty-square-mileareaoftheChamalangValley.Thevalleyprovided rich grazing pasture for the Marri nomadic tribesmen. In the summer of 1974 a much greater than normal number of Marris had moved to the pastures of Chamalang. WithmanyofthemeninthehillsresistingtheArmypresencealargecontingentofolder men, women and children had joined the other nomads in the valley. These people had sought,whattheybelievedwas,arefugefromtheincessantCobragunshipattacksin the highlands. The Army now decided to take advantage of the presence of this large concentrationofMarrifamiliesandlaunchedOperationChamalangon3September 1974. By attacking the tent villages of their families the Army hoped to lure the fighting tribesmen down from the hills. The strategy worked and thousands of armed Marrispoureddownfromthehillstodefendtheirwivesandchildren.

TheMarritribesmendefendedthemselveswiththeirsimpleDarra-made303Lee Enfields^472andusedthemountainouslandscapesurroundingthevalleytothebestof theiradvantage.Itissaidthattheyfoughtforthreeconsecutivedaysandnights, braving-heavyartilleryandmortarfireandrelentlessattacksbytheinvulnerableCobra gunships.Finally,findingthemselvesoutofammunitiontheyhadlittlechoicebutto retreat and escape into the hills.

It was the turning point in the guerrilla war. The Marris, along with the Parari guerrilla force,never really recovered from the incident...

Armyaccountsclaimthat125guerrillaswerekilledand900captured,and independentestimatessuggestthatatleast50,000sheepand550camelswere capturedatChamalangandauctionedoffbythearmyatbargainpricestonon-

471C.L.Sulzberger,'BeliefinCrudeReality',NewYorkTimes,22April1973.

472These rifles were of a local and hand-made manufacture and came' Darra Adam Khel, a town in NWFP knownfor producing such weapons.

BaluchinthePunjab.TheBaluchminimizetheirownlossesandclaimtohave killed 446 Pakistani soldiers.473

TheincidentatChamalangwasanotherblotinthehistoryofourcountry.Therewas never any attempt by the Marris to secede from Pakistan. Faced with unjust despotism ofthecentralgovernmentinIslamabadthesesimpletribesmenreactedintheonly mannerinwhichtheyknewhowto.Theytooktheirriflesandtooktothehillsto defendthemselvesagainstwhattheyperceivedasunwarrantedaggression.Usingthe controlledmediaIslamabadplayedontheemotionsofanaivepopulacebypaintingthe disgruntledBalochastraitors.TheMarris,largelyoftheBijaraniclan,werenolonger treatedasanordinaryBalochtribebutbrutallysetuponasiftheyweremembersof somerevolutionarypoliticalmovement.NodoubtthePararisofBalochistanwerean insurgentforcebuttheirnumberswerefew.BypushingtheMarristothebrinka guerrillaarmywasneedlesslycreated.ThePakistanArmy,nothavinglearntany lessons from East Pakistan, was once more used as an adjunct of oppression and asked todeal withthisnew setof 'traitors'. Intheend thousandsof Marris, haplesscitizensof Pakistan,foundthemselvesdestitute,homelessandinexilewhentheyeventually crossed the border and sought sanctuary in Afghanistan.

***

On2September,threedaysaftermymeetingwithBhuttoand,coincidentally,aday before Operation Chamalang was launched,I visited Attaullah Mengal at Sahiwal Jail. He was not in good health and complaining about pain in his chest because of his heart problem. We discussed the Balochistan situation in detail. Attaullah mentioned that he haddemandedageneralamnestyforallpoliticalprisonersinPakistanfromthe government. He confided that if that was not forthcoming he would settle for a general amnestyinBalochistan.Bothofuswereinagreementthattherewasacompleteabsence offoreignpressureonBhuttootherwisehewouldnothavebehavedcold-bloodedly towardsBalochistan.IfoundAttaullahperplexedatBhutto'sinsistence onregularly sendingemissariestomeetwithhiminjail.Neitherofuswerecompletelysurewhether Bhuttowasseriousinhisintentions.Overthemonthstherehadbeenmanynegotiations and hestill had notmadeasinglegenuinegesturewhichwould haveindicated honesty ofpurposeAttaullahfeltthatitseemedmoreasifBhuttowassendingpeopletomeet withhimsothathecouldreceiveeye-witnessaccountsofAttaullah'sstayinjail.Washe really expectingtheBalochleaderstosuccumbunderpressure?Suchaneventwas highly unlikely. Or else, given Bhutto'spropensity for taking pleasure in making people suffer,hejustsavoredhearingthenewsrelatedtohimbyhismessengers.Duringmy visitAttaullah made itcleartome thathe was in noposition toconsider the idea of any settlement,evenifitwerepossible.Beforemakingeventhevaguestofcommitmentshe

473SeligS.Harrison,InAfghanistan'sShadow,op.cit.,p.38.

would have to make prior consultations with his other colleagues as well as the Baloch fightinginthehillsandbearingthebruntofthegovernment'sharshdiktat.

The next day I went by road to Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) Jail. The Jail Superintendent made me waitoveranhourbefore I couldmeetKhairBukshMarri.I foundKhairBukshinabittermood.HetookpleasureinmakingthePunjabiSuperintendentwho insistedonbeingpresentatourmeeting-squirmbyheapinginsultsuponhim.Like Attaullah,KhairBukshwasinsistentthattherewasnoquestionofasettlementwithout taking-theviewsofhismenfightinginthehillsintoaccountbutwassurprisingly agreeable to the idea of an honorable solution, if one could be found. He talked a great deal which was unlike his usilal self. Though I found him quite adjusted to the rigours of jail life but, he admitted to me that he found himself lonely and 'bottled up'.

ThatverydayItravelledfromLyallpurtoMianwalitomeetwithGhousBukshBizenjo. Iwasquitesurprisedtofindhimwaitingcheerfullyforme inaguesthouseoutsidethe jail. He seemed to be better looked after than either of his other two colleagues. A lavishteawassoonservedtousandwesatdownforalengthychatwhichlastedforabout two hours. He told me 'that under the circumstances Bhutto could have been the best person for all of us but instead he has chosen to try to destroy us'. Bizenjo was very agreeabletotheideaofanhonorablesettlementbutwasinsistentthatfirstthe agreementreachedatMurreebeimplemented,politicallydetainedprisonersbe releasedinBalochistanandthetotalwithdrawalofthearmyfromtheprovince.

ItneedstobementionedthatatthetimeofmymeetingwithBhutto,hemusthavebeen wellawareoftheArmy'splansinChamalang.OnthedayImetKhairBukshandBizenjotheArmyoperationhadbeen fullycommenced.Unknowntousaswetalked, tribesmenandwomenwerebeingstrafed,mortaredandrocketedinChamalang.The questionneededtobeaskedastowhydidBhuttoaskmetomeettheleadersatthis particularmoment?Wasitanexercisetodeludeusintoafalsesenseofsecurityand thenbehitbyaharddoseofmilitaryreality?OnlyBhutto,whowasaknown Machiavellian by nature, knew the answer.

News of the Chamalang incident reached me late. I had spent a week in Sonmiani, and foundmyself-aswasthecaseinthosedayswithouttelephones,newspapersoreven electricity completely cut off from all but urgent telegrams, which would take a couple ofdaystoreach.ItwasonlywhenIreachedKarachion18SeptemberthatIwas informed by Ahmed Raza Kasuri that the Army had occupied Chamalang. He told me thatabout800Marrisandover200soldiershadbeenkilledinthefighting.474Iwas shattered by the enormity of the event.

474Kasuri's initial estimate was later contradicted by more reliable reports from Quetta. A few days later when Ahmed Nawaz Bugti returned from Quetta he told me that 280 Marris had been killed and 130 injured. According to him, a further42 hadbeen takenprisonerand about800 women andchildren hadbeenforciblydetainedin a

AdaylateratanIftarpartyImetayoungArmycaptainwhoproudlyinformedmethat theArmyhadwonatremendousvictoryatChamalang.Accordingtohimthesoldiers hadkilled150Marris,whilelosingonly18menincludingaGCGS.Itseemedthe numberofkilledchangeddependingonwhomyoutalkedwith.

AtKarachi,GhulamFaruqueKhanbroughtamessagefromWaliKhanforme.TheNAPleaderhadexpressedhisconcernatnewsoftheBalochistanmassacreandwished to let me know that he believed a delegation of Opposition leaders should meet with PresidentFazalEllahi,GeneralTikkaKhanandtheNationalAssemblySpeaker.Tome thismannerofprotestseemedabitweakinviewoftheenormityofevents.Overthe next few days I helda series of meetings with other Opposition leaders, includingProfessorGhafoorandMaulanaNoorani,toconvincethemthatstrongermeasureswere called for.

On29September1974aspecialUDFAction Committeewasheldat Karachi forwhich Wali Khan, Mufti Mahmood, Arbab Sikandar and others arrived in Karachi. At thecommittee meetingDr. Hai,the MNA from Balochistan suggestedthat the UDFshould focusonmusteringsupportinLahoreandfromstudentbodies.MuftiMahmoodand PirPagarowereoftheopinionthattheOppositionleaderstourPunjabandcanvas supportthere.IopposedtheseideasandinsteadinsistedthattheUDFleadership should go directly to Quetta. I was all in favour of defying the Section 144 in force at the timeinQuetta,andproposedleadingpublicagitationagainsttheslaughterofthe Marris.Iwasconvincedthatourarrestswouldopenlydemonstrateoursolidaritywith theplightofthehaplesstribesmen.MuftiMahmmodandNooraniexpressedtheir inability for the moment to leave for Quetta and suggested that we all meet there by 8 October. I was disappointed by the delay but by then it had been decided to go toIslamabad to try and enlist support of the foreign governments by meeting their representatives in Islamabad.

On 2 October the UDF Action Committee held a press conference. I had helped draft a telegram on behalf of the committee which was sent a few days later to President Fazal Ellahi and to the Army and Air Force Chiefs. In the telegram we referred to the 'indiscriminate shelling, strafing and killing by the Pakistan Army and Air Force ofinnocentinhabitantsincludingwomenandchildren'as'nothingbutgenocide'.We addedthat'itappearsthatnolessonhasbeenlearntfromthetragedyofEastPakistan'.475

Wethenpersonallyhandedoveraspeciallypreparedsixpagedetailedmemorandum totheheadsofallthediplomaticmissions,aswellastheIslamicSecretariat.Wemadeit

concentrationcampHashimGilzai,whoalsoreturnedfromQuetta,submittedareporttotheUDFon29 September that about 400 Marris had been killed and 100,000 head of livestock forcibly confiscated.

475ExcerptsfromthetelegramssenttotheChiefsofStaffofthePakistanArmyandAirForceon7October1974.

clearwhywefeltitnecessarytoapproachthemdirectly.'Asnearlythewhole information media in the country are controlled by the regime, it was impossible for the democratic opposition to get the truth across to the world or even make an effective rebuttal of the falsities spread by the regime within the country and abroad.'476Our groundsforapproachingthemontheBalochistanissueweremadeclear:

[We are] convinced that this is no longer an internal issue - the fact that Prime MinisterBhutto hadalreadymade it an internationalissuewhen hetookthe foreign ambassadors to Baluchistan - but one that involves the violation of the internationally recognized norms of civilized behavior and of human values as universally recognized.477

TheMemorandum,besidesbeingdetailedandlengthy,wasextremelyhardhitting.It gave a detailed accountof the deaths and deprivation thatwas taking place throughout Balochistan,whilehighlightingtherecentArmyandAirForceactionsatChamalang. Mention wasalsomade of the thousandsof women and children whowerelanguishing inconcentrationcampssetupinKohlu,Loralai,Chamalangandotherplacesin Jhalawan.Noticewasalsogivenaboutthe unnecessarilycruelactofblockadingthe MarriandJhalawanareasandstoppinggrainandotherfooditemswhichwas responsibleforcasesofstarvationandmalnutritionamongthelocalpopulation.The widespread useof torture to extractinformation was also communicated to them.

On3October1974,earlyinthemorningat6.45a.m.,Ireceivedanunexpectedvisit from Zafar Ansari and Altaf Hussain Qureshi, owner editor of theUrdu Digest. At this earlyhourAnsarisuggestedtomethatIaccompanythemtomeetwithBhuttoin connectionwithasettlementonBalochistan.BynowAnsariwasnolongerareliable memberoftheOppositionandIprivatelyheldseriousdoubtsabouthissenseof commitment. I politely refused their offer.Thevery nextday I received atelephonecall from Mustafa Sadiq, owner of a rightwing daily newspaper, asking me to participate in findingapeacefulsolutioninBalochistan.ItbecameapparentthatSadiq,alongwith Ansari and Qureshi were all acting on the government's specific instructions. All three had by now established close links with Khar.

We,attheUDF,hadalreadynotifiedallthe foreignmissionsthattheUDFleadership wouldbecallingonthemon7October.Soonwehadlearntthatthegovernmenthad contacted all the missionsand told themin nouncertain termsthatit would considerit to be an 'unfriendly act' if any of them received the UDF leaders. Early in the morningof7OctobertheHungarianAmbassadorunexpectedlycalledonmetoexpresshis regretsthatneitherhenortheUSSRandCzechoslovakianAmbassadorscouldreceive usattheirembassies.Itbecameobvioustousthatthegovernment'sthreathadworked.

476'MemorandumsubmittedtotheHeadsofDiplomaticMissionsinPbytheActionCommitteeoftheUnited Democratic Front-UDF - on the situation of Baluchistan', 7 October 1974, p. 1.

477Ibid.,p.1.

WeproceededwithourscheduleandcalledontheembassiesoftheUnitedStates, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia and Iraq. We werereceivedatthesemissionsandweregivenapatienthearingafterwhichwe handed them each a copy of our memorandum on Balochistan.

The next day I flew to Quetta along with the other UDF leaders. On our flight we were accompaniedbyPPP'sNasimAhmed,SecretaryInformation,whowastakingalarge group of foreign journalists to Balochistan.478It was an obvious move on the part of the governmenttorefutetheOpposition'sMemorandumonBalochistan.479AtQuettawe met a number of Marris who complained that as their women and children were fleeing from the Army they had been set upon by some local Pathan tribesman who had beaten themanddeprivedthemofalltheirlivestock.Iwasappalledtohearofthisandfeltthat itwasanactworthyofscavengingbeasts.WaliKhanassuredthemthathewouldtry and help them out.

On11October,theOppositionheld a large publicmeeting atQuettatocommemorate BalochistanDay.Anumberofusaddressedthe crowd,including WaliKhan,Mufti Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor, Ali Ahmed Marri and myself. Mufti Mahmood's speech wasparticularlyinsultingtowardsBhutto,heridiculedhimmercilesslymuchtothe crowd'sdelight.ThefollowingdayIreturnedtoKarachiinadespondentmood.ThoughIfeltthatIhaddoneasmuchasIcouldtohelptheBalochcause,itdidnot seem enough. The suffering still continued relentlessly.

On 15 October a special news bulletin on Balochistan appeared on the television atBhutto'sinstructions.Itwasannouncedthat5000Balochinsurgentshadsurrendered andtheresthadbeengiventwomonths,until15December,tolaydowntheirarms.It was noticeable that no mention was made about the detained political leadership of the province.FourdayslaterIreceivednewsthatanArmyBrigadehadjustbeenbeaten backbytheMarris.Havingsufferedover60casualties,theArmyCommandhadtouse a force of full division strength to regain their lost territory. It was apparent that thoughtheMarrishadbeenbadlymauledatChamalangthefighthadnotyetgoneoutofthem. In fact they continued skirmishing for another twelve months before most of them withdrew across the border into Afghanistan.

478Nasim Ahmed wasthe newly appointed Federal Secretary Information. Previously he had been Dawn'sreporter in London and was rewarded for services rendered to Bhutto.

479Two days later on 10 October tie team of foreign journalists met with the Opposition and told us that they had been taken by helicopter to the Marri town of Kohlu wherethey interviewed AliGul Tungiani, a local Marri leader, who hadspoken totheminBalochi. They playedtherecorded interviewon theircassetterecorder andprovided us the officialtranslationofAliGulTungiani'sspokenBalochi. Thereweremajor discrepanciesbetweenwhatTungiani had said and the written version. We helped correct it. Ali Ahmed Khan, Khair Buksh Marri's brother, who had managed to escape from Kohlu a few days earlier, provided the journalists with a graphic description of the true state of affairs in the Marri area.

On 20 October the government published its White Paper on Balochistan. It was adocument which served to mislead rather than to provide any accurate or unbiased information. It blandly stated that 385 Baloch 'insurgents' had been killed - a gross underestimate.Thereportclaimedthatafurther5501hadsurrendered-aclaimthat was highly questionable. It insisted that the situation in Balochistan was now normal - which I knew to be a complete fallacy. Further, it announced that the Army force would soonbewithdrawn-anexerciseincompletemendacity.TheArmywastoeventually leave well after Bhutto's overthrow.

***

Ihaddecidedtotakeabriefbreakfrompoliticalactivity.Therewasaparliamentary delegationgoingtoAustraliaandNewZealandandIhadbeeninvitedtojoinitas deputy-leader. While I declined the offer of becoming the deputy-leader, I decided that asthetripwasaparliamentaryoneandhadnoofficialconnectionwiththe government,therewouldbenoharminparticipatinginitasarepresentativeofthe opposition. Though I had left with the permission of the leaders of the Opposition, my decisionhaditscritics.IlaterlearntthatwhileIwasaway,MaulanaNoorani,among others,hadbeentellingpeoplethatIhadsoldoutandjoinedhandswiththegovernment.

InAustraliawefirstvisitedCanberraandmettheprimeministerandahostof parliamentarians,andthenweretakenforanextensivetourofthecountry.Afterten fairly hectic officially organized days we left for New Zealand. Arriving in Wellington I was pleasantly surprised to see my son waiting to receive me at the airport along with the officially organized reception. Shehryar, had taken a short break from studying for his impending law exams to drive four hundred miles from Auckland to New Zealand's capitalcitytoreceiveme.AfterthetourofficiallycametoanendatAucklandI continuedmystaythereprivately. Besideshavingmysonatauniversitythere Igota chancetospendtimewithmyoldfriendKenRutland.Kenhadactedasguardianfor ShehryareversincehehadarrivedinNewZealandasathirteen-year-oldschoolboy. Not only is New Zealand a truly beautiful country, it is also one of the most egalitarian democraciesintheworld.TheNewZealandprimeministerwasprovideda governmentchauffeured car onlyfor officialduties. Therestof the time he had todrive hiscararoundhimself.Whenhetravelledbyair itwasalwaysona commercialflight andhehadtocarryhisownbriefcaseasnoflunkiesweremadeavailableforhim.Attheotherendhewouldbemetbyjustanotherchauffeurwhowouldtakehimtohis placeofbusiness.Therewerenoflags,policeescorts,sirensorothertrappingsof. pomposity. After Bhutto's Pakistan it was refreshing to be in such a place.

IreturnedtoPakistanattheendofNovemberandby2Decemberwasbackin Islamabad.I was met at the airport by Wali Khan andwe went directly to Sihala to meettheBalochleaders.Ispentanumberofdaysinregularattendanceatthetrial.Ofone

occasionIdrovetotheirdetentioncentrehopingtomeetAttaullahandKhairBuksh, but was denied permission by the authorities. After the Chamalang incident I had lost all hope inBhutto. Whileat Islamabad Iwas invited to attend a dinnerforBhutto given by Hafiz Pirzada. I avoided it by flying to Karachi that same evening.

A few days later, on 22 December, I received a telephone call from Bhutto. As usual he soundedasfriendly asever.Itwasas ifnothinghadeverhappened. Heinformedme that hewas planning tofly to theUS andCanada in February 1975 and wanted me to accompanyhim.Ideclinedhisinvitationmuchtohissurprise.Ratherthantakemy answeratfacevalueheaskedmetothinkitoverforacoupleofdays.Theverynext eveningIreceivedacallfromAghaShahi,theForeignSecretary,Heaskedmeto confirmmyplansfortheUSandCanada.ItoldhimthatIhadalreadydeclinedthe invitation.Afew dayslater ImetHafiz Pirzadaandtoldhimtoconveymyregretsto BhuttoasIhadnointentionofparticipatinginanystatevisituntiltheBalochistanissue was resolved. Two days later on 28 December, I had just arrived in my family town of RojhanwhenIreceivedanurgenttelephonecallfromAftabSohail,thePrimeMinister's Secretary.Hewishedtoenquireaboutmydecisionontheoverseastrip.ItoldhimthatI haddeclinedandhadalreadyconveyedmyregretsthroughHafizPirzada.ThoughI wassurprisedathispersistenceinexpectingmetochangemymind,heseemedequally surprised at my refusal to accompany his boss.

On21January1975aUDFmeetingwasheldatZahoorEllahi'splaceinIslamabad.It wasdecided virtually unanimously thatinfuturenoneof theUDF partieswould bother participating inby-elections. The decisionwas based on the simple premise that as the governmenthad beenconsistently manipulating theresultof every by-electionsofarit was pointless to participate in them. Further, we felt that by boycotting these elections theresultswould berenderedmeaninglessandbereftoftrueelectoral legitimacy. The onlypartywho disagreed withthis decision wasMaulanaNoorani andhisJUP.Their oppositiontothisproposalhadbeenvehement.Havingfailedtoconvincetheother members of the UDF of their viewpoint, the JUP withdrew temporarily from the UDF. Theyputuptheircandidatesintheby-elections,butlostmiserablybecauseofthe massive rigging, This was the first crack within the Opposition alliance.

***

On8February1975myeldestsonSherazamtoldmethathehadjustheardontheradio that Hayat Muhammad Sherpao, the PPP Senior Minister of the NWFP had been killed inabombexplosionatPeshawarUniversity.ThenewssaddenedmeasIhadmet Sherpao on a few occasions and had found him to be very personable.

There are many theories about who arranged his assassination. One theory that cannot easilybedismissedwasthatithadbeencarriedoutonthedirectinstructionsof Sherpao'sownleaderBhuttohimself.ItisaknownfactthatbeforehisdeathSherpao

hadbecomeverydisenchantedwiththeleaderhehadoncehero-worshipped.Bhutto hadnoticedSherpao'sgrowingpopularityandhadcometoresentitandhadbegun politicallysidelininghimateveryavailableopportunity.EvenoneoftheirclosePPP colleagues commented:

A fewmonths before his death,[Sherpao]seriously consideredleavingthe Party altogether.He only changedhismindonthe persuasionofmyselfandother friendsfromtheFrontier...OfallthosearoundZAB,Sherpao'spersonaldevotionhadbeenthegreatest,andhissubsequentdisillusionmentwas consequently the most profound.480

Having alienated Sherpao,Bhuttohad probably littleuseleftfor him. Whenacampaign ofbombblastsbeganintheNWFPBhuttoevensentRafiRazatoPeshawartoaccuse the senior minister ofmasterminding the bombings.Itisironical thatthe verynextday Sherpao met his end in a bomb explosion.481

ThedeathofSherpaoprovidedBhuttowithanexcusetoclampdownonWaliKhan andhisNAP.ItwaseerilyreminiscentofthedismissaloftheBalochistanGovernment onthetrumpedupchargeofbeingresponsibleforthearmsfoundintheIraqiEmbassy in February 1973, two years previously. The day following Sherpao's assassination, Wali Khan and all the national and provincial leaders of NAP were either under detention or beingurgentlysoughtoutbytheauthorities.ThenextdayitwasannouncedthatNAP had been banned and all its assets confiscated. The First Amendment to the 1973 Constitution allowed the Federal Government to ban political parties formed or those 'operatingina mannerprejudicialtothesovereigntyorintegrityofPakistan'.482

Ontheeveningof10FebruaryIgotacallfromJenniferMusafromBalochistan,who had been a NAP MNA, from Islamabad. She told me that over 800 of the NAP partymembershadbeenarrested.ShealsoinformedmethatanOrdinancehadbeenpassed intheAssemblywhichallowedforthearrestofMNAswhiletheAssemblywasin session.Previously,itwasnotpermissibletodetainMNAsduringasession,norduring a ten-day period prior to and following a session. It had become obvious that the governmenthadbegunanintensifiedassaulttodestroyallvestigesoftheNAP.A brutalcampaignhadbeguntopinSherpao'sdeathonNAPpartymembers.Anumber of them, including Asfandyar, Wali Khan's eldest son, were very brutally tortured in an attempttoextract'confessions'.483IwasverytroubledtolearnofAsfandyar'sfate. Earlier,in1974,hehadaccompaniedhisfatherononeofourtripstoBalochistan.Igot

480RafiRaza,op.cit.,p.300.

481Ibid.,p.275.

482Constitution(FirstAmendment)Act, 1974, (ActXXXIIIof1974)ofPakistanExtraordinary, Part1of8May1974,

Section4.

483Not surprisingly these savage acts of brutality would lead Wali Khan his family to view Bhutto and his PPP with enduring animosity for many years to come.

to know him well, finding him to be a very likeable and upright young man. It certainly seemedasifBhuttowasclearlyouttosettlescoresasvindictivelyaspossible.Afew dayslatertheNWFPGovernorAslamKhattakandtheGandapurGovernmentwerealso sacked and the Federal Government imposed its direct rule in the province.

On18Februaryat1a.m.Iwaswokenupbyatelephonecallfromaverydistraught Mrs.AzizullahShaikh.Herhousewasbeingstonedbyhooligans.Herhusbandhadgone into hiding to evade arrest, and she was alone at home with her three young daughters. I took my son Sherazam and a couple of our servants and rushed over to her house within minutes of receiving her call for assistance. Upon reaching there we saw a dozenorsothugsfleeingintothesurroundingdarknesswhentheysawourcar approach.InsidewediscoveredMrs.Shaikhandherthreeteenagedaughterscowering in the corner of a room. The idea that a government could stoop so low as to threaten a defenselesswomanandheryoungdaughterssickenedme.MysonandIkeptanall nightvigilandleftonlyafterthesunemerged.Thoughacomplaintwaslodgedwith the local police station, it seemed of no significance as I suspected there was little thepolice would do in the circumstances.

Allthe Oppositionpartieshadunanimously agreedtoboycottallfurtherAssembly sessions in protest againstthe banning of the NAP. In the meanwhile some members of theUDFhadmadeattemptstogetBhuttotoadoptalessantagonisticapproachtowards thebannedparty.Buton12March,ProfessorGhafoorcalledonmetosaythattheir talkswithBhuttohadbeenquiteunsuccessful.Somedayslater,on21March,Iattended a meeting of UDF leaders in Lahore. The mood was one of defiance.

WhileIwasatLahore,on22March,myfriendSadiqQureshicontactedmerequestinga meeting.Imethimlaterthatdayatmybrother,MirBalakhSher'shouse. Sadiqwasina very jovial mood and with good reason. As Inoted in my diary: 'Sadiq is chirpy as ever, seemsheisbecomingthenewchiefminister'.Hewasmadethechiefministerof Punjab, but only after Bhutto had formalized his plans for Punjab some months later.

FromLahoreI leftfor Islamabad. On25March, accompanied byJenniferMusa, I visited KhairBukshMarriandGhousBukshBizenjoatSihala-atthattimeAtaullahMengal wasstillatKarachi'scardiovascularhospitalundergoingtreatment.JenniferandI stayedaridhadlunchwiththetwoBalochleaders.IfoundbothKhairBukshand Bizenjo ina despondentframe ofmind. With thebanningoftheNAPit wasapparent thatchancesofapoliticalsolutionontheBalochistanissuehadbecomeevenmore bleak. But the despondency had donelittle to temper their defiant mood. I noticed that bothofthemexpressedalittledisillusionmentwithWaliKhanandtheNWFPmembers of NAP.It hadbeen nearly twentymonths since the Baloch triumvirate had been injail, andtheyprobablyfeltthattheirNAPcolleagueshadnotdoneenoughforthe Balochistan cause.

AtIslamabadtheOppositionleadersheldregularmeetingsaboutthelatestpolitical crisistoengulfus.On26MarchIfoundmyselfillandinbedattheMNAHostel. Shortly after the doctor left having examined me, Ghulam Faruque Khan came to visit. HeinformedmethatbothheandMuftiMahmoodwantedAbdulGhaffarKhan,the veteranPathanleader,toholddirecttalkswithBhuttoinanattempttonormalizethe turbulent political situation. I told him that such a meeting would not serve any useful purposebutGhulamFaruquewasadamantandwishedtopursuethematterfurther. ThateveningIwascontactedbyMuftiMahmoodwhosaidthathewasofftoSaudi ArabiawithBhuttotoattendShahFaisal'sfuneral^484andwouldreturnthefollowing day to discuss a matter of some importance. The following evening a meeting was held inMahmoodAliKasuri'sroomwhichwasattendedbysixteenOppositionmembers. LaterMuftiMahmoodcalledProfessorGhafoor,ZahoorEllahiandmyselfforaseparatemeetingtodiscussthepossiblityofGhaffarKhanmeetingwithBhutto.I voicedthesameopinionthatIhadearliertoGhulamFaruque,butaddedthatasthe actingleaderoftheOppositionhewasobviouslywelcometopursuewhateveraction he deemed suitable.

The followingday, 28March, Ileft forPeshawar alongwith GhulamFaruque Khan. The next day I attended a lunch given for me by Zubaida, who was married to an old school friendofmine,AzizKhanHoti.ThelunchwasalsoattendedbyZubaida'ssister, Naseern Wali Khan, and two of Wali Khan's daughters, Nasreen and Gulale. I had met Begum Wali Khan previously when her husband had invited me for a meal at his place. OnthisoccasionIofferedmypersonalsupporttothefamilyintheirtimeofextreme persecution. The ladies of the family had suffered immensely. Both Wali Khan and his son Asfandyar were in jail. Begum Wali's brother Azam - who was married to her step- daughterNasreen-hadescapedtoKabul.Theonlymalememberofthefamilystillwith them was her son Sangeen, as yet a teenager.

The banning of NAP found the UDFOpposition alliance in a weakened state of unity. UnderPirPagaro.thealliancelackedadeterminedleadership.Thesituationwas thrownintoanunexpectedfluxwhenon12May1975thegovernmentcontrolledPress announcedthatPagarowassteppingdownasleaderandthatIwasexpectedtotake overinhisplace.InKarachiTheStarcarriedthestorywithbannerheadlinesstating 'Sherbazlikelytobeelectednewchief.Theintentionofthenewsstorywas undoubtedlytocreatefurtherfissureswithintheweakeningalliance.Theitem mentionedtwoothercandidates-NawabzaNasrullahKhanandChaudhryZahoor Ellahi - but contended that the post of leader would 'go to Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari

... who has kept himself above party politicking'.485The story had no factual base and I immediatelyissuedadenialstating,'Afterseeingthesadspectacleofpeoplehankering forleadershipandpower,Iwouldmuchratherworkinthebackgroundquietlyand

484King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had been assassinated by a deranged nephew of his on the previous day, 25 March1975.

485TheStar,Karachi,12May1975.

without any fanfare'.486In reality both Zahoor Ellahi and I had refused to participate in theelectionsforpresidentofUDF.NawabzadaNasrullahremainedacontenderand canvassed strongly for the position. In the end few members favored Nasrullah Khan's candidature and Pir Pagaro was re-elected largely by default.

HavingbannedtheNAPthegovernmentwasrequiredunderlawtoreferitsdissolutionofthepartytotheSupremeCourt.Iattendedthefirstdayofthehearingon 16 June 1975 at Islamabad. Yahya Bakhtiar the prosecuting attorney launched whatseemed to me, a rather mean and vitriolic attack on the NAP leadership accusing it of working against the ideology of Pakistan. The second day of the Reference hearing was scheduledon19June,whichIalsoattended.OnthatdayWaliKhanwithdrewthe powerofattorneygiventohislawyers.Addressingthebenchhedemandedthe presenceinthecourtofallseniorNAPmembersdetainedbythegovernment,theright to keep lawyers of their own choice, the replacement of two of the judges who, in his opinion, had openly displayed partiality at the very commencement of the Reference hearing-namelyJusticesAfzalCheemaandGulMuhammadKhan-andfinallyhe askedtobeletoutonbail.Thebenchonlyacceptedoneofhisdemands.Thejudges agreed only to allow him to choose his own lawyers. While the court took much pain to distinguishtheReferencefromacriminaltrial,it,nevertheless,didnotbotherto separate the dissolution of the party from a trial of its leaders - all of whom were imprisoned. Wali Khan, finding this judicial attitude unacceptable to him, opted towithdraw from the case.

The government pressed ahead with its caseusing everything it could lay its hands on tohurl atthe NAP. Therewas noonelefttocounter their arguments in the court.In the absenceofdefencelawyersitwasleftsolelyuptothejudgestointerveneonthevalidity ofthegovernment'sargument.Ratherthanexercisejudicialimpartialitythecourt decidedtoacceptthegovernment'sevidenceandconclusionsinfull.Sooneven newspaper cuttings fromthe governmentcontrolled Press were submitted in evidence as'proofofNAP'ssecessionistintentions.Asoneforeignlegalscholarcommented:'The government'scasewasshaky;frequentreferencestotheissuenotwithstanding,its evidencewasRadioKabulinterceptions,foreignnewspaperclippingsandnon- contextual excerpts from NAP speeches.'487

The judges never bothered to challenge the validity or accuracy of the government's jumbledmixof'evidence'.InsteadtheyendedupbygivingYahyaBakhtiarandhis team acarte blancheto produce a mélange of selectively chosen bits and pieces of misinformation: '[The Court] generally accepted the government's case and remained atypicallysilentconcerningtutoredandoccasionallyabsentargument.NAPwasat

486Dawn,Karachi,15May1975.

487Paula R. Newburg,Judging the State-Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 153.

once equated with demands for secession and for national expansion.'488The decision which was announced four months later, at the end of October 1975, went completely inthe government's favor. Exercising a leap in convoluted logic, Chief Justice Hamoodur RahmanhadchosentoconstrueNAP'slonghelddemandforgreaterprovincial autonomyto benothingmorethan aclaim fora provincial'right ofself-determination withtherighttosecede'.489TheSupremeCourthadfallen preytoplayingitshistorical role-sincethedaysofJusticeMunirofaccedingdeferentially,yetagain,to-thewishes ofthegovernmentoftheday:'Thesumof[theSupremeCourt's]longjudgment...was to endorse the Prime Minister's contempt for political opposition.'490Later the controversial testimony obtained in the Reference would be introduced into theHyderabad Conspiracy Case under special rules of evidence and be treated as if it were nothingbutpureandunvarnishedtruth.Inrealityitwasacompletetravestyofjustice.

***

The UDFwascontemplatingwhethertodirectly involve itselfinthe Reference asa concernedparty.On19JuneIwenttoSihalatomeetAttaullahMengal,KhairBuksh Marri and Ghous Buksh Bizenjo to discuss the matter with them. All three commended Wali Khan for refusing to participatein the proceedings and madeit clear that they did notwishtheUDFtofightthecaseagainstthe government.LaterIconveyedtheirviews totheUDFmembership.IntheUDFattemptswerebeingmadetocollectfundsfor NAP'sdefenceasall itsassetshadbeen frozenaftertheparty wasbanned.For abrief period in July 1975 hopes were lifted. A letter arrived from Sirdar Daoud to Wali Khan inwhichtheAfghanPresidentstatedthatBhuttohadfinallyagreedtoreleaseallthe imprisonedNAPleadershipunderpressurefromUSAandIran.Intheendnothingever came of it.

In the meantime the strained relations between UDF and JUP continued. In July 1975 Maulana Noorani was successfully elected to the Senate. On 29 July I attended a UDF meeting at Lahore. In my diary I noted: 'same old complaints and recriminations'. Thepetty politicking continueddespite the precariousness of the Opposition's position.Iraised a firm objection to allowing Opposition members in the provincial assemblies to participate in the proceedings. In my opinion the Opposition boycott of parliamentary proceedings could not just be restricted to the National Assembly. At the end of themeetingitwasagreedthattheOppositionwouldcontinuetoboycottallby-elections muchtoMaulanaNoorani'sandtheJUP'schagrin.ByAugustJUP'scriticismsofthe UDFhadbecomequitenoticeableanditwasexpectedtoofficiallyannounceits departurefromtheOppositionalliance.On23AugustIhadalunchforMaulana

488Ibid.,pp.153-4.

489From Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman's judgment in Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Kashmir Affairs Islamabad v. Mr. Abdul Wali Khan MNA (Reference No. 1 of 1975) PLD 1975 Supreme Court 463.

490PaulaBewburg,ibid.,p.51.

Nooranitotry andhealthe riftbetweenJUPandthe UDF.Otherinviteesincluded Professor Ghafoor and Makhdoom Noor Muhammad, an Independent MNA and friend ofmine.FromourdiscussionitbecameobviousthatNooraniwasnotkeenfora settlement.ShortlyaftertheirdepartureIreceivedacallfromthePrimeMinister'sADC telling me that Bhutto was available to meet me the following day. I could not help but correct the ADC by reminding him that as I had not sought an interview with Bhutto, it wasmorelikelythatitwasBhuttowhoinfactwishedtomeetwithme.And,ifsuchwas the case, I would make myself available to meet with him.

Only twodaysearlier, on 21 Augustmy brother, Mir Balakh Sher had informed me that duringarecentmeetingwiththePrimeMinister,Bhuttohadspokenvery complimentarilyaboutme.Accordingtomy brother,Bhuttohadtoldhimthathestill consideredme tobe afriendof hisandregrettedthatsofarhe had beenunableto do anythingforme. Bhuttoinformedmybrotherthathewouldhavelikedtohaveseenme as the Chairman of the Senate or Speaker of the National Assembly. However, by now,it was difficult for me to take anything that Bhutto said too seriously. He had mastered the art of glib speech and whatever he now uttered, I suspected, was largely devoid of any trace of sincerity.

My meeting with Bhutto the following day lasted barely an hour. We discussed mainly threeissues:Balochistan,NAPandtheOpposition,andBangladesh.Forwhatitwas worth,ItoldhimfranklythatamorerationalapproachtobothBalochistanandthe Opposition would in the longer term be more beneficial for him as well as the country. His attitude was, as was usually the case, friendly. He gave the distinct impression that hevaluedmyadvice,thoughmyrecentexperienceclearlybeliedthatperception. RatherthantemperhisactionstowardsBalochistanandtheOppositionwith moderation, as I had repeatedly advised him over the months, he had ploughed ahead withapolicyofunyieldingaggression.Butashewastheonewhohadcalledforthe meetingthatday,Isawlittleharminputtingmyviewsacrossto himyetone moretime again.Onthisoccasion,foronce,Ialsotookadvantageofmymeetingwithhimand directlysolicitedforhisassistanceinamatterofmuchconcerntome.Afortnight earlier,my homedistrictofDera GhaziKhanhadbeen devastatedby floodsandover 80,000peoplehadbeenrenderedhomeless.IhadnoqualmsaboutaskingBhuttofor emergency fundsfor the helplessflood victims. He agreed tolook intothe matter onan urgent basis and the funds would soon be forthcoming.

TowardstheendofSeptember1975KharresignedfromthePPPandmademovesto join the ranks of the Opposition. Earlier on in mid-March he had been re-appointed GovernorofPunjab.Afterbarelytwomonthsinofficehisresignationwasreportedin thenewspapers,491buthecontinuedinhispostuntilBhuttofinallysackedhim,along withhisPPPrivalHanifRamaywhohadbeentheChiefMinisterofPunjab-inJuly

491TheStar,Karachi,12May1975.

1975.ConsideringmyfriendSadiqQureshihad'chirpily'beenexpectingtobemade chief minister as early as 22 March that year, it would appear that Bhutto had planned these moves month previously. Outwitted, now Khar wished to be taken into Pagaro's MuslimLeagueandcontestaby-electionforaPunjabprovincialseatfromLahore backed with UDF support. Khar's well-publicized intentions soon led to a crisis within the UDF.

On13OctoberIattendedaUDFmeetingat Lahore.Atthemeetingit becameapparent that a coterie of Punjabi politicians, including Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi, Nawabzada NasrullahandMalikQasim,wasstronglysupportingKhar'scandidature.Ifoundit difficult to control my anger and fiercely opposed their stand on this issue. Even if one chose to overlook Khar's contemptible behaviour while in power, the UDF hadunanimouslydecided-withthenotableexceptionofNoorani'sJUP-toboycottall future by-elections. Support for Khar in the forthcoming by-elections in Lahore would clearlymakeamockeryofthatdecision.ImadeitclearatthemeetingthatIwould resignifmembersoftheUDFactedincontraventionoftheirownearlierdecision.

Lessthanaweek earlier theUDF had refusedonprincipletosupport theJUPcandidate inaKarachiby-election.MaulanaNooranihadmadepersonalappealstoeachofus individuallytosupporthiscandidateHanifTayab,whowasbeingopposedbyPPP's Justice Noor-ul-Arfin and the Jamaat-i-Islami supported independent candidate, Abdus SattarEdhi.NooraniwaswellawareofUDF'sstandonparticipationinby-electionsand our negative response to him was made quite public on this occasion. In view of these circumstances,theinsistenceofsomeofPunjab'sUDFmemberstocircumvent establishedUDFpolicyandsupportKharwasinmyviewindisciplinedandtheir motives were questionable.

On 16OctoberKharhelda politicalrallyat Tajpura, Lahore.Ironicallyfor theman who had been instrumental in violently disrupting Opposition meetings, the same fate befellhim. A contingent of armed FSF men had been sent to obstruct the meeting. They raised slogansagainstKharandtriedtocreatedisorderbyfiringtear-gasshellsintothe crowd. In the ensuing confusion poisonous snakes were also let loose in the enclosure. Panicked by the snakes and tear-gas, the people fled causing an appalling stampede.Several people were killed and the meeting ended in a fiasco, even before the speeches could begin.492

Afewdaysearlier,duringthefirstweekofOctober,alargenumberofKhar'stoughs andotherassociates,suchasIftikharTariandMuhammadIrshad(bothofwhomhad been provincial ministers during Khar's administration), along with a few dozen others,hadbeenpickedupbytheauthoritiesandhadthensuddenlydisappearedwithout

492The next day, Barrister Azizuliah Sheikh was contacted by Akbar Bugti who had been present at Tajpuriin support of Khar. According to Akbar Bugti twenty-seven people had been killed that day. Twenty-four had died in the stampede, and the remaining three by the tear-gas canisters striking them.

trace.Monthslateritwasdiscoveredthattheyhadbeenimprisonedinaspecially constructed concentration camp set up in Dalai, Azad Kashmir. When the international organization,AmnestyInternational,approachedthefederallawminister,requesting their release, hedeniedallknowledgeof thedetentions. Hethen advised themthatifin fact thesepeople were being detained as alleged, a writ of habeas corpuscould notbe filed in the High Court as it would pertain to a matter beyond the limits of a Pakistani court's constitutional jurisdiction. Such a writ, he stated, could only be filed at the High Court in Azad Kashmir.493

After my stand attheUDF meeting, afew dayslater, on15October, Iwasinformed that Hafiz Pirzada had telephoned on three occasions in an attempt to contact me. He left a message saying that Bhutto was waiting to speak to me on an urgent matter. I decided toignorethemessageandheardnofurther aboutit.Three days latermy brother,Mir BalakhSher,telephonedme fromIslamabad,shortly afterattending ameeting with Bhutto. He told me that the Prime Minister was full of praise for me for 'sticking to my principles'andopposingmoveswithintheUDFtosupportKharintheby-election.It would prove to be the only time Bhutto approved of my view on principles.

***

On6October1975whileinMultanKaswarGardezitheformerSecretary-Generalof NAP, met me. He told me that his party colleagues had decided that in the event the Supreme Court upheld the Government's ban on NAP, a new party would have to beformed to replace it. He said that senior party members had been searching for a new leader to head this proposed political organization. According to him, they had already rejectedthelikesofMahmoodAliKasuriandChaudhryZahoorEllahi,andchosenme asaleaderoftheirchoice.NothavingtheslightestintimationofthisproposalIwas quite taken aback. I told Kaswar that I would have to consult with my colleagues in the Independent Group before giving him a proper answer. Four days later, on 10 October, Majid Mengal dropped in to see me with a message from Attaullah. He told me that the jailedBalochleaderkeenlywishedthat Iaccept KaswarGardezi'sproposalintheevent theNAP'sbanwasupheldin thecourts.

TowardstheendofthemonthwhenIreachedIslamabadtoattendtheAssembly-after theOppositioncalledoffitseightand-a-halfmonthboycottoftheproceedings- discussionsaboutthepossibilityofthenewpartybeganafresh.Ibegantoconsultsome of myOppositioncolleaguesabouttheproposal.Allof themshowed enthusiasmforthe idea particularly Professor Ghafoor Ahmed whose sincerity and integrity I had come to value.MycolleaguesintheIndependentGroupofMNAsallsupportedmewiththe exceptionofZafarAhmedAnsari.Hetoldmethatitwouldnotbefaironthem.My advicetohimwasthatifIdidgoaheadandformanewparty,allthattheindependent

493TheGovernmentWhitePaperonPerformanceoftheBhuttoRegimeVolumeIII,1979,p.51.

MNAs had to do was to politically disassociate themselves from me, and then follow a courseofactionwhich theythoughtwasbest forthem.

On 30 October 1975the SupremeCourt'sverdict on theReference came out, theCourt had,givenitsdisposition,notsurprisinglyupheldthebanontheNAP.Nowthe discussionsacquiredahighdegreeofearnestness.InmymeetingswithNAPmembers- including Kaswar Gardezi, Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, Jennifer Musa and Hashim Gilzai - I mademyviewpointascleartothemaspossible.Itoldthemthatasanindependent MNA I had enjoyed a great deal ofliberty and could act freely to suit my conscience. By joiningaparty-evenasitsleader-Iwouldbesacrificingmyindividualpolitical freedomwhichthenwouldbecomesubordinatedtotheparty'sconsensualviews. BeforeI could makeany commitment, I told them, I would havetodiscuss thepointsof policywithallthepeoplewhowishedtobecomepartofthispartyandwouldinsistthat some references to Islam be inserted. And, if I decided to accept their invitation of leadership,Iwouldnotcaretobeasimplefigureheadbutbeacceptedasitsfactual leader. I asked them to consider these conditions. I was told that there was nothing for them to consider, theywereall keen forme totake the responsibility.

On 31 October Mazhar Ali Khan, the prominent left-wing journalist, and Mahmood Ali Kasurivisitedmetodiscusstheformationofthenewparty.Mazharappearedkeenfor me to accept the leadership of the new party, but I sensed a note of wariness in Kasuri. Mazhar had told me that earlier the NAP leadership had approached Khar with the intentionofofferingtheleadershipoftheproposedpartytohim.Bothofthemhad turneddowntheoffer.NexttheyhadtriedChaudhryZahoorEllahibuthadmetwith the same result. None of these Punjabi politicians, according to Mazhar, would risk affiliatingthemselveswithapartywhichwasdeeplymistrustedintheirprovince.They all feared that it would mean certain political death for them. I then became the next alternative,achoiceMazharAliKhanclearlyseemedtoapproveofMahmoodAli Kasuri, on the other hand, appeared bitter about NAP. He maintained that despite their'left-wing pretensions NAP was in essence an insular Pathan party'. He stated that hefinally had to leave the party as 'they do not approve of anyone who does not toe their parochial party line'.

The pressure was on me to revive the NAP under a new party. Prominent NAP MNAs, suchasArbabJehangirandGhulamFaruqueKhan,andMPAs,suchasAkramKhan OmerzaiandKulsoomSaifullah,hadalreadydesertedthepartyandjoinedthePPP. Therewerefearsoffurtherdefections.By3NovemberIhadagreedtoheadthe formationofthenewpartyandameetingwascalledforinIslamabadtofinalizeits programme.Alargenumberofpeopleattended,includingAbdulKhaliqKhan(a defectingPPPMNA),JenniferMusa(MNA),MahmoodaSaleem(MPA),UmraoKhan (MNA), Amirzada Khan (MNA), Ghulam Ahmed Bilour (President, NAP, NWFP), and Naseem Wali Khan. As was common with most progressive partiesof those times, we hadoursmallshareoftheextremeleft.Atthemeetingoneortwooftheseleftistsraised

objection to my more moderate approach towards politics as expressed in a recent statement that I had made. Their views were drowned out by the vast majority of thosewho were assembled there.

On 5 November Bhuttotelephoned me in the evening while I was with General Jillani andNaseemWaliKhan.Hecongratulatedmeontheformationofthenewpartyand addedthatinviewofourrelationship'surelytheycouldhavefoundanotherscapegoat'. Reminded by Naseem Wali Khan's presence,I asked Bhutto to allow her to meetherhusbandwhomshehadnotbeenallowedtoseesincehisdetention.His exchangeofpleasantrieswithmedidnotextendthatfar.Afterprevaricatingforawhile he agreed though reluctantly.

Thenextday,on6November1975,theNationalDemocraticPartywasofficially launched at Islamabad. As I noted in my diary, it was an important day for me. In life oneoftensetsoffonanewandunchartedcoursewithoutreallyknowingitseventual destination. At that time,all I had was a clear conscience and an abiding faith in God- and that to my mind were enough to venture forth.

CHAPTER8

PNAandtheFateful1977Elections

MyfirstfewmonthsaftertheformationoftheNDPwerespentorganizingtheparty andrallyingoursupporters.ApartfromregularlytravellingtocitiessuchasLahore, Islamabad and Peshawar, now I had to include the smaller provincial cities and towns ofourfourprovinces.Mydiariesforthosedaysaredottedwithmeetingsatplacessuch asSukkur,Multan,Mardan,Abottabad,etc.Duringtheseinitialmonthsthegovernmentanditsmenials,notsurprisingly,doggeduseverystepoftheway. WhereverIwenttherewereintelligencepeoplefollowingmearoundtheclock.It seemed asif the new party had already begun to prey upon Bhutto's insecurities.

TheNDP'sfirstpublicmeetingwasscheduledtobeheldatKatrakHallbutthevenue wasclosedforusbythegovernmentsoanewmeetingplacewasfoundatBaldia Colony.The meeting went off very successfully.It was the first time that Naseem WaliKhan hadaddresseda public meeting.When herturn came we were allimpressedwith her powers of oratory. She undoubtedly possessed natural talent and gave a very convincingaccountofallthathadbefallenherandherfamily.Itevokedastrongchord ofsympathyfromthecrowdwhowerestillunaccustomedtobeingaddressedbya woman-thingstheywouldgrowaccustomedtoeventuallywiththepassageoftime. At that meeting little did we realize that her maiden speech was simply a start to her lengthypoliticalcareer.However,inthosedays,NaseemWaliKhanwasheavily coveredwithachaddur,andshetookmuchtroubletoexplainthatbeingaPathanlady shewasonlyappearinginpublicbecauseofthecompulsionofhercircumstances.I recall that she even stated that as soon as her husband was released from jail she would oncemorewithdrawtothesanctityofthezananah.Butthenpolitics,tobefairtothe lady, is nothing if not addictive.

OnourreturnfromBaldiaColonywefoundourrouteblockadedbythepolice.A numberofusmanagedtobreakthroughthepoliceblockadesbutSenatorHashim Gilzai (the leader of the Opposition in the Senate), who had been appointed NDP'sConvenorforBalochistanwasarrestedandchargedfordisobeyingSection144which had been imposed in the area prior to our visit. This harassment would continue. By theendof1975,withineightweeksofNDP'sformation,twenty-eightofitsmemberswould be under arrest.

On15November,anall-PakistanNDPconventionwasheldatmyhouseatKarachi. Peoplegatheredfromallprovincestoparticipateinit.UponformationoftheNDP,I hadbeenappointedtheparty'sConvenor.Itwasnowmytasktoassembleallits

leading members and chalk out a programme for the party. Committed as I was to the principlesofdemocracy,Iwaskeentoensurethat-atthisinitialstagebefore appointmentof party officials- all aspectsof party policy were openfor discussionand deliberation anddecisions were only madeby consensus. I was much heartened by the publicreactionwehadreceivedsofar.Itwasbecomingapparentthatwewere receiving anextremely favorable response fromdifferentareasof Pakistan. Lessthana month after the creation of NDP a political commentator noted:

Theswiftemergenceof NationalDemocratic PartyofSirdarSherbazMazarion thepoliticalscenemightbecausingconcerntotherulingparty.Theanimated response to Sirdar Sherbaz Mazari and Begum Wali Khan, particularly from the studentsandteachersofKarachiUniversityaswellastheBaluchandPukhtun sectionsofKarachi'steemingpopulation?isbeingtakennoteofbythehigh commandofthePeople'sParty.AccordingtooneNationalAssemblymember, theMuslimLeaguemightfindareadyresponseinthePunjab,butinSind, BaluchistanandtheNorth-WestFrontier,itmightwellbeSirdarSherbaz Mazari'spartywhichmightmakeheadway - ifpartypoliticsispermittedtogounhampered.

...accordingtosome[MNAs]fromSindh,theBaluchbiradariissingularly consciousofitspreponderancebothintheProvinceofSindaswellasthe NationalAssembly.Itmightcomeasasurprisetomany,butSirdarMazariand his National Democratic Party might find a response in Bahawalpur, parts ofMultan,andDeraGhaziKhandistrict,members[oftheAssembly]say.494

Inthemeantimeyetanothergovernment-Oppositioncrisishadtakenplace.WhileIwas attendingtheNDPconventionatKarachi,on14NovembertheOppositioncreatedan uproarinthe Assembly overthe government'sintroductionofthe proposedFourth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. Under the Amendment the government planned tofurthercurtailthewritjurisdictionoftheHighCourtsincasesofpreventive detention.Itthwartedthecourts'abilitytoprohibitsuchdetentionsorevengrantbailto peoplesodetained.Itwasclearlydirectedtowardsdisablingthecourtsfrom interveningincasesofblatantpoliticalvictimization.Intheensuingparliamentary commotionthesergeant-at-armswasorderedtoevicttheOppositionMNAsfromthe chamber. When the officers of the legislative body found themselves unable to comply withtheinstructions,FSFtrooperswerecalledin.These governmenthiredruffians bodily lifted eight struggling Opposition MNAs and dumped them unceremoniously in theNationalAssemblycarpark.AmongthevictimswastheactingLeaderofthe Opposition,MuftiMahmood.Itwasascandalousdisplayofunwarrantedaggression andonlyhelpedinfurtheringthegrowingbitterdividebetweenmembersofthe Opposition and Bhutto.

494AnisMirza,'RingingBellsandtalkofelections',Viewpoint,5December1975.

TheimminentintroductionoftheFourthAmendmentsoongalvanizedtheOpposition into trying to paper over their existing differences in an attempt at presenting a public displayofsolidarity.AsIhadparticipatedintheUDFasleaderoftheIndependent Group, my association with the Opposition alliance had effectively terminated with the creation of the NDP. While I was busy with the NDP convention, the UDF leaders had announced another boycott of the National Assembly proceedings. They then met in Islamabad to discuss how to deal with the government's intention to force the constitutionalamendmentthroughwithoutallowingforanydebate.

An interesting aspect of the PPP regime period can be gleaned from a secret intelligence reportsenttoBhuttobyhispersonalsecuritychief,AbdulHamidBajwaaboutthe UDF'sdeliberationsontheFourthAmendment.Thisreport,ofcourse,wasrevealedto the public only after Bhutto's fall.

Thereweredifferencesofopinion,aboutthefuturelineofaction,intheUDF. Majority were in favor of resigning their seats, from the Assemblies and then go out and work. The Parliamentary Party was not in favor of putting resignations, except Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi.

(Alongside this paragraph Bhutto wrote in his own hand: 'This majority should bebroken'.)

TheydecidedtoenlistthesympathiesofJamaat-i-IslamiandSherbazMazari Groupalso.ZahoorEllahithoughtthattheywillbeabletopersuade[Tehrik-i- Istiqlal] also to cooperate with them.

(AlongsidethisparagraphBhuttowroteseparately:'PleaseworkonSherbazMazari' and 'Please work on Mufti'.)

They could not, finally,decidetilllateevening lastnight, (they areagainmeeting todayandaccordingtoanunconfirmedreporthaveformedasub-committee, consistingofMuftiMahmood,ChaudhryZahoorEllahi,ProfessorGhafoorAhmedandNawabzadaNasrullahKhantoapproachalltheparties,evenoutside UDF and put up proposals within ten days).

At the end of the typed report Bhutto wrote further instructions: 'Please become veryactivebeforethe10days lapse'.This was followedbyhis signatureanda referencethat his annotated instructions be sent to the Director of the

IntelligenceBureau.495

495From a copy of a secret note from Abdul Hamid Bajwa, Officer on Special Duty for Chief Security Officer, to Bhutto,dated 18 November 1975:TheGovernment White Paperon Performance of the BhuttoRegime,VolumeIII, 1979, Annexure 13, p. A-51.

Twosalientfactscanbeestablishedfromtheabovedocument.Firstly,thatthe governmentwasgettingveryaccuratereportsonallthegoingsonoftheOpposition parties. And, second, that most of these Opposition parties (the NDP included) had its owncollectionoftherulingparty's'moles'.Thejobsofthese'moles'varied.Somejust provideddetailsofOppositionmeetingsandtheirdeliberations,othershadamore sinisterroletoplay.Theyinfactwereagentprovocateursbentoncreatingdisunity withintheOppositionmovement,aswellaswithintheindividualpartiestheybelonged to. In the absence of adequate proof it would be unfair of me to provide any names, but most genuine Opposition members of thatperiod believed that underhand machinations were at play and each had their own list of suspects.

After having been forcibly ejected from parliament Mufti Mahmood, the acting Leader oftheOpposition,refusedBhutto'sofferofadialoguetosortmattersout.Thisofferofa dialoguewasatypicalBhuttogesture.Hewouldnowholdhimselfoutasamanof reasonofferingtosettlethedisputeinacalmandsensiblemanner-completely ignoring thefactthatitwashe whohadshovedthe repressive FourthAmendment downthethroatsoftheOppositionMNAs,aswellashadthemmanhandledandejectedfromtheAssemblychamber.Whenhis'judicious'offerwouldmeetwith rejection,hewouldgetthetheatricalopportunityoftwistinghishandsindismayand thenannouncethatashewasfacedbysuchan'obstructiveandhostile'Opposition,that he had little choice but to 'crush them' for the sake of good governance.

AfterabriefandhectictouroftheNWFP-whichculminatedinamammothpublic meeting atChowk YaadgarinPeshawarI,along withNaseemWaliKhanandother senior NDPparty members, travelledto Lahore to attend the Convention of Opposition PartieswhichwasheldinthefirstweekofDecember.496The ideabehindthe Conventionwastogetthe Oppositionpartiestomake aunifieddecisionaboutour futuredealingswiththegovernment.Thefour-dayConventionwasbestsummedupby a cynical yet accurate columnist who said:

Forfourdaystheleadersof thecountry'smainOppositionpartieswereengaged inendlessconfabulations.Theyhelddinnermeetingsandlunchsessions;and therewasonedayoffieryspeeches, followedbytheinevitablePressconference. They went through the ritual of asking the PPP government to resign, and make way foranationalgovernmentandearly generalelections.Thenhaving unburdened themselves, Asghar Khan and the JUP bandwagon went off to fight the Karachiby-election;the representativesofthe newly-formedNDP circumspectlyobservedthesceneofdisarray[myemphasis];andtheUDF,with

496Other NDP representatives included Ghulam Ahmed Bilor, Hashim Gilzai, Mehmooda Salim, Ali Buksh Talpurand a number of others.

thePagaroMuslimLeagueinthelead,declaredwithaflourishthatDecember19 would be observed as a Black Day.497

Havingbeen awitnesstoUDF'spettyinternalpolitickingandsquabbleseversinceits inception-overaperiodofthirty-twomonths-IwasconvincedthattheNDPwas betterwithouttheUDFratherthanwithinandasaconsequencetheNDPhadstayed outoftheOppositionalliance.AttheOppositionConvention,Nooranionceagain demanded UDF support for his JUP candidate in yet another Karachi by-election. This timehehadextrasupportintheformofAsgharKhan,whohadoriginallyrefusedto participate in the UDF at its inception. A number of us tried to persuade bothof them not to insist onthis issue,as it would only weaken the semblance of Opposition unity. Unfortunately,bothNooraniandAsgharrefusedtoyieldtothemajorityview,which clearlycalledfortheboycottofallby-elections.But,asIwasnolongerapartoftheUDF leadership, I managed to keep out of the resulting fray.

19December1975hadbeennominateda'BlackFlagDay'ofprotestagainstthe government policies. Two days earlier, on 17December, Asghar Khan visited me with aninvitationonbehalfofthe jointOppositiontojointheminaddressing arally at Karachi's Katrak Hall on the scheduled day of protest. After consulting my colleagues I agreed to attend.

Onthemorningofthe19December,wewereinformedthattheFSFandarmedpolice had taken charge of all the routes leading to Katrak Hall, an area adjacent to the well- knownEmpressMarket.AsgharKhan,MaulanaNooraniandIwereforcedto disembarkfromourvehiclesnearEmpressMarketasthepolicehadblockadedthe road. A crowd of several thousand had already assembled there. We forced our waythroughtheblockadeonfoot,asthesheernumberofthecrowd-whichhadbecome very enthusiastic upon our arriving on the scene - was too daunting for the police tohandle.Wewalkedafewhundredyardsdownthemainroadbeforeturningrightinto thelongalleywhichledto theHall.Whenthethreeofus enteredthegates at theendof the alley, a large body of police made their sudden appearance. A DSP quickly took thethreeofusintocustodyastherestofthepolicecontingentchargedthecrowdfollowing us in the alley, with their steel-tippedlathis. The narrowness of the alley had made their taskallthatmucheasierasthepolicehadonlytocontendwiththoseinthefront.As those in the front fell to the blows of the police,others fled towards the rear, creatingpanic. Later I was informed they brutally cleared the alley all the way to the main road. Afterawhilebesidesthepolice,onlymythreesons-Sherazam,ShehryarandSher Afzal, Mir Ali Buksh Talpur and my driver remained in the alley as they had refused to budgeuntiltheydiscoveredwhathadhappenedtome.Laterthepolicechargedthem as well. As a result of this later lathi attack, Ali Buksh Talpur's wrist was broken and my threesonscarriedwiththemtheirshareofcuts,weltsandbruisesforthenextfewdays.

497Linesman,'BetweentheLines',Viewpoint,12December1975.

AsgharKhan,NooraniandIweretakentotheSoldierBazaarpolicestationand detained there. After a while an angry crowd swelled outside and the police decided to releaseusbeforethesituationgotoutofhand.AlloverPakistansimilarrallieshadbeen disruptedbythelocalpoliceandFSF.HavingmuzzledthePressariddespitehaving achieved near complete control of all media, Bhutto'sgovernment was determined not to allow the Opposition any opportunity of communicating with the public in any form whatsoever.Thegovernment'sopenandadverselyhostileattitudetowardsthe OppositionwasnowevenimpellingthelessbelligerentOppositionpartiesinto adoptingafirmerstance.ThecaseforagenuinelyunifiedOppositionblocwas becomingstronger.ConflictingpoliticalviewpointswithintheOppositionoverissues suchasprovincialautonomy,regionalnationalism,anddivergingreligiousoutlooks wouldsoonbeignored.Intheendtheonlyremainingobstaclewewouldfacein unifying the Opposition would be caused by the egos of some of the leaders involved.

On30DecemberNDPheldapublicmeetingatPathanColonyatKarachi.Itwas attended by a large crowd. The NDP was the first political party to begin holding thesetypes of public meetings. At this meeting we launched an anti-Bhutto campaign. ThereasonthecampaignwasdirectedtowardsBhuttowassimple:werealizedthatwe were faced with a civilian despot. Most of Bhutto's cabinet ministers quivered in theirshoes for fear of incurring their master's wrath. It seemed inappropriate to accord themthe distinction of having any say in the government, other than - to act under his instructionsandashisminions.TotalpowerhadbeenwrestedbyBhutto.Allothersin his government were of little consequence.

AftertheformationofNDPalargepartofmytimewasspentinarrangingtheparty into an organized political force in the shortest of time possible. Organizing a politicalpartybasedupondemocraticprinciples-asopposedtopersonalitycultmovement- takes a great deal of time, patience and effort. I consulted all the leading members of the NDPtoestablishaconsensusonsuchimportantaspectsastheparty'sconstitutionand its manifesto. Both of these were to be finalized at the NDP's convention scheduled forApril 1976.

Thepeculiarityofourpoliticalculturealsopresenteduswithsomeunforeseen consequences.Inearly1976AltafQureshi,theeditoroftheUrduDigest,andhis brother Ejaz, met me during one of my visits to Lahore and suggested that I appoint S.

M.Zafar-whooncehadservedinAyubKhan'scabinet-astheSecretary-Generalof NDP.ThoughIhadmypersonalreservationsaboutZafar,becauseofhiscloselinks withAyubKhan'sregime,IsuggestedthatifhefeltstronglyfortheNDPheshouldjoin the party.Then it wouldbe up to the other party members to elect him to the office ofpartysecretary-general,iftheysowished.ApparentlythatwasnottheanswerS.M. Zafarwasseeking.AltafQureshimadeitquitecleartomethatS.M.Zafar'mustbe madethesecretary-generalandheexpectsyoutogotohisofficeanddiscusstheterms ofhisjoiningtheNDP'.Needlesstoadd,S.M.ZafarneverjoinedtheNDPandInever

went to meet him at his office. Eventually he would join Jatoi's National People's Party (NPP) as a vice-president.

Awhilelater,AltafandEjazQureshicameonceagaintopersuademetoappoint someone else as NDP's secretary-general. This time it was Rafique Ahmed Bajwa, who waskeentoenterpolitics.IevenacceptedaninvitationtolunchatBajwa'splace. DuringourmeetingIfoundhimtobeveryarticulateinspeechandextremely ambitious. I imagine he might have been disappointed by my reply. I suggested to him thattheonlycourseopentohim-ifhewishedtobeappointedsecretary-general-to jointhepartyandthenstandforofficeduringtheparty'sconvention.Clearlymy answerwasnotacceptable tohimashe soonjoinedNoorani'sJUPasaparty vice-president.

AnotherpersonwhowaseagertojointheNDPwasGeneralA.A.K.Niazi.Heeven called on me and keenly expressed this desire in person. I was adamant in my refusal. LikemanypeopleIheldNiaziresponsiblefortheatrocitiesandeventualdisasterin East Pakistan. It was also difficult to forget his grandiose bragging which was followed byhishumiliationandourdaysofshame.Sadly,thefollowingyear,duringthePNA movement in 1977,Niazi wasaskedto participate in some ofthe ralliesheld inKarachi asoneofthechiefspeakers.Thisepisodewas,tomymind,adamningindictmenton themoralityotourpoliticalparties.Thispredatoryinstincttooverlookprinciplesin favour of obtaining the slightest of political advantage, renders most politicians largely devoidofanysincerityofpurpose.Whether theybeingovernmentoropposition,the aspiration forpowerisall thatseemstomatter tomostPakistani politicians.

***

On6February1976tragedystruck.Asadullah,thetwenty-yearoldsonofAttaullah Mengalwasgunneddownoutsidemy brotherMirBalakhSher'shouseatKarachi, alongwithhisfriendAhmed ShahKurd.Ironically,theyhad bothbeentoseeme just the day before.

IlaterlearntthatAsadullah,whowasconstantlybeingfollowedbylocalintelligence agencies,soughttoevadethem, earlierthat day, byswappingcars atafriend'shouse. Inthefriend'scarhe,accompaniedbyAhmedShah,arrivedatmybrother'shousein Karachi'sMuhammadAliHousingSocietyafewminutesbefore8p.m.Heinformed theservantpresentatthehousethathewasexpectingtoreceiveatelephonecallthere. At about 8p.m. as thetelephone rang, theservant heard loud bursts of gunfire.When hewentoutofthegate,underthelightofthestreetlamphesawAsadullah'scar crashed againstthewall anda numberof armed peoplesurroundingit.Itwasthen that henoticedthatbothendsofthestreethadbeenblockedbyblackvehicles.Hewitnessed thementhencarryingtwopronebodiesfromthecrashedcartooneoftheirvehicles beforedrivingaway.Theabandonedcar wasbadlyscarredby bullets.Therewasblood

on the carseats.It was clearthat eitherone orboth the boys hadsuffered grievousinjuries.

OnecansurmisethatatsomestageAsadullahMengalorhiscompanionhadnoticed thatthestreethadbeenblockedatbothends.Alertedtheymusthavethentriedto make a getaway. In their attempt to escape they attracted the gunfire which led them to crash the car into the wall. Their assailants then carried both of them and departedwithout leaving any trace.

ThoughIwasatLahore,Ilearntofthiscommando-styleattackwithinminutesofit takingplace,asithappenedoutsidemybrother'shouse.Myinitialshockatthishorrible event quickly changed to sorrow when my thoughts turned towards Attaullah Mengal.Icouldonlyimaginewhatgriefthiswouldcausehim.Dayswentpastwithoutanynews of the missing boys. In the absence of hard facts rumors began to circulate. Some supposedly knowledgeable peopleinseniorpositionsinBalochistanhintedthat Asadullah had only sufferedminor injuries and had been incarceratedin a hospitalin a northerncity,whilehisfriendAhmedShahhaddiedintheencounter.Othersources latersuggestedthatAsadullahhadrecoveredcompletelyandhadbeensenttojail. Almostamonthaftertheincidentnewandmoreominousrumorsbegantocirculate. TheserumorssuggestedthatAsadullahhadbeencriticallywoundedintheshooting. Insteadofbeingtakentoahospital,hewastakentoMalirwherehewastorturedto extract information about his dealings in Balochistan. He was said to have died during tortureandhisbodywasthensaidtohavebeenquicklyandsecretlydisposedoffto prevent any trail of evidence leading to the perpetrators.

By now, I realized that, it seemed likely that poor Asad was dead. I felt terribly for the sufferings his parents had to undergo. Attaullah, being a traditional Baloch to the core, wouldnevermakehisgriefpublic,butIcouldonlyimaginethepainandanguishhe sufferedasafather.Injailhehadnoonenearbytoeventryandconsolehim.These were terrible times. I filed a writ of habeas corpus at the Karachi High Court, but there wasnoresponse.Tothisverydaynoone,apartfromtheperpetratorsthemselves, knows the whereabouts of Asadullah's remains. It was a truly tragic end to the life of a lad I had known since his childhood days.

***

At this stage its worth digressing to mention an event which would eventually have enormous repercussions on Pakistan's future history. On 29 February 1976, Bhutto appointedGeneralZiaulHaqasChiefofArmyStaff,whoingettingthepost, supersededsevengeneralsseniortohim.InselectingZia,Bhuttowouldoncemore beliehisoft-quotedclaimtopoliticalmasteryandgenius.Instead,hehadfallenvictim tohisownpenchantfor flattery and sycophancy.

Bhutto,itseems,firstcameintocontactwithZiain1973.Ziawasthenthepresiding officerinthe1973Conspiracytrialinvolvingyoungofficerswhowereaccusedof plotting tooverthrowthe government.According toGeneralK.M.Arif,during the lengthofthetrialZiareportedtoBhuttoonadailybasisandhismannerseemedto have pleased the Prime Minister.

Zia made a further effort to ingratiate himself to Bhutto. Soonafter thetrial he invited BhuttotobecomethehonoraryColonel-in-ChiefoftheArmouredCorps.Whenhe became Corps Commander of the Multan sector...

Zia maintained his rapport with Mr Bhutto and paid his respects to the latter whenever he visited Multan. During such visits, Mr Bhutto stayed at the 'White House',theresidenceofGovernorSadiqHussainQureshi.Ziausedtobea favoritetopicatthe'WhiteHouse'.Bhuttowasindeedcharmedbyhimduring hisvisittotheMultangarrison.ThePrimeMinisterwasgivenarousingovation by a turn-out of the wives and children of officers at the station, who showered flower petals on the visiting dignitary.498

Atthetimeof Bhutto'svisittotheMultangarrison, itcametomyknowledge thata numberofjuniorofficershadprotestedtoZiaabouthisorderscallingfortheirwivesto be present on the occasion. They objected on the grounds that Bhutto was a well-known womanizeranditwasinappropriatetoputtheirwiveson'display'beforehim.Zia, who would later proclaim himself to be a great 'Islamist', rejected their appeals andinsisted that the women be present. Such obliging behavior could only have further endeared him to Bhutto.

Bhutto held those who constantly bowed before his will in contempt. His attempt toimitateHitler'ssuccessatsuborningthearmycommandtohiswillwouldsooncome apart when it came to dealing with his own generals. He overreached himself by the delusion that 'if a small [Austrian] could master the Prussian Army, what could prevent [ZulfikarAliBhutto]fromdoingthesamewiththePunjabiArmy'.499Bhuttodidnot prove to be the 'politicalgiant' he credited himselfto be.

***

AttheendofApril1976thenationalconventionoftheNDPtookplaceatPeshawar. UnderBhutto'sdirectivesthelocal authoritiesprevented usfromholdingourmeetings inPeshawarcity.Wewerethereforeforcedtoholdtheconventioninthehujrah-the male segregatedsection of a Pathan house - of Arbab Saifur Rehman, afew miles out of Peshawar.Threehundredandseventy-threedelegatesturnedupfromallthefour

498GeneralK.M.Arif,WorkingwithZia,OxfordUniversityPress,Karachi,1995,p.45.

499RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan,1967-1977,op.cit.,p.

provincesfortheConvention,andinadditiontherewereoverfivehundredpeoplewho hadcomeasobservers.Onthefirstdayasmallgroupofself-proclaimedleftistscreated some agitationby trying tointerruptproceedingsandputting acrosstheirextremist demands. Despitetheirattempts,thepartyconstitutionandmanifestowerepassed by anoverwhelmingmajorityofthosepresent.Iwasthenelectedaspartypresidentin accordancewiththetermsofthenewconstitution.Thefollowingandfinaldayofthe convention,therewasnofurthertroubleasthecommunistshaddecampedtheprevious evening.ThemoodofthemeetingwasmixedwithangerasNawazButthadhelda pressconference inwhichhe made some ratherwildallegationswhile bitterly criticizing us. The following day, 1May1976,after leading alargeprocessionthrough Peshawar'sKissakhwaniBazaarweheldalargepoliticalrallyatChowkYaadgar.It went off very successfully and was a suitable culmination to the party convention.

Afewdayslater,on9May,anNDPmeetingforpartyworkerswasheldatmyresidenceatKarachi.Afterthemeeting NaseemWaliraisedthenewpartyflagonthe roof of my house. The flag had been designed by her daughter Gulale, who was then a medical studentstudying atPeshawar.The material forthe flaghadbeenpurchased by Gulale herself.Hermotherhadhelpedstitchit.Despite the earlierobjectionsofthe leftists - who had demanded that the flag be totally red - now in addition to the red, it had a green triangle on the left where it touched the pole. There was a large white star onaredbaseattheright.ThegreenrepresentedPakistanandthewhiterepresented our minorities, who all too often had been much ignored.

Thefollowingday IwenttoHyderabadtoattendtheconspiracytrialagainstWaliKhan,the three BalochleadersandanumberofseniorNAPmembers.I was accompanied by Naseem Wali Khan and a large number of NDP party men. Only a few ofuswereallowed intothejailprecinctswherethetrialwas being held.We metwith WaliKhan,AttaullahMengal,KhairBukshMarri,GhousBukshBizenjo,Arbab Sikandar Khalil and the others who were imprisoned there for the duration of the trial. In the Hyderabad Conspiracy case the government had charged the defendants with a 'conspiracytodisintegratePakistan'andaspecialcourthadbeenempanelledto conduct the case in Hyderabad Central Jail. Government intelligence agencies had been giventhetaskofcollectingevidenceagainsttheaccused.Thisevidencewas supplementedbytheSupremeCourt'srulingintheearlierReferenceCase.The governmentdefendedtheConspiracycasebyclaimingthatitwasanecessarysuccessor to the Reference Case. It argued that:

...astheNationalAwamiPartyanditsleadershadwalkedoutoftheSupreme Courtduringthehearingofthecaseaboutthedissolutionofthisparty,therefore itwasconsiderednecessarythattheseleadersandotheraccusedmayhave

properopportunitytorebutevidencethatmaybebroughtbeforetheSpecial Court in support of the finding given by the Supreme Court.500

Thegovernment'sargumentwasblatantlymendacious.Awritercommentinguponit said: The absence of due process guarantees - under special rules of evidence, the governmentcouldaddchargesanytimebeforethejudgmentwaspronounced-casta longshadowonthegovernment'sallusionthatthecourtwasconvenedforthebenefit ofthedefendants.501TheHyderabadConspiracyCasewasnothingbutanotherexample offlagrantpoliticalvictimization.Andsadlyoncemore,ourjudiciaryfellcompletelyin linewiththewishesofthegovernmentoftheday.BythetimetheSpecialCourt convened in Hyderabad more Opposition politicians were added to the existing list offorty-fourdefendants.AmongthemtherewereOppositionmemberswhohadabsolutelynoconnectionwiththebannedNAP.502Iattendedthetrialregularly.Itwas allIcoulddotoprovidemoralsupporttomyfriendsinthedock.Whatabsolutely appalledmewasthatatthetrialallthedefendantsweremadetositbehindbars,asif they were dangerous criminals. The judges did not even bother to give a semblance of justice during the course of the trial- at least not untilBhutto was overthrown in July1977.Then,remarkablytheybegantodisplayanewfoundconscience.InAugust1977 theHyderabadCourtevenventuredtocriticizethegovernmentbyholdingtheeditor andpublisherofthegovernment-ownedPakistanTimesforpublishinganeditorialon theoutcomeoftheHyderabadtribunal and claimingthat thosewho advocatedWali Khan's release were unpatriotic. Naturally, the sycophantic editorial had been written before the Army coup against Bhutto and the Court's contempt verdict against it was delivered only after the coup had successfully taken place. It was indeed a pathetic reflectiononthequalityoftwoofthefivefundamentalpillarsoftheState-thePress and the Judiciary.

Thecontinuationofthestateofemergencyandtheemergencylaws-suchtheDefence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) - was a similar exercise in perpetuating an authoritarian state of rule. I questioned these policies on several occasions in the Assembly. Article 232 of the Constitutionclearlystated'thattheproclamationofemergencycanbeissuedonly, either if the country is threatened by war or external aggression or by internaldisturbancesbeyondthecontrolofthegovernment'.AfterthelossofEastPakistanand thewarwithIndia,onecouldhaveenvisageditsapplicability,butbythistime diplomatic and trade ties had resumed with India. Our relations with borderingAfghanistan had also normalized. I stressed these points quite vocally but to no avail. BhuttowasnotpreparedtoyieldhisdraconianDPRpowerswhichcouldbeusedat will to defend his political interests.

500Excerptfromaletter,dated19August1976,sentbyYahyaBakhtiar,theAttorney-GeneraltoAmnesty International. Cited inIslamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report, London, 1977.

501PaulaR.Newburg,Judging theState,op.cit.,p.156.

502On 10 June 1976 Ali Buksh Talpur MNA, a leading member of NDP was among those charged belatedly in theHyderabad Conspiracy Case.

InJuly1976heextendedtheDPRevenfurtherbyanamendingOrdinance.Thisnew amendmentgavethespecialtribunalsexclusivejurisdictionoveroffencesunder DefenceofPakistanRules.Theirjurisdictionwasnowmadefinal.Aspecialtribunal decision did not allow for any reviews or appeals in any other court. It was obvious to methatthisamendingOrdinancewasmadewiththeHyderabadConspiracyCasein mind.On6July 1976theAssembly waspurposelyadjournedtofacilitatethe proclamation of this Ordinance. If it had been passed as a Bill in the Assembly it would have been debated. Despite the PPP's overwhelming presence in the Assembly, Bhutto waswaryofthetinyOpposition.Weusedthechamberasvocallyaspossibleinan attempt to expose what we felt were the government's mean designs.

Notwithstandingtheacquiescenceofalargenumberamongthejudiciary,Bhuttostill mistrustedthem.Tofurtherbringallseniorjudgesintocheckthegovernmentproposed introducinganotheramendmenttothe1973Constitution.Underthisamendment,for thefirsttime,thejudgeswerethemselvesdirectlyaffected.Thetermofthe officeofthe ChiefJusticesoftheSupremeCourtandtheProvincialHighCourtswastobe determinednotonlybyagebutnowbyafixedperiodaswell.Itsaimwasclearlyto alterthecompositionofthejudgesoveraperiodoftime.TheAmendmentalsogavethe governmentpowertotransferajudge from oneHighCourttoanotherforaperiodof oneyear,forwhichconsentwasnotnecessary.Noreasonneededtobegivenforthe transfer nor was any consultation required. This power of instantly transferring aHigh CourtjudgewasaweaponofcoercionBhuttointendedtouseagainstrecalcitrant judges who chose to ignore his dictates.

I made several scathing attacks on the government's latest moves. At Abottabad while addressing the local Bar Council I ended my speech by saying: 'All these measures only amounttoanexpressionofnoconfidenceinthesuperiorcourtsandreflecttheanxiety of the government to deprive them of all their effective power in matters involving the liberties of citizens.' On 2 September I issued a press statement which was subsequently printed in one or two of the remaining independent newspapers which still had thecourage to publish it. In it I said: 'The whole Amendment Bill is perhaps the mostrepressive and blatant attack on the liberty and rights of the citizens. The powers of the judiciaryhavebeendrasticallywhittleddownandwhateverlittleconfidencethereis leftinthejudiciarywillnowbecompletelydestroyed.'Inanyeventwhenthe Amendment was brought before the Assembly the Opposition walked out in protest. Needlesstosay,inourabsenceitwaspassedunanimously.

Thedilutionofthefundamentalclausesofthe1973Constitutionwereananathemato me.I made sure thatthe NDPtake astrong standonthisissue.A party statement issued that year summarized my feelings.

Ourpartywillnotrestuntilandwhenweareabletorestorethe1973 Constitution without the anti-democratic and anti-people amendments. To us democracy, rule of law, an independent judiciary, complete civil liberties andhumanrightsshouldbeensuredasbytheUNcharter.Freedomofspeech, freedomofassembly,afreePress,decencyandhumanityinoursocietyshould be the right of every free-thinking Pakistani. And along with this, economic rehabilitation and social justice free from discrimination based upon caste, creed, faith,religion,profession,colour,sexororiginshouldbethegoalofourcountry.503

Increasingly, NDP organizational activities had begun to take a large part of my time. I haddecidedtopersonallyorganizetheNDPaffairsinBalochistan,SindhandPunjab. TheNWFPIlefttoNaseemWaliKhanandothersupportersofWaliKhanasitonly seemedfairthattheyshouldbegivenafreehandtodoso.Ihadtofindsuitable leadershipforNDPBalochistan.OntheadviceofmyBalochfriendsinjailIflewto QuettatomeetwithAghaAbdulKarim,thelateKhan'sbrother.Iwassurprisedto discoverthathewasstayingatagovernment-ownedresthouseneartheBalochistan University.Iratherunexpectedlyfoundhimtobequiteuncooperative.Hespoke disparaginglyofBizenjo,theverymanwhohadrecommendedAghaAbdulKarim's appointmentasprovincialheadoftheNDPinthefirstplace.I.recallhesaid,'Whois Bizenjo? He was only my secretary not so long ago!' I could not allow his remark to go unchallenged.IremindedhimthatBizenjohadbeenthegeneral-secretaryofUstman Gal - the Baloch nationalist party headed by Agha Abdul Karim - and not his personal secretaryashiscommentsuggested.FindinghisattitudeunaccommodatingIpolitely told him that my visit had been solely prompted by the suggestion of the jailed Baloch leadersandperhapsheshouldvisitthemattheHyderabadCentraljailanddiscussit with them.

The name that Attaullah Mengal had proposed to me was that of Gul Khan Naseer. Gul Khan had been an ardent Baloch nationalist and was the much acclaimed rebe! poet of Balochistan.IwasunabletomeetwithhimashewasinMachjail.Ihadtosenda representativetodiscusswithhimthepossibilitiesofhistakingthemantleofparty provincialleadership.TomygreatdisappointmentGulKhanrejectedtheofferand pronouncedthattheNDPshouldneverhavebeenformedinthefirstplace.He maintained thattheonlywayoutwastonegotiatedirectlywithBhuttoand reachsome form of agreement. Little did I know then that Gul Khan Naseer's rebellious spirit had beentamedbyBhutto'sattemptstoaccommodatehim.Laterrecordswouldrevealthat as earlyas August 1974Bhutto had written to Jam Ghulam Qadir, theBalochistan Chief Minister,tellinghimtoadoptaconciliatoryapproachwithGulKhan.Intheletter Bhuttohadsaid,'IthinkitwouldbeadvisabletoutilizethechangeinGulKhan

503Whilethiswaspublishedovertwenty-twoyearsagoIstillardentlysubscribetothissameidealistvision.

Naseer's attitude for achieving our objective of solving the Baluchistan problem'.504A fortnight earlier Bhutto had sought his private secretary, Afzal Said Khan's advice. ThePM's secretary had replied:

...wemayreleaseGulKhanNaseeronbail. Heshouldmeet otherNAP leaders injailandtryandbringthemround.GulKhanNaseermay,howeverbetold thatincasetheotherthreeNAPleadersdonotseeeye-to-eyewithhim,he wouldhavetogoitalonewiththehelpofotherNAPleadersandmembersof Assembly.Myfeelingisthathewouldsucceedinbringingaboutfinalpolitical settlement.Ifhegenuinelyworksforit,hemaybeallowedtoretainhisseatin the Provincial Assembly.505

WhileBhutto'splannevercametofruition,itwasclearthatGulKhanNaseer'sheart was no longer in the cause he had for so long espoused.

FinallyI contactedMahmoodAzizKhurd,whohadbeenBizenjo'schoiceforparty general-secretaryandofferedhimthe party'sprovincialleadership.He acceptedthe postwithoutasignofhesitation.ThenIapproachedAmir-ul-MulkMengal,506who agreedtobecomeprovincialNDPsecretary-general.Itmustberecalledthatduring thosedaysofgovernmentoppressionevensomeoftheself-professedmenofcourage hesitatedtotakeprominentOppositionrolesagainstthemightofthegovernment.In thetestingdaysthatfollowed Ifound bothof themto bemenof quality. IntimeIlearnt to admire them for their integrity and dedication to our political cause.

In Sindh the rebel PPPMNA Mir Ali Buksh Talpur had joined the NDP and had been appointedasprovincialConvenoroftheNDP.UnfortunatelyMirAliBukshwas heavilyinfluencedbyself-styledSindhinationalistslikeRasoolBukshPalejo.Ifound himandsomeoftheotherSindhinationalistsveryrigidintheirattitudetowardsthe Urdu-speakerspresentinthe province. Theysoonbeganshowing a marked preference foronlythosewhosemothertonguewasSindhiintotheparty.Moreproblemswere soon created when Talpur took itupon himself to appoint M. M. Pirzada as ConvenorofNDPKarachiandAmirHaiderKazmigeneral-secretaryofNDPKarachi-allthis without consulting anyone. Problems such as these would continue to crop up in Sindh andIwouldthenhavetopersuadepeopletoadoptamoremoderateandconsensual approach. The Urdu-speaking community were as muchpart ofPakistan as any of us, and I waskeen to see that more membersfrom their community joinNDP. Much to my satisfaction, they did.

504From a copy of the official 'Top Secret /Eyes Only' letter from Bhutto to Jam Ghulam Qadir, Chief Minister,dated 17 August 1974:The Government White Paper on Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Volum in, Misuse of the Instruments of State Power, 1979, Annexure 1, p. A-4.

505From acopy of a secretmemofrom Afzal Said Khan,Secretary to Bhutto,dated 12August 1974:ibid.,Annexure 1, p. A-2.

506Amir-ulMulkMengallaterbecameChiefJusticeofBalochistan.

In Punjab the poet, Habib Jalib was aspiring to become the provincial Convenor of the party.Unfortunately,agroupofpartymembers,ledbyKaswarGardeziandRao Mehroz Akhtar,actively opposedhim.Much as I admired HabibJalib,as I was bound to my commitment of following a consensual approach, I was saddened to see him fail. Hehadalwaysbeenamanoffirmconvictionsandresolutecourage,and inmy book,anassettothe patty. I wasfastlearning thateven the political men of principlefoundit difficult to forego their own ambitions for the greater good of the party.

Despitethemanyobstaclesonefacesinsettingupanewparty,theNDPwassoon shaping into a vigorous political force. This had already become apparent to the government and steps were being taken to prevent us from succeeding. As early as May 1976 Rao Rashid Khan, a policeman who had been appointed as a Special Secretary and head of the National Intelligence Board, had submitted a top secret note to Bhutto suggestingvarious'linesofaction'againsttheOpposition.

PreventingtheNDPfromcominginthefoldoftheOpposition.Thiscanbe achievedbyattackingtheirsecessionistmanifesto.Animmediateattackcanbe launchedonthesimilarityoftheirprogrammewithMujib'ssixpoint programme,theirplantoreopenthefundamentalsoftheConstitutionin proposingredefiningoftheboundariesoftheProvincesandencouraginglocal culturesandlanguages.Ifthisattackislaunchedimmediately,withoutwaiting foradetailedstudyoftheirmanifesto[myemphasis],itwillscaretheJUI,the Muslim League and Punjab generally, from accepting the NDP in their fold.507

RaoRashid'ssuggestionwasagreeduponbyBhuttowhoannotatedthenotetothat effect, 'Yes, may try. [NDP] coming into UDF also carries some advantages. Keep them outifyoucan...'.Thenotewasdated18May1976.ItisworthnotingthattheNDP Manifestohadonlybeenadoptedalittleoverafortnightearlier.Theregimedidnot wish to waste time.

Inashorttimeaneleven-pagedocumentwaspreparedbythePrimeMinister's Secretariat.Headed'NDP'sManifesto-ACriticalAppreciation',itwasdistributed widelyamongthePressandpeople perceivedasbeing influential.Itwasglaringly obvious that the writers of the document had obediently followed Rao Rashid's dictum ofnotbotheringtomakea'detailedstudy'oftheNDPManifesto.Itwasfullofhalf- baked assertions and innuendoes, and shorton hard facts. Attimes itwas puerile and patently ludicrous.

507From a copy of a secret note from Rao Rashid Khan, Special Secret PM Bhutto, dated 18 May 1976:ibid., p. A-10.

Firstofalloneshouldanalyzetheirflag.Itisaredflag-aredflagwithafivepointed star in the centre. So far there is no ambiguity. Then there is a green equilateral [sic] triangle on the left side. What does this triangle stand for? Is it for the Holy Trinity? The father,thesonandtheHolyGhost!ButPakistanisaMuslimcountry.Itcannotshow the Holy Trinity. It does not symbolize the provinces of Pakistan because there are four provinces in Pakistan. Which one they want [sic] to exclude? Or does it stand for their foreign friends fromwhomthey derivealltheir inspiration.508

Hisyearsinthepoliceforcehad certainly givenRaoRashid avery colorful imagination. AsIhavementionedearlier,theflaghadbeendesignedbyyoungGulaleWaliKhan.Sheshowed ittomeandI,alongwithothermembersof theNDP-withtheexceptionof the communists who soon left the party-approved of her contribution wholeheartedly.

Theclearintentionofthisdocumentwastolabelusas'secessionists'.TheNDPdid advocate the developmentofPakistan'asaFederalState withaParliamentary Government, on the basis of complete provincial autonomy. Defence, currency, foreign affairsandcommunicationsweretheonlyportfoliostoremainwiththeFederal Government'.509Now, with the lapse of fifty years since independence, one could quite reasonablycontendthatifprovincialautonomyhadbeenallowedinPakistaninthe earlierdays,thecountrywouldpossiblyhavebeenmuchbetteroff,andatthevery leastEastBengalwouldmostlikelyhaveremainedapartofthecountry.510Anyway, Rao Rashid's ham-fisted attempt to malign the party in this manner did not succeed in alienating the NDP from other parties in the Opposition.

MylastmeetingwithBhuttotookplaceon4June1976.SirdarShaukatHayatmetmeas I was leaving the Assembly building and insisted that I accompany him to the Prime Minister's chambers to meet Bhutto. It appears Bhutto had assigned Shaukat Hayat thetask of persuading me to meet with him. We spoke for about fifteen minutes, once again receivingassurancesfromBhuttothathewasallinfavorofsettlinghisdisputeswith theNAPleadersamicably.BynowBhutto'sdeclarationsheldlittlevalueandI wonderedattherealmeaningbehindourmeeting.Onlyashortwhilelateritdawned on me that I had become party to yet another stunt. Bhutto was off very shortly to AfghanistanwiththeintentionofholdingdiscussionswithSirdarDaoud.Hismeeting with me, at the very last moment, was done simply to create a cordial impression on the Afghanleader.OnecanonlyguessaboutwhatassuranceshewastogivetoSirdar Daoud.MostprobablyhetoldtheAfghanPresidentthattheNDPandhewereworking

508Taken from pages 7 and 8 of my copy of the document issued in Jun 1976. It is titled 'Prime Minister's Secretariat (Public) Subject: NDP's Manifesto-A Critical Appreciation'.

509TheManifestoandConstitutionoftheNationalDemocraticPartyoPakistan,1976.

510One can also question the amount of damage that has been wrought the nation in these decades by those self- proclaimed upholders of the 'ideology' of Pakistan. In a civilized society no one has the right to forcibly foist his version of 'patriotism' upon others and call those who disagree with his particular viewpoint 'traitors'.

closelytoresolvethedisputebetweenthegovernmentandthejailedleaders.Thetruth, of course, was quite to the contrary.

InJune1976,Iissuedaneight-pointprogrammeonbehalfoftheNDP.Webelievedthat these points could form a basis of an alliance between all the Opposition parties. These points were:

1. ThewithdrawalofthestateofemergencyimposedinAugust1972andthe restoration of genuine democracy and civil liberties.

2. TheremovalofallPressrestrictionsandthereinstatementofallbanned newspapers and magazines.

3. TherepealofSection144andtherestorationofthefreedomtohold political meetings.

4. Thereleaseofallpoliticalprisonersandtherescindingofallcases pending against them in the special tribunals and other courts of law.

5. The departure of the armed forces from Balochistan and the resolution of the political dispute by peaceful methods.

6. Theimplementationintotoofthe1973Constitutionandthegrantof complete autonomy to the provinces.

7. Theprovisionoffullbenefitstothelaborersandprotectionprovidedto them against arbitrary dismissals.

8. Anendtogovernmentinterferenceineducationalinstitutions.

Shortlyafterweissuedoureight-pointprogrammewereceivedaninvitationfrom HassanMahmood, PirPagaro'sbrother-in-law, toattend ameetingatLahoretodiscuss thepossibilitiesofforminganOppositionallianceagainsttheBhuttoregime.The meetingwaspresidedoverbyAirMarshalAsgharKhan.Duringthecourseofthe meetingHassanMahmoodsuggestedthat,if andwhenanalliancecameintobeing,itbeheadedbyAsgharKhan.Naturally,theNDPhadlittleobjectiontothat,butitwasthenextissue thatbroughtdoubtstomymind.Wewereeachhandedoveraratherodd pieceofpapertosign.It stated:'The memberparties...hereby declarethatAirMarshal (retired)MuhammadAsgharKhanwillbetheleaderoftheCoalitionParliamentary PartyandPrimeMinisterineventofthecoalitionformingagovernmentinthecentre forthetermfollowingthenextgeneralelections...'.Thisdocumentwasplacedbeforeus for signing ata stage where no one had, asyet, even agreed toforman alliance. We had

onlycommenceduponpreliminarynegotiations.Eventheelectiondatewasyettobe announced by the government. Given the circumstances, NDP refused to sign.

AttheNDPconventioninAprilIhadbeengivenaspecialmandatebymypartyto contactOppositionpartieswithaviewtoformingaunitedfrontandIresolvedto continuewithmyefforts.HavingparticipatedintheseunsuccessfulattemptsIdecided to make a serious attempt of my own. The NDP sent written invitations to leaders of six Opposition parties for a meeting at Lahore on 30 October 1976 with a view to forming a commonfront.Theleadersinvitedwere:MuftiMahmood,actingLeaderofthe OppositionandheadofJamiat-ulUlema-i-Islam;MianTufailMuhammad,Amir Jamaat-i-Islami; Pir Pagaro, President Muslim League; Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, PresidentJamiat-ulUlema-i-Pakistan;NawabzadaNasrullahKhan,Presidentof PakistanDemocraticParty;AirMarshal(Retd.)AsgharKhan,PresidentTehrik-i-Istiqlal. With the notable exception of Asghar Khan; all the party heads accepted the invitation and turned up at Lahore on 29 October, for the meeting scheduled for the followingmorning.Eachbroughtwithhimanumberofotherrepresentatives,soit madeforasizeablegathering.TheNDPwasrepresentedbyBegumWaliKhan, Barrister Zahoorul Haque, Mehroz Akhtar, and myself. We all stayed at a hotel at Davis Road.Muchtoourconsternationthehotelstaffdeclinedtoserveusfood.WhenI enquiredas to theirrefusal, theyinformedmethat they'hadno orders to serveus'.We hadlittlechoicebuttogotoanearbyhotelforourmeals.Obviously,thegovernment wasnotpleasedbythismeeting.Therewasmoretofollow.

***

In the middle of the night I received a disturbing call from my family. Five masked men hadinvadedthegroundofmyresidenceand,andafterhittingasleepingservantonthe head and rendering him unconscious, they tried to smash entry into the house. Unable togainentrytheythenattemptedtoseizemycars.Theymanagedtopushoneabout tenfeettowardsthegatebeforetheservantsbecamealertedandrangthealarm. Membersofmyfamilythenopenedfireupontheintruders.Inthedarktheshots missedtheirtargets. Unfortunately, all fiveintrudersmanagedtofleeunhurt.I would learnsomeyearslaterfromanunimpeachableseniorPPPsourcethattheattackhad beenarrangedbyJamSadiqAli under the specificinstructionsof Bhutto, whoprobably wished to remind me of the vulnerability of my family.

Myson,Sherazam,lodgedanFIRwritteninEnglishwiththelocalpolicestation.The policethenclaimedtotranslateitintoUrduandmademysonsignthedocument writteninUrduwithoutreadingit.Unbeknowntohimthefactshadbeenradically altered.Soonthegovernmentbeganapettynewspapercampaignhighlightingthe differences betweenmy statements about the incident and the Urdudocument my son, unusedtopolicechicanery,hadunwiselysigned.Asinisterincidenthadbeenturned into afarce.ThisprovedtobeatypicalcraftytraitofJamSadiqAli, ashisothervictims

woulddiscoverintheearly1990swhenhewasfoisteduponSindhasitsChiefMinister, ironically, by a Bhutto-hating President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

***

The morning after the incident the gathered assembly of Opposition parties met andagreedtoformanalliancebaseduponafour-pointprogramme:

1. Restorationofdemocracy according to the 1973 Constitutionand annulment of all the arbitrary constitutional amendments which had rendered it ineffectual.

2. SupremacyandindependenceoftheJudiciary.

3. Thewithdrawalofthestateofemergencyand'blacklaws'andothercurbs on civil liberties.

4. Economic,socialandpoliticaljustice.'

And, so, what later became known the Pakistan National Alliance came into being. As a resultofmyefforts toform the allianceIwas appointedconvenor forthe timebeing.At themeetingAsgharKhanhadbeennoticeablebyhisabsence.MaulanaNoorani stronglyinsistedthattheOppositionalliance wouldbeweakenedwithoutthepresence of the retired Air Marshal.

TheOppositionallianceheldanothermeetinginIslamabadinthelaterpartof November1976.Onceagain,thoughinvited,AsgharKhanwasconspicuousbyhis absence. ProddedbyNoorani,itwasdecidedatthe meeting tosenda teamtopersuade himtojointhealliance.TheOppositiondelegationconsistedofProfessorGhafoor Ahmed,MaulanaNoorani,myselfandKhawajaSafdar,whosenamehadbeenadded byNooranihimself.AsgharKhaninvitedthefourofusforlunchathishouseinAbottabad.

On22NovemberweleftforAbottabadinmyjeep.I,ofcoursehadknowntheAir Marshal for a number of years. Right at the onset of our meeting I told him briefly of the special mandate given to me by the NDP to try and form an opposition alliance and my successsofar.ThenItriedtoconvincehimthatitwasinallourgreaterintereststoform aunitedfrontagainst*Bhutto,hisreplywas onethatsurprisedbothProfessorGhafoor andmyself.AsgharKhanintimatedthathewouldonlyjointhejointOppositionifseats tobecontestedinthenextelectionswereallocatedamongthevariouspartiesin advance.Inegotiatequotasforthenextelectionbuthadsentustoinvitehimtojoinon thebasisofourfour-pointprogramme,Istressedthattherealissuewastherestoration ofdemocracy-thedateoftheelectionshadnotevenbeenannouncedasyet.His

disappointingreplywas,Thatisallidealisticwishfulthinking.Let'snowtalkabout practical polities'.

WhileProfessorGhafoor,IandothersintheOppositionwereawareofthepolitical bondwhichhaddevelopedbetweenNooraniandAsgharKhan,noonehadquite realizedthattheynowoperatedvirtuallyasateam.ItsoondawnedonbothGhafoor AhmedandmyselfthatourtriptoAbottabadhadbeenengineeredbyNoorani,who despite being a member of the delegation now began strongly supporting Asghar Khan andhisstandon'practicalpolities'.AsgharKhandemandedthatJUPandTehrik-i- IstiqlalbegivensixtypercentofallseatscontestedbytheAllianceinthenextgeneral elections.Noorani,readingourlooksofamazement,addedthatthematterofasixty percentsharewasopentofurthernegotiationanddiscussions.GhafoorandIreminded themofthedifficultrealitiesfacingtheOppositionunderthePPPrule,andthatthe Alliancepartieshadnotevendecided whethertheywouldcontestthenextelections- we held serious doubts as to whetherthey would be free and impartial. Before we left Abottabaditwasdecidedthatwewouldcontinuewithourtalkson4Decemberat Noorani'shouseatKarachi.BythattimeNooranidroppedtheirdemandtoafifty percent share of seats for JUP and Tehrik-i-Istiqlal.

The attitude of both Asghar Khan and Maulana Noorani led to a feeling of distrust on bothsidesaswasrevealedlater.On4DecemberProfessorGhafoorwaitedalldayto hearfromNooranitoreceiveconfirmationofthescheduledmeeting.Finallyherangme at5.30p.m.tofindoutwhatwashappening.IinformedhimthatNooranihacl contactedmeandconfirmedthathewasexpectingustomeetwithhimandAsghar Khanfor dinnerathisplaceat7p.m.ThenGhafoor telephoned Noorani toenquirewhy he had not heard from him, to which Noorani replied that his telephone had been 'out of order'. Yes, there was adinner being held at his place for Ghafoor and anumber of other Opposition leaders, including Pir Pagaro. It became apparent the scheduled talks hadnowbeentransformedintoapoliticaldinnerwithahostofextraparticipants.In replythejustifiablyirritatedGhafoortoldhimthathehadkeptthewholedayfreeof engagementsinanticipationofthemeetingbutashehad'committedhimselftoa familyfunctionthateveningitwouldbeimpossibleforhimtoacceptthedinner invitation at such short notice.

Four days later, on 8 December, Asghar Khan wrote a long and angry letter to Professor Ghafoorcomplainingofsuffering 'unusualbehavior' at thehands oftheOpposition leaders, including Ghafoor's recent failure to show up for the dinner at Noorani's place. Other culprits, he wrote, included Mufti Mahmood and Pir Pagaro, who he accused of arriving consistently late to functions, hours after the scheduled time, having kept him needlesslywaitingonseveraloccasions.AnotheraccusationwasmadeagainstPir Pagaroforhis'non-serious'attitude.TheAirMarshalwrotethaton4DecemberPir Pagaro'informedmeinallseriousnessthatthe"Hurs"haddecidedthatnothingshould

bedoneandthathewasnotwillingtodiscussthemechanicsofelectionsastheUDF had not decided to take part in the election'.

In the letter to Professor Ghafoor, Asghar Khan, mentioned his recent meeting with Pir Pagaro and expressed his real concerns:

IalsocandidlyexplainedthatwewereNOTinsistingthattheUDFshould participateintheelectionsbecauseTehrik-i-IstiqlalandtheJUPwouldinany casebeinthefieldandwouldhavethesupportandtheprayersofallthose, includingthe well-wishersof the UDF,whowished toseethisregime changed.It wasonlythatwe wereanxioustoavoidacontestwithotherelementsofthe Oppositionandweretherefore,suggestingthatyouatleastdiscusstheareaof cooperationinapossibleelectionoralternativelygiveusanassurancethatthe UDF would remain out of the contest so that we could plan to take on the ruling partysingle-handed-asituationthatwewouldwelcome.Ialsoexplainedthat anylatedecisiononyourparttoparticipatewithoutpriorunderstandingwith us,wouldalmostcertainlyrenderimpossible anycoordinationforajointeffort in the elections andwouldpit us against eachother in this contest.511

No mention was made in the letter of the JUP-Tehrik demand to be allocated a high percentage of seats in the 'next' elections.

On 7 January 1977 Bhutto, who had long dithered over the issue, announced suddenly thattheelectionswouldbeheld,twomonthslater,on7March.Hewasundoubtedly confidentthathewouldfindtheOppositionincompletedisarrayandthetwo-month periodwouldprovetooshorta timeforthemtomobilizetheirresourcesandmountan effectivecampaign.Bhuttohadbynowcometorelylargelyonhisteamofadvisors appointedfromwithinthe bureaucracy,andtheyhadconvincedhimthatthebrief twelve-dayperiodgiventocandidatesforfilingofpapersfortheNationalAssembly elections,thedisunitedOppositionpartieswouldwrangleamongstthemselvesand would end up putting candidates against each other, thus leaving the field clear for the PPP candidates. Bhutto had received poor advice. As a bitter Kausar Niazi would laterstate:

[Bhutto]waslayingfaithinthesamebureaucracywhichhehimselfhad completelyoutwittedin1970andwontheelectionstocapturepower.Sincethen thosepeoplehadverystealthilyandcleverlymanagedtoweanhimawayand shatterhisbondswiththemassestotakehimintheirowngrip.Atthesametime they did all they could do to lower the prestige of the devoted party workers in theeyesoftheChairman.Anybureaucratgrantingapermit,alicenseoraplotto apartyworkerwouldsimultaneouslyopenafileonhimandforwardittothe

511Acopyofthisletter wassenttome.

PMtoprovetheirirregularandcorruptpractices.Whattotalkofthebraveparty workers,eventheChairmanwasdupedbythisstratagemandhefellsodeep intotheirnetthathegraduallystartedconsideringhisownpartyasofno consequenceandeachoneofitsmemberstobesomeoneouttogrindhisown axe.Thatisthe reasonthatinsteadofrelying onthe powerofthe party and keepingfaithinthemasseshejumpedintothefieldofelectionsonthe'secret steps' which Rao Rashid and company had presented before him.512

While I do not hold any sympathy for the 'loyal' PPP workers who corruptly acquired 'permits,licensesorplotsofland',NiazidoesaptlydescribeBhutto'sdisenchantment with his own partyandhis undividedrelianceon aselectcoterieofbureaucrats,who knew little about politics of the masses,toshape his electoralplan.These bureaucrats - likeRaoRashidKhan,apoliceman-wereskilledindeliveringwhattheirpolitical masters wished of them and were adept only at applying the forceful reins of authority against any obstructions that came in their way. In short they were the opposite of what wasrequiredtowinsupportinanelectioncampaign.

Theannouncementof theelectionshada catharticeffectontheOppositionparties.The original Alliance of six parties NDP, JUI, Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, JUP and PDP weresoonjoinedbyAsgharKhanandhisTehrik-i-Istiqlal.Sadlyashasbeenthecase in allalliances-thenaswellasnowNawabzadaNasrullahandthoseofhispersuasion also brought in minor playerssuch as AshrafKhan's Khaksar Tehrik and Sirdar Qayum Khan'sMuslimConferencetoboosttheirvotingpositionwithintheAlliance.Despite, minor misgivings,after months of effort wehad finally achieved complete unityamong alltheOppositionpartiesthatmattered.Thenine-partyalliancewasnamedthe PakistanNationalAllianceanditsformationwaspubliclyannouncedon10January, barelythree days after Bhutto's election announcement. It made mockery of the advice given to Bhutto by his specially appointed election council of bureaucrats.

On 15 January a meeting washeldby the headsof all the componentpartiesof the PNA to decide the leadership of the Alliance. The Muslim Leaguers - such as Zahoor Ellahi, Malik Qasim, Hassan Mahmood and Khavvaja Safdar - were keen to see Pir of Pagaro electedasleader.After hisquestionable performanceasheadofUDF,very few others were keen to support him. Asghar Khanwanted tothrow his ownname intothering, butthiswasmetwithsomeresistance.Finallywe,intheNDP,proposedMufti Mahmood'sname.Asaveteranpolitician,MuftiMahmoodwasknownfornever imposinghisviewsonothersbutratherforstrivingtoachieveconsensus-aquality indispensableforoneheadinganallianceofsuchdiverseparties.Hisnamewas approved by a majority support of seven of the nine parties.

512KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,JangPublishers,Lahore,1991,p.28.

There continued to be much uncertainty,even among RNA circleswhether the Alliance wouldlast.Thereisnodenyingthefactthatminorplayers,suchasthePDFandthe Khaksar Tehrik, had caused heartburn among the rest with their demand for offices to begiventotheirpartymembers,butconcessionshadtobemade.EventheNDP demandedandforcedtheotherpartiestoagreetoatotalboycottofallelectionsin Balochistan. As the late Mazhar Ali noted in the Viewpoint:

Though the NDP is the youngest political party, it has the largest number of its politicalworkersandofficebearersimprisonedandvictimizedsinceits formation. Such arrests appear not to have daunted the NDP's claim for a special position in Baluchistan and the Frontier^513

Themajorpointofcontention,whichalsocausedtheuncertainty,remainedtheissueof theallocationofseatsamongthevariousparties.ThosesuchasPirPagaro'sMuslim LeagueandAsgharKhan'sTehrik-i-Istiqlalwereinsistingonasharemuchbeyondtheir actualstrength.IncontrasttheJamaat-i-Islamiremainedbalancedinitsapproachand theNDPwasagreeabletoacceptingwhateveritgot,simplytogetthePNAoffthe ground and into the elections.

Thedistributionof thepartytickets was, of course, notthe onlycauseforfrictioninthe PNA. We were a diverse mix of parties with strongly divergent views. In an interview withacorrespondentofThe Observer,theUKnewspaper,Iwasquotedassayingthat 'thenine-partyallianceisgrotesquelyill-sortedand,shoulditwin,isunlikelytohold togetherformorethansixmonths'.514Despitemyapprehensions,thePNAwasa marvel,itworked.Pushedintoacorner,nothingunitedusmorethanourimmediate goal -tooustBhutto. Theself-proclaimedpolitical 'genius'hadoverreachedhimself.He had managed to unite us and each person within the' PNA made a surprising effort to makeitwork.ItwascommendablethatAsgharKhangracefullyacceptedMufti Mahmood'sleadership.OtherpraiseworthyaspectsofthePNAwerethewaythe Jamaat-i-Islamiadoptedanunusuallylowprofile,thetemporaryburialofreligious hatchets between Noorani's JUP and Mufti Mahmood's JUI and the acceptance of NDP's demand toboycottelectionsinBalochistan. Itauguredwellfor theelections.Themajor partieswere nowinagreement,andforonce the negative factorsstirredupby the minorpartiesandtheiregotisticjockeyingforinfluencethroughintrigueandbyforging mini-alliances within the Alliance, were doomed to failure.

The PNA chose the plough for an election symbol. While the Election Commissioneracceded to our request, Hafiz Pirzada appealed against it on the basis that an election symbolcouldonlybegrantedtoanindividualpoliticalpartyandnottoanallianceof nineparties.AreviewpetitionwasfiledunderSection21oftheRepresentationof

513ObtainedfromaPresscuttinginmycollectionwhichisunfortunateundated.

514TheObserver,London,Sunday,27February1977.ThecorrespondwasGavinYoung.

People Act but in the end Bhutto allowed the allotment of the symbol by amending the Election rulesto permit a common symbol for any two or more parties putting up joint candidates. KausarNiaziregardsthisasBhutto'sbiggestblunder ofthe1977campaign and he may well be right. According to him. Bhutto was confident that the PNA could not cause him any harm.

Under his special powersas the Chief Executive, he permitted the allotment of a common symbol to the PNA.

So far as that symbol, Plough, was concerned, the Prime Minister's close team of technocratswasoftheopinionthatithardlyheldanyattractionforthemassesas comparedtothePeople'sParty'ssymbol,Sword.Infacttheycontended,thatit wouldgotospoilthe image ofMuftiMahmoodandthe otherleadersinthePNA.515

IwouldagreewithKausarNiaziwhenhestatesthatBhuttoandhisteamof 'technocrats'were nonchalantoverthe issueofourelectionsymbol.ButIwouldgo furtherandsuggestthatthereasonfortheirnonchalancewasthattheyhadplacedgreat faith in their planned 'Operation Victory'. By allowing the symbol Bhutto was using his developedpenchantfortheatricstoholdhimselfouttobeapolitically'fair-minded' person and artfully donning the garb of a 'democrat'.

Having reached agreement on the allocation of seats the Opposition parties and their leadershipsoonbecameinvolvedwiththetaskoffilingofcandidates'papersbythe final date of 19 January. The first sign of the government's electoral intentions became publiclyapparentwhenMaulanaJanMuhammadAbbasi,thePNAcandidate contesting Bhutto's Larkana seat was abducted by the police on the eve of registration simplytopreventhimfromfilinghispapersagainstthePPPleader.Takingcuefrom theirleader,ahostofotherPPPleadersoptedtofollowasimilarelectoralrouteto victory. Among these were many who would later claim to be self-professed democrats. TheywereallfromSindh.Thesametookplaceatthetimeofnominationstothe Provincial Elections. This 'illustrious' company included: Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Ghulam MustafaJatoi,MakhdoomTalib-ul-MaulaofHala,LiaquatAliJatoi,MehranKhan Bijarani,AttaMuhammadMarri,MalikSikanderKhan,SultanAhmedChandio, MakhdoomMuhammadZaman,andYusufChandio.516

Among the provincial PPP candidates all four chief minister's ensured that they would notbe'disgraced'bytheappearanceofanyrivalcandidateintheirconstituencies.Thus,

515KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.50.

516Others who got elected unopposed from Sindh were Noor Muhamm Lund, Allan Khan Leghari, Haji Syed Fateh Din, Niaz Muhammad Wassan, Abdullah Halepoto, Najamuddin Sarewal, Shabbir Ahmed Shah and GhulamMustafa Jatoi. From Balochistan four PPP National Assembly candidates got themselves elected unopposed: Taj Muhammad Jamali, Abdul Nabi Jamali, Agha Mohiyuddin and Amanullah Gechki.

NasrullahKhattak,SadiqHussainQureshi,GhulamMustafaJatoiandMuhammad Khan Barozai declared themselves elected to the provincial assemblies unopposed.

ThisdisgracefuldisplayofpoliticalthuggeryledevenaPPPstalwart,suchasKausar Niazi, to later comment:

Having[MaulanaAbbasi]carriedawayandkeptinpolicecustodytillthefiling of the nomination papers was such a feat of bureaucracy which [sic] cast anindelibleslurontheelectoralintegrityofthePrimeMinisterandbrought disrepute to the concept of fair elections...As per later reports, Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi had been taken into custody by the police on the evening of18thJanuaryandreleasedthenextmorningafterthetimeoffilingthe nomination papers was over. The statements issued by him in this connection formedtheverybasisofthePNA'selectioncampaign.Itwasthisverydoingof thebureaucracywhichwenttocauseuntoldharmtothePeople'sParty's electoral campaign.517

WhileNiaziisquicktoblamethesycophanticofficials-namelyMuhammadKhan Junejo,theSindhHomeSecretary,andKhalidAhmedKharral, DeputyCommissioner Larkana-itisunlikely,takingtheirsupinenatureintoaccount,thattheywouldhave hadthetemeritytointerfereinBhutto'spersonalconstituencywithoutBhutto'sdirect blessing. My view was later corroborated by Rafi Raza, who stated:

I met [Bhutto] on his return from Larkana ... I said his unopposed election was astonishing;noonecouldacceptthatthePNAcandidatehadsimplyfailedto show up. The error was further compounded by the publicity given to the 'Undisputed Leader', as it were a presidential election. He tetchily asked why, if Iwassurprisedathisunopposedelection,Ididnotenquirehowmyfriend Mumtaz was similarly elected from Larkana: 'Surely I am better known thanMumtaz[Bhutto]?'LaterIdidenquire,andmyworstfearswereconfirmed.518

It is interesting that two senior PPP figures of that period later chose to stress the importance of the Abbasi kidnapping andthe subsequent spate of unopposedelectionsand the negative impact on the electorate. Raja Anwar, a close acolyte and adviser toBhutto on student and labor affairs, said:

Bhutto's advisers had assured him that these electoral walkovers would be seen abroadasevidenceofhispopularity,whileathomepeoplewouldconcludethat itwasfutiletoopposeapartywhoseleadershiphadreturnedwithoutcontest.

517KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.55.

518RafiRaza,ZulfikarAliBhuttoandPakistan,1967-1977,op.cit.,p.

One of the co-authors of this advice [Muhammad Hayat Taman] asserted that the averagecitizeninvariablysidedwiththepowerfulandvictorious.519

ThePNAbeganitselectioncampaignbyholdingitsfirstpublicmeetingatKarachi's NishtarParkon23January.Despitethegovernment'ssuspensionofbusandother transportservicestotheareaandamisinformationcampaignspreadingrumorsof expectedviolentdisturbances,amassivecrowdshowedup.Laternewspaperestimates putitatover150,000-makingitoneofthebiggestgatheringthathadbeenheldin Karachi until then. The crowd was in an exuberant mood. We all took turns to address the mammoth assembly. In myspeech, I could not help but inform the crowd about the tragicplightofthepeopleofBalochistanandopenlydefendedmyjailedfriendswho hadbeenprodigiouslydubbedastraitorsinthegovernmentcontrolledmedia.Tomy dismaywhenitcametoRafiqueBajwa'sturn,heproducedacopyoftheHolyKoran andproceededtopledgeonit.'WewillkeepPNA'sunityintact',waswhathepromised.Personally,Ialwaysdisapprovedofusingreligiontoscorepointsinpolitics.520

WhenAsgharKhan,inhisspeech,rhetorically askedwhetherthe PPPGovernment shouldbeheldaccountableforitsexcesses,theassembledthousandsroaredtheir approval. The mood of Karachi seemed stridently anti-Bhutto. And as later PNA rallies in other parts of the country would reveal, a large part of the populace had become fed up with the PPP regime. Thiswas watched with increasing dismayin Islamabad. As the PPP Minister of Communications and Information later was to state:

Themostdifficultsituationwhichtheseadvisershadtofacewaswhenthelifting of Section 144 restrictions, there was a flood of processions and public meetings undertheauspicesofthePNA.InFebruary1977,whentheelectroncampaign wasatitspeak,theirwishfulthinkinghadbeenobliteratedandthehighhopes they had given to the Prime Minister were nowhere in evidence. The farce of the unopposedvictoriestheyhadputupinitiallylayexposed.521

ThelongyearsofPresscensorshipandthesuppressionofanyattemptsbythe Opposition to address the public had backfired. A direct consequence of this 'blockade' imposedonuswasthatthepublicwasgenuinelyinterestedinhearingourpointof view.PeopleflockedtoPNAralliesineverincreasingnumbers.InHyderabadwe addressedanotherrecordbreakingcrowd.Laterahugenumberofparticipants,estimatedtobe70,000strong,marchedinprocessionthroughthenarrowstreetsofthe

519RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince,Vanguard,Lahore,1998,p.15.

520Unfortunately, after the arrest of all the front rank leadership of the movement came into the hands of second tier leaders who bolstered the agitation by using 'Nizam-e-Mustafa' as a political slogan. While I confess to an abiding faith inGod,I believe thatreligion should always bekept out of politics.It's beenmyexperience thatthose who use Islam in this manner often do so very unscrupulously.

521KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.57.

oldcitywheretheywereshoweredwithrosepetals.WhilepassingtheHyderabad Central Jail they chanted 'Withdraw the Conspiracy Case! Release Wali Khan! Release AttaullahMengal!ReleaseGhousBukshBizenjo!ReleaseKhairBukshMarri!'Whena teamofPNAleaderswenttotourBalochistanwemetwiththesameresponse.

A few days later Bhutto held a rally at Nishtar Park. The Press which, only days before, hadbeenhailinghimas'TheSupremeLeader,TheUndisputedLeader,TheGreat Leader'now described thismeeting as'the largestever heldinAsia',522Inthe course of hisaddressatNishtarPark,hedeliveredapersonalattackonme.Thenmuchtomy sorrow,headded,'Whilethispersonconstantlyopposesme,hisownsonhaswrittento me, disowning his father and pledging his loyalty to me. The letter is in my pocket'. He then extracted a letter and waved it at the crowd.

***

Regretfully,SherAli,borntomysecondwife,had beena difficultchild fromanearly age.HewillfullyleftAitchisonCollege,withoutfinishinghisAleveleducation,to follow his obsession with the ideaof becoming a tribal sirdar. Subsequently, on several occasionsIhadtoadmonishhimforhisoppressiveattitudetowardsthetribe.Bythe timehewastwenty-one,hehadalreadybrokenthelawonatleasttwocounts.These incidents provided the PPP regime an advantage in their campaign against me, and the governmentissuedspecialordersthatSherAlibeimmediatelyapprehendedand rumors were purposely spread that hewas tobe 'shot on sight'.

Despite my anger at Sher Ali for his criminal behavior, I was faced with afait accompli. Asafathermyfirstdutywastoprotectmyson'slife.ImadehimcometoKarachi, where he hid at my house for a while. Then I arranged with Naseem Wali Khan to look after him. I counseled Sher Ali, to bolster hiscourage,mentioning that manyothersof our race were alsofacing a dire predicamentinBalochistan, and thathe should face his situationwithbravefortitudeuntilasolutioncouldbefound.Itoldhimthattyrants never lasted forever. To my sorrow instead of following my advice, after a brief stay in theNWFP,hewenttomeethisuncle,mybrother,MirBalakhSher,atLahore.I subsequentlylearntfrommyfriendSadiqQureshithatSherAliwroteasubmissive letter to Bhutto expressing his profound apologies and seeking a pardon. That was the letter thatBhutto, much tomy dismay, had delightedly displayed tothe thousandswho hadassembledatNishtarPark.Onreceivingtheletter,Bhuttohadissuedimmediate ordersforallchargestobedroppedagainstSherAli.Ihadexpectedbetterfromasonof mine,andwas sorrowfully disappointed.Unfortunately,he wastobring morepain to meovertheyearsthatfollowed.IevenpaidforhiseducationatColumbiainNew

522The Government's Press Information Department had, on20 January 1977, instructed all newspapers to print a large 3 by 8 inch photograph Bhutto with the caption of 'The Supreme Leader, The Undisputed Lead The GreatLeader'.

York, but my efforts were to no avail. Finally, in 1997, I was driven to publicly disown him when he forged my signature and involved me in a fraudulent property case.

Inthemeanwhile,thePNAcampaignwasproceedingwithgreatsuccess.Wewere mobbedandcheeredateverylocation.WithnearlyfiveyearsofharshPresscensorship, a large number of the intelligentsia were taken aback by the response the PNA was receiving among the masses. It appeared that the regime's attempt at brainwashing the newspaperreadershiphadonlybeenpartiallysuccessful.Havingreadnothingbutnews ofthe government's popularity, the 'brilliance' of its leader, and almost nothingabouttheOpposition,this'turnaround'cameasacompletesurprisetosomeandcaused a degree of disbelief in others. The reality was simple, a majority of the voters had overtime simply had enough of Bhutto. With the strict censorship in place nothing had everbeendonetogaugethetruemoodofthepeoplewithoutincurringthewrathofthe regime. Fear had been the all-prevailing factor. It was only when state controls were temporarilyrelaxedfortheelectioncampaignthatpeoplefeltconfidentenoughto openlyexpresstheirviews.InitselectioneditiontheHeraldmagazinecommented:

Inthenextandlastweekoftheelectioncampaign,thedominantquestionwill be: Who will win? The PPP or the PNA?

To predict with a high degree of precision the outcome of the electoral contest on March7(fortheNationalAssembly)andMarch10(forprovincialassemblies)is a pretty hazardous business.523

It must be remembered that the real strength of the PNA was in its unity. In the 1970 election,whenBhuttowastrulyattheheightofhispopularity,thePPPhadwononly

38.89 percent of thetotal vote in West Pakistan and that waswhen all the other partieshad actively campaigned against each other. Now that all the other parties, of any consequence,were alliedagainst the PPP,thevotecouldonly split in twoways,rather than in a myriadways,as was the case in the 1970 elections.

InPunjab,largelywiththepromiseofthethousand-year-warandanti-Indiainvective, in1970Bhuttohadsucceededingetting41.66percentoftheprovince'svote.Fiveyears of PPP power had seen the party structure crumble into factious disunity, and alienated mostofthePPP'sardentpoliticalworkers.Thebrutalviolenceandopencorruption begun by Khar's administration had further damaged the party image. Bhutto was nolongerthepopularyoungrebelwhohadopposedAyubKhanandhadthreatenedto reveal the so-called 'secrets' of Tashkent. Instead, he was now commonly viewed as an autocraticleaderwhowantedtotalpower.Inthechangedcircumstances,thelarge backing that Bhutto received from Punjab in 1970 was no longer there. Further, the two- waycontestwouldnowensurethatallnon-PPPvoteswouldonlygotothePNA

523HamidHussein,'Election'77What?'.Herald,Karachi,March19p.12.

candidates.Inafreeandfaircontest,itwasclearthatPPP's'FortressPunjab'hadcollapsed.

In1970thePPPhad onlyreceived 14.28percentof the vote intheNWFPand wononly onenationalseat,whichwasthatofAbdulKhaliqKhan,wholater,ironically,joinedtheNDP.Intheearlierelection,partiesnowrepresentingthePNAhadwon10outof the total of 18 seats. The remaining 7 seats had gone to the Qayum League. The PPP in recenttimeshadimprovedtheirpositionattheexpenseofAbdulQayumKhan,who, once Bhuttogaugedthathisutilityhadceased,hadbeenunceremoniouslydumped fromhisalliancewiththePPP.ButthePPPwasweakstructurallypartlyduetothe continuingfeudbetweenChiefMinister,NasrullahKhattak,andtheGovernor.The 1977electionintheNWFPwasincorrectlyassumedbymanytobeathree-waycontest. Nevertheless, all commentatorshad givenaclear lead tothePNA, largely becauseof its twocomponentparties-theJUIandtheNDP.Initspre-electionissue,Herald,stated that '[in the NWFP], while no one will be ableto muster a complete majority... the PNA, is likely to have an edge in the National Assembly seats'. As far as we were concerned, thePNAcombinedNWFPvote-bankofNDP-JUI,aswellasotherpartiessuchasthe Jamaat-i-Islami,wouldeasilytakemorethanhalftheNationalAssemblyseatsinthe province. In a fair election we, in the NDP, were anticipating a sweep in the province.

InSindh,inthe1970elections,BhuttohadcultivatedtheSindhilandedgentrytohis ownadvantage.Apartfromleftists, suchasRasoolBukshTalpur - whohadleftthePPP

- and Pir Pagaro and his followers, the landed gentry of Sindh remained with the PPP fortheirmutualadvantage.However,intheprovincetherewasonestarkdifference between1970and1977,andthatwasthebitterdivideengenderedbythebloody languageriotsof1972.LargelythankstoMumtazBhuttotheprovincehadbeencleaved into two. The language riots, the creation of the job quota system, limiting government jobsforthemuhajirsandtheexclusionofKarachifromthepowerstructure,ensured PNA a complete dominance in urban Sindh.

AmongthePNAtherewasastrongandgrowingconvictionthattheelectionswould resultinvictory.Thiswouldeventuallyandconvincinglybeprovedbythedeserted pollingboothson10March1977,whenthePNAcalledonthepublictoboycottthe provincialelections.ThisphenomenonwasnotjustrestrictedtourbanPakistan;polling boothsweredesertedalloverthewholecountry.Thosewhostillpersistoninsisting thatthatPPPwouldhavewonthe1977elections-eveniftheyhadnotbeenrigged- shouldanswerthissimple question:Where wasthe PPPsupportonthe day ofthe provincial elections?

VaqarAhmed,Bhutto'sCabinetSecretary,madeaveryrevealingadmission.He disclosedthathewasinformedbyAkramSheikh,theDirectoroftheIntelligence Bureau, 'that on the day of the election Mr. Bhutto was in the control room and about 12 o'clockhegotpanickyandsaidthatPPPwaslosing.Itappearsatthattimecertain

instructions went at least to Chief Secretary Punjab which resulted in large scalerigging'.524It is worthwhile noting that on that election day even Bhutto believed that he had lost the election.

***

Kausar Niazi states in his election memoirs that 'one of Mr. Bhutto's intense desires was wellknowntome;hehadexpressedthatmorethanonceinmypresence.Andthatwas

...hewantedavictorywithtwo-thirdsmajority!'525Bhuttoneededatwo-thirdsmajority intheNationalAssemblytoamendtheConstitutiontoobtainhischerishedgoalofa presidentialpoliticalsystemwithhim,ofcourse,asthePresident.Inreachingthe ConstitutionalAccordofOctober1972theOppositionhadstubbornlyresistedall attemptsbyhimtoswayustowardsagreeingtoapresidentialformofgovernment. NowBhuttowantedthe1977electiontogivehimwhattheOppositionhadlongdenied

- him, and to get it he was prepared to rig the elections. But it was important - as RaoRashidputitinanotetohismaster-that'Theelectionshavetoappearcrediblenot onlyinsidethecountrybutoutsidethecountryaswell'.526Mucheasiersaidthandone, inpracticeitprovedtobefarmoreelusiveanddifficult.

The first plan formulated seems to have been the so-called 'Larkana' Plan. In April 1976, Bhutto sent a copyof this plan to Rafi Razato improve upon. The plan envisaged the settingupofinfluentialcommitteesappointedatdistrictlevelwhichwould'be responsiblefortheoverallcontrolanddirections oftheelectioninthedistrict'.The district committee, the membership of which would include the local DeputyCommissioner and Superintendent of Police, would obtain reports on a daily basis from juniorcommitteessetupattheconstituencyandvillagelevels,andthenissue instructionsbaseduponthesereports.Further,a committeewouldalsobe formed for eachpollingstationwiththespecifictaskofensuringthat'onelectionday...thevotes are cast in favor of the right candidate'. According to Rafi Raza's annotations on the document, he appears to have given the plan his approval, barring two insignificantalterations.

A more encompassing plan was put up by Ali Muhammad Rashidi. Rashidi was once a well-knownsycophantofAyubKhan's,whothenrapidlytransferredhisloyaltiesto Bhuttoandwasappointedinformationadviser.In1975Rashidihadsentawritten requestasking hisnewmentorforajobforhisson.Bhutto'sannotationonthejob applicationreads:'WeareresponsibleforRashidiandallhissonsbecausehetoldAyub

524From a statement made by Vaqar Ahmed, Federal Cabinet Secretary GovernmentWhite Paper on the Conductof the General Elections in March 1977, July 1978, Annexure 28, p. A-91.

525KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.53.

526In a note from Rao Rashid Khan, head of the PM's Secretariat, to B dated 30 May 1976:The Government White Paper on the Conduct of theGeneral Elections in March 1977, July 1978, Annexure 12, p. A-35.

Khantogetmeshot.Thatislife;whatmorecanwedofortheseloyalbunchoffaithfuls'.527

InMay1976theever'faithful'Rashidisubmittedadetailedsecretelectionplanrelating towiderangingactivities-dealingwithpublicityofthePPPregime's'spectacularacts' torevisingelectorallaws.Included,amongthemanythingsRashidisuggested,were:

• weshould havea listof sensitive constituenciesand of personswho must not be allowed to be elected. We should have [sic] special programme for conducting elections in such marked constituencies...

• Detailedworkonpollingstationsandonchoiceofpersonsfromamong the officials who will conduct elections...

• 'Surrogates'ineachconstituencywhomwecanputupascandidatesin eventoftheOppositionboycottingtheelectiontocoveritsdiscomfiture and give us a bad name.

• Wemustsetupourownmachineryofaqualitywhichleavesnothing tobe desired[Rashidi's own underlining]. When I say this it meansa greatdeal.528

BhuttosentRashidi'splantoRaoRashidKhanwithinstructionstoimproveuponit.In his reply to Bhutto, Rao Rashid submitted a new revision of the plan. He covered every detailsubmittedearlierbyRashidiunderseparateheadings,includingthefollowing:

• Mr.Rashidihasalsorecommendedthatweshouldhavealistofthose personsreadywhoshouldnotgetelectedatanycost.Thiscanonlybe doneafterthenominationpapershavebeenfiledanditisknownhow manyofsuchpeoplewouldreallybeinthefield.However,spadeworkby the Intelligence Bureau can be done even at this stage...

• TheProvincesarealreadybusymakinglistsofofficialswhowillbe engaged as Polling and Presiding Officers on the day of the election. The workofweedingoutofundesirableandundependableofficialsshallbe completedbythefirstofAugust[1976].Ineachprovince,duringmyvisits andpersonalmeetingswithChiefSecretariesIhaveconveyedthePrime

527From a copy of a personal letter from Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi to Bhutto, dated 7 July 1975:The Government White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. II, Treatment of Fundamental State, January 1979, Annexure 54, p. A-129.

528From a copy of a note from Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi to Bhutto:Government White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, July 1978, Annexure 11, pp. A-21 to A-29.

Minister'sconcerninthisregardandmadethemrealizetheimportanceof having absolutely reliable and dependable officials for this job.

[To] meet the alleged threat of the Opposition to boycott the elections ... a handfulofsurrogatecandidateswouldnotrestorethecredibilityofthe elections;itwillberestoredonK'ifcertainsurrogateOppositionparties remaininthefieldtogenerateapparentbutcontrolledheatinthe electionstomakeitappear well-contested.In thisconnectionIhaveheld very fruitful discussions with certain Opposition Parties/Leaders...529

Needlesstosay,therevisedplanwascarriedoutintotality.EventheRashidi suggestionof'TheSpectacularActs'wastakentothehilt.Thiswascommemoratedbya lengthypropagandablitzinthemediawhichwentonforanumberofweeks 'highlighting'theachievementsofaparticulargovernmentMinistryeachweek.Moreimportantly:

• Afortnightbeforetheelections,on23February,RaoRashidKhanissueda listofOppositioncandidates.Heissuedinstructionsthat'specialefforts needtobemadetokeeptheselistedcandidatesoutoftheAssemblies'.I was very much on the list of these 'chosen' few.530

• On 17 June 1976 Bhutto wrote to his three Chief Ministers and the Chief Secretary of Balochistan giving them instructions to be followed in the preparationoflistsofReturningOfficers,PresidingOfficers,Polling Officersandassistantsmanningthepollingstations.531Hestated:

Itisextremelyimportantthattherighttypeofpersonnelare selectedfortheseappointments.Theutmostcarehas,therefore,to beexercisedinselectingthemandithastobefullyensuredthat personsofbiasedpoliticalleaningsarenotselected.Theavailable personnelshouldbethoroughlyvettedthroughtheSpecial Branchesandonlythemostdependableofficersshouldbeselected.532

529FromacopyofasecretmemofromRaoRashidKhan,headoftheSecretariat,toBhutto,dated30May1976,

ibid.,Annexure12,p.A-30A-35.

530Fromacopyofa'Secret'notefromRaoRashidKhan,headoftheSecretariat,toBhutto,dated30May1976,

ibid.,Annexure188,p.A-51toA-520.

531The imposition of Federal Government rule in Balochistan came to end on 6 December 1976 when Muhammad Khan Barozai was made chief minister.

532From copies of the official letters from Bhutto to the four Chief Minister, dated 17 June 1976,ibid.: Annexure30, pp. A-93 to A-96.

• Thechosensurrogatecandidates/partiesremainedacloselyguarded secret.EvenRaoRashidKhanavoidedwritingtheirnamesinhissecret memorandum of the revised Rashidi plan sent to Bhutto. Referring to his 'fruitfuldiscussions'with'certainOppositionLeaders/Parties'headded that I would report the resultof my discussions to [Bhutto]personally to safeguardsecrecy'.533Iharboredmysuspicionsonwhothesewere,butin absence of solid proof it would not be proper to name them.

• Rashidi'ssuggestionofcreating a'machinery ofaquality whichleaves nothing tobedesired'wasimplementedinfull. InRaoRashid Khan'sown words to Bhutto:

UnderthedirectionsofthePrimeMinisterIvisitedallthefourprovincesand mettheChiefSecretaries.TheSpecialCellswillstartfunctioningineach Province from the 1st of June [1976] to handle election matters, and gradually expandedasthevolumeofworkincreases.TheCellsshallfunctionunderthe direct control of the Chief Secretaries. Special Cells shall also be created in all the Special Branches.534

Havingformulatedtheir'OperationVictory'thePPPElectionteamcomplacently awaitedwhattheythoughtwouldbeaneffortlessvictory.RaoRashidwentevenasfar as to write to the Prime Minister that 'I will respectfully submit that we should look ... beyond the next General Elections and PPP's easy victory'.535It was only after lifting of Section 144 restrictions and the subsequent flood of public to the PNA meetings, did it dawn upon their bureaucratic mindset that disaster lay round the corner for them. The nine-party alliance was suddenly emerging as a winner. In the words of the much- respected journalist I. H. Burney. 'Two months of hectic electioneering had unleashed a mass upsurge which had no parallel in the history of the country'.536Bhutto and hiselection team were no longer confident that their planned 'Operation Victory' would be sufficientonitsowntorigavictory.Bytheirsubsequentactions,itappearswith startlingclarity,thattheynowdecidedthattheywouldhavetodomuchmoreto'win' the elections.

Notsurprisingly,Bhutto'steamchosethemostdirectapproachtosolvetheirproblem and that was to pressurize the local administration in the constituencies to deliver the 'votes'tothem.Driventosuddendesperation,Bhutto'saidesdidnotbothertohide

533FromacopyofasecretmemofromRaoRashidKhan,headoftheSecretariat,toBhutto,dated30May1976,

ibid.,Annexure12,p.A-30.

534FromacopyofasecretmemofromRaoRashidKhan,headoftheSecretariat,toBhutto,undated,ibid., Annexure 31, p. A-98.

535Fromacopyofasecretmemo,fromRaoRashidKhan,headoftheSecretariat,toBhutto,dated10June1976,

ibid.,Annexure16,p.A-55.

536I.H.Burney,'March'77Elections:AnAnalysis',PakistanEconomics,23July1977,p.16.

theirtrail.Copiesofdozens oforiginaldocuments laterpublished intheGovernmentWhite Paper on the Conduct of the General Electionsprovide copious evidence of theiractivities.

The NWFP was a prime example of such misdeeds. Bhutto assigned Muhammad Hayat Taman,hisPoliticalAdviser,theurgenttaskofmakingelectionpreparationsinthe NWFP.Taman arrived in Peshawarin January1977 andspent the next two months touring the area until the elections were held. Even General Imtiaz, Bhutto's Military Secretary was sent there for a lengthy period of three weeks to assist Taman. Their activitieswere blatantand little attempt was madeat discretion.

SaeedAhmedAkhtar(thenDeputyCommissioner,MansehraDistrict,NWFP) describing a meeting held by them, stated:

ThentheChiefSecretaryaddressedus,praisedMr.Bhuttoandhisregimeand wasapprehensiveofagreatlosstoPakistanincasethePNAwontheelection. GeneralImtiazandMr.Tamanagreedwithhim...TheChiefSecretarysuggested

...muchcouldbedonetohelpthePPPcandidates.Hesuggestedthatthe Returning Officers could fill ... ballot [boxes for a] few polling stations for a PPP candidate and this box could later be exchanged with another by the Presiding Officer.Healsosuggestedthatevenafterthecloseofthepollswhenthe Presiding Officerisonhisway back, hecanusetheunusedballotpapers forthe PPP candidates.537

MuhammadAzamKhan(thenCommissioner,HazaraDivision,NWFP)stated:

...theVIPs[GeneralImtiazandChiefSecretary,NWFP]wantedtoknowthe specifickindsofhelpwewouldbeabletoprovidePPPcandidates.They discussed the possibility of rigging and malpractices which could be resorted to under the circumstances. Amongst other suggestions we were asked to direct the Presiding Officers to tamper with the sealed bags sent to them by the Election Commissiononthenightbeforethepollingday.Theobjectivewastofilla numberofballotboxesbeforehandinfavorofPPPcandidates.Theseboxeswere tobeintroducedandplacedamongstthefilledboxessometimesduringthe middleofthedaywhenthepollingagentsofvariouspartieswentoutfora break.ItwasalsosuggestedthatReturningOfficersshouldcallallthePresiding

537From an eyewitness account given by Saeed Ahmed Akhtar, Deput Commissioner and Returning Officer of NA- 15:TheGovernmentWhitePaper ontheConductoftheGeneralElectionsinMarch1977,ibid.,Annexure40,p.A-

123. This statement was corroborated in its entirety by Khalid Mansoor, then Deputy Commissioner, AbottabadDistrict, NWFP, who was also present on the occasion,ibid., Annexure 280. p. A-771 to A-774.

Officersandissuethemwiththeaboveinstructionsaswellasanyother instructionstheymaydeemnecessarytowardsachievingthedesiredobjective.538

EvenonelectiondaywhentheresultswereplainlygoingagainstthePPP,Taman, GeneralImtiazandtheNWFPChiefSecretarywerebusytryingtomanipulatethe results withtheassistanceofthesenior administrationoftheprovince.

TheDeputyCommissioner(andReturningOfficer)ofKohistanDistrict,NWFP,who wasearlierinstructedtokeeptheresultsofhisconstituencyasecretwasthen summoned to Abottabad for a meeting by the troika. Atthe meeting he was threatened 'withdireconsequences'ifhedidnotaccedetotheChiefSecretary'srequesttomakeup the deficiency in the PPP candidate's votes and reverse the result.

Iexpressedmyinabilitytodosotellingthemthatmyjobwastosimplycompilethe resultsreceivedfromthePresidingOfficers,topassthemontothequarterconcerned and to announce it officially. All three got annoyed. Mr. Taman inquired from me as to what type of a Deputy Commissioner was I [sic] when called to do such a thing. I kept mum.TheChiefSecretarythentoldtheCommissionerandtheDIGPolicetotakeme outside and explain the position.

The DIG then took me aside [and] in the presence of the Commissioner threatened me withdireconsequencesif I didnotreversetheresultsand declare acandidate oftheir choice successful.He informedme thatthePPPhadalready wonamajority inthe Centre anditwascertainthattheywouldformtheirGovernment.Hesaidthatthe officerspresentinsidewerebentupontakingactionagainstthosewhodidnothelp them. He informed me that my dismissal would not take days but hours. He told me to level a charge against me was a very thing [sic] and they could level any charge againstme.539

IwasstandingasacandidatefortheNationalAssemblyfromtwoconstituencies: KarachiandPeshawar.Interestingly,inaderailedintelligencereportjointlycompiled by the Intelligence Bureau and the ISI and presented to Bhutto on 19 February 1977, the agencies had forecast that PPP would win 13 seats out of the 26 seats in the NWFP. But despitetheirconvictionthatthePPPwouldwinhalftheseats,thereportconceded sevendefinitewinstothePNA.AmongthesesevenwasNA-3Peshawarseat,whereit wasmadeclearthatitwouldbewonbySherbazMazariagainsthisPPPrivalAftab

538From an eyewitness account given by Muhammad Azam Khan. Commissioner Hazara Division,ibid., Annexure 62,43. A-186.

539FromaneyewitnessaccountgivenbySyedAbidHussain,DeputyCommissionerKohistanDistrict,ibid., Annexure 281, p. A-775.

Sherpao.540Thereportprovedtobewrong.ThePNAwon17ofthe26seats;thePPP, notwithstandinganallouteffortbyTaman,GeneralImtiazandtheseniorprovincial administration,wononly8seats;andthelastremainingseatwaswonbyQayum League. But despite the PNA sweep I lost from Peshawar.

Ironically,theveryreportwhichhadforecastacleanwinformeintheNA-3seat,also hadthenplacedmeontopofanation-widelistofthose'whooughttolose'inthe regime'sinterest.541So,intheseatwhichboththeISIandtheIBhaddeemedasafewin formeonlysixteendaysbeforetheelectiondate,Iwastoexperienceadefeat.Ayear later,whenthesecretreportwasrevealedtothepublic,itbecametransparenttoallthat I had been a victim to aconcentrated effort ensuring my defeat. Part of the reason lay inthefactthatBhuttohadbeenadamantthattheonlypersonallowedtowinfrommore than one electorate was Bhutto himself. He did not wish to share this distinction with anyone else. Even with the benefit of hindsight, there was little I could have done tocountertheNWFPadministration'sdeterminationtodefeatme.Ihadleftthefinalpart of my Peshawar campaign in the hands of my NDP colleagues. On election day I was at Karachi busy working for my other seat.

Unlikethestrategy employed intheNWFP, Bhuttoadopted atwo-pronged approachin the Punjab. The senior administration was given the task of producing the results, and the PPPpoliticians the jobof organizing theelection. The use of theChief Secretary of eachprovinceasapointofcontrolwaspivotaltotheirplan.ShortlyafterBhutto announcedtheelections,retiredBrigadierZafarMalik,Punjab'sChiefSecretary, summonedallseniormembersofthePunjabbureaucracy,includingtheIGPolice,all theCommissioners.DIGsandaselectgroupofDCsandSPs.Atthemeetinghelaid down the policy for the coming elections. According to one of those present:

The Chief Secretary said that Mr. Bhutto had laid down the guidelines for the elections. Itwasthathe didnotwanttowinanelectionwhichhe mightlose internationally. Henceeverythingistobedonecarefully.TheChiefSecretaryfurthersaidthatthe requirementwas80%seats,70%wouldbeagoodperformancebutbelow60%would notbeacceptable...Nationallevelleadersandcandidatesshouldnotbearrestedatall withoutGovernmentclearance.HefurthergaveinstructionsthatPPPcandidates shouldberecommendedsothattheirprestigeisbuiltup.Evenofficialswereso requiredurgently[sic]bealsotransferredattherequestofthePPPcandidates.Afterthe

540From a copy of a ’secret/immediate’ memo from Akram Sheikh, Director of Intelligence Bureau, to Bhutto,dated 19 February 1977,ibid., Annexure 200, 200A and 201, pp. A-573-A-575 and Annexure 205 pp. A-584 to A-633.

541From an attachment to the ’secret/immediate’memo from Akram S Director Internal Bureau, to Bhutto, dated 19 February 1977,ibid., Annexure 204, p. A-581.

meeting was over the IG showed some indecent posters pertaining to Oppositionleaders.542

The IB/ISI secret intelligence report had given the following report on the Punjab(inclusive of the Federal Area of Islamabad):

ClearwintoPPP

33

Clear win totheOpposition

32

DoubtfulbutleaningtowardsPPP

24

Doubtful butleaningtowardstheOpposition

12

Couldgoeitherway

5

Thereporthoweverwarnedthatthesefigureswereontheoptimisticsideasitwenton to state:

This province needs much greater attention. With concerted effort, the Party can hope to win 33 + 24 = 57 seats. With extra effort it could retrieve at least 10 or 15 undecidedseats.Theoverallsuccessofthepartycouldbeintheregionof60%. Thepartyneedstoworkmuchharderto improveuponthispercentage.543

It is worth noting that the Intelligence Bureau and the ISI had said that only after 'a concerted effort' on part of the PPP would it get 57 seats and that still left the party in a minority, as Punjab provided 116 seats to the National Assembly. In my view even this report was optimistic: as it had earlier ignored the PNA sweep in the NWFP, it now overlookedthetruePNAstrengthinthePunjab,particularlytheurbanandmore literatetothefore.Onelectionday,itheldbackfromreleasingelectionresultssoon after the Chief Secretary received the panicked call from Bhutto. Then the district and division officials took it uponthemselvesto blatantly doctor the results. I am sure whenthe final verdict came out (a preposterous 108 out of the 116 seats to the PPP) even these bureaucrats would have been astounded by the cumulative result of their individual handiwork. Ensconced in Islamabad, even Bhutto lost his composure. According to US Ambassador,HenryByroade,whowaswithBhuttoatthetime:

Theresultswerecominginabout70percent.HewaslosingKarachi.Hewas losing in Peshawar. Then the Punjabi numbers started coming in and guys who wereabsolutethugswonby99percent.ThenBhuttobecameabsolutelyquiet andstarteddrinkingheavily,callingLahore,andhesaid,'Whatareyou[people]

542FromaneyewitnessaccountgivenbyMuhammadBaqirSuperintendentofPolice,GujratDistrict,ibid., Annexure 284, p. A-793

543Fromacopyofa’secret/immediate’memofromAkramSheikh,DiInternalBureau,toBhutto,dated19 February 1977,ibid., Annexure 20 p. A-574.

doing?...!sawBhuttoat8thenextmorning, and hewasn'thimself.Hehadn'thad any sleep, obviously drinking. He was just sad.544

In Sindh, by election day 18 seats had been won unopposed by PPP candidates. Thisworkedoutasanincredible42percentofthetotalof43NationalAssemblyseatsfrom theprovince.Lookedatintheclearlightofday,itwasnothingbutaludicrousexercise inpoliticalhubris.EvenoneoftheirseniorPPPcolleaguescynicallyobserved,'Looking at[these]stalwartselectedunopposed,therewerehardlyafewwhoappearedto deserve the honor'.545In all the cases, including Bhutto's, it had been achieved by the applicationofbruteforcebythedistrictadministrationandpoliceforce.

The Deputy Commissioner of Sukkur reported that three days before the election the provincial Chief Minister visited the city where he issued instructions to the District administration 'that the candidates of the ruling party were to be helped in all possible ways'.WithinafewhoursnearlyahundredPNAworkerswerearrestedbythepolice inSukkur.546InKarachi,inthedayspreceding theelection,hundredsofPNA workers were similarly detained. The purpose behind these detentions was to dishearten PNA supportersandfrightenthemintoinaction.AccordingtotheSindhHomeSecretaryof the day:

PNAworkerswerearrestedbeforetheelectionontheordersoftheChief MinisterGhulamMustafaJatoi.NamesweregiventotheChiefMinisterbyhis partyworkers.HeheldmeetingswiththeChiefSecretary,IGP,HomeSecretary and DIG Karachi, and gave the names of people against whom action was to betaken by DIGP, Karachi. The then Chief Minister told officials that these were the persons who were indulging in attacks on PPP meetings and processions andshouldbetriedunder DPR.The obviouspurposewastoweakenthePNAwhich wasstrongin KarachiandHyderabad towns.547

KarachihadveryquicklybecomethePNAbastioninSindh.Withtheexceptionofafew, such as Hafiz Pirzada, and perhaps Abdul Sattar Gabol - who had support among theBalochispeakingMakranicommunityinLyari-therestofthePPPcandidatesin Karachiwereanindifferentlot.WhilePirzadawaspartlycountingonthePPP-Sindhi vote-bankinMalir,mostoftheothersheldpoliticalambitionsbasedsolelyonthe complete support of the local administration. They included: Akbar Liaquat Ali Khan - hisclaimonly restedonbeing thelate LiaquatAliKhan'sson;JamiluddinAali-aknownUrdupoet;HakimMuhammadSaid-ofHamdardfame;AliMahmood-a

544InaninterviewwithStanleyWolpert:(StanleyWolpert,ZulfiBhuttPakistan,op.cit.,p.279).

545KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.56.

546From an eyewitness account given by Manzoor Hussain Bhutto, Deputy Commissioner Sukkur:The Government White Paper on the Conduct o the General Elections in March 1977, op. cit., Annexure 309-A, p. A-8.

547From a statement made by Muhammad Khan Junejo,Home Secretary Sindh Government,ibid.,Annexure 67,p.A-255.

youngdeserterfromNAPandrelatedtotheHaroonfamilyofKarachi;KamalAzfar- whohadlostfromKarachiinthe1970elections;NabiDad(N.D.)Khan-thenan unknown PPP worker. Other 'luminaries' included Malik Mir Hazar, a Pathan marbledealer,ImdadAliShah,andSulemanHussainGhanchi.

On the day before the elections, 6 March, all the Returning Officers in Karachi were summonedtotheChiefMinister'sHousewheretheywereallinturncalledseparately intoacommitteeroom.Inthecommitteeroomtherewasagatheringcomprisingmost ofthePPPcandidatesandledbyHafizPirzada.MuhammadKhanJunejo,theprovincial Home Secretary was also present. In their presence Pirzada informed each ReturningOfficerwhatwasexpectedofhimthefollowingday.Accordingtoone ReturningOfficer'themainaimofthemeetingwastopressurizetheReturningOfficers in front of the candidates so that Returning Officers may not have any check on thePeople's Party candidates during voting'.548It was also declared at a later enquiry thatHafizPirzadahad'directedtheReturningOfficerstokeepthepaceofpollsslowat some polling stations while he instructed for faster pace of voting at polling stations ofrural areas'.549If this was not enough the person responsible for coordinating the administrative arrangements of the elections later testified:

[on election day] arrangements were made to collect and compile results in [the] Commissioner's Office. At about 11.00 p.m. there was silence and the communicationsofresultswasstoppedbythe[ReturningOfficers].Oncontact they informed that the Home Secretary has stopped them to [sic] finalize or communicate the results.550

***

AlargepartofmyelectioncampaigningwasdoneoutsideKarachi.Iwentwherevermy serviceswererequiredtosupportPNA candidates.Asaresult,I arrivedinmyhomecitybarelyafewdaysbeforetheelectiondate.Bythenalargenumberofour politicalworkersandpollingagentshadalreadybeenarrestedbythelocal administrationunderahostoffictitiouschargesunderDefenceofPakistanRules. Despite the daily harassment there was not the slightest sign of demoralization among our workers. The month and a half of open campaigning against the government, afteralongfive-yearprohibitionoffreeexpression,hadaddedfiretotheirspiritandsteeled their resolve.

548From a statement made by Muhammad Humayun Farshori,Assistant Commissioner Liaquatabad and Returning Officer for NA-186,ibid., Annexure 308, p. A-881 to A-882.

549WordsoftheCMLA’sInquiryCommittee,ibid.,p.308.

550From a statement made by Mobashir Ahmed, Assistant Director, Local Government,ibid., Annexure 56, p. A-165.

Afewdays priorto electiondaySaeedHaroonaskedmeto joinhiminleadinga processionthroughhisconstituencyinLyari.551AlargenumberofNDPworkersand otherPNAsupportersgatheredinLyari,andformedaprocessionwhichthenwound itswayslowlythroughthemainroadinLyari.Itjustsohappenedthatthehouseof AbdulSattarGabol,SaeedMaroon'srival,waslocatedonthemainroadandonthe routeofourmarch.Asweapproachedit,weweresuddenlymetwithahailofgunfire fromitsrooftop.AhandfulofPathanNDPsupporters,whowerecarryingweaponsasa protective measure against just such an incident, returned fire. A chaotic scene soon followedashundredsofunarmedPNAsupporterssoughtcoverwherenonewas offered. A number of people also began firing at us from the adjacent lanes. I refused to budgegroundinthefaceofwhatI.consideredtobeanactofcowardlyaggression. VerysoonanumberofNDPworkersencircledmeanddespitemyprotestations insistedonprovidingmewithprotection,leavingthemselvesexposedtotheflying bullets. One person died and several were badly injured as a result of the unexpected skirmish. I later went to the Press Club to denounce the incident but the next day the newspapersdecidedtoprintonlythePPP'sandAbdulSattarGabol'sdoctoredversion of the whole affair.

When the election day finally arrived, it turned out to be a day of strife and turmoil in Karachi. In a pre-planned move, a large number of armed gangs of PPPgoondasforcibly tried to take over chosen polling booths. It was their intention to prevent genuine voting from taking place and then, having asserted control over a polling booth, they openly indulgedinbogusvoting.Thiswasmoreprevalentinthewomen'spollingbooths.I waswitnesstoonesuchshamefulincidentwhenoneofmypollingofficers,Najma Babar,awell-knownjournalist,wassetuponbyagroupoffoul-mouthedharridans from Lyari. They stoned her and physically mauled her in my presence. Facing thesewomen I, along with my male supporters present on the scene, found ourselves quite helpless. And the police refused to render any assistance. That day my rival candidate,Malik Mir Hazar went about my constituency with a large group of armed ruffians, and forcibly,usinggunfireinoneincidentcloseddowntwopollingstationslocatedinthe KMCPrimarySchool(MiranNaka).Someoftheadjacentshopsweresetablazeto further frighten voters from approaching the polling area. These incidents were only illustrative of what took place in Karachi that day as the ruling party did its utmost to manipulate the polling results.552

WhileIhadwonmyKarachiseatwithanoverwhelmingmajority,therewaslittleto celebrate.Whentheresultsstartedtocomeontelevisionthateveningitbecamevery

551SaeedwastheyoungestsonofSirAbdullahHaroon.

552ThemostbrazenwasJamSadiqAli’sattempttocompeltheReturningOfficerofKarachiNA-185toaccept,at

4.30 a.m. on the election morning, 7 March, a proposal of ’an already prepared election result’ that would be supplied immediately to ensure the PPP candidate Ali Mahmood’s victory. And this was a few hours before the polling even began. Luckily the Returning Officer saw sense and quickly rejected the instructions:The Government White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections March 1977, op. cit., Annexure 310, p. A-894.

obviousatanearlystagethatanabominablecharadehadbeenplayedonallofus. Some of the results were so grotesquely skewed that no one could for a moment doubt thatanactofgrossdeceptionhadtakenplace.EvenBhutto,wholatercameonthe televisiontoacknowledgehis'resoundingvictory'lookedfurtiveandillatease,quite belyinghisimageasthenewlytriumphant'SupremeandUndisputedLeader'.Ithad, probably,alreadyoccurredtohimthathehadhugelyoversteppedthelimitsofcredulity.

The political 'genius' had far greatly over-reached himself, and this would now lead to his political downfall, and ultimately - unforeseen by all at the time - to a horrible and lonely death at the gallows of Rawalpindi Jail.

CHAPTER9

ZiaulHaqandtheRevivalofMartialLaw

When itbecame obvioustoall thatthe PPPregime hadindulged in massive rigging, the PNAandanimmensesectionofthePakistanipublicbecameenraged.Thefivelong years of oppression had led to repressed feelings of frustration and anger, which were tosoonexplodeonthestreets.Ontheeveningofelectiondaylargecrowdshad gathered in Karachi at public places to await the results. One could not help but notice thepalpable fury oftheassembled peopleas thedoctoredresults beganpouringin.A fire had been lit and a powder-keg of indignation was about to blow.

On8March,thedayfollowingtheelections,thePNAleadershipgatheredatan emergencymeetingatLahore.Therewerestoriesofmassiverigginginallthe provinces. We received widespread evidence of forged ballot papers, illegal stuffing of ballotboxes,incrediblyhighincidencesofrejectedvotes,forcibledispersalofvoters from polling stations by the police in short, the regime had used every available illegal method to ensure its victory. The mood of the assembled PNA leadership was one of unrestrained fury. No one was prepared to accept the results of the 7 March elections. It wassoonunanimouslydecidedthatallsuccessfulPNAcandidateswouldresigntheir seatsforthwith;thePNAwouldboycotttheprovincialelectionsscheduledfor10 March;andacallwouldbemadeforanationwideproteststrikeon11March.ThePNA call for the boycott of the provincial elections was soon endorsed by Qayum's Muslim LeagueandNAP(Pakhtoonkhwa)ofBalochistan.

FacedwithanenragedOpposition,Bhuttotookanaggressivestance.Hepublicly derided PNA's claims, terming them as baseless, and appealed 'to the mass of theelectorate for the Provincial Assemblies to ... turn out for the vote with full vigor and enthusiasm'.553Despite urgent instructions to the provincial administrations to ensure a goodturnoutonelectionday,on10Marchthepollingstationsremainedlargely deserted.AleadingPPPcabinetministerlatercommented:

The PNA's mass popularity was proved on the 10th of March when the ProvincialAssembly elections were scheduled and the polling booths lay deserted. That day it was only the People's Party candidates who were in the field. Complete boycott of theProvincialAssemblypollsgavemeaclearindicationthattheanti-government campaignlaunchedbythePNA...wouldproveveryeffective.554

553Z.A.Bhutto,statement,9March1977,PakistanHorizon30(SecondQuarter1977),p.164.

554KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.62.

On11Marchthenation-widestrike,calledbythePNA,wasextremelysuccessful. Public demonstrations took place in all the major cities and towns of Pakistan. The authorities employed the police in an indiscriminate manner to enforce Section 144 andlathicharges and use of tear-gas were made the established norm. In my hometown of Rojhanthereweremassarrests.Manyofmyrelativesandsupportersweredetained and curfew was soon declared. Notably, it was the first imposition of curfew in all of Pakistan.Sooncurfewswereimposedinmanyotherpartsofthecountry.

I attended a further PNA general council meeting at Lahore at which we resolved to continue with the agitation. Our demands now included the immediate resignations of Bhutto and the Election Commission, and the holding of fresh elections under the supervisionofthejudiciaryandthearmedforces.Itwasdecidedthatuntilthese demands were met we would continue with a programme of non-stop agitation. Theprotest movement was to be launched on 14 March.Various leaders were assigned thetaskofleadingtheralliesindifferentpartsofthecountry.MuftiMahmoodwastolead the movement in Peshawar, Asghar Khan in Rawalpindi, Begum Naseem Wali Khan in Lyallpur,AhmedShahNooraniinHyderabad,andIwasgiventhetaskforKarachi.

On 12 March Bhutto addressed the nation on television and radio and spoke for nearly ninetyminutesconstantlyberatingthePNAandinsistingthattheelectionshadbeen fair.Thenhe addedthat despiteitall hewas prepared tomeetwiththeleadersof the PNAanddiscuss'somequestions'raisedbythemduringtherecentelections.The followingdayhewrotetoMuftiMahmoodreferringtotheinvitationthathehad extendedovertelevision.TheletterreachedMuftiMahmoodintheearlyhoursof14 March, the day of the launch of the protest movement.

InKarachi,on14March,anumberofPNAleaders,includingProfessorGhafoorand ShahFaridulHaq,assembledatmyresidenceinpreparationforourdayofprotest. ThenweleftforEmpressMarket,fromwherewehadplannedtoleadaprotestmarch to Quaid-i-Azam's mausoleum. By the time we neared the vicinity of Empress Market alargeprocessionhadalreadyformedbehindus.AsweapproachedBohriBazaarwe wereaccostedbyaverylargecontingentofpolicewhichbeganfiringtear-gasshellsat us.Iwasdrivingmyjeepattheheadoftheprocessionandwasaccompaniedby ProfessorGhafoorAhmedandShahFaridulHaqwhoweresittingnexttome.Atear- gascanistersuddenlysmashedthewindscreenandlandedbesideme.Thegas enveloped us and we found ourselves unable to breathe. We were dragged in a state of semi-consciousness from the vehicle and taken to a second storey flat in Bohri Bazaar.555Wet cloth was placed on our eyes as we tried to recover our senses. Down below, the impassionedcrowdhaderuptedandengagedthepoliceinafuriousstreetbattle.Some oftheprotesterswerepickingupthetear-gascanisters'andhurlingthembackatthe

555MyToyotajeepwasinthemeanwhileconfiscatedbythepolice.

police, others were throwing stones and any other handy projectiles at the lawenforcement authorities. The agitation had begun.

OnthatdaysimilardemonstrationshadbeenplannedalloverPakistan,inthemajor cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Hyderabadand Quetta, as well as in smaller towns such asBahawalpur,Gujranwala,Sukkur,etc.Ateverylocationthepolicehadresponded withtear-gasandlathicharges.Insteadoffleeing,asthegovernmenthadhopedthey might,theprotestersspontaneouslychosetorespondbystone-throwing,fist-waving andslogan-chanting.Forcewasnowbeingmetwithforceonthestreetsofourtowns and cities.

In light of the countrywide official mood of repression, the PNA rejected Bhutto's offer of a meeting. We all believed that Bhutto's idea of holdingdiscussions was his typically deceitful method of defusing any crisis. Mufti Mahmood, in his reply to Bhutto's letter of13March,informedhimthatinhismeetingwiththeco-leadersofthePNA,'itwas decided not to enter in a dialogue, the terms of which are not clear'.556It is noteworthy thatintheletterMuftiMahmoodaddressedBhuttoasChairmanPPP;asaclear indication of our refusal to accept the result of the elections. Beside our lack of faith in Bhutto, he had, in all his public utterances, continued to insist that the elections were a 'settled matter' and could notbe made a subjectof any discussion. He had leftnoscope for genuine discussions, even if we had wanted them.

There was another general council meeting of the PNA at Lahore. By this time Mufti MahmoodhadreceivedanotherletterfromBhuttoagaincallingforameeting.This time Bhutto tried to be more conciliatory and intimated that he was prepared to listen to our complaints, at the same time insisting that the daily street demonstrations were dangerousandshouldbecalledoff.NooneinthePNAwaspreparedfora compromise. We had by now discovered that Rafique Ahmed Bajwa, the JUP vice-presidentandsecretary-generalofthePNA,hadsecretlymetwithBhuttoon13April. At first Bajwa mendaciously denied meeting with Bhutto but when confronted with undeniableevidence,hefinallyownedup,andratherspuriouslyclaimedthathehad met Bhutto as a representative of JUP and not of the PNA. We forced him to tender his resignationandinhisplaceProfessorGhafoorwaselectedsecretary-generalofthe PNA. Further, we were daily facing a barrage of invective in the government-controlled Press and there had been no let up in police brutality towards the public demonstrators. With ourgeneral consensus,MuftiMahmood,in a lengthy reply dated17 March,once more rejected Bhutto's offer of talks. The letter was blunt:

Iregrettosaythat...youhaveagainavoidedtoclarifyyourstandregarding countrywidepre-plannedriggingofgeneralelections...On7thMarch1977,the

556MuftiMahmood'sletterto Z. A. Bhutto,14March 1977:quoted in StanleyWolpert,ZulfiBhuttoof Pakistan,op. cit., p. 284.

countrywassubjectedtoafarceinthenameofgeneralelections...[T]he administrationmadeeveryendeavortosubvertthenationalwillandtoensurea new lease of lifefor a leader and a government which had been overwhelmingly rejectedbytheelectorate...Youradministrationonceagainprovedhowdishonest itisbyannouncingthat62percentvoterscasttheirvoteson10thMarch1977.A moreridiculousannouncementcouldnotbemade...freshelectionsshouldbe heldbyanadministrationandagencies whoenjoytheconfidenceofthepeople and the PNA.557

ThePNA'scampaignofpublicprotestcontinuedwithoutarest.Thegovernment furtherexacerbatedthesituationbyannouncingon17Marchthatthe'newlyelected' members of the National Assembly would meet on 26 March to take oath. It was an act ofclearprovocation,consideringthattheElectionCommissionhad,asyet,noteven confirmed the results of the election. There was more to follow.

I returned to Karachi from the Lahoremeeting on the eveningof 17March. Inthe early hoursofthefollowingmorningthepolicesurroundedmyresidence.At2a.m.Iwas arrested,alongwithNaseemWaliKhan,whohadbeenstayingasahouse-guest.Begum Wali Khan was put on a plane and sent to Peshawar, while I was first taken to Karachi Central Jail, and thentakenunder custody byroad toSukkurJail. Thesameday anumberofotherPNAleadersweresimilarlydetained,includingShahAhmed Noorani, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Mian Tufail, and Professor Ghafoor. Both Maulana Noorani and Professor Ghafoor were also brought to Sukkur Jail.

Caught in a fix Bhutto now hoped that by applying pressure upon us we might be more amenable to negotiations. He continued to correspond with Mufti Mahmood, who was intentionallyleftatliberty.On19MarchheawrotethirdlettertoMuftiMahmood. Whileinsistingthathis'...Partyhassecuredanoverwhelmingvoteofconfidencefrom theelectorate,whichnofalsechargeofrigging,nomatterhowstridentandsweeping, can throw into dispute', Bhutto reiterated that he was open to all discussion connectedwith the electoral process just as long as it remained within 'constitutional' limits.558His interpretationof'constitutionallimits'clearlyprecludeddiscussionson'thevalidityof his prime-ministership, as Bhutto insisted that he would hold discussions as the Prime Minister and not as leader of the PPP. That very day the Director General of ISI had submittedanintelligencereporttohimwiththeassessmentthathehadnooptionbut to hold fresh elections.559Unable to accept the reality of the situation Bhutto seemed convincedthatbyusingamixtureofcoercion,guileandblusterhecouldmanagehis wayoutofthecrisis,safeguardinghispoliticalposition.

557MuftiMahmood'slettertoZ.A.Bhutto,17March1977,PakistanHorizon30(SecondQuarter1977),pp.165-6.

558Z.A.BhuttotoMuftiMahmood,19March1977,PakistanHorizon(SecondQuarter1977),pp.166-7.

559Stated by General Ghulam Jillani Khan (then Director General of Int Intelligence): General K. M. Arif.Workingwith Zia, ibid., p. 68.

On 19 March, the day following our arrests, Karachi exploded into a frenzy of rage. The rioting that followed was so violent that the army had to be called in. A large section of Karachi-Korangi, Landhi, Baldia, Sher Shah, Golimar, Mangopir, Nazimabad, Orangi, Liaquatabad,FederalBArea,NewKarachi,etc.,wereplacedunderimmediatecurfew. ThearmybeganpatrollingthestreetsofKarachiwithorderstoshootcurfewbreakers on sight. The unrest had, by now, also spread across Punjab as well. There were violent demonstrationsinLahore,Multan,Gujranwalaandothersmallertownsagainstthe riggingoftheelections.Apartfromlathichargesandtheuseoftear-gas,the government had no answer.

OnreceiptofBhutto'sthirdletterMuftiMahmooddeclaredthathewasunableto responduntilheconferredwithhisjailedcolleagues.On21Marchwewerereleased fromSukkurJailandflowntoLahore viaKarachitoattendaPNA generalcouncil meeting called to discuss Bhutto's latestletter. The next morning, at Lahore,I received unexpectedvisitorsatmysister'shouse,whereIwasstaying.TheywereSirdarShaukat HayatandhissisterBegumMahmoodaSaleem,awell-regardedmemberoftheNDP. TheycarriedapersonalmessagefromZulfikarAliBhutto.Bhuttoaskedthem totellme thatIwasanoldfriendandhehadmuchaffectionforme.Henowpromisedthathe wouldwithdrawthearmyfromBalochistan,holdfreshelectionsintheprovince,and havethejailedNAPleaderstriedinanormalcourtoflawinsteadofinthe special tribunalatHyderabad.AllheaskedforinreturnwasthatIreachanunderstanding with him. I told Shaukat Hayat that it was now too late for individual settlements. Any commitment from me at this stage would mean a betrayal of my colleagues in the PNA. IsaidthatitwouldbemoreappropriateifthisofferwasinsteadsenttothePNA general council.

Laterthatday,atthemeetingofthePNAleadershipatMuslimLeagueHouse,I informedtheothersabouttheofferthatIhadreceivedandmyreplytoit.Wethen discussedBhutto'slatestlettertoMuftiMahmood.AftersomedeliberationthePNA highcommandstuck firmly toitspreviousstand:discussionscouldonly take place once fresh elections were held under the independent supervision of the army and the judiciary.ThusBhutto's third letter metwithyet another rejection.

Soon after my return to Karachi we were all, not surprisingly, re-arrested. I was taken to Sukkur Jail where I once more foundmyself in the company of other PNA leaders,including Professor Ghafoor and Maulana Noorani. We were incarcerated together in a barrack building which had now been renamed as the special political ward. While we remained in jail the nation-wide public demonstrations continued without any sign of abatement.Confinedinjailwewerecompletelycutofffromtheoutsideworld.The Urdunews broadcastsonBBCWorld Service keptusinformedabouttheagitationthat was continuing outside our prison walls.

Theturmoilcontinued.Theworstoccurrencetookplaceon9AprilatLahore.Anumber ofprotestprocessionshadplannedtoconvergeontheprovincialassemblybuilding where the newly 'elected' PPP members were to take oath. The authorities ordered the police andthe FSF to prevent the demonstrators from reaching the building. Theymetwith some success as only the main procession of protesters managed to get within the vicinity of the building. They were badly set upon by the police. Even the women demonstrators were seriously injured by a police contingent especially made up ofrecentlyconscriptedprostitutescalledtheNathforce.Intheensuingrampageover thirtyprotesterswerekilled,andhundredsinjured.Itisgenerallybelievedthatitwas thisincidentthatprovedtobetheturningpointofthewholecampaignagainstBhutto. Itfuelledasenseofoutragethroughoutthenation.ThreeBrigadiersinvolvedin carrying out martial law duties in Lahore asked to be relieved of their duties, an action which causedthem to be forcibly retired from the army.560

Intheafternoonof15AprilIwasinformedbythesuperintendentofSukkurJailthatI had special emissaries from Bhutto waiting to see me in his office. I was surprised to discoverthatmyvisitorswerenoneotherthanmyfriendsMazharAliKhanandhis wifeTahira.561Theyhadflownonaspecialplanetotryandpersuademetoleavethe PNA. Mazhar Ali Khan was not a strong supporter of Bhutto, but because of strong inclinations towards the political left, he made it clear that, given the presentcircumstances,hewouldmuchratherhaveBhuttothanthe'religiousbeards',ashe chose to call them, managing the affairs of the country. He informed me that he and hiswife had been flown to Hyderabad earlier that day to meet with the jailed NAP leaders. TheyhadhelddiscussionswithWaliKhan,AttaullahMengal,KhairBukshMarri,ArbabSikandarKhalil,GhousBukshBizenjoandotherseniorNAPmembersonanew dealnowofferedbyBhutto.Theofferincludedwithdrawalofthearmyfrom Balochistan, fresh elections in the province and the inclusion of NDP in the national and provincialgovernments.AllthatNDPhadtodowastowithdrawfromthePNA.

According to Mazhar Ali Khan, Wali Khan and the others had made it clear to him that asIwastheheadofNDPanddirectlyinvolvedinthemovementagainstthe government, it was best that I should be the one to make the decision. It appeared that onlyBizenjohadvoicedadissentingopinion,byinsistingthatBhutto'sofferbe accepted.Bizenjo,asIhadbynowgathered,hadbeenlargelyostracizedbyhis colleagues.Hissocialboycottwasaresultofabeliefthathewasinclosetouchwith BhuttothroughhisregularandclandestinemeetingsinjailwithSaiedAhmedKhan,the Chief of the PM's Security. He was no longer trusted by any of his colleagues and as suchhisviewsonBhutto'sofferseemedoflittlevalue.MyreplytoMazharAliwas muchthesameasthatIhadearliergivenShaukatHayat.ItoldhimthatastheNDPhadjoinedthePNAtoputupaunitedstrugglefortherestorationoffundamental

560ThebrigadierswereIshtiaqAliKhan,SaidMuhammad,andNiazAhmed.

561Mazhar Ali Khan had been a respected editor of leading newspapers asDawnandThe PakistanTimes.At the time he was running his own magazine,Viewpoint.

freedoms,andIwouldnotbetraymycolleagues.Needlesstoadd,myfriendsTahira andMazharAliKhanflewbackdisappointed,havingfailedintheirmissiontobreak NDP away from the PNA.

Bymid-AprilthegroundhadshiftedfromBhuttocompletelyandhewasleftgrasping forhislostascendancy.Muchpublicitywasgiveninternationallytothejoint resignationsofGeneralGulHassanandAirMarshalRahimKhanasambassadorsto GreeceandSpainrespectivelyon13April.Theyweresoontogiveextremelyhostile press conferences in London against the Bhutto regime. They sent a letter to General Zia (with a copy to the PNA) demanding that he decline from accepting 'illegal and undemocratic' orders from a 'fascist' Bhutto. The actions of these two former militarychiefsnotonlyfurthertarnishedBhutto'scarefullynurturedimageabroadbutcaused him deep concern on the possible effect they might have on the armed forces. From thetimeofthenation-widestrikeof21Aprilthecountryhadgroundtoacompletehalt. PIA planes had ceased flying, trains had stopped running and the Karachi port was at astandstill.

Driventodesperation,on17April, BhuttoannouncednewIslamicmeasures.Alcohol, andallformsofgamblingincludinghorseracingwerebanned,nightclubsandbars werecloseddownandFridayreplacedSundayasaholiday.Hehopedthatby this action he would regain lost ground among the masses. Itwas not to be.The real issue behind the protests was the call for fresh and fair elections. Not surprisingly the public agitationcontinuedwithoutabating.Sensingfailure,threedayslater,Bhuttoisreported tohavecomplainedtoageneralthathehadtakenthesereligiousmeasuressolelyon GeneralZia'sadvice.AccordingtoBhutto,Ziahadassuredhimthatoncethese measureswereintroducedtheagitationwouldfadeaway.562Bhuttowasgraspingatstraws.

On21AprilBhuttoheld ameetingwiththethreemilitarychiefsand shortlyafterwards apartialstateofmartiallawwasimposedonKarachidivisionandthedistrictsof LahoreandHyderabad. Bhuttohadvoluntarilyconcededpartofhiscivilianpowerto themilitary-itwasanopenadmissionofdefeat.Thedeclarationofmini-martiallaw wassubsequentlychallengedintheLahoreHighCourt.On2Juneafullbenchofthe HighCourtruledthatthere wasnoscopeintheConstitutionforthe impositionof martiallawandthatcitizenscouldnotbetriedundertheArmyAct.Thegovernment appealed againstthisdecisioninthe Supreme Court. Inthe meantime the impositionof martiallawinKarachibroughtbriefcalmtothecity,butnoticeablyfivepeoplewere shot dead on the very first day for violation of the curfew.

***

562GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.69.

Injailmyhealthhaddeteriorated.Perhapsitwasduetotheheatofsummerthatmy face broke out into a severe rash. I was also suffering from a persistent backache. All the medicalteststakenappearednormalbutthebackacheincreasedinseverity.The doctors suspecteda slippeddisc.Finallyon 18 March I was movedUnderescort to Karachi.Travelling by road, whichprovedto beanagonizing experiencefor me, we arrivedatKarachi Jailat1.30 a.m. andnext morning,at10a.m.I wasadmittedtoa hospital under police guard. Karachi's well-known orthopedic physician, Dr Z. Kazi, examinedme.AfteranumberofX-raysheconfirmedthatIwassufferingfroma slipped disc and his professional advice was that I rest for a number of weeks. In the prevailingcircumstancesitseemedtobeabitofatallorder.WhenmywifeSouriya triedtogetpermissiontomeetwithmeatthehospitalthenormallygentlemanly MustafaJatoirefused,thefearofannoyingBhuttoSahibprovedtobetoostrong.

IntheendImanagedfourdaysrestinthehospital.Shortlyaftermartiallawwas declaredinKarachion21AprilmywifecontactedGeneralSadiqAbbasi,myschool contemporaryatRIMC,whohadjustbeenappointedtheprovincialMartialLaw Administrator,togetauthorizationtovisitmeatthehospital.Withoutamoment's hesitationSadiqAbbasigavehispermissionforapasstobeissuedandmywifewas finallyabletoseeme.AtthetimeKarachiwassubjectedtoviolentupheavals.On22 April a call had been made for a completepayajaam hartal(a strike against all forms of vehicular movement) and a deathly hush descended over the city. In the early hours of 24 April I was taken from the hospital by the police, against medical advice, and made toboardaplane boundforRawalpindi.OnarrivalIwasdriventotheSihalaRestHousewhichhadbeenconvertedintoajail.IdiscoveredthatmostofmyPNA colleagues were already there: they were Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Noorani, Professor Ghafoor,MianTufail,MaulanaJanMuhammadAbbasi,NawabzadaNasrullahKhan andBegumWaliKhan-thelasttoarrivewasAirMarshalAsgharKhanwhowas released from Kot Lakhpat Jail on 27April. Upon my arrival I was met by my brother MirBalakhSher,whohadbeensentbyBhuttotopersuade'anoldfriendtolistento reason'.Mybrotherjustpassedonthemessagetomeashehadbeentoldtoanddidnot express any personal opinion either way.

On28AprilwewerevisitedbytheSaudienvoy,SheikhRiazal-Khatib,whoaskedusto tryandreachasettlementwith Bhuttowithoutdemandingfreshelections.He wasto make several more visits in an attempt to convince us. The next day, 29 April, it was the turnoftheForeignMinisterfromtheUnited ArabEmirates,AhmedKhalifaAlswedi.It was obvious that their concern for Pakistanwas genuine, but they were clearly out oftouch with the reality ofthe position in Pakistanitowns andstreets and were looking at the situation from an altruistic foreign perspective.

On30AprilthecurrentactingpresidentofPNA,PirPagaro,whohadnotbeen imprisoned,wastoleadamammothmarchtothedoorstepofthePrimeMinister House.Itwasmeanttobetheculminationofthemuchpublicized'longmarch'to

Rawalpindibyparticipants fromallpartsofPakistan.Despitepoliceblockadesimposed all along their route, a large number of people managed to evade arrest and reach Rawalpindi. For' reasons known only to himself, Pir Sahib decided to stay at the Intercontinental Hotel on the eve of the march, thus making it convenient for theauthoritiestofindanddetainhim.BhuttovisitedtheinternedPirPagaroinhishotel suitethateveningandchattedwithhimfornearlyanhourafterwhichphotographsof himbeingseenoffbythePirweretakenbythePress.Thesephotosweresplashed acrossthefrontpagesofthenewspapersthefollowingdaycausingbewilderment among the gathered protesters. Amid the confusion, not surprisingly, the march failed miserably. In Sihala prison camp I noted in my diary on 1 May: 'all of us are upset at PirPagaro...'.

Ontheeveningof3Mayas wewerefinishingourdinner atSihala wewere informed thatBhuttohadarrivedandwaswaitingin anadjoiningbungalowwiththedesireof meeting with us. We briefly discussed the situation amongst ourselves. It became clear thatnoonewishedtomeetwithBhuttosoMuftiMahmoodwasselectedforthetask. Thendulyauthorizedbyhiscolleagues,MuftiSahiboncemoresalliedforthtolaydown our conditions to Bhutto, but this time in person. His meeting with Bhutto went on for about an hour and a half, while the rest of us waited confined as we were in our quarters.WhenMuftiMahmoodreturned,hiseyeswereglintingwithhumorandhe chuckled loudly when he met us. 'He takes me for a complete fool!' he announced.

According to Mufti Mahmood when he entered the room he was met with a barrage of chartsandmapswitharrowsmarkedalloverthem.Bhuttohad broughtwithhimthe DirectorGeneralofISI,GeneralGhulamJillaniKhan.Thegeneralthenproceededto sternlylectureMuftiMahmoodonasuddengravesituationthathad'developed'. PointingtotheAfghanistanborderonthemapheassertedthatSirdarDaoudhad massedhistroopsatTorkhumandDarraandwaspreparingtoinvade.Thenhepointed toarrowsleadingtowardsoureasternborderandsaidthattheIndianshaddonethe same and were preparing for an all-outattack in the vicinity of Lahore. Even the Iranis, they said, were following suit by assembling their army at Zahedan. After some three- quartersofanhourofthisconcoctedinanity, Bhutto,whohad beensteadily watching MuftiMahmoodduringthisperiodtryingtogaugehisreaction,tookoverthe conversation. Giventhe seriousnessof thesituation, Bhuttonow added, it was vital in theinterestsofnationalsecuritythatthePNAdoitspatrioticdutyandreachan understandingwiththegovernment.MuftiMahmoodgaveabriefanswer.HeinformedthetwomenthatallthatheandhisPNAcolleagueswantedwasfreshelections.

Thefollowingdayweissuedamemorandumadvisingofthefailureofthetalks between PNA and Bhutto. Until and unless the issue of fresh elections was brought up, thereseemedlittlepointinholdingdiscussions.On5MayPNA's33-pointdemands weremadepublicatapressconferencewhichPirPagarogaveonourbehalf.Our

foremostdemandwasofcoursefreshelectionsheldunderindependentsupervision. AmongtheothersNDPhadcontributedtwodemands.Thefirstbeingwithdrawalof troopsfromBalochistanandtheotherwastheimmediaterestorationoftherightsofthe workers. Itwasironical thattheman whohad oncechampioned the cause of the urban poor had over aperiod oftime had completely restricted the rights of thelaborunions.

Livingincloseproximitytosomeofourreligiouspartyleaders,itwashardnotto becomeawareoftheschismsthatdividedthem.OntheveryfirsteveningMufti Mahmoodgotuptoleadmaghribprayers.IncustomaryIslamicfashiontherestofus linedupbehindhim,butnotMaulanaNoorani.Announcingthatherefusedtopray behindaDeobandi,hewalkedawaytoprayelsewhere.Onlyhisclosepoliticalally, AsgharKhan,optedtofollowtheBarelvimaulana.Itwasdishearteningthatevenin crisisweclungtosuchnarrow-mindedpractices.ThefactthatthePNAunityheldfor such a long period was indeed remarkable.

OnefinedaySirdarAbdulQayumdescendeduponussupposedlyasafellowprisoner, butnoonebelievedthis.Weallsuspectedthathehadbeensenttospyonus. UndoubtedlyinthecircumstancesitwaslogicalforBhuttototryandfindoutallhe could about our activities and deliberations, how we got along together, and our weaknessesandstrengths.WhileweallavoidedAbdulQayumhemusthavebeena sourceofsomeuseful informationtothePPP regime.

Then we were visited by Dr. Zafar Niazi, Bhutto's dentist and ardent loyalist, who came ostensiblytocheckourteeth.ThefollowingdayNasrullahKhandonnedhisfezand gaily sauntered to a waiting official car which was there supposedly to take him to the dentist. Later we discovered that he had gone surreptitiously to meet with Bhutto. What galledtherestofuswasthesecrecythatwasinvolved.NasrullahKhannever mentionedanythingabouthisclandestinemeetingstous.Naturally,inthe circumstances, trust became the first victim. I never came to know exactly whatinformation was passed on to Bhutto or his intelligence agencies by Nasrullah Khan or Sardar Abdul Qayum, but a general impression had been formed by Bhutto and his colleagues that the PNA hard-liners consisted of Asghar Khan, Maulana Noorani andmyself.

On the lighter side of things there was an amusing incident which is worth recalling. It took place on 11 May when my eldest son came to visit me. My back had been causing me great discomfort over the past few weeks and my family were concerned about my welfare.Sherazam,thenastudentat Karachi'sInstitute ofBusinessAdministrationhad flowntoRawapindi.BorrowingacarfromWaliKhan'ssonSangeen,Sherazamhad driven to Sihala. When he was preparing to leave the car would not budge. It had to be push-started. While Sherazam sat in the driver's seat thecar was pushed by the whole PNAleadershipconsistingofMuftiMahmood,AsgharKhan,ProfessorGhafoor,

MaulanaNooraniandmyself.WithalltheOpposition'heavyweights'behinditthecar had no option but to start immediately!

Asnotedinmydiaries,BhuttoandMuftiMahmoodhadfourmeetings.Thelasttwo tookplaceon7and11May.Ontheearliermeetingmydiaryentryreads:'Bhutto remains unwilling to call for new elections'.563At the last meeting no discussions reallytookplace.AllMuftiMahmooddidwasgiveabriefansweronourbehalf:'Ourthree basicdemandsmustbemet.Untilthennocommitmentcanbegivenandno negotiationscanbecommenced'.564AletteraddressedtoBhuttowasthendraftedon our behalf by Asghar Khan and signed by Mufti Mahmood. In the letter we bluntly expressed our view that the talks between Mufti Mahmood and Bhutto were getting nowhereandtherewasnopointincontinuingwiththem.InthedraftInoticedthat Asghar Khan had inadvertently addressed Bhutto as prime minister of Pakistan. In myview, therigged elections that had beenpopularly rejected, didnot accordanyone the righttothattitle.MysuggestionwasacceptedandBhutto'sdesignationwasamended to read 'Chairman People's Party'.

OurdemandforfreshelectionshadrecentlybeenstronglyreinforcedbyabelatedPress statementoftheChiefElectionCommissioner,JusticeSajjadAhmedJan.Hehadfor oncecategoricallystatedonrecordthattheelectionshadbeenriggedonsuchavast scalethatlookingintoindividualconstituencycomplaintswouldnotsolvethematter. Fresh elections, he insisted, were the only answer.565His remarks were only published inaGujarati languagenewspaperwhich becauseofitslanguageandlimited localized circulation managed to evade Bhutto's ever vigilant team of censors.

On 13 May in an unexpected moveBhutto announced his plan to hold areferendum on his continuance in power. There was noprovision in the Constitution allowing for such areferendum,butBhuttoarranged for anamendmenttoberushed throughinthe 'PPP Assembly'. Henow desperatelypinned hishopesonusingthereferendumasasolution andhadapproachedGeneralZiatogethisendorsement.AccordingtoKausarNiazi, General Ziahadevidently replied, 'I'llbe ableto sell[the referendum]to my jawans'.566

At Sihala weknew that our rejection of dialogue would result in animminent backlash. Onceplanshadbeenmadeforthereferendum,itwasnotlongincoming.Onthe morningof13Maywewereinformedthatvisitorswouldnolongerbeallowed.That nightwedispersedtovariousjails,withthe'hardliners'gettingtheworstofthedeal. Only MuftiMahmoodcontinuedtostay inthe Sihalaresthouse.AsgharKhanwas movedtoSahiwalJail,NooranitoJacobabad,andIendedupinMianwali.Asthe temperaturesinJacobabadandMianwalifrommid-Mayonwardsoftensoarabove50°

563Diarynoteof7May1977.

564Diarynoteof11May1977.

565Millat(Gujarati),Karachi,6May1977.

566KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.147.

Centigrade,itwouldseemthatMaulanaNooraniandIhadbeen'chosen'forspecial treatment. On theother hand, after only three days in jail, on 17 May, Nasrullah Khan was returned to the relative comfort of Sihala rest house.

BhuttowhohimselfspentabriefsojourninMianwaliJailin1968,butinNovember when the temperatures are at least comfortable, said:

I was confined in an old cell full of rats and mosquitoes ... the charpoy [bed] was tied to a chain. There was anadjoininglittle room meant for toilet purposes. But itwassodirtyitwasrepulsivetoenter...Thefoodconsistedoftwochappatiesmade of red wheat withdalwhich had stones in it or two tiny pieces of meat. A stronglightshonefor24hoursthroughoutmystaytheremakingmysleepat night extremely difficult.567

After confiscating my radio, shaving kit, diary and all writing materials I was placed in solitaryconfinementinacellwithbarsonallfoursides,ratherresemblingacagefor animals.Unlike BhuttoIwasneitherallocatedacharpoyandinsteadhadthehard cementfloorforabed,norwasIprovidedaccesstoalavatory.Iwasonlygivenfour simpleitems,twotowelsandtwobuckets.Onebucketwasprovidedwithwaterand theotherwastoserveasalavatory.IntheunbearableheatofMay-therebeingnofan- atnightIwouldwetbothtowels;oneIwoulduseasa'mattress'andtheother,asa coveringsheet.And,ofcourselikeBhuttobeforeme,Ihada'stronglight'tokeepme company day and night.

Thejailsuperintendentvisitedmeandsomewhatgleefullyinformedmethatminewas a historical cell, and many luminaries had been imprisoned within its confined space including Mahatma Gandhi in the 1930s, Abdul Ghaffar Khan after Partition and more recently in 1971, by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In my condition I did not find thisinformation at all interesting, so I tersely told him to put a commemorative plaque there and be done with it. To my mind Bhutto's back was now against the wall. He was determined nottoresignand wasprepared todoanythingtoclingtopower. Now anythingwaspossible.So,Isteeledmyresolveandtriedtoprepareforwhateverfate layinstoreforme.Thoughmybackachehadbynowbecomeagonizing,Irealizedthat I would have to bear with it and whatever else came my way. Rather than take things passively,Idecidedtogoonahungerstriketoprotestmyconditions.

OnthesixthdayofthehungerstrikeIexperiencedseverechestpainsthatalmost renderedmeunconscious.Atthattimetherewaslittlechanceofgettinganymedical attention.Later,whenIdescribedwhathadhappenedtoacardiologist,heconfirmed thatIhadsufferedaheartattack.RecoveringslowlyIfoundmyselfseverelydepleted

567ZA.Bhutto,affidavitinLahoreHighCourt.5February1969:Z.A.Bhutto,PoliticsofthePeople,vol.2.

AwakeningthePeople,Rawalpindi,PakistanPublications(nodate).

and decided to forego my hunger strike. The temperature had by now become quite intolerablebecauseofaheatwave.ThatnightasIlayuncomfortablyonmydamp towelundertheglaringlight-bulbandtryingtosleep,Isensedsomeonewatchingme fromtheothersideofthebars.Igotuptoseewhoitwasandwassurprisedtoseethe jail superintendent standing there all by himself.

HeseemedveryperturbedforsomereasonbutIjuststaredathimwithsuspicion.Then strangely,hebrokedown.'AsaJailSuperintendent',hesaid,'I'vedonesomeawful things in my life but I have my limits. Bhutto Sahib personally rings me up almost on a dailybasistoseeifIhavebrokenyouyet.Buttodayhegavemeorderswhich,even thoughiamscaredofhim,I can'tobey'.Thengivingme astrickenlook he added, 'Believeme,evenIhaveaconscience.Ihaveappliedforleaveandamtakingoff tomorrow. I'll face the consequences of my decision but my mind is made up'. Then he warnedme.'Thedeputyjailsuperintendentisaviciousman,Idon'tknowwhatwill happenwhenI'mgone'.ShockedbywhatIsuspectedwasathreatofdepravityI informed him as coldly as I could. 'I ama man of honor. I suggestyou inform Bhutto, yourdeputyorwhoeverelseforthatmatter,ifanyoneforciblyindulgesinanything indecent with me I will kill myself. Locked inthe cage and in a frail state because of my recent hunger strike and heart ailment, I could only hope for sanity to prevail.

Bynow,itappears,Bhuttohadbecomeextremelywaryofthearmy.Earlierhehad begun having frequentmeetingswith GeneralZia and hiscorpscommanders, believing in his own ability to beguile them on to his side. He had sold them the idea of holding a referendum. But once PNA had announced that it would boycott such a move even the army now changed its mind and opposed it. According to one source Zia is said to have informed Bhutto, 'Sir, the idea of holding a referendum won't work. It does not satisfy ourjawans.And...eventheOppositionhasrejectedtheidea'.568Withoutthearmy supporting hisreferendumBhuttowasleftwithlittle optionbuttorestarthis discussions with Mufti Mahmood and the PNA.

Thearmy wasnowshowingsignsofrestiveness,whichonly addedtoBhutto'salarm. AtanearliermeetingtheChiefofGeneralStaff,GeneralAbdullahMalik,madesome remarksaboutthearmy'sresponsibilityforrestoringorderinthecountry.InBhutto's presence,GeneralMalikwassharplyrebukedbyGeneralFaizAliChishti,Corps Commander Rawalpindi, who loudly and openly admonished him by saying. 'You are notaCorpsCommander,whatdoyouknowaboutourdifficulties!Whyshouldwe fire? Political problems should have political solutions'. Chishti was followed by two of theothercorpscommanderspresent,GeneralsSarvarKhanandArbabJehanzeb,who also heatedly denounced General Malik's views.569According to Kausar Niazi who had witnessed these proceedings:

568KausarNiazi,LastDaysofPremierBhutto,op.cit.,p.153,

569QuotedbyKausarNiaziwhowaspresentatthemeeting:ibid.,p.1

After this meeting...[Bhutto] appeared fairly upset; anxiety was writ large on his face. Thatwas the firstoccasion thatthe generals hadspoken in thisstrainin his presence. Actually,itwasonly after thisepisodethatMr.Bhuttostarted thinking seriouslyabouthavingnegotiationswiththePNA;theimportanceofsuchan exercise had now dawned upon him.570

Onabout25MaySirdarAbdulQayum,nowactingopenlyasBhutto'semissary,had flown in by a special plane to visit me in jail.571At first I refused to meet with him but thenhe sentme aletterfromBegumWaliKhanthathe wascarrying.Inthe letter Naseem Wali Khan had requested me quite earnestly to meet with Abdul Qayum as he wasbringinganimportantmessage.Ithenmethim,reluctantly,inthedeputy superintendent'soffice.HetoldmethathehadalreadymetwithAsgharKhan,Maulana Noorani and Professor Ghafoor, and had now come to inform me that 'we are closetoreachinganunderstanding'.Hementionedthaton17MaytheSaudienvoy, SheikhRiazalKhatib,hadcalledonMuftiMahmoodimploringhimtoreachan understandingwithBhutto.Thishadthenledtoavisiton18MaybyBhuttoandhis advisers to Sihala where they had met with Mufti Mahmood and Nasrullah Khan.572At themeetingBhuttohadexpressedhisassenttoafreshelectionprovidedthePNA agreedtodiscusstheissueat'anegotiatingtable'.Itoldhimthattherewasnochanceof any understanding as far I was concerned aslong as we remained incarcerated. Within a day or two I was flown to Karachi and lodged in Central Jail. I was finally admitted to hospitalon1June.On2June I wasofficially releasedandthe policeguardsatthe hospital wererecalled. Thefollowing day, 3June, negotiationsbetweenthe PPPregime and the PNA had begun in Islamabad. The PNA had called for a temporary halt to the agitation.Verysoonastateofuneasycalmspreadthroughthecountryaseveryone awaited the results of the negotiations.

WhilewewereinjailcommunicationsbetweenMuftiMahmoodandBhuttohad continuedthroughthemediationoftheSaudiAmbassador.Havingsentmostofthe PNAleadershiptojailBhuttohadsentNawabzadaNasrullahbacktoSihala.The strategyhadworked.MuftiMahmood,withNasrullahKhannowashissoleadviser,hadvirtuallydroppedthedemandforBhutto'sresignationasapre-conditionto negotiationsandathree-manPNAnegotiatingteamhadalready been'preselected', aftertakingBhutto'sobjectionstothepresenceof'hard-liners'intoaccount.Theteam from the PNA consisted of Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor GhafoorAhmed. ThePPP wastobe representedby Bhutto,HafizPirzada and KausarNiazi.

570Ibid.,p.145.

571AsIwasunabletokeepadiaryinMianwalijail,itishardtoworkthe datesforthisperiodwithanyaccuracy.

572BhuttowasaccompaniedbyHafizPirzada,KausarNiaziandMirAfzalKhan.

WhenthePNAleadershipmetoncemorewemadeitcleartothenegotiatingteamthat it had no authority to accept any term or condition of the proposed settlement without priorapprovalofthegeneralcouncil.Whilethisclearlyhamperedtheteam'sabilityat thenegotiatingtableweintheNDP,alongwithmostoftheOppositionparties,were not prepared to concede any delays in the call for fresh elections. It was at the cost of hundreds of lives and sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands of people that we hadbeen able to reach a position of nullifying the results of the 7 March election. We did not wishtoloseinnegotiationwhatwehadsoexpensivelyobtainedafterwagingnoless than a public war against the regime.

There were two other issues of great importance to me. The first was of courseBalochistan.AfterfourlongyearsofpersonallyputtingupwithBhutto'slies, prevarication and deceit on the issue, I believed it was time for us to force an immediate returnofthearmytoitsbarracksanddemandcompensationforallthefamiliesthat had suffered as a result of the army action. The other issue was that of the jailed NAP leadership,WaliKhan,AttaullahMengal,KhairBukshMarriandahostofother Opposition politicians who had been unjustly dubbed as 'traitors' through a parody of judicialprocess.BhuttohadpersonallyconcoctedtheHyderabadConspiracyTrialand itwastime for himtoexpungehis misdeeds.

The first session of the negotiations was held on the afternoon of 3 June. The initial demandsofthePNAwerelargelyrelatedtothereleaseofthousandsofpolitical prisoners who were being held in prison for opposing the regime and upholding issuessuch as lifting martial law, ending of Press and media censorship, and compensating familiesoftherecentvictimsofpolice/FSFviolence.Thesecondsessionwasheldon the morning of 6 June when discussions began in earnest on the issue of fresh elections.The negotiations continued on an almost daily basis often in an atmosphere of mistrustand tension. The underlying reason for these misgivings was the fact that while the PPP team talked about reconciliation thousands of PNA supporters continued to languish in imprisonmentandmorecontinuedtobearrested.Eventhosebeingreleasedbythe courtswouldoftenfindthemselvesre-arrestedonanassortmentofdifferentcharges. ThePNAteamfeltthattherewasagreatdiscrepancybetweenthewordsanddeedsof theregime.TheircomplaintstoBhuttoweremetwithemptyreassurancesandwhat theyperceivedtobe delayingtactics.NeverthelessthePNAteamwascommittedto finding a solution.

After the odd deadlock, several disagreements, a proposal and a counter-proposal and numeroussessionsandcounter-sessions,acompromiseofsortswasreachedbetween thetwonegotiatingteams.By15Juneanaccordhadbeenagreeduponbybothsideson the following terms:

• freshelectionswouldbeheldsoon(thedatehadnotyetbeenagreedupon):

• thearmywouldbewithdrawnfromBalochistan;

• allspecialtribunalswouldbeshutdown(withparticularreferencetothe Hyderabad Conspiracy Case);

• allpoliticalprisonerswouldbereleased:

• allconstitutionalamendmentsincontraventionofbasichumanrights would be rendered null and void:

• allcensorshipofthePresswouldbestopped;

• equaltimewouldbeprovidedtoboththePPPandthePNA

• thestateofemergencywouldbeliftedonthedaytheagreementwassigned.

Furthermoretoensurethatthenewelectionswereheldwithoutfearofanytamperinga ten-memberImplementationCouncil,withfivemembersfromeachside,wastobe establishedtoensurethattheagreementwasproperlyimplemented.Itwasdecided thatanydisputeswithinthecouncilwouldbesettledbyapanelofthreeSupremeCourt judges. The final form of the agreement was to be drafted by Professor Ghafoor Ahmed andHafizPirzada,assistedbyateamoflegalexperts.Finally,itwasalsoagreedthatthe agreement would be signed by Bhutto and Mufti Mahmood by 20 June 1977.

On the evening of 15 June Bhutto informedMufti Mahmoodthat hewould be retiringtoLarkanaforthreeorfourdaysfor'awell-earned rest'.Mufti Sahib,whobelieved that finalizingtheagreementwouldtakethreedaysorso,didnotthinkBhutto'spresencein Islamabad during the interim period was necessary. In fact Mufti Mahmood went on to publiclyannouncethattheagreementwouldbesignedverysoon.On18JuneBhutto unexpectedlyflewoffonawhirlwindtripoftheMiddleEastleavingbehindavery stunnedMuftiMahmood.AdaypriortohisdeparturehehadappointedGhulam MustafaKharashisspecialadviser.Thesetwoactionswereinrealityadeliberately provocative red rag to the Opposition.

When the terms of the accord reached by both negotiating teams were presented beforethePNAleadership,anobjectionwasvoicedbyourlegaladvisers.Theysaidtherewas anabsenceoflegalprotectionintheeventBhuttodecidedtobackoutofhis commitments. Therefore it was vital, they insisted, if the terms of the accord wereprovidedwithsomeformofconstitutionalprotectionwhichcouldifnecessarybe upheldinthecourts.WhenProfessorGhafoorraisedthisissuewithHafizPirzada,he wasmetwithafirmrefusal.ThefollowingdayHafizPirzadaantagonizedusfurtherby

publicly announcing that the PNA would have no say in the appointment of provincial governors. This was a point which had earlier been raised by the PNA, and it had been agreedbythePPPthatthematterwouldbeleftfortheproposedImplementation Council to decide.

IhadknownZulfikarAllBhuttoforsometwenty-threeyears-withinmonthsofhis taking residence in Pakistan in November 1953. I had seen him progress from adespondentpoliticalaspirantunabletocontestaprovincialassemblyelection,toa civilian martial law administrator and president. Throughout this period Bhutto hadopenly scorned those who favored the straightforward approach. To him, lying, double- dealing and deceit were normal means of attaining and keeping power. His evident acceptanceofnewelectionswasnowbeliedbyhisunexpectedtripabroad.Itwasa clearindicationthat mischiefwasafoot.Theappointment ofthemuch-detestedKharas his specialadviserand Hafiz Pirzada's markedobstinacy in dealing with subsequent issues,were revealing footprints of Bhutto's furtherdesigns.

IhadreceivedamessagefromBhuttothroughProfessorGhafoorwhohadbeen meetinghimduringthenegotiations.BhuttowishedtoprivatelymeetwithBegumWali Khanandme,promisingthatassoonaslawandorderwasre-establishedhewould withdraw the army from Balochistan and bring an end tothe Hyderabad Tribunal. As had become my practice in reinforcing PNA's continuing unity, I brought this message totheattentionoftheothermembersoftheAllianceleadership.Theiradvice,a unanimousno,wasin keepingwithmyownviews. Ihad becomeconvinced, bynow, that for Bhutto the negotiations had simply been a means of buying more time. He now hopedthatthedelaywouldbringaboutarupturewithinthealliancecausedby differingviewsamongthePNAleadership-somethingwhichhehadcovertlybeen encouraging.Thiswouldthenprovide Bhuttowithanopportunemomenttobackoutofhiscommitments.Andbythistime,ifhisstrategyhadworked.,theOppositionwouldhavelostitsmomentumandwouldproveincapableofrestartingtheagitation.It was a game of brinkmanship that Bhutto believed he excelled at.

In the midst of these uncertainties we were alarmed by reports that Bhutto had been arminghisPPPsupportersthroughoutPakistan.Thisissuehadbeenraisedearlierby ournegotiatingteamdirectlywithBhuttoandwehaddemandedthatallrecently issuedarmslicensesberevoked.TherewaseveryindicationthatBhuttowasplanning tocounterthePNAagitationbyuseofarmedPPPmemberssetonakillingspree.It seemsthatthearmyhadalsoreceivedsimilar informationonBhutto'sintentions.573

DuringoneofthePNAmeetingsheldatSihala,AsgharKhanrevealedsomefurther disturbingnews.Assomeofushadrecentlybeenwarnedaboutourhost,Arshad Choudhry,beingapaidinformerofanintelligenceagency,AsgharKhan,suspecting

573GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.80.

that our meeting room was bugged,574insisted upon taking a number of us outside toreveal some vital information that he had received from an intelligence source.575AccordingtothisinformationBhuttohaddecidedtodealwiththePNA's'hard-liners' onceandforall.Hehadnowconcoctedaningeniousplanbywhichhewouldsacrifice the lives ofKausar NiaziandGhulam Mustafa Khar.It was plannedthat the two would soonbecomevictimsofanassassinationplan.Inretaliationan'enragedandoutof control'PPPmob,seekingvengeanceforthedeathofthetwoleaders,wouldthen proceedtokillAsgharKhan,ShahAhmedNooraniandmyself.

The assassination plan may seem a bit farfetched to some,but even Kausar Niazi, one oftheplot's twosacrificialvictims,believed inits authenticity.576Afrantic Bhutto would have done anything within his means to maintain his hold on power. It must be recalledthatthesewereverydesperatedays forhim indeed.Iamconvincedthatalongwith arming a large number of PPP rabble, getting rid of a handful of irritating PNA leaders presentedanagreeablesolutiontoBhutto'sanxietiesatatimewhenhispoliticalgrip lay in tatters before him. General Arif writes about a very revealing episode which took place in the third week of June.

...GeneralZiaexpressedhisapprehensionto[Bhutto]that,iftheagitationdid not end, it could erode the army's discipline and cause divisions in its ranks. This wouldbeadisasterforthearmyandforthecountry.Mr.Bhuttosensedthe mood.Employinghischarm,hesaid,'youaremybrotherandItrustyou.'He asked General Zia not to get unduly worried as the government did not plan to employ the army in a hurry again. He went on to confide that he had taken 'other measures' to deal with the PNA agitation [the emphasis is mine]. That statement ranganalarm bell inGeneralZia's mind.577

***

After Hafiz Pirzada's refusal to consider constitutional guarantees for the accord and his subsequent statement on the provincial governors, the next meeting between him and ProfessorGhafoorheldon20Juneendedincompletefailure.Facedwithan unrepentantly aggressive Pirzada, Professor Ghafoor walked out of the meeting and announcedthatnofurthermeetingscouldtakeplaceuntilBhuttoreturnedtoPakistan.

574Accordingto thisinformation the IntelligenceBureau wasprivy toeverything discussed atPNA'smeetings.Even the cost of the tea and snacks being provided to us was being met by the said government agency. Very soon afterwards the venue of PNA meetings was changed.

575AsgharKhan'sdaughterwasmarriedtothesonoftheformerheadIntelligenceBureau.

576On 22 April 1978 Kausar Niazi admitted that Bhutto had planned to him and Kharmurdered: Lt.-General Faiz Ali Chishti,Betrayals of Another Kind, PCL Publishing House, Rawalpindi. 1990, p. 157.

577GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.80.

By now the atmosphere atthe PNA council meetings was one of deep mistrusttowards Bhutto.WehadbeenassuredbyBhuttothatthetwo-mancommitteeofProfessor GhafoorandHafizPirzadawouldquicklydrafttherequiredagreement,butnowthe attitudeofPirzadaandKausarNiaziwasprovingtobeanythingbutcooperative. Nevertheless,weweredeterminedtomoveaheadandourteamoflawyersputtogether a draftagreement.In the documentsubstantial powers had beengiven tothe proposed Implementation Council and it also included a detailed list of amendments that would have to be made to the Constitution to give it the much desired legal status. On the day ofBhutto'sreturntoPakistan,on23June,ournegotiatingteamhanded overthePNA draft agreement. At the next meeting of the two teams on 25 June instead of discussing thetermsofthePNAdraftagreementBhuttopresentedMuftiMahmoodwithan alternatePPP-draftedagreement.ItappearedthatBhuttohadseriousobjectionsover the proposed Implementation Council being given the powers of a super-government.

ThatmorningatthePNA'sgeneralcouncilmeetingsawaheateddebateoverthe differencesbetweenthetwodraftagreements.AsgharKhaninsistedthatweshould sticktoouroriginaldraftandbedonewithit,butthemajoritydidnotwishtotakesuch anextremestance.ItwasdecidedthatthePNAlegalteamwouldprepareanew amended version to its earlierdraft, making itmore acceptableto Bhutto and his team.

The newspapers of 26 June carried a vitriolic statement by Ghulam Mustafa Khar whowhileaddressingPPPworkersatRawalpindi,announcedthat'ifPNAknowshowto runamovement,thePPPknowshowtodestroyamovement...Violencewillbemet withviolence'.578ThatverydayaseriousarmedclashtookplacebetweenPNA supportersandPPPworkersatLahore.Itseemedasifourfearswerebeingprovenright.

On 27 June there was a lengthy meeting of the PNA general council which lasted most oftheday.TherewasmuchcauseforconcernamongtheOppositionleadership.The PPPhadstillnotreleasedmanyofthepoliticallydetainedprisoners,andwere deliberately confusing the issue by providing incorrect figures.579Further, much to our consternation,newcriminalcaseswerebeingregisteredagainstourworkers.Wehad alsoreceived informationthatlarge scaletransfersweretakingplace inthepoliceand the civil administration, and anyone suspected of PNA sympathies was being sidelined intoobscureandpowerlesspositions.Atthesametimewecouldnothelpbutnotice thatthePressstatementsofPPPleaderslikeKharandDrGhulamHussain,were incitingtheirworkerstotakeuparmsagainstthePNA.Somemembersofthe leadershipweredemandingthatwedesistfromfurthernegotiationsandgobacktothe streetsand restartour agitation.In the end themoderatesprevailed.

578ProfessorGhafoorAhmed,PhirMartialLawAagya(Urdu).JangPublishersPress,Lahore,June1988.p.223.

579A large majority of the PNA workers had been arrested on fraudulent charges of criminal acts as such buffalotheft, etc. Bhutto and his team insisted on treating these people as 'criminals' rather than political detainees.

It was decided by the PNA general council that the newly amended draft agreement be handed to the PPP without delay. Mufti Mahmood was given the authority to sign the agreementprovidedthePPPaccepteditwithoutfurtherchanges-butitwasmadeclear thatintheeventofevenminorfurtheramendments,thedocumentcouldonlybe ratifiedbythegeneralcouncil.ButthatnightHafizPirzadatelephonedProfessor Ghafoor and informed him that the PPP was not willing to even receive the document. He referredtoaPressreportprintedearlierthatday thatstatedthatthePNA was planningtopresentthedocumentonan'acceptitorrejectit'basis.Callingitan ultimatum,PirzadaissuedaPressstatementinsisting thathe wouldnotreceive the document even if it was sent by mail.580

Thefollowingmorning,28June,anangeredPNAgeneralcouncildecidedthatifthePPPcontinuedtorefusetoacceptPNA'samendeddraftthenwewereleftwithlittle choice but to announce a restart of the agitation. Mufti Mahmood was asked to contact Bhuttoandadvisehimoftheposition.AfterabriefdiscussionwithBhuttooverthe telephone it was agreed that Pirzada would accept the draft, which he did at 9 a.m. the next morning.

By29JunethePNAdeterminedthatthereremainedonlytwoissuesofsubstance between the two parties, the first being the date of the dismissal of assemblies and the holdingoffreshelections,andtheotherthepowerstobegiventothenew ImplementationCouncil.MuftiMahmoodspoketoBhuttooverthetelephonetelling him that the matter of the Implementation Council needed careful deliberation and reminded him of his commitment to release all political prisoners and cancel recently issued arms licenses - issues which were creating serious misgivings among the PNAleadership.

At the next session of negotiations, held on 1 July, Bhutto pulled a surprise out his hat byarrangingabriefinggivenbyGeneralZiatothePNAnegotiationteaminfrontof Chief of Joint Staff and the Air Force and Navy chiefs. During the two hour briefing Zia raisedfourobjectionstothePNAdemands.DespitethepeaceprevailinginBalochistan, hesaid,itwastooearlytoaskforacompletewithdrawaloftroopsbecauseneighboring Afghanistan was engaged in training and arming 'separatists'. Then he pointed outthat includingAzadKashmirinthePNA-PPPconfrontationwasnotintheinterestof Pakistan'snationalsecurity.Ziaalsoadvisedthatitwasnotsuitablefortheproposed ImplementationCounciltotakechargeofthearmedforces.Finally,andrather vicariouslyheinsistedthatitwouldnotbesuitabletointerfereintheHyderabad Conspiracy case.For all intents and purposeshe behaved as if he had been tutored by Bhutto to present these contrary views.

580ProfessorGhafoorAhmed,PhirMartialLawAagya(Urdu),op.cit.p.225.

In response Mufti Mahmood stated that it had never been the PNA's objective to place thedefenceforcesundertheImplementationCouncil.Thesolepurposeofthatbody was toensure thatfuture elections were heldin a totally fair manner. Powers hadbeen giventoitsothatitwasstrongenoughtoresistanypossibleinterferenceintheelection process. As far as Kashmir was concerned, Mufti Mahmood added that he did not wish toseeanyconcernofPakistan'snational securitycompromised.Thenmuchtomylater disappointment,thePNAconcededtwovaluablepoints:asfarasBalochistanwas concerned, he stated,the armywithdrawal need not beimmediate but couldtake place overareasonableperiodoftime.HefailedtomentiontoZiaandtheothersthatthesole causeoftheBalochistanproblemwassittingbeforethem,Bhuttohimself.Theother grave errorMuftiMahmoodmade wasthathe agreedtowithdrawPNA'sdemand calling for the end of the Hyderabad Tribunal. He had no authority to do that.

At the second session of the negotiations which began at 8 p.m. that evening, Bhutto strategicallypressurizedtheelderlyMuftiMahmoodintodiscussinganddebatingeveryissue point bypoint until6 a.m.the followingmorning.It was a tacticalmove to wearthePNAnegotiatingteamdowntoalevelofleastresistance,therebymaking them concede points which they may not have done given a more normal situation. Nevertheless Bhutto was well aware that the negotiating team had no authority to make any binding agreement on any of the issues. That authority rested only with the PNA general council.

On the evening of 2 July there was a heated debate at the meeting of the PNA general councilwhenwelearntofsomeoftheconcessionsthathadbeenmadeearlythat morning.IwasparticularlyaggrievedbytheconcessionmadeontheHyderabad Tribunalissue.MuftiMahmoodmadeitclearthathehadwantedtokeepthePNAin goodfavorwiththemilitary.InhisopinionitwasnotfeasibletooffendboththePPP andthearmyat sametimeat acrucialjuncturesuchasthis.InPushto MuftiMahmood toldBegumWaliKhanthatsheshouldrefrainfrominsistinguponherhusband's release from Hyderabad Jail, otherwise Wali Khan would suffer the same fate as Bangladesh's Mujibur Rahman, who, along with most of the members of his family, had been slaughtered in 1975 by angry young army officers. Upon hearing this Begum Wali Khanbecamevisiblyupset and walkedout fromthemeeting. Later,onmy insistence, MuftiMahmoodapologizedtoBegumWaliKhanforhisthoughtlessremarks.

Afterthemajoritydecisionitwasthendecidedincouncilthatthedraftoftheaccord shouldbeexaminedbyourlegalteam.Ourlegalexpertsweredelegatedthetaskof ensuring thatall safeguardsfor future fair electionswere covered. The following day, 3 July, they came up with the following nine points:

1. TheImplementationCouncilmustbegivenfullconstitutionalprotection.

2. Any change in governors could only be made by the consensus of bothparties.

3. TheagreementshouldbemadebetweenthePPPandPNA(i.e.not betweenMuftiMahmoodasPresidentofPNAandBhuttoasPrimeMinister).

4. Appointmentof theElection Commission wasto bemadebyconsensus of both parties.

5. FSFshouldbeplacedunderthecontroloftheArmyGHQ.

6. Alllawsthatrequiretobeamendedoralteredwillhavetobeamended and altered before the agreement can be signed.

7. The'RemovalofDifficulties'Clausetobere-instated.

8. AllamendmentstotheConstitutionmustbemadeandapprovedbythe PNA before the agreement is signed.

9. Special tribunal cases should be tried according to laws used in normalcourts.

Asthemeetingcontinued,AsgharKhan,whohadalsobeeninfuriatedattheturnof events, demanded a renewal of agitation. By now emotionswere running high and he was supported in his views by both Maulana Noorani and myself.

BynowIhaddevelopedacompletedistrustofBhuttoandfounditdifficulttoaccept thathewouldgenuinelyconcedeanything.Atthisjuncturethenegotiationsseemedto metobeacharadewhichwouldleadusnowhere.Despitemyhardenedfeelingswhen itcametoavote,themoderateswhowishedtocontinuewiththenegotiationswere foundtobeinamajority. BoundbyprinciplesofdemocracyIhadtoadheretothe majoritydecisionandgoalongwithit.EventhemoremilitantAsgharKhanpresented anappearanceofcompleteunitytothePressthefollowingmorning.

***

Bhuttosufferedfromacommonfailing.He hadbecomeblindedbypower.Accordingto Kausar Niazi, he contacted Bhuttoon themorning of 3 July with news of a possible armytake-over.Theinformationhadbeenprovidedtohiminpersonbytheever- resourcefulSirdarAbdulQayum.BhuttorefusedtomeetwithAbdulQayumtelling Niazithat'thesepeopleonlylookforanexcusetohaveaninterviewwithme'.581Even

581KausarNiazi,op.cit.,p.209.

at this late stage Bhutto seemed to have been mesmerized by his own sense of grandeur. LaterthatdayGeneralJillani,theheadofISI,andRaoRashid,thenewlypromoted Director of the Intelligence Bureau, informed Bhutto that the army's patience had been exhausted and it was planning to act very soon. In their presence Bhutto rang up eachcorpscommanderandsubtlyenquired'ifallwaswellandwhetheranythingunusual washappening...[andwas left]nowiseraftertheconversation'.582

At10p.m.on3JulyMuftiMahmood,ProfessorGhafoorAhmedandNawabzada NasrullahKhanhandedovertheadditionalnine-pointstoBhuttoinsistingthatthese weretechnicalpointsanddidnotmateriallyaffecttheaccordthattheyhadreached uponthepreviousmorning.Bhuttoappearingamiableglancedatthedocumentand informed the PNA team that he would have to consult his team in the adjoining room. We only have Kausar Niazi's version of what took place next.583He states:

Glancingoverthepapers,andreadingoverthepointstous,Mr.Bhuttoaskedfor ouropinion.'There'snothingnewinthesepoints,'Isaid,'norwouldtheyadd anythingtotheclausesoftheaccord.Theseareonlysomepointsofatechnical natureandIthinkwe shouldacceptthemsothatwecansigntheaccordtoday and not allow any deadlock'.

[Bhutto]nowlooked towardsHafeez [Pirzada].'Sir,'hesaid, 'there'snoneedof this.Letthembend;theyclaimcontactswiththeGenerals...there'snothingofthe sort...theGeneralsarewithyou.Thefactisthattheirownbubblehasburst, that's why they are talking like this ... let them talk.'

WhenIinsistedonceagainthattheaccordshouldbesignedthesameday, [Bhutto] spoke up. 'Why do you worry, friend,' he said, 'we'll accept all this, but where'sthehurry!Ifweacceptstraightawaythey'llthinkweareonaweak footing. They should wait for a while'.584

HavingconsultedwithPirzadaandNiazi,BhuttoreturnedtothePNAteamandtold themthatheneededtimeforfurtherconsultations.AccordingtoProfessorGhafoor, Bhutto'sattitudeappearedquiteaccommodatingthroughouttheirbriefmeeting,andin particular,therewasacompleteabsenceofhostilityonhispart.Butonlytwohours later, his stance hardened dramatically. Addressing a Press conference atmidnight3/4 July,BhuttolambastedthePNAnegotiatingteamfor'repudiatingtheirearlieragreement'.

IfIcanconvincemyMNAstosigntheirpoliticaldeath-warrantsbyamendingthe Constitutionwhycan'tthePNAnegotiatingteamconvincetheircolleaguestoratify

582GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.86.

583UntilHafizPirzadaprovidesuswithhisversionofeventsweonlyNiazi'saccounttorelyupon.

584KausarNiazi,op.cit.,pp.228-9.

whathasalreadybeenagreedupon...IfthePNAleadershipisnotpreparedtoaccept what hasalreadybeenagreedupon,thensimilarly,myCabinet andchiefministersare also not prepared to accept it either.585

Shortly after addressing the Press conference, at 1 a.m., 4 July, it is reported that the US AmbassadorArthurHummelcalledonBhuttoforurgentdiscussionswhichwereheld in private. It was suspected that he warned Bhutto of an imminent army take-over.586By nowallofBhutto'salarmbellsshouldhavebeenringing.

On the morning of 4 July, as people read news of Bhutto's Press conference, a feeling of gloomandconfusionpervadedthecountry.ItwascleartoallthatthePNA-PPPtalks hadbrokendownonceagain.Rumorswereflourishing.ThatsamemorningIwas visitedbyAtiyaInayatullahwhoinformedmethatmartiallawwillsoonbedeclared. Onedidnotknowwhattobelieve.TomymindIsensedBhuttowasplayingyetagain to bring about disunity within the PNA. From the onset of the negotiations he had been informed that the negotiating team had no power to approve any term or conditionwithoutpriorapprovalfromthePNAgeneralcouncil.Nowhewaspubliclyaccusing ourteamofrenegingoncommitmentswhichtheywereclearlyunabletomakeinthe firstplace.It was yetanotherexample ofhis incessantdeceit.

That evening the PNA general council met to discuss the latest events at a dinner given bySirdarAbdulQayum.Itwouldprovetobethefinalgatheringofitskind,'alast supper'ofsorts.Forthefirsttimewesawanopensplitinthealliance.AsgharKhan, Maulana Noorani and I insisted that we stick topur nine demands. Otherswere more flexible and some even suggested that we withdraw some of the demands which were notconsideredvital.AtonestageAsgharKhanbecameemotionalandberatedthe othersforconsideringfurtherconcessions.I,forone,hadnotrustinBhuttoandwas convincedthathe wasbeing purposely evasive eachtime we nearedanagreement. Powerwastoodeartohimtobeconcededwillingly.Bytheendofthemeeting it becameclearthatthemajorityofthemembersfavoredfurthernegotiations.Withmuch reluctanceIhadtoaccepttheirdecisiononceagain.AsgharKhanwasmoretrenchantin his criticism and announced that he had lostall confidence in the negotiating team. He openly disparaged some of the members of the PNA leadership of being in league with theregime.Bitterlyaccusingthemofbetrayingthosethathadsacrificedtheirlivesfor the PNA movement he stormed out of the meeting.

OnthesameeveningBhuttohadcalledforameetingofhiscabinetandchiefministers. ItisindicativeofhisgrowinguncertaintythatBhuttohadalsocalleduponGeneralZia and the Director General of ISI, General Jillani to attend the meeting. At the meeting heoncemoreheardtheprosandconsoffurthernegotiationswiththePNAwithout

585ProfessorGhafoorAhmed,PhirMartialLawAagya(Urdu),op.cit.p.248.

586KausarNiazi,op.cit.,p.229.

expressing any comment. Later he is said to have had a private chat with General Zia,which may be assumed to have been related to Ambassador Hummers early morningrevelations.587

Clearly Bhuttowasnowunsettled,havingplayedadangerousgame,he musthavebeenawareoftheriskshehadtaken.Bynowhemusthaveknownsomethingwas brewing,asallofasuddenhisself-createdobstructionscametoahalt.Laterthat eveninghesummonedhiscloseaidesforanurgentdiscussion.WithKausarNiazi, MumtazBhutto,GhulamMustafaJatoiandHafizPirzadagatheredbeforehim,the unnerved Bhutto announced his decision to sign the accord and be finished with it. He thenaddressedaPressconferenceontelevisionat11.30p.m.informingthecountrythat the next day, 5 July, he would sign the accord with the PNA. But he had sailed too close totheedge.Theyawningdepthsnowclosed aroundhimandwouldtakethecountry intotwelvemoreyearsofmisfortune.At2a.m.on5JulyOperationFairPlay was carried out and the army once again took Pakistan into its firm grip.

***

Bhuttowasanundisguisedtotalitarian.Fundamentalfreedomshadbeenguaranteedby theConstitution.ThedayaftertheConstitutionwaspassedastateofemergencywas declaredmakingamockeryofthesesupposedfreedoms.Forfiveandahalfyearswe hadwitnesseddemocraticallyelectedprovincialgovernmentsbeingsacked, newspapersbeingbanned,Oppositionpoliticiansandjournalistsharassed,jailed, tortured, andat times evenkilled, and aprovince savagelybrought to heel. Dissent had been put down with a ruthlessness never before seen in our country.

By March 1977 Bhutto, having lost touch with the masses, had become too arrogant to countenanceanythingbuttotalvictory.ThevictoryhadtobeorganizednotbyPPP party workers but by chief secretaries, deputy commissioners, magistrates and superintendentsofpolice.Facedwithrejection,hetriedtobrowbeattheOppositionby a show of naked force. When the police and paramilitary forces failed to intimidate thePNAmovement,insteadofnegotiating,heblunderedbycallinginthearmyand declaring martial law in the urban areas. He politicized the army corps commanders by regularlycallingtheminformeetingsandseekingtheiradvice.

He wasted three monthsbefore agreeing tomeetwiththe Opposition. Before he did so, hehadtriedeveryalternativetoavoidit.Thisincludedthepoliticalgimmickryof Islamization-declaringFridayastheweeklyholiday,bringinginprohibitionand banninghorseracing.Thenheconsideredareferendumwhichfailedtofindany support.WhenfacedwithlittlechoicehewouldreleasethejailedOppositionleaders andthenwhenaglimmerofanalternativewouldemergehewouldsendthemtojail.

587Ibid.,p.230.

Oncenegotiationsbeganhewould prevaricateand hedgearound wasting timewithout carrying out what he had promisedto do, such as release political prisoners and cancel armslicensesissuedtohissupporters.Thelittletrustthatremainedwassquandered whenhearrogantlywentabroadinthemidstofagrowingclimateofreconciliation. Hearing only whathe wanted tohear and seeing only whathe wished tosee, in the end hisdecisiontosigntheaccordonlycamewhenthearmywasminutesawayfrom knockingathisgate.Lostinthebeliefofhisownomnipotence,heonlyfacedreality when it came crashing upon his head. By that time it was, of course, all far too late.

***

WhileatIslamabadIhadbeenstayingatSirdarShaukatHayat'shouse.Intheearly hoursofthemorningof5JulyIwasrudelywokenbyloudbangingonthebedroom door.Halfasleep,Iopenedmydoortoseeauniformedyoungmanpointingapistolat myhead.HeaskedmeinEnglish,'AreyouMr.Mazari?'WhenIrepliedinthe affirmative,IwasinformedthatIwasunderarrest.Myimmediatethoughtwasthat Bhutto had sent the FSF to round us all up. It occurred to me that it was perhaps time to recitethekalimaandgetpreparedtomeetmymaker.Butsuddenangerboiledinme andinsteadIsnappedathim,'Whoexactlyareyou?'Theyoungmanreplied,'I'ma captaininthearmy.MartiallawhasbeenimposedandIhaveorderstoarrestyou!'All at once I relaxed, at least the worst had not occurred. I then headed to the bathroom to washupandgetreadyfordeparture.Mypathwassuddenlyblockedbythecaptain who insisted that he accompany me. I told him not to be silly. My host, Shaukat Hayat, reassuredtheyoungofficerthatIwasnotabouttoescape.Ihadaquickwashand changedoutofpyjamasintosuitableclothes.AsIwasabouttoleaveIaskedBegum Hayat,orMuchoApaassheisknownamongfriends,tosupplymewithtwolarge towels in the event I ended up in a place like Mianwali Jail. As I left the house I was astounded to see that the grounds had been surrounded by nearly a hundred armed soldiersandahostofarmyvehiclescarryingheavycalibermachine-guns.Itappeared as an exercise in over-kill but I suppose in the circumstances the army planners did not wish to leave anything to chance.

In accordance with the instructions issued under the so-called Operation Fair Play I was taken to the officers' mess at Chaklala in Rawalpindi where I met up with the otherdetained Opposition leaders, who included Mufti Mahmood, Asghar Khan. MaulanaNoorani,ProfessorGhafoor,NasrullahKhanand,tomysurprise,PirPagaro.588ThePir was released later that day. The PPP leaders, with the exception of Bhutto, were also broughtthere,buthousedinseparatebarracks.AshortwhilelaterHafizPirzada walkedpastcloselyandIheardhimsay,There'stheOpposition!'Icouldnothelp

588Apart from Bhutto, those detained from the PPP side included Hafiz Pirzada, Kausar Niazi, Mumtaz Bhutto, GhulamMustafa Khar,Tikka Khanand Sheikh Rasheed. Thearmy also hauled up a number of key bureaucratssuch as Rao Rashid (Director Intelligence Bureau), Masood Mahmood (Director General FSF), Akram Sheikh (Director FIA), Muhammad Raza (Deputy-Director FSF) and Vaqar Ahmed (Cabin Secretary).

correctinghim,Thereisnolongeranygovernment,nor,forthatmatter,any Opposition. We, my friend, are now all prisoners of the army'.

At7p.m.thateveningwewererequested to assembletowatch GeneralZiaaddressthe nationontelevision.Inhisspeechhedeclaredthatheharborednopoliticalambitions andhadbeenforcedtotake thesteps thathe hadtakenbecauseof the 'vacuumcreated by political leaders'. He went on to state that:

Mysoleaimistoorganizefreeandfairelectionswhichwould beheld inOctober this year.

Soonafterthepolls,powerwillbetransferredtotheelectedrepresentativesof thepeople.IgiveasolemnassurancethatIwillnotdeviatefromthisschedule.589

Thiswouldbecomeoneofthemostcolossalmisrepresentationsevermadeinthe history of Pakistan.

Duringthistwenty-minutespeechZiaappearedtometobesympathetictowards Bhutto.ThePPPleaderhad beenshiftedby helicoptertothecomfortableGovernment HouseatMurree,andhadbeenaccordedtheuniqueprivilegeofhavinghisformer Military Secretary and his ADCs still serving him. It occurred to me that perhaps Zia's handhadbeenforcedby hisgenerals.Butthe deedhadbeendone.Bhuttowasno longerinpowerandIwassatisfiedbyZia'sassurancethatelectionswouldbeheld withinninetydays.Myviewsonthecorpscommanders'roleinthecoup,were confirmedby the formerArmy ChiefofStaff,GeneralGulHassanKhanwhomaintained'Bhutto'sexitwasaccomplishedbyallseniorofficersexertingimmense pressure on General Ziaul Haq'.590

Thefollowingday,5July,thesixofusfromthePNAweretakentoMurreeandconfinedtoPunjabHouse,whichformewasadecidedimprovementfromMianwali Jail. The weather was cool and I had to send a message to my friend Syed Asad Ali who was holidayingnearbyat the Clifden Farm to send me some warm socks and awoollen sweater.AtMurreewehadtimeto,reflectupontherecenteventsanddiscussthem amongstourselves.AtonestageMuftiMahmoodexpressedhisdisappointmentwith mystanceoninsistinguponthewithdrawalofthearmyfromBalochistanandthe release ofourcolleagueswhohadbeenjailedinthe HyderabadConspiracy Case.I repeatedmyearlierviewtohimthattomymindBhuttohadbeenusingthe negotiationstobuytime.IremindedMuftiSahibthatBhuttohadconsistentlyevaded andprevaricatedoverthevitalissueofgivingtheImplementationCouncila

589ExcerptfromGeneralZiaulHaq'saddresstothenationon5July1(Fulltextofthespeechcanbefoundin: HasanAskariRizvi,TheMilitaryandPoliticsinPakistan1947-86,ProgressivePublishers,Lahore,1986,AppendixH,

pp.289-93).

590Lt.-GeneralGulHassanKhan,Memoirs,op.cit.,p.412.

constitutionalbacking.By giving such a constitutionalsanction to the councilBhutto would have then been unable to repudiate the agreement at a later stage. Only when the army coup was upon him did he express a sudden desire to concede this point. I was convinced that Bhutto had used the servile Zia as a ruse to counteract our demands on Balochistan and the Hyderabad Tribunal. My views were subsequently confirmed separatelybybothGeneralChishtiandGeneralArif.Attheveryfirstmeetingbetween Zia and Bhutto after the army take-over, on 15 July, Bhutto asked Zia to ensure that the armywasnotwithdrawnfromBalochistanandtheHyderabadConspiracyCasewasnotinterferedwith.591ItmadeamockeryofBhutto'searlierclaimtothePNAthathe waskeentoresolvethesetwoissuesbutthatitwasthearmywhichwasnotallowing him to.

On 8 July General Zia telephoned Mufti Mahmood and asked about our welfare. A few dayslateron12Julyhetelephonedonceagainand asked MuftiMahmood toconveyhis salaams to all of us. Thefollowing day I wascontacted by the office of the local General OfficerCommanding(theGOCthenwasMajor-GeneralAkhtarAbdulRehman)and informedthatastaffcarwasonitswaytofetchmeforsomeimportantdiscussions.I wasquitenonplussedandrepliedthattherewasnothingthatIcouldnotdiscussin front of my colleagues. The answer was no, only I was to come.It occurred to me that perhapsIwasupforinterrogationsoIaskedifIneededtocollectanyofmy belongings. I was told that I would not be needing anything. Quite mystified I took the staff car to the GOC's office on the Mall in Murree, only to find my friend Air Marshal NurKhansittingtherewaitingforme.Hetoldmethathehadcomeattheexpress requestofGeneral Zia. ItseemedZiawas alittleapprehensiveasthe onlyoneamonguswhomhehadmetpreviouslywas Asghar Khan,someonefromwhomheexpected verylittlecooperation.NurKhanaskedmeifwewereinthemoodtoreceiveZia.I expressed my amazementattherequest.Itappeared odd intheextremefor acaptor to ask his prisoners' permission to meet with them. I took Nur Khan back toour place of confinement and invited him to have lunch with the rest of the PNA leadership. Hewas pleasantlyreceived.AfterlunchhelefttocallonBhuttowithasimilarrequest.Ilater learnthewasmetinitiallywithatempertantrum,butintheendhemanagedto persuade Bhutto to meet with his once subordinate Army Chief of Staff.

On16July Ziavisitedus.Accompanyinghimwere GeneralsChishtiandArif,and GhulamIshaqKhan.MyfirstimpressionofZiawasthatofanextremelydeferential man. He exuded humility and was extremely courteous toall. He asked us if we were comfortableinourlodgingsandiftherewas anythinghecoulddotoimprovethings. Then he apologized for the army take-over and informed us that he had been left with nootheralternative.Hegaveusabroadmeaningfullookbeforeaddingthatthe

591Lt.-General Faiz Ali Chishti,Betrayals of Another Kind, op. cit., p. and General K. M. Arif,Working with Zia, op.cit., p. 113. (Both of the Generals accompanied Zia to the meeting with Bhutto on 15 July 1977).

MilitaryIntelligencehadwarnedhimthat'alotofbloodshedwasgoingtotakeplacein the country'.

WhenZiaaskeduswhathecoulddoforus,MuftiMahmoodandNasrullahKhan asked him to ensure our release before Ramzan which was tobeginin the beginning of August. I took the opportunity of asking him about the issues that continued to remain close to my heart: to return the troops to thebarracks inBalochistan and the release of theNAPleadersheldinHyderabadJail.Ziapromisedmethathewouldattendto them.ThenthesixofuscollectivelyrequestedhimtoreleaseallthePNAsupporters whowerestilllanguishinginprisonandtocompensatethefamiliesofthosekilledin the movement. Again, Zia promised that he would sort the matter out very soon.

One personhe lockedhornswithwasAsgharKhan.He criticizedAsgharKhanfor sending aletter to militarycommanders asking them not to obey 'unlawful commands' oftheBhuttoregimeinstructingthemtotakeactionagainstthePNAprotesters.Zia informedAsgharKhanthatheconsideredthelettertobeanactofseditionand intended puttinghim on trialforit. Asghar Khan retorted that he coulddowhatever he liked.ItwasthenleftuptotheeversolicitousMuftiMahmoodtocalmtempersand soothethesituation.Havingmetus,GeneralZiathenwenttoGovernmentHouseto meetwithBhutto.Laterreportsindicatedthattheirmeetinghadnotbeensmooth.It wasprobablythenthatZiaulHaqdecidedthathecouldnotworkwithhim.Satisfied withhisvisitsZiaallowedustohavevisitorsfromthenon.Healsostoodbyhis commitmentandvisitedWaliKhan,AttaullahMengal,KhairBukshMarri,GhousBuksh Bizenjo and other NAP members in Hyderabad Jail.

On28JulywewerealltakenundercustodyandtakenbyroadtoIslamabad.Bhutto, however,wastakenthereinaspecialhelicopter.IheadedforKarachiandwasreceived byatumultuouscrowd.MostofthedetainedPNAleadershipweresimilarlyfetedin theirhometownsasreturningheroes.Butwewerenottheonlyones.Thatsameday the newly released Bhutto was received by a large crowd at Rawalpindi. Realizing the electoralbattlethatlayahead,heknewitwastimetoshedhisacquiredpersonaofa majorworldstatesman,andreverttohisearlierroleofacombativestreetfightingpolitician.

Portrayinghimselfasanunderdoghewentontheoffensive.AjournalistinTheHerald

magazineinSeptember1977describinghiselectioneeringsaid:

[Bhutto]hasre-emergedonthepoliticalscenenotonlyunrepentantbutina surly, aggressive mood, with his usual slogans and catchwords and shibboleths. Hisfall,hewouldhaveusbelieve,wasbroughtaboutnotbyhisownfolliesbut

through a conspiracy between a foreign power and local vested interests out to destroy Pakistan and crush her poor masses.592

Bhutto resorted to shamefully abusing his political opponents to amuse the masses. The same journalist, who was covering the PPP leader's campaign, mentions an instance at Lahore when Bhutto publicly made 'an obscene threat' towards Mufti Mahmood. Thethreatwas'sofilthy',accordingtothejournalist,thatevenBhuttowascompelledto check himself in midst of his delivery and then complain that he was forced to do so as there were women present.593

The battle lines for the new elections were set. The PPP announced on 4 August that it wouldcontesttheOctoberelections.Despitethebanonpoliticalactivityuntil14 August, Bhutto opted to violate the restrictions. On 6 August he went to Multan and addressedalargeandrowdycrowd.TwodayslaterhearrivedatLahoreandwasmet byatremendousswarmofpeople.Someoftheseenthusiastsphysicallyattackeda numberofPNAleaderswhomtheychancedupon.Theunfortunatevictimsofthis violencewereMaulanaNooraniandMaulanaSattarNiazi,whoweretakenoffa rickshawnearLahore'scantonmentbridgeandbadlyroughedup.Thatevening Maulana Noorani received a personal telephone call from General Zia, in our presence, apologizingfortheincidentandpromisingtoprotectthePNAleadershipfromall forms ofPPP hooliganism in the future.

WhileBhuttoandthePPPwentaboutcampaigninginearnest,thePNAbecame embroiledinadebateovertheallocationofelectionseatsamongitscomponentparties. TheparliamentaryboardofthePNA,headedbyPirPagaro,wasmakingextremelyslowprogress.Theirworkremainedincompleteevenatthefinaldateforthefilingof nominationpapers.Aspiringcandidateswerethenadvisedtofiletheirpapersinthe constituenciestheywishedtocontestuntilafinaldecisionwasannounced.Whenthe parliamentary board's first decision, which related to Sindh, was announced, it led to a stormofprotestwithinthePNA.InSindhoutofatotalof43seats,20hadgoneto Pagaro's Muslim League and 6 more to Muslim League-supported independents. Of the remaining17seats,6weregiventoJamaat-i-lslami,5toJUP,3toJUI,2toTehrik-i- Istiqlal and I to NDP. What annoyed some of us was that a number of these PNA tickets had been allocated to former stalwarts of the PPP who had now switched sides. On 22 AugusttheKarachinewspaperTheStarearnedabannerheadline:'StormyPNA Meeting at Lahore Today.. NDP Angry at Raw Deal in Sindh'. It reported:

TheNDPleaderSardarSherbazMazari,yesterdaystronglysupportedthe demandofyoungworkersofthePNA(voicedbyTheStaryesterday)thatthe PNAshouldnotallow'notoriousPPPmen'tojointheAlliancePirPagaro's

592ZubbairSiddiqui,'WhyBhuttofell',TheHerald,Karachi,September1977,p.7.

593TheStar,Karachi,22August1977.

League.ThePNA,heveryaptlysaidshouldnotbemadeanotherConventionLeague.594

By 25 August NDP received two further seats in Sindh, raising its total to 3 seats in the province. Little by little the issue of the seats was resolved, but even so it was not to everyone'sliking.TheViewpointmagazinecommented:

TheNDPleadershipthinksthatithasbeenoverlookedglaringlyinSind, althoughithasbuiltupsizeablesupportamongtheworkingclasses,more substantial, according to some Karachi NDPmen, than the former NAP had evermanaged.

However, neither the NDP Chief Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, nor Begum Nasim Wali Khanwerewillingtocommentontheseaspectsthisweek.Theywerebothof the viewthatpurelypartyinterestsshouldatthistimebesubordinatedtothebigger question of preserving PNA unity. Having come thus far, it was crucial that the Alliance should continue to function with a solid, unified front, they said.595

On13AugustZiatelephonedmeaskingmetomeetwithhimtodiscusstheBalochistan issue.IcontactedtheNDPprovincialleadershipofBalochistantoaccompanymeforthe meetingwiththeChiefMartialLawAdministratorbutIwasinformedlaterthatZia wished to see me alone on the evening of 15 August.

On the morning of 15 August I received an unexpected call from the Home Secretary of Balochistan. He told me that he had just externed the aging Pathan leader, Khan Abdul GhaffarKhanfromBalochistanandhadplacedhimonaplaneboundforKarachi. When he was asked who should be requested to receive him at Karachi, Ghaffar Khan mentioned my name, adding that I was the only person he could trust in Karachi. At the airport 'Badshah Khan', as he was called by his admirers, was placed in my care by the Deputy-SuperintendentofPolicewhohadescortedhimtoKarachifromQuetta.The firstpersonGhaffarKhanwantedtomeetwasAttaullahMengal.Athisinsistencewe drove straight from the airport to Cardiovascular Hospital where the ailing AtaullahMengal was being kept for treatment. From there he went on to meet with the Sindhi nationalist leaderG.M.Syed.Thelocalauthorities didnot approveofGhaffarKhan's forcedvisittoKarachi.AfterallowinghimtovisithissonWaliKhaninHyderabadJail on20August,hewasexternedfromSindhas well.I wenttotheairporttoseehimoffas he boarded a plane for NWFP.

When I met General Zia on the evening of 15 August at Karachi, I reminded him of the promisehehadmadetomeatSihalaregardingtheHyderabadConspiracyCaseand

594Ibid.,p.8.

595Viewpoint,Lahore,28August,1977,(LahoreDiary)p.7.

the withdrawal of the army from Balochistan. Now I appealed to him to honor his commitment.Ziasaidhehadnotforgottenthepledgeandhadeveryintentionof honoringit.DuringourdiscussionsonthesituationinBalochistan,Isuggestedtohim thathehavethearmywithdrawnbeforethecomingelectionsinOctobersothatthere was every chance for the people in the province to freely vote for the representatives of theirchoice.Ialsotoldhimthatitwasnecessarytopaycompensationtoallthosewho hadlosttheirfamilymembers,hadtheirhomesdestroyed,theirlivestockconfiscated andcropsruinedasaresultofthemilitaryaction.Ziarepliedthatnotallhiscolleagues in the army would be happy with such an all encompassing proposal. Countering him, I proposed that he talk directly with the jailed leadership of Balochistan about the future settlement of issues in the province.

On the future of the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case, Zia had accepted the two alternative solutionsIhadproposedtoresolvetheissuethatis,eitherthespecialtribunalbe dischargedandtheprisonersreleasedorelsethetribunalfollowlawsthatappliedin normalcourts.Ziainsistedthatheneededmoretimetosorttheissuesout.Ithenraised the issue of Attaullah Mengal's health. The Mengal Sirdar had a serious heart problem andthedoctorsattheCardiovascularHospitalwerenotabletoperformthebypass operation required. Zia informed me that he would address the matter very shortly.

ThenextmorningIreceivedacallfromZia'sMilitarySecretaryadvisingmethat instructions had been issued to have Attaullah Mengal released on bail. Ten days later, on Zia's specific instructions, the ailing Attaullah Mengal and his doctor were flown on governmentexpensetoHoustontoreceiveurgentlyneededmedicalattention.Laterhe wouldalsohaveWaliKhanshiftedfromHyderabadJailtoaMilitaryHospitalin Rawalpindi ostensibly for dental treatment.

Unfortunately by now serious differences had cropped up among the NAP leadership. ThemostpertinentrelatedtoGhousBukshBizenjo.Hewascompletelyostracizedby hiscolleaguesforhissuspectedunderhanddealingwithBhuttothroughhisassociate,

B.M.Kutti,aswellashisclandestinemeetingswithBhutto'spersonalsecuritychief, SaiedAhmedKhan.Laterhistorywouldalsorevealthathehadmaintainedothersecret linksaswell.GeneralHussainFirdost,whoheadedtheShahofIran'sdreadedsecret policeSavak,revealedinhismemoirsthatwhenBizenjoasGovernorBalochistan, visitedIranwithBhuttoin1972,hewasgiven'alargesumofmoneytoensurethat BaluchnationalismdidnotspreadacrossthebordertoIran'.596Firdostfurtherstated thatBizenjocontinuedtoworkforSavakuntiltheShah'soverthrowin1979.Whilenone of his colleagues truly realized the full extent of Bizenjo's betrayal, most of us had lost all faith in him. He even managed to surprise the normally unflappable Zia when on 12 August1977,heaskedtheGeneraltoprovidehimwithanewMercedescartoreplace

596Lt.-General Hussain Firdost,Shah Iran Kay Sival Mein Khiifia Age Ka Kirdar(Urdu-The Activities of IntelligenceAgencies during the Shah of Iran's Reign), Function House, Lahore, 1997, p. 233.

his agingvehicle.Zia obligedBizenjo anda Mercedes was presentedto himin June1978.597

By now a split had also emerged between the Pathan leaders led by Wali Khan and the Balochleadership.WhenWaliKhanwastransferredfromHyderabadJailtothe CombinedMilitaryHospitalatRawalpindi,theBalochleadersbegantoharbor suspicionsthathewasmakingaclandestinedealwithZiabehindtheirbacks.Ziawas tomaketwotripstothehospitaltomeetWaliKhan.TheNAPleadercandidlytoldZia thathehadideologicaldifferenceswiththeBalochleaders.Hesaid,'Ourvisibleunityis nomorethanskin-deep...[and]eventhishasbeenforcedonmebecausethe governmenthadmade mea co-accusedwiththeminthe jointtrial'.598

GeneralZiahadbeenpushedbyhisseniorgenerals,inallprobabilityledbyChishti, intooustingBhutto.He wasaman aboutwhomoneofhissuperiorofficers, Brigadier (later Major-General Nawazish Ali Khan, had once written in a confidential report: 'He is not fit to be an officer in the Pakistan Army'.599

Having attained the highest of military offices through acts of blatant toadyism, which wereopenlyadmittedtoevenbyhisservingcolleaguessuchasGeneralsChishtiand Arif,ZiawastreatedscornfullybyBhutto.AttimesBhuttowouldhumiliate Ziaby makinghimsitforoveranhour outsideina waitingroombeforedecidingtomeetwith him.600On other occasions he would make funof his teeth.601Apparentlyit was in Zia's naturetoaccepthisabasementinsilence,knowingfullwellthatheowedhispositiontoBhutto.

Having been forced by his comrades into overthrowing the PPP regime, General Zia-ul Haq then did his utmost to convince Bhutto of his honesty of purpose and the fact that hehadbeenpushedintoasituationnotofhisownmaking.GeneralChishtiwhowas present at thefirst meeting between the twomen shortly after the coup, quoted Zia as tellingBhutto'thathewasonly atemporary custodian. Thereafteritwasgoing tobeall Mr.Bhutto'sagainandheshouldmanageitasdeemedfit'.602GeneralArif,theother witness present at the meeting, recalled:

ZiaalsotoldBhuttothathehadintervenedreluctantly,wasdeterminedtoremain neutral,andwouldholdfairelectionsonschedule.Thereafter,'Iwillreverttothe barracks leaving the field free for you to manage the affairs of the state as you consider appropriate', said Zia.

597GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.140.

598Ibid.,p.167.

599Lt.-GeneralGulHassanKhan,Memoirs,op.cit.,p.401.

600Ibid.,p.395-6.

601StanleyWolpert.ZulfiBhuttoofPakistan,op.cit.,p.313.

602Lt.-GeneralFaizAliChishti,BetrayalsofAnotherKind,op.cit.,p.18.

GrantingthedeposedBhuttofullprotocolandpermissiontoretainhisADCsat Murree'sluxuriousGovernmentHouse,afterreleasinghimheevenaccordedBhutto theprivilegeofreturningtoLarkanaontheprimeministerialFalconjet.Clearly,Zialeft no stone unturned to appease Bhutto's sensibilities.

ItismybeliefthatatthetimeofthecoupandforseveralweeksafterwardsZia earnestly desired holding neutral elections which he thought would see Bhutto back in officeagain.HehadapparentlyconvincedhimselfthatafterBhutto'sreturntopower thingswould reverttonormalcyonceagain.Butsoontherewasanoticeableshiftinhis thinking. According to General Chishti, he witnessed a sudden change in Zia's attitude on the evening of 9 August. The cause, he states, was a telephone call that Zia received from Bhutto:

The conversation started nicely and politely, but gradually became harsher. I didnotknowwhatBhuttowassaying,naturally,butIcouldhearGeneralZialoud andclear.Theconversationendedbadly,asfarasIrememberlikethis:-

No. It cannot be done. I cannot give concessions. We are judicious to both sides. If we are not allowing them we cannot let you have it either. No that stage may notcome.Youmay neverhave anopportunity.I willsortitoutbefore that. However, I wish you good luck.

WhenZiacamebackafterthetelephonecall,Iaskedhimifeverythingwasall right.Hesaiditwasnothing,onlysometrivialmatters.ItoldGeneralZiathatMr. Bhutto would not make a call on trivial matters. General Zia kept quiet and looked upset. I realized a crack had come.603

It is possible that Bhutto might have verbally threatened Zia on the telephone, but that wouldbeaconjecture.Nevertheless,whileGeneralChishtimighthavebeenableto pinpointthevisiblechangeinZia'sattitudeon9August,theactualcauseforthe transformationmostlikelylayelsewhere.Zia'spositionhadaltereddramaticallysince thecoup.FrombeingBhutto'smuchdeprecated'monkey-general'henowfound himself elevated to the most powerful position in the country.604As Chief Martial Law Administratorhepossessedsole chargeofthecountryandwasnowprivyto informationabouteverything.AuthenticevidenceofBhutto'svengefulnessmusthave unnerved him. As one foreign historian commented:

603Ibid.,pp.133-4.

604Stanley Wolpert,Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 263. (According to Wolpert Bhutto would often make Zia a butt of public ridicule and shoutat him from the head of the dinner table, 'Where's my monkey-general. Come over here, Monkey!')

Ziacouldnotignoretheaccountsofgrossabuseofpowerthatwereleveledat Bhutto.Moreover,theArmyhadlaunchedaninvestigationofBhutto'sFederal Security Force (FSF), had arrested its head Masood Mahmood and disarmed his troops.RecordsuncoveredintheseizureofFSFfilesrevealednumerousacts, supposedlytakenonBhutto'sorders,againstthepoliticalopposition.Ina number of casestheregime'santagonistshad beenviolently killed. Thearrestof Vaqar Ahmed, the bureaucracy's Establishment Secretary and Rao Rashid, Chief of Bhutto's National IntelligenceBureaualsoled to furtherdisclosures.605

IfBhuttohadthreatenedZiaonthetelephonethatday,itwouldhaveactedasacatalyst preying on Zia's new-found fears. About this time Zia started feeling threatened by the possibleresurgence ofBhutto.Whenhe visitedWaliKhanatthemilitaryhospital, the NAPleaderwhohadfirst-handexperienceofBhutto'svindictiveness,warnedthe Generalinjocular fashion,'Therearetwocorpsesandonlyonegrave.If Bhuttoisnot buriedfirstyoumighthavetoleadtheway'.606Itwasawarning,whichbynowZia must have taken to heart. He had realized that if Bhutto won the elections his own life could be at stake.In a changed political climate,Zia, as the army chief at thetime of acoupd'état, could betried fortreason. One ofthe penaltiesfor treasonwasdeath.Faced withafraughtandperilousfutureZiasoonfoundthemeansofensuringhisown survival.Themanthathehadonlyafewdaysearlierpraisedasa'tenaciousfighterand a great politician' would soon be referred to as 'an evil genius and a Machiavelli'. who hadletloose'areignofterror'inPakistan'.607Inaninterviewpublishedafewweeks laterZiawentontodescribeBhuttoasbeing'atotalfraudandacold-blooded murderer'who'hadbeenrunning a Gestapo-style police state inwhichkidnapping and political murder had become routine'.608

On7JulythefamilyofthemurderedAhmedKhanKasurihadappealedtothemartial lawauthoritiesforjusticeinapprehendinghiskillers.Thevictim'ssonAhmedRaza KasurirequestedthatthecasebeheardbytheLahoreHighCourt.Atthetimeofthe killingon11November1974RazaKasurihadnamedBhuttoasthemurdererinthe FirstInformationReportregisteredatthepolicestation.Interestinglyenough,thefact that he blamed Bhutto for his father's murder, had not prevented Raza Kasuri from rejoining the PPP and applying for a party ticket in the March 1977 elections, only to bemetwithrejection.NowonlyafewmonthslaterandonlytwodaysafterBhutto's downfall the exceptionally opportunistic Raza Kasuri resumed his case against the PPPleader.

605LawrenceZiring,Pakistan:TheEnigmaofPoliticalDevelopment,DawsonWestview,UK,1980,pp.200-1.

606General K. M. Arif,Working with Zia, op. cit., pp. 166-7. (As Wali Khan in all probability spoke to Zia in Urdu, Ihave deliberately paraphrased the quote to improve its nuance.)

607GeneralK.M.Arif.WorkingwithZia,op.cit.,pp.132-3.

608GeneralZiaulHaqinterview,UrduDigest,Lahore,September1977p.28.

Clearly,ifthemartiallawauthoritieshadwishedtoignorethecasetheyhadthe requisitepowertodoso.Instead,theychosetopursueitvigorously.GeneralArif,the ChiefofStafftotheCMLA,wasthekeymanbehindtheinvestigation.609Inhismemoirs he states:

InJuly1977,theFederalInvestigationAgency(FIA)wasdirectedtoassistthe [Major-General S. R. Kallue] Committee in assessing the performance of the FSF. Duringthecourseofitsinvestigation,FIAdetectedhardevidenceimplicatingtheFSFinthe11November1974murder in Lahore,TwoemployeesoftheFSF werearrested.Oninterrogationtheyconfessedtheirparticipationinthe commissionoftheoffence.Thelinkstheyprovidedwidenedthenet.More arrestsweremade,inwhichadditionalevidencewasunearthed.Theevidence implicatedMasoodMahmood,theDirectorGeneraloftheFSF...[who]whileheld incustody... hadwrittenaconfessional statementacceptinghiscrimeand taking the plea that he had acted on the orders given to him by Mr. Bhutto. The incriminating evidence was too strong to be ignored.610

It has been subsequently claimed that 'Zia was ... confronted by his corps commanders. Afteranintensediscussionitwasagreedtore-arrestBhutto,toexaminethecharges leveled againsthim, and totryhimif theevidencewarranted it'.611Themostinfluential corpscommanderatthattime,GeneralChishtideniesallpriorknowledgeaboutthe investigation of the murder case and insists that the case could not have been pursued withoutdirectclearancefromtheCMLA.And,headds,thatGeneralZiausedA.K.Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada to advise himon how to proceed against Bhutto.612

GeneralChishtialsomentions,inhismemoirs,thaton2September1977hewas summoned by Zia to his residence. Zia told Chishti that he had planned to visit Karachi thefollowingdaybutwasunabletodoso'becauseofanunforeseencommitment'.Now he wished Chishti to fly toKarachi instead and personally informthe Sindh martial law commander,GeneralJehanzebArbabtoarrestBhutto.AccordingtoChishti,whenhe protestedthatZiacould doithimself by contactingGeneralArbab ontheconfidential 'seorophone',hewastoldthatthe messagecouldonlybegiveninperson.613Ifonegoes byChishti'sversionofevents,itdoesseemasifZiawaseagertostayinthebackground and let Chishti carry the blame. Yet, in the absence of any corroboration itis difficultto establishthetruecourseofeventsinthehighestechelonsofthearmy.Nevertheless,on

609'Theonlystaffofficer whocouldhavebeenfullyinthepicture[abouttheKasuri murdercase]wasMaj.-Gen.K.

M.Arif':Lt.-GeneralFaizAChishti,BetrayalsofAnotherKind,op.cit.,p.82.

610GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.179.

611LawrenceZiring,Pakistan:TheEnigmaofPoliticalDevelopment,op.cit.,p.201.

612Lt.-General Faiz Ali Chishti,Betrayals of Another Kind, op. cit.. p. 82. Both these legal peddlers (A. K. Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada) made their 'high' reputations on advising the establishment on how to legally avoid their constitutional and lawful responsibilities. Most of our draconian amendments to the constitutions in recent times bear the fingerprints of one or both of them.

613Lt.-GeneralFaizAliChishti,BetrayalsofAnotherKind,op.cit.,p.81.

thefollowingday,3September,BhuttowasarrestedathisCliftonresidenceonacharge of conspiring a murder.

***

BylateAugustmoveswereafoottogetallthepartiesinthePNAtomergeintoone party. Four parties, including Jamaat-i-Islami, JUI, and Muslim League, were in favor of it. Asghar Khan, Maulana Noorani and I disapproved. Commenting on the possibilities of a PNA merger the Viewpoint magazine said:

[The]JUP leaderMaulanaNooraniexpressedhis misgivings ...NDP President Mazan has spoken out with similar reservations, pointing out with refreshing frankness,thatthePNAwasananti-Bhuttofront,andwouldcontinuetowork onlyaslongastheBhuttodangerwasalive.Tehrik'sAsgharKhanhasrejected the move more definitely. This makes the score three - all among the parties thatmatter.614

Theideaofthemergerdiedaquietdeath.

On 25 August a PNA general council meeting had been called at Quetta. Asghar Khan optednottoattendandsentMahmoodAliKasuritorepresenthim.Threenon-party headsinsisteduponattendingthemeeting.TheywereMoulaBukshSoomroandAli AhmedTalpurfromSindh,andZahoorEllahifromPunjab.Atthemeetingthethree menthenbegantopleadwiththePNAleadershipthatweshouldrefrainfrom pressurizing General Zia to hold the elections as scheduled for October and warned of seriousbloodshedifwepersistedwiththeideaofearlyelections.Isuspectedthey fearedthatBhuttomightregainhislostpopularity,butatthetimehadlittleinklingthat these three wereacting at Zia's behest.615

My concern was that without the release of the elected leadership of Balochistan and the NWFPfromHyderabadJailtheelectionwouldprovetobeafarceinthesetwo provinces.Whenquestionedaboutwhatmyviewswouldbeatthepossible postponement of elections, I said provided Zia had valid reasons for the postponement publicly and made a firm commitment to hold them by March 1978 latest, then the NDP would not raise any objection in the event of a brief delay. For my part I was relying onZia's promise that the jailed NAP leaders would soon be released. I keenly wanted these leaders tobeabletoparticipateinanyfutureelectioncampaign.

Therewasnounanimityatthemeeting,butitwouldbeincorrecttomaintain,ashas beensuggestedbysome,thatatthisearlystagesomeofthePNAparties(asopposedto

614Viewpoint,Lahore28August1977.(Linesman)p.5.

615Laterallthreeofthemwouldholdcabinetrankinthemartiallawgovernment.

someindividualsincludingZahoorIllahi,etc,)wereactinginconnivancewithZia.Most of the parties were more preoccupied with the coming elections and a number of them were focused on seats and keen to enhance their share.For some of them release ofanyoftheNAPleadersfromjailwouldhavemeantareductionintheirquotaofseats inBalochistanandNWFP.Assuch,indecisivenessprevailed.PromptedbyZahoor Ellahi, Moula Buksh Soomro and All Ahmed Talpur, a decision was made that the PNA would remain silent in case Zia decided to postponethe elections, provided, however, thatacompleteprocessofaccountabilitywascarriedoutconcerningallcontesting politicians.But,itwouldbefairtosaythatmostofuswereexpectingelectionstobe heldontime.On3September,quiteunawarethatBhuttohadbeenarrestedthatday,as official leader of the PNA, Mufti Mahmood publicly demanded that elections be held as scheduled in October.

In the first weekof September General Zia surprisedall by announcing that 18 October asElectionday hadnotbeenfixedby divine revelationandthatthe pollscouldbe delayedafewdaysoraweek-ifthepeoplesodesiredorifvariouspoliticalparties supportedsuchademand.Itwasthefirstpublicsignofawaveringfromhisearlier commitment.Later,on4SeptemberMartialLawregulationNo.21waspromulgated. Thenewlawdemandedadeclarationofassetsfromallformermembersofthenational andprovinciallegislatureswithinafifteen-dayperiod.Theinformationprovidedbythe politicians made for interesting reading.

In themeantimetheelection campaign continuedwith fullfervor.Busy with electioneering most of us were quite unaware that some of our colleagues were meetingZiaandsecretlyencouraginghimtoprolonghismartiallaw.AccordingtoGeneralArif, 'thePirofPagaroandChaudhryZahoorEllahi,metZiaon30Septemberandrequested the postponement of elections, the former suggesting a five-year delay'.616And it also subsequentlyappearedthatsuchrenegadesdidnotonlyexistinthePNA.General Chishti informed us that on the afternoon of 28 September:

[PPPleaderssuchas]Khar,Jatoi,KausarNiazi,MirAfzal,HamidRazaGillaniand Noor Hayat Noon metftheZia appointed] Election Cell and recommended thattheelectionsbepostponedandnonewdategiven.MartialLawmust become strict, and accountabilityproceeded with through civil courts.617

WhileMuslimLeaguers,suchasPirPagaroandZahoorEllahi,hadonlyanelectoral alliancewiththerestofthePNA,thesePPPleaderswereclandestinelyindirect opposition to the dictates of their party chairman, Z. A. Bhutto. Clearly, the grip of fear thatBhuttoused toexertcontrol over his party men was nolongerfunctional now that he was out of power.

616GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.131.

617Lt.-GeneralFaizAliChishti,BetrayalsofAnotherKind,op.cit.,p.140.

On 1 October Zia announced on a national broadcast on radio: 'There is cry from the countrythataccountabilityshouldtakeplacebeforeelectionsHoldingelectionsunder thepresentcircumstanceswillbeinvitinganewcrisis.Sotheelectionsarepostponed till further announcement'.618At the same time he also proclaimed a complete ban on all politicalactivity.WhenthePNAleadersmetZia,on13October,hewasaskedto explainhisreasonsforthepostponement.Ziareplied byblamingthedeteriorating law andordersituation.Thecampaignaccordingtohimhadnotbeenorderlyandthe martiallawauthoritieshadreceivedinformationthatthereweresome'political elements'whowereplottingtocreatetrouble.Tome thisexplanationappeared farfetched. Realizing he faced a skeptical audience Zia then embarked on another justification for the postponement. He then informed us that a number of top leaders of both the PNA and the PPP had been pleading with him to postpone the elections. Hissecondreasonsuddenlyappearedtobemuchmoreplausible.

Thepostponementoftheelectionswasreceivedbymixedfeelingseverywhere.This moodwasperhapsbestsummedupbythePakistanEconomistmagazine,whichsaid:

Indefinitepostponementhascomeasablowtoanexpectantpeople.Itistrue that postponing is amply justified. But it is also true that while people want the guiltymanto be punished, theywant theelectionsverybadlyindeed. No doubt they [would] like to know the truth about what really went on behind the democratic facade of Mr. Bhutto. But their desire for the democratic dispensation through a free and fair elections is the strongest ofthem all.619

WithinthefewshortweeksdoubtsappearedinmymindaboutZia'strueintentions.By early November 1977 I had made my views public.

TheNationalDemocraticPartyleader,Mr.SherbazMazari,emphaticallyurged

...thattheMartialLawauthoritiesshouldannounceafirmelectiondate independentoftheprocessofaccountability,whichcouldcontinueinthenormalcourse.

He said that vacillation on the question of elections could create a despondency inthepublicandleadtodoubtswhetherelectionswouldbeheldinthenearfuture.

Mr.Mazarisaidthatcontradictorystatementsonanelectiondatecouldalso erodethecredibilityofthepresentGovernment.AslateasOctober30,headded, itwassaidthattheelectionswouldbeheldimmediatelyaftercompletionofthe

618Ibid.,p.140.

619'ANastySituation'(Editorial),PakistanEconomist,Karachi.8-14October1977,p.6.

processofaccountabilitywhich,itwassaid,wouldbeoverinfiveorsixmonths. ItwasnowbeingstatedthatelectionsmightbeheldinOctoberorNovember next year [1978].

Mr.Mazarisaidthatthenationalinterestdemandedanearlyelectiondate...620

Littledidanyoneknowthenthatwewouldhavetowaitelevenlongyearsbefore elections would be held. By then a large number of the leading players would be dead andreplacedbynewfacesbelongingtoagenerationofpoliticians,manyofthemraised fromobscuritytobegroomedandnourishedunderZia'slongyearsofdictatorship. After being cursed with five years of Bhutto's brutal megalomania, we were now fated to suffer eleven years of Zia's uncommonly corrupt hypocrisy.

620'EarlyElectionsaMust,SaysMazari',Viewpoint,Lahore,13November1977,p.13.

CHAPTER10

MRDandOpposingZia'sMartialLaw

Soon after the postponement of the October 1977 election, a meeting of the PNAleadership was held at Jamaat-i-Islami's headquarters at Mansoora. Concern wasexpressedbythememberpartiesatthepostponementoftheelections.Itwasdecided that ateambe appointedto meetwith Zia and persuade him tokeep tohis word by holdingelections byMarch 1978.Thosenominatedto theteam includedProfessor Ghafoor Ahmed, as secretary-general of the PNA, Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi as a representativeoftheMuslimLeague,andmyself.

Atthemeetingoneoftheissuesthatcausedconsiderabledisharmonywastheobjection raisedagainstthecontinuingpresidencyoftheallianceunderMuftiMahmood. Maulana Noorani and Asghar Khan insisted that as over a year had passed since Mufti Sahib'sappointmentnew electionshouldbeheldfor thepost. AsgharKhan'snamewas thenproposedasacontestantforthePNAleadership.Thiswasnotacceptedbythe majoritywhothenvotedinfavorofMuftiMahmoodcontinuingasPresidentofthePNA for another year. The ill-feeling that was created would soonlead to aparting of ways. By 11 November, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal had left the PNA and JUP would do the same four months later in March 1978.

Professor Ghafoor, Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi and I met Zia on 19 November. Initially we discussedanumberofoutstandingissueswithhim,someofwhich,suchasthe Balochistanproblemandthe fateofthe jailedNAPleadersinthe Hyderabad ConspiracyCase,Ihadalreadyraised withhimonpreviousoccasions.Ziaassured us that he was committed to withdrawing his troops from the province and was sincerely tryingtoresolvetheissuesinvolvedintheHyderabadtrial.TheNAPleaders,he insisted,wouldsoonbereleased.ThenIquestionedhimabouttheshootingand kidnapping of Attaullah Mengal's son, Asadullah, and his companion. Zia said that he believedthatthetwoyoungmenhadbeenmurderedandtheirbodiesburiedinan unknown place. He added that 'with deep regret and despite all his efforts' he had not been able to trace the culprits.621

621The fact that Zia did not put the blame of the killings of Asadullah Mengal and Ahmed Shah Kurd on Bhutto led me to suspect that they had, instead, been targeted by the Military Intelligence for their alleged activities in the Balochistaninsurgency.If thatindeedwasthecase then itwould proveto be aharshindictmenton ourmilitaryfor carrying out cold-blooded assassinations of its own citizens on the streets of Karachi.

Other issues that we raised with Zia related to the release of all political prisoners and the withdrawal of cases registeredagainstthose involvedin the PNA movement. Itwas also suggested to him that he ought to reverse the process of nationalization of schools thathadtakenplaceundertheBhuttoregime.Wemaintainedthatcomplete governmentcontroloftheeducationalsystembodeddisasterforthefuturegenerations ofstudents.622Itookup anissue on behalfofthepeopleofSindhregardingtheopening of an Indian Consular Office in Karachi which would make it easier for those who had relatives across the border to obtain visas.

On the key issue of elections Zia proved to be evasive. He claimed that he had received'clearevidence'thatthePPPwasplanningamajorcampaignofdisruption.According to him, this could prove to be a serious risk to law and order. Then in a polite tone Zia commented on the weaknesses within the PNA. Pointing to PNA's internal disharmonyover electoral seat allocations and the often contradictory statements being given by its variousleaders,hesaidstepsshouldbetakentoimprovethealliance'simageinthe publiceye.HewasactingasifhissympathieslaywiththePNA.Zia,however,then insisted that in view of threatened civil violence, public interest demanded that the electionsbeindefinitelypostponed.BothProfessorGhafoorandIopenlydisagreedwithZia'sassessmentandtoldhimthatwecouldonlyagreetothepresent postponement if he in return provided us with a firm date for the elections, which we insisted should be held no later than March 1978. The third member of our team,ChaudhryZahoorEllahiwasclearlysupportiveofZia'sstand.

DespiteourcleardivergenceofviewsZiaremainedamodelofcourtesythroughoutour meeting.Overtheyears,evenwhenIactivelycampaignedagainsthisregime,Inever found anopportunitytofaulthismanners. AfterfiveyearsofBhutto, iffornothingelse, it made for a dramatic change. After our meeting was over he insisted that the three of us stay for dinner. We were then joined by the governors of some of the provinces and an assortment of senior generals. All through the evening Zia made us the focus of his attention. Itwasa talentwhichwould provevery useful tohimwhenitcametodealing with most politicians.

***

InJanuary1978IhadtobrieflyinterruptapoliticaltourofthePunjabtoattendseveral functionsgiveninhonorofthevisitingBritishPrimeMinister,JimCallaghan.During the state banquet, on 12 January, Zia asked me to meet with him the following day. At thesamefunction,whichhadbeenhostedbyZia,Iwassurprisedtocomeacross GhulamMustafaJatoiandKausarNiazi,twoofBhutto'ssenior-mostlieutenants,

622Zia did not de-nationalize the educational institutions as we had hope would. The damage wrought by Bhutto's ill-considered nationalization has crippled the educational standards in Pakistan. Nationalization brought with it a complete mediocrity of teaching staff and institutionalized corruption within the educational system.

amongtheguestsatthestatefunction.Itwasapparentthatthetwogentlemenhad foundfavorwiththemilitaryleaderdespitetheincarcerationoftheirleader.

Meeting Zia the next day I thanked him for honoring his promise by releasing the NAP leadersandsuggestedtohimthatitwasnowtimetodiscussthegrievancesofthe Baloch leadership and sort out the issues of compensation for the tribesmen who had sufferedundertheBhuttoregime.Ziaappearedquiteagreeableandaskedmetomeet himon18JanuaryatKarachi,alongwiththeothermembersoftheBalochleadership.

On 6 December 1977 Wali Khan, along with fourteen other prisoners in the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case had been granted bail. While the Pathan leaders of the NAP tookadvantageoftheirnew-foundfreedom,theirBalochcounterpartsrefusedtofilepapers forbail.TheBalochleadersobjectedonthegroundsthattwenty-sixoftheircolleagues had been refused bail and decided that as long as these men remained imprisoned they would stay with them.

By now there was a clear divergence of views between the two sets of NAP leadership.WaliKhan foundit difficulttofeelhostile towardsthenewmilitaryregimewhichhad beenresponsibleforreleasinghimafterfourlongyearsofincarceration.Thefocusof his angry attention continued to be centered on Bhutto. Quite naturally, he was at thattime,extremelybittertowardsthePPPleaderbecauseofallthathadbeeninflicted upon him, his family and his party. Once asked to comment upon Wali Khan and hisfamily'senduringhostilitytowardsBhuttoIhadreplied:

...three attempts had been made on his life, his family was arrested, his wife was arrested,hissonsweretortured,[hisfather]BadshahKhan...wasinsultedand humiliatedbyBhuttopublicly.Afterallthattheyhadgone through,canyou blame them...623

OntheotherhandtheBalochleadershiphadexperiencedacompletelydifferentordeal. HavingpoliticallyconfrontedBhutto,punishmenthadbeensavagelymetedouttothem andtheirpeoplebythearmy.Hundredshadbeenkilled,scoresofwomenraped, housesrazed,hundredsofthousands oflivestockseizedandthousands ofvillagershad been starved into

submissionby the heartlessarmy blockades.Notsurprisingly leaderssuchasKhair Buksh Marri viewed the new military regime with deep suspicion verging on hostility. For themtheir tormentorswere nowinpower. Itnow remainedfor Ziatofind awayof appeasing them.

623Syed Ziaullah and Samuel Baid,Pakistan, An End Without a BeginningLancer International, New Delhi, 1985, p.29.

***

HavingpostponedtheelectionsZianeededsomeformofacabinetteamtoassisthimin managingtheaffairsofthecountry.On14JanuaryZiaannounceda'Councilof Advisers',withtheadvisersbeingtreatedasfederalministers.TheCouncilconsistedof a mixture of serving senior military officers, such as General Chishti; bureaucrats, such asGhulamIshaqKhan;politicalsympathizerssuchasMoulaBukshSoomroand MuhammadAllHoti;businessmensuchasMustafaGokalandGeneralHabibullahKhan;andconstitutionallawyerssuchasA.K,BrohiandSharifuddinPirzada. Interestingly, Brohi and Pirzada appeared tohave hated each other.624

***

On18January,atKarachi,GhousBukshBizenjoandIcalledonZia.AttaullahMengal wasabroadundergoingcardiacsurgeryandKhairBukshMarrihadrefusedtojoinus. ItwashiscontentionthataslongasLieutenant-GeneralGhulamMuhammadMalik stayedinofficeastheMartialLawAdministratorforBalochistanhewouldnotmeet ZiaulHaq.KhairBukshMarriheldGeneralMalikpersonallyresponsibleforthe atrocitiescommittedinChamalang.OurdiscussionswithZiawerelimitedto generalities rather than any topics of substance. Importantly, the ice had finally been broken. Zia had openly shown that he was prepared to meet and discuss issues with the Baloch leadership, who until recently had publicly been adjudged to be 'traitors'. As we wereleavingtheStateGuestHouse,Ziaaskedmetomeetwithhimalone.Leaving Bizenjo,Zia andI walkedoverto an adjacent room where he requestedme toconsult Khair Buksh Marri upon his choice of general to head the martial law administration of Balochistan. When I confided Zia's request to the bewildered Bizenjo, he advised me towait untilAttaullah MengalreturnedtoPakistan.'KhairBuksh isneveraneasymanto dealwith',hesaid,'Attaullahisclosetohimanditwouldbebestleftuptohim'.I thought it to be sensible advice.

In themeanwhileZiacontinuedto pursueapolicyofappeasement with allpoliticians, withtheexceptionofthosebadlytaintedbyBhutto'srule,thoughotherPPPnotables suchasKaufarNiaziandGhulamMustafaJatoihadbynowmadetheirpeacewithhim. On 4 February the leading political personages in the country were invited by Zia to Islamabadtoaspecialconferenceonnationalissues.WaliKhan,hiswife,Bizenjo (thoughnotyetanofficialpartymember)andIrepresentedtheNDPatthisfunction. The gathering which included Zia, his four deputy martial law administrators, the four governors,newlyappointedadvisors,andamultitudeofleadingpoliticians,was subjected to five hours of addresses and discussions. Ghulam Ishaq Khan spoke on the nationaleconomy,alongwithAftabAhmedKhan,andAghaShahihighlightedissues offoreignpolicyconfrontingPakistan.Itwasagrandandartfulexercisewiththe

624GeneralK.M. Arif,WorkingwithZia,op.cit.,pp.154-5.

intendedpurposeofbeguilingtheinvitedpoliticiansintobelievingthattheywere participating in the highest affairs of the country.

Twodayslater,on6February1978,RezaPehlaviofIranandhiswife,FarrahDiba, arrivedinPakistanonaStatevisit.AlongwithanumberofpoliticalleadersIwas invitedtoattendtheStatefunctionswhichwereheldtomarkthevisit.Afteralunch givenbyPresidentChoudhryFazalEllahiIwasaskedbyZiatoattendaprivate meeting with the Shah. At the meeting, apart from Zia and some senior governmentofficials,therewereonlythreeinvitees,A.K.Brohi,HajiMoulaBukshSoomroaridmyself.

TheShah, having bestowed uponhimself the titleof TheLightof theAryans'seemed to be quite taken up with the idea of Aryan supremacy. Addressing me he said, 'You are a BalochSirdar,aren'tyou?'Gettinganaffirmativereplyfrommehethensmiledand said, 'Then you are an Aryan and very much one of us'. Moments later the Shah turned around toBrohi and said, 'Given your name I imagine thatyou must be a Brauhi'. Brohi repliedthatindeedhewasaBrauhi.TheShahthensaidratherdismissively,Thatmakes you a Dravidian, does it not?' There was anawkward and embarrassing silence which wassoonbrokenbyBrohi'sriposte.'YourImperialMajesty',hesaid,'Iamneithera historiannorananthropologistbutallIknowisthatIbelonghereinthiscountry'.It wouldappearthattactanddiplomacywerenotqualitiesratedveryhighlybyRezaPehlavi.

LatertheShahsoughttoexplainIran'sroleinsuppressingtheBalochinsurgencytome. He said, 'I suppose that there is a general impression among the Baloch that I was fully supportingBhuttoinsuppressingyourrightsinBalochistan.Letmemakeitclearthatit wasnothingofthekind.Asfaraswewereconcernedwewerehelpingyour governmentmaintainlawandorderinaprovinceborderingonIran.Thestabilityof Pakistan is of vital importance to Iran. It had nothing to do with Mr Bhutto!'

Shortly after the Shah's departure I was once again invited by Zia to meet with him. At themeeting, atwhich onlythetwo of uswerepresent, Iinformed himthat KhairBuksh MarrihadmadehischoiceforthepostforthegovernorofBalouchistan.Attaullah MengalhadveryrecentlypassedthewordtomethatKhairBukshMarrihad recommendedthenameofGeneralRahimuddin.Intheearly1950sRahimuddinhad beenpostedasajuniorofficerinQuettawherehehadmetKhairBukshMarri,Both were keen sportsmen and soon took to regularly playing tennis and squash together at the Quetta Club. According to Khair Buksh Marri, Rahimuddin was the only general he knewwhocouldbe trustedtoplay fairinBalochistan.Ziatoldme thathe hadno objection to Rahimuddin becoming the governor of Balochistan. He said that he would discuss the matter with his generals but 'he expected an affirmative answer from them aswell'.AndthusthegovernorshipofBalochistanwasawardedonthebasisofa partnership on the tennis courts of the Quetta Club a quarter of acentury earlier.

Very soon after I returned to Karachi and commenced upon an extensive political tour ofSindhwhichbeganon8Februaryandlasteduntilthe23rdofthatmonthwith BegumNaseemWaliKhan,thevicepresidentoftheparty.TheNDPleadershipwas warmlyreceivedbyanumberoflocalluminariesincludingAyubKhuroandKazi FazlullahatLarkana.WeevenaddressedmeetingsatZulfikarBhutto'svillageofGari KhudaBukshandhiscousinMumtazBhutto'svillageofRatoDero.Despitemybitter experienceatthehandsofBhuttoIwasreluctanttocriticizehimnowthathewasinjail as it did not seem to be fair. It became obvious, however, that a number of other NDP membersdidnotseethesituationinthesamelight,Manymadehighlycriticalspeeches againstBhuttobutnoneweremorevitriolic thantheonesmadebyNDPPresidentof Sindh,HakimAliZardari(ironicallyhissonwouldlatermarryBhutto'sdaughter, Benazir).Despitetheharshcriticismof theirhomebornsonthecrowd surprisingly did notonly not objectbut rather clapped loudly and even raised slogansagainstBhutto. It was remarkably strange.

ThefollowingmonthPresidentDaoudKhanofAfghanistanarrivedforafour-day officialvisittoPakistanatZia'sinvitation.Hearrivedon5Marchandtherewereahost ofattendantbanquetsandfunctionstowhichthePNAleadershipwerealsoinvited. AfteralunchhostedbyGeneralZia,WaliKhan,AttaullahMengal,ChaudhryZahoor EllahiandIpaidacourtesyvisitontheAfghanPresidentinZia'spresence.Itwasmy firstmeetingwithSirdarDaoudKhanandhegreetedmewarmly.Hetoldmethathe had heard about me through his fellow Pathans and made much about reports he had received about my efforts to get the NAP leadership out of jail. To my surprise he then invitedmetovisitAfghanistanasaStateguest.Butitwasnevertobe.Onlyamonth and a half later he was brutally assassinated along with most members of his family. Ironically,IhaveaphotographinmypossessionofmymeetingwithDaoudKhan.In thephototherearefourotherpeoplebesidesme.SirdarDaoudKhan,theAfghan Foreign Minister (whose name I cannot recollect), Wali Khan, and General Zia. The firsttwo died during the bloody Communistcoupthat took place in Afghanistan on 27 April 1978. Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi was murdered by Al-Zulfikar in September 1981 and ZiawaskilledinAugust1988.Alltheill-fatedfourweretodieviolently.

DaoudKhan'sdeathwasatragedyforPakistan.Duringhisvisitabreakthroughhad been made in the perennially hostile relations over the borders of the two neighboring countries.AskedabouttheDurandLineathisfarewellpressconference,DaoudKhan hadreplied'everythingwasdiscussed,andwiththepassageoftimeeverythingwould fallintoplace'.625HavingseizedpowerfromhiscousinKingZahirShahwiththehelp of a group of rebellious, Soviet-trained military officers with ties to GRU (the Sovietmilitaryintelligenceagency),DaoudKhanhadbynowturnedagainsthisCommunist

625AsianRecorder.26March-1April1978.14237.

allies.626Onthenightof25ApriltheAfghanpolicearrestedthetopCommunistleaders. Whilemostoftheloyalistsoldierswereparticipatinginofficiallyorderedcelebrations to mark 'the downfall of theKafircommunists', on 27 April the Communist-led section of the armed forces struck.627After refusing to surrender voluntarily, Daoud Khan and hisfamilywereallmurdered.Bydawnthefollowingmorningthe'SaurRevolution'had overthrown the established old elite of Afghanistan from power.

The Communistcoupled to twenty years of ruin and misery in Afghanistan. With Afghanistan internally at war, the persistent and somewhat misguided interventionist policies of our military leadership and their political acolytes over the following years resultedinthepeopleofPakistanpayingabitterprice.Afinal'advantageous'solution inAfghanistanstillcontinuestoeludeourPakistanimasterminds.

AfterDaoudKhan'sdepartureon8MarchalargenumberofusleftforNWFPtoattend the wedding of Wali Khan's son, Asfandyar. Shortly after the nikah ceremony was performedwereceivedamessagethatthefamilypatriarchAbdulGhaffarKhanwished tomeetwithKhairBukshMarri,AttaullahMengal,GhousBukshBizenjoandme.We found Ghaffar Khan seated under the shade of a chinar tree in the garden. He was in a reflective frame of mind.

AswetalkedGhaffar Khanbeganto relatehisfirst-handexperience oftheeventsthat ledtothebirthofPakistan.HesaidthathistoryclearlystatesthatMrJinnahhad expressedhisacceptanceoftheCabinetMissionPlanwhichhadcalledfora confederacyinIndia.Eachprovincewastohavecontrolofallaspectsofgovernment withtheexceptionofforeignaffairs,defence,communicationsandcurrencywhich weretoremainwithinthepreserveofthefederalgovernment.InGhaffarKhan's opiniontheCabinetMissionPlan,whichhadalreadybeenacceptedby,boththeMuslim League and the Congress party, had been the ideal solution to the predicament facingtheSubcontinent.Inthewordsofthe oldand seasonedCongressiteitwasonly when Nehrulater'foolishlyandimpetuously' refusedto accept the Plan that Mr.Jinnah found himself compelled to demand a separate homeland.

The eventual partition of British India into Pakistan and India resulted in the massacre ofhundredsofthousandsofinnocents.Peopleweresavagelybutchered,theirvillages werepillagedandwomenwerebrutallyrapedandabducted.Inanemotionalvoice GhaffarKhancondemnedallthosewhohadinstigatedthebarbarityandheldthem answerable to God and to history. According to him it was distorted remnants of what oncehadbeenMr.Jinnah'sMuslimLeaguethatsoondeprivedEastPakistanofits rightfulroleinthenewcountry.Thebreakup,hebelieved,hadbeeninevitable. Regardingthe problems facingthecountryin1978 GhaffarKhan wasinsistentthatthe

626DiegoCordovezandSeligHarrison.OutofAfghanistan,OxfordNewYork,1995,p.14.

627Ibid.,p.25.

answerlaywithaconfederalsystem,withtheprovincialgovernmentsofNWFP, Punjab, Sindhand Balochistanenjoying all powerswiththeexceptionof foreignaffairs, defence,communicationsandcurrency, whichwouldremainwithIslamabad.Intime, he believed, it was possible that some of theprovinces such as NWFP and Balochistan may wish to amalgamate. That would be left entirely up to them, even Sindh could join ifitsowished. Thatwastheprerogativeoftheprovincesinaconfederalstructure,he said. The aged Pathan leader appeared deeply concerned with the future well-being of thecountry.Thesewerethewordsofamanwidelyandunjustlycondemnedtobea traitor by successive 'patriotic' dictators.

Unfortunately 'patriotism'has becomethe sole preserve of whomsoeverhappens tobe inpowerinPakistan.ThoseholdingviewsdivergenttothoseinofficeatIslamabad almostalwayssuffertheopprobriumof'treason'.ItwasSamuelJohnsonwhoonce rightly said 'patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel'.

Tomymindnoonehastherighttoadjudge anotherperson'sloyaltytoone'scountry unlessof coursethe person isfound tobeactively assisting aforeignpower againstthe interestsofhisownhomeland.Theonlypersononrecordtohavecommittedtreason,to my knowledge, was Ghulam Mustafa Khar when he directly met Indira Gandhi to seek India'sassistanceinprovidingweaponstooverthrowZia'sregime.628Itisworth recallingthatratherthanbecensuredforhisactions,thepost-Ziabureaucratic/military establishment of Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Mirza Aslam Baig rewarded Khar by makinghimafederalministerin1990.Clearly,inPakistantreasonousactivitycanbe overlooked if political self-interest is involved. Both Ghulam Ishaq and General Aslam BaigwerekeentoenlistKhar'sserviceswiththehopethathemayhelpweakenBenazir BhuttoandherPPP'ssupportinPunjabintheelections.Similarly,in1990JamSadiq Ali, a man whohad fled the country after being charged with the murder of six of Pir Pagaro's Hurs, with strong evidence implicating his guilt, was appointed Chief Minister ofSindhinanattempttoexorciseSindhofthePPP.WithoutdoubtGhulamIshaq donned the mantleof 'patriotism' to absolve himselffrom these actions.

***

After attending Asfandyar Wali Khan's wedding I stopped briefly to visit my old school friend General Fazle Haq who was then serving as Governor of the NWFP. Over lunch heinformedmethat.GeneralRahimuddin'sappointmentasGovernorofBalochistan had officially been approved. Then he broached the idea of a national government. Zia, itseemed,nowwishedtohaveacabinetcomposedsolelyofpoliticians.Inhisunofficial capacity as one of my oldest friends, Fazle Haq advised me not to be my 'obstinate self and join the proposed new government.

628The extent of Khar's contacts with the Indian governmentwere revealed in detail by one of his wives (Tehmina Durrani,My Feudal Lord, Lahore, 1991, pp. 138-50).

A week later on 16 March the NDP leadership met with the Zia-appointed Election Cell inRawalpindi.Interestingly,the NDPwasthe firstparty tobe soinvited,andwas represented by Begum ”Wall Khan and myself. We also took along Abida Hussain, who had recently joined the NDP, with us to the meeting. Chandi, as she was better known, was the only child of an old ftmily friend, the late Col. Abid Hussain. The Election Cell washeadedbyGeneralFaizAliChishtiandincludedGeneral(Retd.)FarmanAli, GeneralIhsanulHaqandGeneralJamalSaidMian,whohappenedtobeanother schoolmate of mine.

AtthemeetingGeneralChishtiproposedtheideaOfaninterimgovernmentwhich wouldincludeallthemainpoliticalpartiesoftheoriginalPNA.Thisinterim government, according to Chishti, would remain until the long-awaited elections wereheld. He made it clear that NDP was the first party to be invited to join the newgovernment.Weweretodisappointhim.Asapartycommittedtothedemocratic processastheNDPwas,andinviewofthesacrificesofthehundredswhodiedduring thePNAmovement,itseemedunthinkableforustojoinanunrepresentative governmentappointedunderastateofMartialLaw.Offeringourregretswedeclined the offer to join the federal cabinet.

The Wali Khans soon left for London and I was planning to take a holiday overseas as well. During the days of theBhutto regime 'lhad found itdifficult to leave Pakistan, but nowwiththelullinpoliticalactivitiesIthoughtitwasanappropriatetimetotakea longoverdueholiday.FazleHaqinsistedthatImeethimpriortomydeparture,and accordingly on 20 April I visited him at Peshawar at his Governor's residence. Much to mysurpriseIlearntthatGeneralZiawasthereaswell.OverlunchZiaexpressedhis disappointmentatmyrefusaltoparticipateintheproposednationalgovernment.After lunch Zia announced that he was retiring forprayers leaving 'you two friends to have a chitchat'. After his departure Fazli, as I called him, opened up with me. He told me that hewasangryanddeeplydisappointedwithmyrefusal.Usingemotiveappealsof friendship, 'As a close friend I know what isbetter for you even more than you do', he triedhardtopersuademetochangemymind.Onceherealizedthatmymindhad alreadybeenmade uphe wasmore conciliatory andevenofferedme aDiplomatic passport. Thanking him for the kind gesture I declined his friendly offer.

In May my wife Souriya and I went overseas. After stopovers at Hong Kong, Singapore, PerthandSydneywearrivedinNewZealandandweremetbyoursonShehryarwho hadrecentlycompletedhisBarandwasworkingwithalawfirminAuckland.Apart fromNewZealand,wherePakistanhadnodiplomaticrepresentation,ateveryportof call we were received at the airport by Pakistani diplomatic representatives. It appeared that they had been instructed by Islamabad to look after me. It certainly looked as if Ziawastryinghisutmosttoobligeme.FromAucklandweflewtotheUSwhereaftera briefstopinLosAngeleswetravelledtoWashingtonwherewewereputupbyour

ambassadorSahibzadaYakub Khanandhis charmingwife Tooba.YakubKhan,tohis credit,hadestablishedagoodrapportwiththeUSStateDepartmentandother membersof the diplomaticcommunity. He arranged a lunch for me at the White House which was hosted by a senior adviser to President Carter. At New York we stayed with ourConsulGeneral,AzizKhan,anoldAitchisonianfriend.Then,inLondon,another school friend, Aziz Sarfaraz, put his house at our disposal. We caught up with the Wali Khans and others.

WhileinLondonIlearntthaton5JulyGeneralZiahadannouncedanewFederal CabinetamongwhomweresixMuslimLeaguemembers.629Havingbeeninformedof thiseventbyacorrespondentoftheBBCUrduService,Iimmediatelyissueda statement (which was then broadcast on the BBC) advising the Muslim League to either leave the government or face expulsion from the PNA. And in the event neither of these optionswereexercisedthentheNDPwouldconsiderresigningfromthePNA.

IreturnedtoPakistanon27JulytofaceaPNAditheringoveritsfuturerole.Zia'sinitial proposalofforminganationalgovernmenthadmetsupportwithinsomeofthePNA componentparties. MianTufail ofJamaat-i-Islami hadeven gone onanextremelimbto announce'thatallpoliticalpartieswhichrefusetoacceptaplaceinanominated governmentshouldbebanned,andshouldnotbeallowedtoparticipateinthenext general elections'.630But at ameeting held in mid-June,in which the NDP represented by itsacting-PresidentAbdulKhaliqKhanmade astrong opposing stand,the PNA remained divided on the issue. On 25 June General Zia declared in a national broadcast thathehaddroppedtheideaofforminganationalgovernment.Tendayslater,on5 July, the Muslim League had joined hands with him.

Soon after my arrival I left for Islamabad to attend a special meeting of PNA leadership called by Mufti Mahmood. With the departure of Asghar Khan's Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and Maulana Noorani's JUP there were only seven component parties left in the alliance. Wemet on 3 August at a hitjra in Rajah Bazaar, which was close to a mosque where Mufti MahmoodusedtostayatRawalpindi.TheparticipantsincludedMuftiMahmood(JUI), PirPagaro(MuslimLeague),MianTufailandProfessorGhafoorAhmed(Jamaat-i- Islami), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (POP), Ashraf Khan (Khaksar Tehrik) and Sirdar Qayum'sbrother(MuslimConference).Wesoongotembroiledinaheateddebate. Striking out at the Muslim League and accusing them of recklessly indulging in a self- servingstratagem,Idemandedimmediateresignationsofitsrepresentativesinthe

629The Muslim League Ministers were: Fida Muhammad Khan (Housing and Works), Muhammad Khan Junejo (Railways), Muhammad Khan Hoti (Education, Culture and Tourism), Khawaja Muhammad Safdar (Food, Agriculture, Cooperatives and Livestock) Zahid Sarfaraz (Commerce) and Chaudhry Zahoor Ellahi (Labour Manpower, Local Government an Rural Development). Other Ministers included Mohyuddin of Kalat (Communication) Gul Muhammad Khan Jogezai (Water and Power) Mahmood Haroon (Interior) SharifuddinPirzada (Attorney General) an A. K. Brohi (Law and Parliamentary Affairs).

630Viewpoint,Lahore,18June1978,('BetweentheLines'),p.5.

FederalCabinet.PirPagaroinsistedthathisMuslimLeagueministersweresotaken with their jobs that even if he asked them to resign they would not heed him. Therefore, given the circumstances, it was now impossible for him to change his party's unilateral stand.IthadbecomeapparentthatPirPagarohadthrowninhislotwiththegenerals. InthemeantimeMianTufailremainedadamantlyinfavorofcooperatingwiththeregime.

FacedwithrecalcitrantpartnersItriedtogetthemtoseethefollyoftheirstance.Zia andhiscoterieofgeneralsandbureaucrats,Itoldthem,wouldnotallowthePNAto swaytheirdecisions.Thealliancecontinuedtorepresentapotentpoliticalforceaslong as it maintained an independent stance but the moment it joined hands with the Martial Law regime it would lose all credibility and influence. I further remonstrated with themthatZia'spostponementofhisguaranteedelectionswasanominoussign demonstratingunreliabilityand hewasnot to betrusted.I insisted avotebetakenand fiveoutofthesevenpartiessupportedmeininsistingthattherebenoparticipationin the military government. After leaving the meeting I publicly condemned the Muslim LeagueforbetrayingitsalliancewiththePNApartiesanddemandedafirmelection date from Zia.631

The following day while I was at Peshawar attending an organizational meeting of the NDP,IwasinformedbyanumberofnewspaperreportersthatMuftiMahmoodhad publicly announced that the PNA would soon be joining the Martial Law government.Itcameasadeepdisappointmenttome.The political ficklenessofmycolleagueshad become abundantly obvious. It was time for NDP to take a stand.

[T]heNDPchief,SardarSherbazMazari,hasimplicitlythreatenedtoquitthe Alliance...Statingthathispartywouldnotjoinanycabinetthroughthebackdoor,heremarkedtheMuslimLeaguehadstabbedtheAllianceinthebackby joiningtheGovernmentandthathispartywouldopposeanypartythatwentthe PNA way.632

LeftwithlittleoptionitwasdecidedthattheNDPwouldholdanationalconventionon 16AugustatKarachiwhereitsfutureparticipationinthePNAwouldbedetermined.

InthemeantimeothermembersofthePNAnowbegannegotiatingwiththe governmentonthe termsoftheirparticipation.Subsequentreportsoftheirdealings with Zia made for poor reading.

ThePNApartieshaggledoverdetails.Eachwantedalargeshareofthecabinetcake andpreferredtonominateitsownrepresentatives.TheissuewassettledwithGeneral

631Viewpoint,Lahore,13August1978,('TheWeek'),p.22.

632FarEasternEconomicReview,18August1978,('EarlytestforZiaCabinet).HongKong,p.37.

Ziaselectingtheministersthroughmutualconsultationswithpartyleaders.The allocationofcabinetseatsandportfoliostoeachpoliticalpartywasthenexthurdle.The party demands were heavy. The CMLA had already promised some ministries to non- PNAministersandhedesiredaconsensusontheallocationofotherministries. NawabzadaNasrullahKhanaskedforthree cabinetpostsforhistiny Pakistan Democratic Party (POP). His colleagues smiled at his insistence. The CMLA offered two cabinetseats.Hedemandedonemore.Thepleasantatmospheresuddenlybecame tense.Therewasahushedsilence.GeneralZia'spatienceranout.Helookedaround andsaid'Well,IwillbeunfairtoothersifIacceptyourdemand.Ihavestretchedmyself to the limit. It is for you to take it or leave it'. Nasrullah accepted the offer but declined tojointhecabinethimself.Nasrullahhadspenthispoliticallifeinopposition,finding faultwitheveryadministration.Hedidnotwishotherstomakehimthebuttoftheir criticism.633DespiteNasrullahKhan'scooperationwiththeregimehewasoften subjectedtoZia'sscathingridicule.Justtendaysaftertheformationofthenew government Zia publicly belittled him by announcing that'Nasrullah Khan and all his PDF followers could fit comfortably in a singletonga'.634

The NDP national committee met at Karachi on 16 August, with Attaullah Mengal andGhousBukshBizenjoparticipatingforthefirsttime.Thatdayitwasunanimously decidedthatthepartywouldwithdrawfromthePNAallianceonthegroundsthatthe PNA had betrayed its commitment to democracy by agreeing to participate in an unrepresentative martial law government.

On23Augustanewcabinetwassworn in.Itincludedthe followingPNAmembers:

- FidaMuhammadKhan(MuslimLeague)

- MuhammadKhanJunejo(MuslimLeague)

- MuhammadKhanHoti(MuslimLeague)

- KhawajaMuhammadSafdar(MuslimLeague)

- ZahidSarfaraz(MuslimLeague)

- ChoudhryRehmatEllahi(Jamaat-i-Islami)

- ProfessorGhafoorAhmed(Jamaat-i-Islami)

- MehmoodAzamFaroqi(Jamaat-i-Islami)

- MuhammadZamanKhanAchakzai(JUI)

- SubuhSadiqKhanKhoso(JUI)

- IftikharAhmedAnsari(PDP)

- MuhammadArshadChoudhry(PDP)

Theirperiodingovernmentlasteduntil21April1979.Duringthisshortdurationof eightmonths,realpowercontinuedtorestinthehandsoftheseniorbureaucratsatthe

633GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.157.

634Sadakat(Urdu).

federallevelandtheMartialLawAdministratorsintheprovinces.Thesecivilian ministers were unable to properly carry out their functions even if they hadwanted to. According to one writer

...the PNA ministers soon found out that the ruling Generals and senior civilian bureaucrats often by-passed them on important policy matters. This impaired the civilianministers'abilitytodistributepatronageamongtheirworkers.The military rulers were disappointed by the intra-PNA squabbles and the ministers desire to work like a political government.635

InhindsightitappearscertainthatZiausedtheaspirationforpoweramongsomeofthe PNA leaders to achieve his own ends. The issue undoubtedly at the top of Zia's agenda wasBhutto.ThejailedPPPleaderhadbeensentencedtodeathbytheLahoreHigh CourtinMarch 1978.TheSupremeCourtaffirmedtheHighCourtsentenceinFebruary 1979andtwomonthslater,on4April,Bhuttowashanged.Clearly,Ziabelievedhe neededvisiblesupportfromabroadbaseofpoliticianstohelphimtideoverthis difficult and uncertain period.

On23March1979,justtwelvedaysbeforeBhutto'sexecution,Ziaannouncedhis intentionofholdinggeneralelectionsin December.InApril,shortlyafter Bhuttowas safely in his grave, Zia informed the cabinet that those wishing to participate in the electionswouldhavetoresignatleastthreemonthsbeforethepollingdate.General Arifstatesthatthisdecision wasnotwelcomedbytheministers.

Surprised,theministersarguedthat,inademocracy,thecabinetstayedinpower when elections were held. President Zia reminded them that during the Bhutto- PNA negotiations,the PNA itselfhaddemandedthatthe governmentshould resign before elections to demonstrate its impartiality. General Zia enquired if it wouldbemorallycorrectforthePNAtorenegeonitsownstandontheissue. Cornered, one of them said: If we have to resign around August, why not do so now? It would give us more time to preparefor the elections'.636

HavingusedthePNApoliticiansforhisownpurposesZiahadtalkedtheminto resigningfromtheircabinetpostsinanticipationoftheforthcomingelections.The politiciansonly realizedtheyhadbeendupedby Ziawhenthe electionswere once again 'postponed'.

***

635HasanAskariRizvi,TheMilitary&PoliticsinPakistan1947-86,op.cit.,236.

636GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.161.

TheoldBalochleadershipinNAPhadnotasyetjoinedtheNDP.ButasBizenjohad said in June 1978, 'Although we have not yet joined the party there should be no doubt about our affinity with the NDP. Most of our old colleagues belong to the NDP'.637OnceNDP left the PNA fold in August 1978 a number of the 'progressive' members of the old NAP,whohadheldadeep-seatedaversiontosomeofthepartiesoftheAlliance, decidedtojointheparty.Sadly,soonafterseriousproblemsemergedwithintheparty.

InlateAugust,Bizenjo,whowasstillnotaNDPpartymember,madeavery controversial publicannouncementinLahore. Hestated thatPakistanconsisted offour nationalities,witheachhavingarightofsecessionifit'sjustdemandswerenotmet. BecauseofhiscloseassociationwithNDPitwasunfortunatelytakenforgrantedby somemembersofthepublicandthePressthatBizenjowassimplyreiteratingthe official NDPparty line.Itstirredupa hornet'snestandI wasdeluged withcalls fromalloverthecountry.FinallyIhadtoresorttoissuinganofficialpartyclarificationwhich flatly contradictedBizenjo'scontention. Itstated thatPakistanhad notbeencreated on thebasisofanynationalityitwassimplyaquestionofmuslimmajorityareas.And,that allfourprovinceswerebothmultilingualandmultiethnic.Hence,theissueofa provincebelongingtoanypotentiallyaggrievednationalitywithideasofsecession couldnotevenarise.DespiteouropenconflictofviewsGhousBuksh Bizenjocameto KarachishortlyafterwardsandjoinedtheNDP.HeletitbeknownthatAttaullah Mengal would also be joining the party very shortly.

Inmid-September1978BizenjoaccompaniedmetoPeshawartoattendtheNDP nationalcommitteemeeting.Onourway Bizenjoexpressedhisdesiretobeappointed astheparty's'ChiefOrganizer'.Iheardhimoutsympatheticallybutexpressedmy inabilitytomakeanyappointments.TheNDP,unlikemostotherparties,wasrun strictlyondemocraticprinciples.Party officialswere elected tooffice by themembers. Another problemthatcameto my mind was thatinthe party constitution therewasno referencetoanypostof'ChiefPartyOrganizer'.RatherthandisappointBizenjo, however,ImentionedtohimthatIwouldbringhisrequesttotheattentionofsenior party members and see if a solution could be found.

AtPeshawarwhenIdiscussedBizenjo'srequestwithWaliKhan,ArbabSikandarKhalil,andahandfulofotherseniorpartymembers,theirresponsewasnotparticularly positive. Wali KhanfeltthatBizenjo'sdemand wasquiteunreasonable. Hesaid, 'If Ican workinthepartyasanordinarymember,whycan'the?'Laterinfrontoftheparty working committee that had gathered there,Wali Khan openly rebuked Bizenjo for his backdoorapproach.'Ifyouwishtostandforapartyposition',WaliKhancoldlytold him,'justputyournameupatthepartyelectionsbeingheldinNovember'.Not surprisingly,Bizenjowasextremelyupsetathispublichumiliationandbegannursinga

637Viewpoint,Lahore.18June1978,('BizenjoonNationalCrisis'),p.8.

feeling of deep grievance. Over the next fewmonths he began lobbying the more leftist party members and actively began spreading seeds of rebellion.

Iwasdeeplysaddenedbythewholeepisode.IhadbeenelectedPresidentofNDP duringsomeverytryingtimeswhenBhuttohadbeenattheverypeakofhispower. Later in December 1977 when Wali Khan was out of his confinement I had publicly proposed that he take over the party leadership, which I believed was his by right of seniority and precedence. Besides, I was keen to step down now that my task had been achieved.WaliKhanwasinsistentthatIstayon,anditwassolelybecauseofhimthatI did. As an experienced politician Bizenjo had his own ambitions but it seemed that veryfewofhisformerNAPcolleagueshadfaithinhim.

It had become apparent that Wali Khan had little trust left in Bizenjo; During their prolongedincarcerationinHyderabadJaildeepsuspicionshadbeenraisedabout Bizenjo's loyalties. But Wali Khan was far from being the only one who now disliked Bizenjo.InOctober1978whentheseniorleadershipofNDPhadgatheredforameeting atQuetta,anumberofuswereinvitedbyKhairBukshMarriforlunch.Bizenjowho had pointedly been left out from the invitation list had nevertheless insisted upon 'gate- crashing'thesmallaffair.WhileKhairBukshMarricarefullyobservedtheBaloch protocol of hospitality he made reference to Bizenjo's unwanted presence by making a calculated curt remark to his staff about the shortage of plates. 'Why is it that when we invited seven guests, we need eight plates?' The message was not lost on the others who werepresent.DespitetheunderlyinginsultBizenjobravedthroughthemealwithout any sign of outward emotion.

AtthetimeoftheNovemberNDPpartyelectionsIhaddecidedtostepdownfromthe post of party president and spoke to Wali Khan of my intention. Once again he was notkeentotakechargeofthepartyanddespitemyresistanceinsistedthatIcontinue.It wasapitythatAttaullahMengalhadstilltojointhepartyotherwisebothWaliKhan, whohadastronglikingfortheMengalSirdar,andI,wouldhavehappilynominated himforthepost.WiththelackofalternativecandidatesIwasobligedtocontinue,at leastuntilthenextpartypresidentialelectionswhichwerescheduledformid-1979.

Byearly1979seriousdivisionshadbeencreatedinthepartybypocketsofhardened progressiveswhoseactionsweallsuspectedwerebeingorchestratedbyBizenjoandhis smallcoterieofpoliticalextremists.638WhenAttaullahMengalfinallyjoinedtheparty inMarch1979,heunfortunatelydidsoaspartofBizenjo'sstrategy.Ratherthanhelp soothematters,thesituationonlybecameevenfurtherinflamed.Acommentator writinginthePakistanEconomistbestsummedupthesituationthatprevailedatthattime.

638Interestingly among this band of self-styled 'progressives'was Abida Hussain, today very much a stalwart of the conservative Nawaz Sharif Muslim League.

Thebasicdifferencesbetweenthe'moderates'ledbySardarSherbazMazari, vice-presidentBegum Nasim Wali Khan...and the 'extremists' led by Mr. Bizenjo, SardarMengalandQaswarGardeziappearedtohave croppeduponseveral points,includingthenatureoftheparty'sorganization,autonomy,secularism and the rights of nationalities.

Themoderateswantedthepartytobeamass-organization-opentoallsections ofsociety.Theextremistswantedittobeaworker'spartyinwhichthe presidentsandsecretarieswillhavetheauthorityandpowerstoadmitorexpel anypersonfromtheorganization.Thequestionofgrantingmaximumautonomy to federating units was the bone of contention. Bizenjo and Mengal wanted the federationtobeleftwithonlythreesubjects-defence,foreignaffairsand currency. The remaining subjects should be administered by the federating units. They wanted unfettered authority with federating units which is nowhere comprehensible. On the other hand, the moderates, while claiming autonomy, wanted safeguards written into the constitution, against intrusion of the Federal authorityinspecifiedareas ofcontrolof federatingunits.

The myth of four nationalities propounded by Bizenjo, Mengal and their fellow- travellersgeneratedheatmorethananyissueinthecountry.Mazariandhis group contended that the NDP was committed to bringing about an 'honorable settlement'oftheissueofprovincialautonomyandremovingallgrievancesof thefourprovinces accordingto thepartymanifesto.Theyclaimedthat therewas nomentionintheNDP'smanifestooffournationalitiesorfourlanguagesor equal representation for all in the National Assembly or the services ... [t]he extremists insisted, however, that there were four nationalities in the country and that their 'rights' needed to be ensured to them.639

ByApril1979thepartynationalcommitteedecidedthattheonlywayoutofthe quagmirewastodismissallpartyofficialsandcommitteesandcallforfreshelections across the board convinced as we were thatfull-fledged democracy was far better than makingforced concessionstoback-roomintrigues. Faced withdefeatinpartyelections the Bizenjo faction, with Attaullah Mengal now unfortunately in the lead, stormed out of the party after making angry accusations againstme for being a pawn of the military regime.Iwasdeeplyhurtbytheseactions,particularlybythoseofAttaullahMengal, whom I had always liked. The whole idea of creating the NDP had been based upon on correctinginjusticesdonetomyfriendsinBalochistanandtheNAP.WhileItriedto respond to what I felt was a betrayal by trussed colleagues, Begum Naseem Wali Khan proved to be more vocal in my defence.

639PakistanEconomist,29April-5May1978(NationalScene-SplitinNDP).

AskedabouttheallegationsthatMr.MazarihadtheblessingsofIslamabad, BegumWaliKhansaidthattheNDPdidnotbelieveinbargainingandaddedthatifitwantedtobepurchaseditcouldhavedonesoduringthetimewhen these [two] leaders were in jail. The NDP could have sought the blessings of the GovernmentatatimewhenMr.Bhuttousedtosendemissariesforsuchabargain.

She said that these leaders were fully aware of the fact that the NDP left no stone unturnedtogetthemreleased.Itwasaninsulttothemselvesiftheycharged their own party with having any link with Islamabad. She said that in fact such chargeswerelevelledagainstallthosewhostoodbehindSardarMazari.

AskediftherewasanychanceofbringingthembacktoNDP.Shesaid...that theirabsencewouldhardlymatterastheNDPhadbeenformedwithouttheirpresence.640

Inretrospectitappearsobviousthatwhathadbeenattemptedhadbeenlittlemorethan aMarxist-typepartytake-over,which,haditsucceeded,wouldhaveestablisheda politburo-ledpartyorganization.AnumberofuswereawarethatBizenjohadbeena cardcarryingcommunistsincehisyouthbutperhapswemisjudgedhisambitions. While he used Attaullah Mengal when it suited him, he displayed little loyalty towards him.Duringthebriefperiodofparty strife Bizenjowould tryand play bothsides.On occasionhewouldbecomeprivatelycriticalofhiscolleagueanddefender.Afterone particularincidentwhichoccurredonlyadaybeforetheirdeparturefromtheNDP, Bizenjowastotellme,'Pleasedon'tmindAttaullah.Trytobepatientwithhim.This was no way for him to behave as you are also Sirdar like him. You see he was born and nurturedinLasBelaandwenttoschoolinKarachi.Hehasacquiredatendencyto behave more likea Sindhi Waderarather than a Baloch Sirdar that he is'.

Sixmonthslater,inOctober1979,IreceivedacallfromKhairBukshMarriwho happenedtobeonararevisittoKarachipriortohisdepartingforaprolongedperiod ofself-exileinKabul.Hetoldmethathe'wantedtoeatice-cream'madeatmyhouse. Over lunch followed by ice-cream Khair Buksh tried to absolve the actions of his friend AttaullahMengal.'Iknowthatyou'vebeendeeplyhurtbyhisbehavior',hesaidtome, 'webothknowthatAttaullahisadecentpersonbutpronetobeingemotionaland volatile.Hewasused.Bizenjoexploitedhimforhisownpurposes'.

***

Bylate1978Ziahadgainedconfidenceinhisabilities.Monthsearlierhisregimehad beenaccordedfulllegalrecognitionbytheSupremeCourtintheNusratBhuttoCase.In

640Dawn,Karachi,20April1978.

September 1978, with the resignation of Choudhry FazalEllahi, Zia had also gained the officeof Presidentforhimself.Withthepassageoftime hehad developeda degreeof contempt for the politicians who besieged him for official positions and favors. Duringa trip toTeheran Ziarevealed his personalfeelings ata press conference:

What is aconstitution? Itis abooklet withtenortwelvepages.Icantearthem awayandsaythatfromtomorrowweshallliveunderadifferentsystem.Today thepeoplewillfollowwhereverIlead.Allthepoliticiansincludingtheonce mightyMr.Bhuttowillfollowmewiththeirtailswagging.641

I was offended by the arrogance of the statement and shortly afterwards in October that year,duringajointmeetingofpoliticalleaderswithZia,Itookhimtotaskformaking it.Hehedgedatfirst,'SirdarSahib,youknowhowthePressmisrepresentsthings'. WhenIpersisted,herespondedwithaconspiratorialsmileandadded,Theremarks were not directed towards you at all, you should know that, please believe me'. He then wavedhis arms aroundopenlyhintingthat his intendedtargets were seatedamongus. NotparticularlysatisfiedwithhisanswerIsaid,'Well,Idemandapublicretraction'. Zia then promised to make an official contradiction to the Teheran statement. In the presenceoftheassembledpoliticalleadershedirectedGeneralAriftohaveitissuedto the Press at the earliest opportunity. But the official contradiction - never appeared. I resolved not to meet Zia after that. The assumption that politicians were following Zia'withtheirtails wagging' had infuriatedme.

InMarch1979IwasinvitedbyZiatoattendthePakistanDayParadeatIslamabad whichwastobefollowedbyaPresidentialbanquet.Ideclinedtheinvitation.Later attemptsweremadethroughtwofriendsofmine,GeneralFazleHaqandGeneral Jehanzeb Baghdada, who visited me to try and persuade me to change my mind. Their visitshadlittle effect. IwasdeterminednottomeetZiaandstoodmygrounddespite theblandishmentsofmygoodfriends.Beforeleaving,FazleHaq decidedtoforewarn meabouttheissuethatwashanginglikeablackcloudoverPakistanatthattime:the fate of Zulfikar All Bhutto. He announced 'It is all over for Bhutto'. Brutally frank about his likes and dislikes, as he was known to be, Fazle Haq then added, 'The decision has been taken. They'll be hanging the bastard very soon'.

***

By the time of his execution most of Bhutto's lieutenants had deserted him. Shortly afterthecoupthePPPhadopenlysplitintotwofactionsandaccordingtoRajaAnwar,then a PPP activist and Bhutto family loyalist:

641KayhanInternational,Tehran,18September1978.

The right wing was formed by former federal minister Maulana Kausar Niazi,formerSindhChiefMinisterGhulamMustafaJatoi,GhulamMustafaKharand Kamal Azfar. They opposed Begum Nusrat Bhutto's confrontationist stance and advocated a working arrangement with the army. This faction believed that the party'sleadershipbelongedinthehandsofsomeonelikeJatoi,whodidnot upset the army...642

Whilehispartywasfragmenting,BhuttohadbeenfoundguiltybytheLahoreHigh Courtlargelyonevidenceprovidedbyapprovers.Theleadingapproverswerenone otherthanBhutto'sownright-handmen,MasoodMahmood,theformerheadofthe FSF,andSaiedAhmedKhan,Bhutto'sChiefSecurityOfficer.Whiletheremighthave been strong grounds to believe that Bhutto was guilty as charged, to my mind the trial was not a particularly fair one. During the trial the judges, who are expected to behave impartiallyatalltimes,oftenassumedtheroleoftheprosecution.AsJohnMathews, Queen's Counsel, a British lawyer present at the trial commented:

Iwasconcernedatthewayawitness'sfavorableanswer[inBhutto'sdefence] would be subject to an immediate interruption from the Bench, who would take over the witness, and cause him to whittle down or change his answer. None of thiswouldberecordedbythetypistcontemporaneously,butultimatelythe courtwoulddictatetothetypisttheoriginalquestionandthefinalanswer, whichfrequentlyborenoresemblancetothatwhichthewitnesshadfirstsaid.643

Mathewsalsomentionedthathenoticedthe antagonismoftheCourttowardsBhutto, inparticularthe'outbursts'ofChiefJusticeMaulviMushtaqHussain,whohadtwice been superseded under Bhutto's regime.

The High Court Judgment was appealed in the Supreme Court which heard the petition over a period of many months. Of the nine original judges, one retired on 30 July 1978 and asecondwithdrewbecauseof ill-health.Bythetimetheappealwasdismissedon6 February1979,onlysevenSupremeCourtjudgesremainedonthebench.Theverdict confirming thedeath sentence hadbeensplitby the narrowestof margins:4-3.

Bhutto'slawyersfiledareviewpetitiontotheSupremeCourtonbehalfofBhuttoand thefourotherconvicts.ThereviewpetitionwasrejectedbytheCourton24March.On 31MarchBhutto'soldersistersubmittedamercypetitiontoZia,whoasHeadofState hadthepowertocommuteadeathsentence.644Itfellupondeafears.Withintwenty- fourhoursZiahastilyrejectedthemercypetition.Whenit finallydawneduponBhutto andhisfamilythatexecutionwasimminent,NusratBhuttotriedinvaintomeetwith Zia,whoinsteadfobbedherofftoMajor-GeneralSaghirHussainSyed,themartiallaw

642RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince,op.cit.,p.22.

643VictoriaSchofield,TrialandExecution,Cassel.London,1979,p.46.

644ShaharbanoImtiazwasactuallyBhutto'shalf-sister.

administratorofRawalpindi.Itwastonoavail.Intheearlyhoursofthemorning Bhutto was hanged to death.

ThatnightIhadreceiveda telephone callfromFazleHaq telling me thatBhutto'sdeath sentence wastobe carriedoutbefore sunrise.Distraught,I foundmyselfunable to sleep. During the long hours of darkness I thought about the man I had known and the promisethathehadhelduponassumptionofpowerinthedismaldaysofDecember 1971. Intheendhisselfishandbrutal pursuitof absolutepowerhadled tohisundoing. Hehadengineeredhisowndoom.Hisarroganceandvindictivenesshadmadehim manyenemies. Nowthathe wasdown even hisfewremaining self-styled friendsand hispoliticalassociateshaddesertedhimandscamperedforcover.Theonlypeoplewho hadcomeinthestreetstosupporthimwerehisyoungstreetdiscipleswhostillbelieved inthedreamsthathehadspunaroundthem.Thesewerethewretchedpoor,whonever having known him at close hand, had worshipped him from afar. Whatever bitterness I had felt towardsBhutto had dissipated soonafter his arrest. Itis hard to despisea man oncehebecomesavictimhimself.Thenasthenightpassedandtheearlyglimmerof dawn emerged across the darkened sky, I knew that Bhutto was no more. My thoughts thenturnedtohiswidowandchildren,andtheanguishthatnowfacedthem.Afew hourslaterthatmorningIsentatelegramtoNusratBhuttoofferinghermydeepestsympathy.

Unlikesome ofmy formercolleaguesinthe PNA I couldnotendorse theexecution.The

FarEasternEconomicReviewlaterreported

Inaninterviewsoonafterthehanging,Ziaremarked:Thehigheryoufly,the harderyoufall.'HeaddedthatinorderingBhutto'sexecutionhehadactedinthe bestinterestsofPakistan.Hisclosestpoliticalcollaborator,theJamaat-i-Islami, distributedsweetsinaccordancewiththelocalcustomtomarkahappyoccasion and, though he said itis improper to rejoice over the death of anyone, Jamiat-ul- Ulema-e-Pakistan chief Maulana Noorani said the execution was well-deserved.

Otheradversariesweremorecharitable.TheNDPpresident,SardarSherbaz Mazari,saidthatasalong-timefriendofBhutto,hewasgrievedbyhisdeath, which had ended all his differences with the late politician...645

Ever since her husband's arrest in late 1977 Nusrat Bhutto had been trying to launch a movementagainstthemartiallawregimewithoutmuchsuccess.Asthepolitical activistandtheformerBhuttofamilyloyalistRajaAnwarlaterwrote:

[NusratBhutto's]tacticwastodeflatethepopularfear ofmartiallaw'sexcesses byplanningaseriesofvoluntaryarrestseverydayinLahoreandextending

645FarEasternEconomicReview,20April1979,('ThingsWillNeverBetheSameAgain'),HongKong,p.11.

them to other cities as time passed. She drew a list of five or six hundred party leaders said to be willing to court arrest and thus set in motion a campaign that wouldeventuallyleadtofull-scaleoppositiontomartiallaw.Aswastobe expected, most of these leaders were former ministers, prospective legislative candidates and members of the PPP Central Executive Committee favored by the Bhutto family. The first man to volunteer was the retired General Tikka Khan in Lahore's Anarkali area. The next day, not one volunteer set foot in the publicdomain.ItturnedoutthatmostPPPleadershadphonedthepoliceand requestedtobecollectedfromtheirhomes...themovementBegumBhutto wantedtolaunchhadbackfiredonthelaunchingpad.646

ItappearedthatnoneofZulfikarAliBhutto'serstwhilelieutenantspossessedthe courage to lead a movementagainst the army. In the wordsof Raja Anwar, then Nusrat Bhutto'swallowedher disappointmentand decidedtolaunchasecretcell [Al-Nusrat] within the PPP to take up the fight against Zia' but in the end the PPP proved to be

... incapableeitherof organizingmassvoluntaryarrestsorrunningAl-Nusrat, its phantomsecretarmandthisthwartedBegumBhuttoinbetween1977and1978. The army regime tradedonPPP'sparalysistopeddle the impressionbothat home and abroad that therewas absolute peace in the country...647

TherewaslittleprotestinPakistanaftertheexecution.Thegeneralpublicresponseto Bhutto's hanging was surprisingly muted. A number of leaderless PPP activists, still at largeincitiessuchasLahoreandGujranwala,madeanattempttoprotest,buteven their activities lasted only a day or two. Soon it was all over. Bhutto was dead and Zia was now firmly in power.

Once reassured that there would be no severe public unrest as a result of Bhutto's execution, Zia proceeded with his plans. The first of these was to get rid of the 'extra baggage' of politicians that he had been carrying in his federal cabinet. On the pretext of holdingelectionson17November,henowtalkedthemintoresigningsothatthey could commence with their election campaigns. Having once again announced general elections for November Zia now set about altering the ground rules to favor his own position. Moves were now afoot to amend the Constitution to give more powers to the President and the army. And, in direct contradiction of all that Mr. Jinnah had proudly espoused, he also now wished to placate the religious lobby by introducing separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims. These efforts were vociferously opposed by a numberofpoliticians including myself.

646RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince,op.cit.,p.25.

647Ibid.,p.27.

Mr. Mazari ... reiterated his party's stand on the question of constitutional amendmentsandcommentedthattheNDPwasagainsttheopeningofa Pandora's box.

He said only an elected Parliament had the right to discuss constitutional amendmentssuchasthedivisionofpowersbetweenthePresidentandthe Premier and a separate electorate.

He [further] said that as far as the role of the army in politics was concerned the NDPwas theonlypartythathadstated in itsmanifestocategoricallythatthere was no role for the army in politics.648

Havingonceagainpromisedtoholdelections,Zia,stillwaryofthePPP'ssupport withinPunjab and Sindh, wished totestthepolitical waters inadvance. Nusratand Benazir Bhutto had been under house arrest but Zia remained very unsure about the supporttheycontinuedtoholdinthecountry.InMay1979heannouncedtheholding of'non-party'localbodieselectionspriortothegeneralelectionsscheduledfor November.TheNDPtookaleadincriticizingthisnewstep.Itappearedobvioustous that,intheabsenceofpoliticalparties,thepollswouldbecontrolledbythebureaucracy

- inotherwordsbythemartiallawregime.ConvincedthatZia'spersonalobsession withthePPPwasprovingcounter-productivetothenationalinterest,Ibeganbecoming openly supportive of the PPP by publicly demanding that the party be accepted in the mainstreamofnationalpoliticsanditsleadersbeimmediatelyreleased.649And,I insistedthatitwouldbetotallywrongfortheregimetodeferelectionsbecauseofits uneasiness over the PPP's political strength.650

On 22 July Zia proposedto allpolitical parties that a proportionalrepresentation systembe used in the coming elections as opposed to the traditional 'first past the post' system. ThemajorityofpoliticalpartiesincludingthePPP,Tehrik-iIstiqlalandtheNDPstrongly objectedto this latest proposal. Dissatisfiedwith his lack of success inremodelling the political system, Zia adopted a more aggressive method. In a national broadcast on 30 August 1979, when most people were expecting him to announce the revival of political activities in the country, Zia instead announced the arbitraryamendmentofthePoliticalPartiesActof1962.Thenewamendmentcalledfor:

(a) registrationofpoliticalpartieswiththeElectionCommissionasaprerequisite for taking part in national elections,

(b) submissionofaccountsofthepartytotheElectionCommissionforscrutiny,

648TheMuslim,Islamabad,21May1979.

649Dawn,Karachi,23May1979.

650Dawn,Karachi,15June1979.

(c) publicationofaformalmanifesto,

(d) holdingofannualelectionsfortheofficebearersoftheparty,and

(e) submission ofa list of office bearers andordinary members to the ElectionCommission.651

TheamendmentalsomadeitanoffenceforpoliticalpartiestocriticizeeithertheArmy orthejudiciary.As thejudiciary werealreadyprotectedbythe lawofcontempt,this addedprotectionmadelittlesenseotherthanforZiatousethejudiciary'snametoslip inprotectionforthe armedforces,in otherwords,forhimself.

The NDP was the first political party topublicly reject this amendment tothePolitical PartiesAct,WerefusedtoregisterourpartywiththeElectionCommissioninsisting thattheamendmentwasunlawful,andwecalleduponotherpartiestojoinusinour boycott.Ourappealwentlargely unheeded.Inthe endeighteenpartiesappliedfor registration,anumberofwhich,suchasMarkaziJamiatAhleHadithandPakistan ChristianNationalParty,wereoflittle consequence. Whilethe PPPhadbeeneffectively debarredfromthe outset,the ElectionCommissiondisqualifiedanumberofparties which had applied. The disqualified parties included Nawabzada Nasrullah's PDP and MuhammadAshrafsKhaksarParty,bothmembersofPNA.Thosethatweredeclared eligiblefortheelectionsincludedAsgharKhan'sTehrik-i-Istiqlal,PirPagaro'sMuslim League,MuftiMahmood'sJUI,MaulanaNoorani'sJUP,KausarNiazi'sProgressive People'sPartyandtheJamaat-i-Islami.Thepartiesthathadrefusedtoregisterwere Bizenjo's Pakistan National Party (PNP) and the NDP.

Thelocalbodieselectionswereheldinmid-Septemberandvoterscameouttoenter their ballots. While most parties had publicly refused to participate in these elections, a numberofthemputuptheircandidatesunderpseudonymousparties,suchasthe PPP's A warn Dost. The result of these elections proved to be contrary to the regime's expectations. According to one historian:

Despitethenegativeresponseofthepoliticalpartiesthemilitaryauthoritieswent ahead withthelocal bodiespolls. Muchtotheirdismayalargenumberof people havingtieswithpoliticalparties,especiallythePPP,gotelected.Thesuccessof thepro-People'sPartycandidatesalarmedthemilitarygovernmentwhichsaw thisasanindicationofhowthepartymightperformintheupcomingelections.652

651HasanAskariRizvi,TheMilitary&PoliticsinPakistan1947-86,op.cit.,231.

652Ibid.,p.232.

Theconcernof theregimewasreflected inthemanner inwhichthenominationpapers ofcandidatesforthegeneralelectionswerescrutinized.Normallyonceacandidate's papershadbeenacceptedtheonlymeansavailabletochallengewasthroughan election petition. The right of appeal to the Returning Officer was only available to the candidate whose papers had beenrejected. These rules were suddenly changed. As theViewpointcommented at that time

...thistimeappealshavebeenheardagainsttheacceptanceofnominationpapers as well, and this unleashed an intensive hunt for people suspected of any connectionswiththePPPhidingunderthelabelofindependent.653

Inamockeryoflegalprocessmanycandidateswerenotonlyquestionedabouttheir ownpoliticalsympathiesbutalsoaboutthoseoftheirfathers,sonsandotherfamilymembers.

WhiletheNDPkeptoutoftheelectionprocessitmaintainedasteadycampaignof publiccriticismagainstthe military regime,insisting thatpollsshouldonly be held under theConstitutionof 1973. Inearly October 1979Iwasinvited by Ziatomeetwith him'todiscussthecurrentpoliticalsituation'.Ourmeetingtookplaceon6Octoberat RawalpindiduringwhichIsensedthathewasoncemorelookingforapretexttocall off the elections. He mentioned 'hisfear that a weak political governmentwould not be abletosustainthemountingforeignpressureagainstPakistan'snuclearprogramme'. My response to him was bluntly put.

[Sherbaz Mazari]saidthat hetoldthePresident in clearterms thathis party wantedelectionsunderthe1973Constitution.Thedecisionofhisparty's National Committee, regarding amendments in the Political Parties Act and introduction of Proportional Representation was final. There would be no compromise on these basic principles, he added.

ElaboratinghistalkswiththePresidentaboutholdingofelectionsonNov.17, Mr. Mazari said the President pointed out certain difficulties in this regard but he madeitquitecleartothePresident,thatwhateverthecasemaybe,hisparty would never favor the idea of postponing the polls.

Hesaid,'Wehaverepeatedlyannouncedthatelectionswithoutmajorpolitical partieswouldbe nothing more thanafarce.Howcanwe beparty tosucha hoax'. All major parties he added should be allowed to take pan in the elections.

Hesaid,'Wearepreparedtoaccepttheverdictofthepeopleevenifitisagainst us.Thestandofourpartyremainsthatnounrepresentativegovernmenthasthe

653Viewpoint,Lahore,14October1979,('TheGreatPPPHunt'),p.13.

righttoamendtheConstitutionwhichwasunanimouslyapprovedbyallpolitical parties of the country, he added.

TheNDPleaderalsoopposedtheholdingofelectionsunderseparateelectorates anddescribed itagainsttheConstitution.Hesaidhispartywould neveraccept theamendmenttothePoliticalPartiesActunderwhichthecriticismofthe Judiciary and the Army was prohibited.

'As long as the Army was ruling the country, it can never be exempted fromcriticism'.654

Tendayslater,on16October1979,Ziacalledofftheelections.Healsobannedall politicalpartiesand imposedstrictPresscensorship.Anewamendmentwas made by PresidentialdecreetotheConstitution.ThenewArticle22-Aprovidedformilitary courts and tribunals for trial of offences punishable under the Martial Law regulations. Thejudiciarywasexpresslydebarredfromentertaininganyappealsagainstdecisions made by these military courts and tribunals.

But luck was with Zia, Little over a month later the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistanto overthrow Hafizullah Amin's regime.Pakistan had now become a front-line state in theColdWarbetweentherivalsuperpowers.The UnitedStatesgovernmentfound itselfcommittedtoproppingupthePakistanimilitarydictatorshipwithamassive supplyoffundsandweaponryinpursuanceofitsownglobalinterests.Ziaexploited this new found status fully to the hilt.

***

InPakistanZia'scredibilitywasin ruins.Havingtwiceannouncedandthencancelled electionshisstandingwasatanall-timelow.Onlythemightofthearmyandthe divisions within the political parties enabled him to continue unchecked. Nevertheless, as one of his closest advisors, General Arif, later admitted:

With elections on the backburner, it was time to consolidate his power base.General Zia was in no hurry to hold elections, but he also faced the pressures and disadvantagesofrunninganadministrationwithoutthepeople'sparticipation. Theallegationofbeinganon-electedrulerweighedheavilyonhim.655

On28February1980IreceivedacallfromZia'sMilitarySecretaryinformingmethat thePresidentwishedtomeetwithmeinIslamabad.Bynowcompletelydisenchanted withthemilitaryleader,IrepliedthatIhadnodesiretomeetwiththeCMLA.Zia's

654TheMuslim,Islamabad,7October1979.

655GeneralK.M. Arif,WorkingwithZia.op.cit.,p.215.

brokenpromiseoverhisTeheranstatementstillrankledme.Interestinglyenough,a weeklaterIreceivedavisitfromateamofseniorJamaat-i-Islamileaders-Professor GhafoorAhmed,AzamFarooquiandMunawarHassan.Allofthemnowwholeheartedly approved of my refusal to meet with Zia. The party that had until very recentlybeenZia'sstaunchestsupporterswasnowopenlyreferringtohimasavilehypocrite.

On 12 March we were all to discover from BBC World Service that about twenty or soyoung army officers had been arrested in Lahore on charges of attempting to topple the militarygovernment.Itwasonlymuchlaterwelearntthatthesenaiveofficershad placedtheirtrustinGhulamMustafaKhar,whohadarranged,quiteunbeknownstto them,withtheIndianGovernmenttoprovidethemwithweapons.OneofKhar's trustedmiddlemen,thenotorioussmugglerSethAbid,isreputedtohavespilledthe beans to the military authorities.656

ThenextapproachIreceivedfromZiawasthroughmyfriendFazleHaq,thengovernor ofNWFP.Hearrivedon16AugustonaspecialplanefromPeshawarattheexpress behest of his army chief. Zia now wished NDP to form the core of a new national governmentatthecentre.Accordingtomyoldschoolfriend,theprimeminister'sjob wasminefor theasking.Icandidly repliedthatitwasimpossiblefor metocomplywith hisrequestfor,twosimplereasons,thefirstbeingthattheNDPpartyconstitution forbadeany partyofficeholderfrom holding anyotherofficialposition ofanycapacity, andtheotherreasonwasthattheNDP'sNationalCommitteehaddecidedthatthe party would not participate in any unrepresentative government. Then Fazli (as he was knowntohisfriends),lookingvisiblyirritatedatmylackofcooperationsaid,'Well,if you seem so determined then I'll go to London and offer the job to Wali Khan instead'. Itoldhimthathecoulddoashepleased,butatthesametimewarnedhimthatWali Khan was boundbythe decision oftheparty's nationalcommitteeas well.'So what are yougoingto do if heacceptsmyoffer?' heaskedme disdainfully.My replyseemed to shock him. I told him that I would sack Wali Khan from the party. Principles were more importantthanpersonalitiesintheNDP.AfterourheatedexchangeIrefusedtojoin him for dinner. Later a mutual school friend of ours, Colonel Nasr, insisting thatfriendships superseded politics, requested me to join him and Fazli over dinner. Despiteourregulardifferencesofopinion,myfriendshipwithFazliwasnevertosufferagain.

AyearearlierhehadtoldmeoverlunchatGovernor'sHouseatPeshawarthatmyrigid adherence to principles made me 'aliability in polities'. According to himZia held mein respect and would happily make me an ambassador to Washington or London. With hisusualmischievousglintinhiseye,FazlireckonedthatIwouldbe'amuchmore successfulambassadoranydaythanasapolitician'.Ilaughedoffhissuggestionbut

656Tehmina Durrani,My Feudal Lord, op. cit., p. 149. It is said that aft this event Zia felt himself indebted to SethAbid. As a consequence the smuggler became 'above' the law for many years that followed.

was at the same time aware that theoffer was serious and could only have come from the CMLA himself. Over the years Fazli would make me other offers, including once a governorshipofanyprovinceofmychoosing.I,ofcourse,declinedalloffersmuchto Fazli's tut-tuttings and accusations of being too stubborn for my own good.

After my meeting with him in Karachi, Fazle Haq flew straight to London to make his offertoWaliKhan.TomyknowledgeWaliKhanthoughtoveritandtheninformed Fazle Haq that he would accept the offer subject to party approval provided two prior conditionsweremet;thefirstbeingthatthestateofmartiallawbewithdrawnwithin sixmonths,anationalgovernmentbe formedandtheseconditionsbemadepublicon television.Hissecondconditionwasthatuponassumptionofofficehecouldaddress thenationguaranteeinggeneralelectionsunderthe1973Constitution.Inessence,what Wali Khan wanted was to create a temporary caretaker government which would help returndemocracytothecountry.NeitherofhisconditionsprovedacceptabletoZiaand the offer was then hastily withdrawn.

ThesameofferwasthenmadetoGhulamMustafaJatoi.657On10Septemberhevisited meinKarachiwithaninvitationfortheNDPtojoinanationalgovernmentheadedby him.ItooktheopportunityoftellinghimoftheearlieroffermadetotheNDP,which hadnowbeenpassedtohim.Jatoiappearedtohavenoreservationsaboutworking undermartiallawandwaspreoccupiedwiththetaskofcreatinghisnational government. I regretted his offer and informed him of NDP's inability to join any unrepresentative government. Then Jatoi made a serious miscalculation. He secretly arranged to meet his friend Ghulam Mustafa Khar in Dubai to seek his advice on the proposednationalgovernment,whileostensiblyonhiswaytoUmra.Ziawhowas awareofKhar'ssupervisoryroleintherecentfailedcoupattempt,soongotwindof Jatoi's secret meeting through his intelligence agencies. By now Zia hated Khar with unparalleledvehemence.658ThechancesofGhulamMustafaJatoibecomingPrime Minister vanished overnight.659

Towardstheendof1980asIwaspreparingformyeldestsonSherazam'sweddingI was telephoned by myfriend Fazle HaqfromPeshawar. After the usual pleasantries he gottothepoint.Heindicatedthathischief,GeneralZia,hadexpressedawishtobe invited to my son's wedding. I replied that I planned to invite only family, friends and political associates, and as Ziafitted in none of the categories, I did not plan on inviting him.Irritatedbymyrefusal,Fazlithenpresentedmewithan'ultimatum'.Hesaidthat

657Diaryentry:15July1986.This wasconfirmedtomebyMahmoodHaroonwhotoldmethathewastheonewho had taken the offer to Jatoi and it had been accepted without the imposition of any preconditions.

658Majid Nizami (of theNawa-i-Waqtgroup of newspapers) related that once during a trip to London Khar begged him to intercede with Zia on hisbehalf and plead for forgiveness. According to Nizami when he broached the topic with Zia, it was the only time he had ever witnessed Zia break into an impassioned outburst and openly use four- letter language. It was all directed at the absent Khar.

659ThisepisodeiscorroboratedbyGeneral Arif(GeneralK.M.Arif,WorkingwithZia,op.cit.,p.216).

hewouldattendtheweddingonlyifZiawas invited,otherwisehewouldbe boycotting thewedding.Itoldmyfriendthathecoulddoashepleased.Intheendthe irrepressible Fazle Haq and his wife flew to Karachi and attended the wedding. As he embracedtocongratulatemeontheoccasion,helaughinglyberatedmebytellingme thatIwas'aloveablebutobstinatefool'.HewarnedmethatIhadsucceededin irritating Zia yet again.

OvertheyearsIbelievemyfriendFazleHaqwasmuchmaligned.Hewasregularly accusedofbeinginvolvedintheillegalnarcoticstradeandononeoccasionaforeign magazine mentioned him by name as a suspected drug smuggler. Fazle Haq had madeit abundantly clear that he viewed the foreign addict as the ultimate causeof the drug tradeandthathesawnoreasonwhytheNWFPshouldnotprofitfromthisoverseas demand.ThisattitudeundoubtedlyirritatedtheUSandotherWesternpowers.ButI am convinced he had no direct hand in the illegal trade. As an old school friend I could risk directly asking him about the rumors circulating about him, and on one occasion I did. Herepliedthatthegossipabouthimhadstartedwhena closerelativeofhis was caughtred-handedwithalarge consignmentofdrugs.Hisfamily hadthenexerted pressure onhimtohave hisrelative released.Quoting the oldadage 'Godgivesus relativesbutweareluckilyabletochooseourownfriends',hesaidthathehadbeenleft withlittlechoicebuttolet'thebloodybastard'goscot-freeandthenaddedbitterly, 'And,nowI'mstuckwiththiscursedreputationandthereislittleIcandoaboutitto make it go away'.

AsafriendIbelievedhimandlaterevidencecorroboratedmybelief.Justbeforehis tragic assassination Fazli visited Karachi. He was in poor health and was visiting a local hospital for a medical checkup. When I visited him he was discussing business matterswithAitizazShahbaz,thenheadofBurmahShellLimited.ItappearedthatFazliheld thedirectorshipofalubricantblendingplantwhichwasbeingmanagedbyBurmah Shell.InmypresencehetoldAitizazShahbazthathewasupsetthatthedirector'sfees had been cut by Rs 4000 and pleaded with him to reconsider the move as he was having difficultiesmakingendsmeet.Thequestionworthaskingis:wouldsomeone supposedlyinvolved ina multimillionactivitybe so perturbed at theloss of afew thousandrupees?Myanswerismostdefinitelynot.

Fazlihadaremarkablyunrestrainedpersonality.Hehadagiftforhumorandpossessed aformofbluntnessrarelywitnessedinPakistan.Undoubtedlyhisaptitudeforplain speaking made him powerful enemies who would make lifedifficult for him in his final years. But he had unchallengeable qualities as a friend, loyalty being foremost of them. Withmeheoftenbehavedasifwewerestillatmilitaryschool,laughing,jokingand swearinglikeatrooper.Onceataweddingfunction,whileseatedatahightable alongsideGeneralZiaandothergovernors,Fazlinoticedmeamongtheguests. AccordingtootherspresentheexcusedhimselfbysayingpointedlytoZia,'Asmy

friendSherbazwillprobablynotbewelcomehere,I'dprefertositwithhimelsewhere'. HeleftZiaandspenttheeveningchattinginsteadwithmeatmytable.

* **

By now most people had seen through Zia's pretensions. The facade of elections lay completely exposed. At a meeting of NDP's national executive committee, held on 20August1980atmyhouseinKarachi,aresolutionwaspassedgiving'fullauthorityto me as the President of the Party to contact the leadership of other political parties in the countrytoexchangeideasandtocoordinateajointeffortfortherestorationof democracy,ruleoflaw,civilliberties,socio-economicandpoliticaljusticeand provincialrights'.660Itcalledfor aunitedpoliticalstandagainstthemartiallaw regime. Wethensentourprovincialpartyleaderstocallontheleadersofallpoliticalparties witharequesttomakeajointpoliticalgroupingfortherevivalofdemocracy.Thiswas the first step towards the formation of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) formed some six months later.

ShortlyafterWaliKhan'sreturnfromLondoninearlyOctober,MuftiMahmoodarrived inKarachitomeetwithus.On13Octoberheexpressedakeendesirefora reconciliationbetweentheNDPandhisJUI.HisdiscussionswithWaliKhanandme wentveryamiably.Expressinghisregretatparticipatinginthemartiallaw government,hecomplainedthathissupportershadpushedhimintoacorner. Inundatedwiththeirrequestsforjobs,transfersandotherformsofpolitical preferments, he had then felt the only way to satisfy them was through gaining ministries.661He also confessed that he was now convinced that Zia was a religious hypocriteandusedhimtoachievehisownpurposes.ThefollowingdayWaliKhanand I paida return courtesy callon the JUI leader. As soon as we returnedto my house afterour meeting, we received a telephone call informing us that Mufti sahib had died. We immediatelyreturnedtothemosquewherehehadbeenprayingatthetimeofhis death.Itwasindeedasadoccasion.IhadknownMuftiMahmoodformanyyearsand hadfoundhimtobeacutabovemostotherpoliticians.Hehadalwaysbeenasincere and good man at heart.

TheNDP'seffortstofindcommongroundamongthepoliticalpartieswasprovingtobe a success. A number of political leaders had expressed their support of the idea. In the firstweekofDecemberPyarAliAllanapresentedmewithadraftagreementfor discussionpurposes.TheNDPhadproposedthatthenewpoliticalmovementshould havefourbasic demands: thelifting ofmartiallaw, restorationofConstitutionof1973 initsoriginalunamendedform,electionsheldundertheunamendedConstitutionand

660Excerpt from the resolution passed by the National Executive of the National Democratic Party on 20 August1980.

661Mufti Mahmood protested that during his meetings he was accosted favor-seeking supporters even when hewould head for the lavatory. There had been no respite for him, he complained, from his party men.

thecreationofgreaterprovincialautonomy(withonly foreignaffairs,defence, communicationsandcurrencyremainingwiththefederalgovernment).ThePPPwas nothappy aboutourdemandforthe originalunamendedConstitution,andinstead proposedthatweaccepttheConstitutionasitstoodon4July1977,thetimeofZia's coup. The NDP rejected this demand outright. We maintained that the only form of the Constitutionacceptabletouswastheoriginalonewhichwaspassedunanimouslyby all politicalparties, andnot the one that hadbeen deliberately tamperedbyBhutto.

Over a period of two months the cause of our disagreement continued to be the Constitution.TheNDPcontinuedtorejectaseriesofreviseddraftagreementssentby the PPP. Nusrat Bhutto could not help but view our rejection of all Bhutto orchestrated constitutionalamendmentsasimplicitcriticismofherlatehusband'sgovernance.But on 5 February I finally received an agreement accepting the original untampered Constitution of 1973 with Nusrat Bhutto's signature on the document. I then affixed my signatureandreturnedthedocumenttoPyarAliAllana.And,sotheMRDwasformed. Ithadbeenagreedthatthefollowingmorningrepresentativesofotheropposition partieswouldmeetat70CliftonandofficiallyjoinMRDbyalsoaffixingtheir signatures to the agreement. Present at the meeting were Mahmood Ali Kasuri (representing Tehrik-i-Istiqlal)? Maulana FazlurRehman (who hadnowreplaced his father as head of JUI), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (representing his PDP), Khawaja Khairuddin and Malik Qasim (representing their faction of the Muslim League), Sirdar Qayum Khan (Muslim Conference),Nusrat Bhutto andGhulam Mustafa Jatoi,Nusrat BhuttorequestedthatweallowMairajMuhammadofQuamiMahazAzadiand Fatehyab Ali of the Mazdoor Kissan Party (Afzal Bangash faction) to participate in the meeting. She was also keen that three or four other minor Sindhi nationalist parties (the namesofwhichIhavenowforgotten)beacceptedintothisnewalliance.Clearlythis was a ploy. The addition of a half-dozen peripheral PPP-supporting parties would have immenselybolsteredPPP'sstrengthwithintheMRD.Thosewhowerewellversedin such tactical maneuvers, such as Nasrullah Khan, were quick to raise objections to these machinations. Both Mairaj Muhammad and Fatehyab Ali Khan had to sit outside allthroughthedurationofthemeetingwhiletheircasewasargued.

DuringthecourseofthemeetingBenazirBhuttosuddenlystormedinandstarted loudlyberatinghermother.'Howcanyousitthere',shescreamedatNusratBhutto, 'with these people whose hands are red with my father's blood! Visibly upset by this outbursttheassembledleadersdecidedtopostponethemeetinguntilthatafternoon andwouldreassembleatmyresidence.AsIarosetoleaveNusratBhuttopleadedwith me to stay for a brief while longer. Then in my presence she admonished Benazir and remindedherofmyrelationshipwithherlatefather.ShealsotoldherthatIhadbeen theonlyoppositionleadertohaveopenlycondemnedherfather'sexecution,andalso thatIhadsenta telegramofcondolencetoNusratBhutto.

LaterthatafternoontheMRDsignatoriesgatheredatmyhousewithNusratBhutto nowbeingassistedbyFarooqLeghariandRaoRashidKhan.Intheirpresencetheother politicianssignedtheagreementwhichhadearlierbeenendorsedby NusratBhuttoand myself.EvenMairajMuhammadKhanandFatehyabAliwerenowinvitedtosignthe document.NasrullahKhanwishedtoinvitePirPagaro'sMuslimLeagueandthe Jamaat-i-Islamitojointhemovement.MahmoodAliKasuriwasalsokeentoseeTehrik- i-Istiqlal'spartnerMaulanaNooraniandhisJUPintheMRDaswell.Ithenadded GhousBukshBizenjo'sPNPtothelistofinviteesaswell.Intheendonlyoneofthem, the PNP, joined in late 1983.

NusratBhuttowaskeenthatIleadtheMRDbuthereffortswereopposedbysome other parties, in particular the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal which wished to see Asghar Khan head the movement. Inthe end acompromise wasworked out. Within theMRD aPakistan BachaoNationalActionCommitteewasformed.The committeehadfourmembers, GhulamMustafaJatoi,KhawajaKhairuddinandMairajMuhammadKhanandlaterI was also elected as the Chairman of MRDs'PakistanBachao'Committee. Nusrat Bhutto had proposed my name and this was unanimously approved by the others. It is the sad natureofPakistanipoliticsthatTehrik-i-Istiqlalwouldsoondisassociateitselffromthe MRD in all but name.

The next day the martial law authorities took cognizance of the MRD by expelling both Mahmood Ali Kasuri and Sirdar Qayum Khan from Sindh.

***

On 2 March 1981 a PIA Boeing 737 was hijacked by Al-Zulfikar terrorists and taken to Kabul. According to the memoirs of a senior Al-Zulfikar member, Raja Anwar, who hadthen been residing in Kabul, 'the hijack plot was hammered out in detail' three months earlier between Murtaza Bhutto and Salamullah Tipu, the eventual leader of the hijackers.662Theresultsoftheirplanswouldendincreatingadoubletragedyfora familywellknowntome.Eightdaysearlier,on22FebruarymyfriendGeneralKazi Rahim had died. His son Tariq, had returned from his diplomatic posting at Teheran toburyhisfatherandhadthegravemisfortuneoftakingtheill-fatedPIAflightto Peshawar.Ontheeveningof6March,afterspendingfourdayscoopedupinthe hijackedplaneatKabulairport,asRajaAnwarstates,TariqRahimwasshotbyTipu after rec'eiving a prearranged signal from Murtaza Bhutto to carry out the execution.663Tariq'sbodywasthencallouslyflungdownontothetarmac.

662Raja Anwar,The TerroristPrince,op.cit.,p.91.Itisworthmentioning thatfivemonthsbeforethe hijackingtook placeMurtaza Bhutto wasquoted ashaving stated 'PIA isour first target.I appeal to people not to use thisairline': The Sunday Times, London, 7 March 1981.

663RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince,ibid.,p.108.

I had last seen Tariq only the day before he commenced on his ill-fated journey. Themannerofhis death greatlyupsetme.It is ironicalthat onedayboththeperpetrators, Tipu and Murtaza Bhutto, would themselves meet with violent ends. In 1984 Tipu was executed by an Afghan firing squad after having been found guilty of murdering an Al- Zulfikar colleague.664In 1996 Murtaza Bhutto was himself shot to death on the streets of Karachibypolicemenatatimewhenhissisterwastheprimeminister.

AfghanistanhadprovidedprotectiontoMurtazaandhisragtagbandofmenduring theirexile.BychanceIhadalreadymetthemanwhowouldturnouttobehiskey protector. InSeptember 1979whenPresidentNur Muhammad Taraki wasoverthrown andkilledbyhisdeputyHafizullahAmin,anumberofTaraki'scloseassociatesfled Afghanistan.ThenewrefugeesincludedDrNajibullahKhanwhoturnedup unannounced atmydoorsteponedayinlate1979. HewascarryingaletterfromArbab SikandarKhalil,formerNWFPgovernorandseniormemberofNDP(hewaslater murdered in Peshawar by a fanatic in 1982), asking me to help the man. Dr Najibullah wasdesperatetogetavisaforIndiawhereheplannedtoseekasylum.Ihappenedtobe on extremely cordial terms with Mani Shankar Ayer, then the Indian Consul General at Karachiandthevisawasarrangedwithoutdifficulty.665Afewmonthslater,in December,whentheSovietsinvadedAfghanistanHafizullahAminwaskilledand replaced by Babrak Karmal. Dr. Najibullah soon returned to Kabul and attained the all- powerfulpostofintelligencechiefanddeputytoKarmalhimself.Hewouldnow providecompleteprotectiontoMurtazaandhismen.AsRajaAnwarcommented, 'withoutNajibullah'spersonalsupport,therewouldhavebeennoAl-Zulfikarinthe firstplace'.666LaterheoustedBabrakKarmalandinstalledhimselfasPresidentin1987. While I had only helped Najibullah get a visa, I had little sympathy for his politics. Atthesametimenoonedeservedthesavagebrutalityofhisdeath.In1996hewaslynched in public and then his strung up corpsewas vilely mutilated infront of a cheering mob.

Over the course of the Afghan civil war I received visitorsfrom a variety of the fighting factions. Knowingaboutmyconcernfor thesad plightof theirnation, theywould come to discuss the problems facing them and invariably try and enlist my support. Some of thesecallers,suchasProfessorBurhanuddinRabbaniandEngineerGulbadeen Hikmatyar,wouldlatergainevenfurtherprominencewithtime.Thetragedyof Afghanistan liesbefore us.There were no realvictors. Not only had millions of Afghans died orbecome refugees, but Pakistan became badlylacerated inthe process.

***

664Tipu issaid to havepleaded to the Afghan court thathe had carriedthe killing on Murtaza Bhutto'sinstructions, as the murdered man had been a 'traitor' to Al-Zulfikar (Raja Anwar,The Terrorist Prince, ibid., pp. 161-3).

665MonthslaterIwouldreceiveapersonalnoteofgratitudeDr.Najibullahforhelpinghim'duringatimeof adversity'. The note was accompanied with a gift of a Czech machine-pistol.

666RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince,op.cit.,p.210.

UsingthepretextofthePIAhijackingtheregimebeganacrackdownonMRD.On9 March as I was returning by road to Karachi from Sonmiani I learnt that Nusrat andBenazirBhuttohadbeenarrested.Moveswerealreadyafoottoimpairthemovement. On 19 March Altaf QureshiofUrdu DigestandSalahuddin ofJasaratvisitedme at my house, and spent an hour trying to 'persuade us to leave MRD'.667Sirdar Abdul QayumKhan was the first to buckle under pressure. On 22 March he appeared on nationwide televisionconfessingtohavingmadeamistakebyjoiningtheMRDandthenproceeded tocriticizethemovement.ThenextdaywedecidedtoholdanMRDmeetingon24 March during which we would officially expel Qayum Khan from the movement. That eveningthepolicearrivedatmyhousecarrying'externment'ordersexpellingmefrom theprovinceofSindh.Iwastakentotherailwaystationunderescortandmadeto boardtheKhyberMail.Irecallthatitwasnotaparticularlypleasantjourney,asmy diary entrystates,'Bittenbybedbugsthe wholenight.Sat upkilling them.No sleep'.668ThepoliceescortreleasedmeatSadiqabadstationwheremystaffhadarrivedtotake me to Sonmiani. In my absence a writ was filed on my behalf by my son Sherazam challengingmydeportationfromtheprovinceonthegroundsthatIhadeffectively beenresidinginKarachisincetheearly1950s.NotonlywasmyhomeinKarachibutI had also been successfully elected to the National Assembly from one of the city's constituenciesin1977.Bymid-ApriltheSindhgovernmentwascompelledtowithdraw its orders against me.

In May I travelled to Peshawar to attend a political meeting of the party. Shortly after I returned to Karachi I received a missive from the NWFP government advising me that Iwas prohibited from re-entering the province until further notice. The ban was to intermittently last until 1984.

InthemeantimeIcontinuedholdingregularmeetingswithotherpoliticalleaderson the MRD and its future plan of activities. Some of the revelations made during these discussionswerequitestartling.On9JuneKhawajaKhairuddinfromtheMuslim LeaguerevealedtomethathehadbeenkeepingregularcontactwithaColonelImtiaz of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).669Khairuddin insisted that he was deliberately misleading the ISI representative who was demanding detailed information on theactivitiesoftheMRDfromhim.AmonthlaterKhairuddincametovisitonceagainto makefurtheradmissions.Henowconfessedthathehadbeenintouchwiththeregime andhadcometotheconclusionthatformationofa'nationalgovernment'wouldbein our interest. Amazed at Khairuddin's volte-face I politely told him that I was against the formationofanyunrepresentativegovernmentcreatedto'legitimize'Zia'sregime.

The other person who caused me astonishment was Nusrat Bhutto. On 26 July 1981GhulamMustafaJatoiinformedmethathispartyleaderwantedtoretirefrompolitics

667Diaryentryfor19March1981.

668Diaryentryfor23-24March1981.

669IimaginethatColonelImtiazwasthesamepersonwholaterachievednotorietyasBrigadier'Billa'Imtiaz.

andwishedhimtorepresenther.Itseemedunderstandable.Afterthe deathofher husband,withthePPP leadershipbeingthrustupon her,the taskwas provingto betoo muchforNusratBhutto.Butitwasthemannerinwhichshesoughtreleasefromher responsibilitieswhichgaverisetodoubts.ThreedaysafterJatoi'svisit,on30July, Khairuddincalledonmeonceagain. Thistimeherevealedthathehad beenactingas go-betweenforNusratBhuttoandtheISI.AccordingtohimNusratBhuttohad promisedtoretirefrompoliticsprovidedshewasallowedtoleavethecountry. Khairuddinjustifiedhisrolebyinsistingthathehadbeenactinginthe'national interest'. A few days later, on 10 August, MirAfzal Khan, then a senior PPP leader, told meoverlunchatmyhousethatNusratBhuttohadalsobeenholdingsecretmeetings with General Sadiq Abassi, the Sindh Governor, with a view to striking a deal with the regime.MirAfzaltoldmethatMrs.BhuttohadcontactedSadiqAbassithrough GhulamMustafaJatoiwhowasmarriedtotheGovernor'ssister.Itappearedthat NusratBhuttowasnowpleadingforarespitefromtheverymilitaryregimethathad hangedherhusband.MirAfzal'sinformationwaslaterconfirmedby SadiqAbbasi,whowouldtellmein1986thatnotonlydidtheBhuttoladiesreachaclandestine understandingwiththeregimein1981,butthat'Benazirkeptherpromiseandsecretly cooperatedwiththegovernmentbynotissuingoverlycriticalstatements'rightuntilher departure for London in January 1984.670

Whenwenextheldameeting oftheMRDleadershipmeetingtopassaresolution condemningterrorism,withparticularreferencetohijacking,NusratBhuttowas conspicuousbyherabsence.Afewmonthslater,in1982,sheleftforLondon,on grounds of ill-health. It was announced by the PPP that she was suffering from cancer.

By 1981 Zia had decided to stop scheduling phantom elections. Instead he sought to legitimize his rule by 'law'. In the absence of popular backing he promulgated the 1981 ProvisionalConstitutionOrder.Itwasclaimedthatitwasrequired'forconsolidating and declaring the Law and for effectively meeting the threat to the integrity andsovereignty of Pakistan', and 'because doubts have arisen ... as regards the powers and jurisdictionofthesuperiorcourts'.671Instead,asoneforeignlegalwritercommented, 'thePCOextinguishedjudicialpowers'.672Theprimemoversbehindthisunprincipled andunparalleledpieceoflegaljiggery-pokerywerenoneotherthan Messrs A.K.Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada.673These two men were later scathingly described by General Chishtito beamongZia's most prominent 'sycophants'.674

670Dairyentry:8January1986.

671Preamble,ProvisionalConstitutionOrder,1981,(CMLA'sOrderof1981)(Lahore:CivilandCriminalLaw Publication, 1983).

672PaulaR.Newberg,JudgingtheState,op.cit.,p.180.

673GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.260.

674Lt.-GeneralFaizAliChishti,Betrayals,ofAnotherKind,op.cit.,p.68.

ThePCOeffectivelyabrogatedthe1973Constitutionandvirtuallyplacedallpowerin the hands of the executive, in other words, in General Zia. It also provided extensive emergency provisions to extend military rule and gave Zia the retrospective power to amendtheconstitution.AccordingtothePCOallordersandactionstakenbythe regime were considered to be legally valid, and 'notwithstanding any judgment of any Court'couldnotbecalledintoquestion'inanyCourtonanygroundwhatsoever'.

FurtherthePCOexcludedthejudiciaryfromhearingabroadrangeofcases.Military personnelwerenowcompletelyexemptfromcivilprosecution.HighCourtswere preventedfromrulingonpreventivedetentionorofferingrelieftothosejailedunder preventivedetention.Norcouldtheyinterferewithanycaseregisteredincivilor militarycourtsortribunalsorevenpolicestations.TheeffectofthePCOonthe judiciarywas devastating. Buttogetjudicial 'legitimacy'Ziainsistedthatall judgesof the superior court had to take an oath to uphold the PCO.

Itwasthesaddestofreflectionsontheindividualintegrityofourseniorjudiciarythat onlytwooftheSupremeCourtsjudgesprovedworthyoftheirofficebyresigning. Eager to stay in office, the rest of the judges betrayed their high calling by cravenly swearinganoathtoupholdthenewpoliticalorderwhichrenderedthemirrelevant.675Thetwoexceptions,theworthyJusticesDorabPatelandFakhruddinG.Ibrahimshould be admired for placing their principles before personal self-interest.676As for the rest, I openly condemned them at every opportunity. Finally in 1983 after a public meeting in Malir, where I attacked these servile Supreme Court and High Court judges rather more vehemently than usual, I was 'rewarded' with a contempt of court notice from the Sindh High Court while in detention near Khanewal. During the contempt hearing I was represented by Barrister Azizullah Sheikh, Chief Justice (retired) Khuda Buksh Marri,ImamAHQaziandIqbalHaider.Totheircreditthesegentlementookthecaseasa matter of principle and refused to accept any fees. Later I was asked to meet the SindhChief Justice Saeed Qureshi in his chambers. The judge suggested that if I made a public apology all would be forgotten. Unrepentant I declined his offer. Rather than make afurther issue of it, the judges apparently then decided to let the matter rest. I heard no further from them.

***

During1982effortscontinuedtouniteallpoliticalpartiesinastruggleforthe restoration of democracy. At every stage we faced obstacles. Political leaders were preventedfrommeetingeachotherbymeansofarrestsand'externments'.Our telephonesweretapped,ourcarstrailedandourpartiesremainedconstantlyexposed toinfiltrationbytheintelligenceagencies.TheeconomicconditionsinPakistanduring

675AmongthemwasJustice(laterChiefJustice)NasimHussainShah,self-proclaimed'saviorofdemocracy'.

676It hasbeen reported that Chief Justice Anwarul Haqresigned at the last minuterather than take oath under the PCO: General K. M. Arif,Working with Zia, op. cit., p. 261.

thisperiodhadbeenpropitiousforZia.Theinfluxofforeignfundsasaresultofthe AfghanWarandthesubstantiallyincreasedremittancessentbyexpatriateworkers bode well for the economy.677There wasa mood of passivity among the general public. Itwasclearthatif theMRD wished tosucceed initsambitionsitwouldhavetostruggle thatmuchharder.TheNDPmaintainedamoreaggressiveposturetowardsthemilitary regimethanmostotherparties.InMarch1983IhadalreadybeenwarnedbyMir Khalilur-RehmanoftheJangnewspapergroupthattheregimehadinstructed thePress to desist from projecting NDP's role in the MRD.678

The orders of 'externment' issued to politicians was a case in point. While other political partieshadresignedthemselvestoobeyingthegovernment's'externment'directives, NDPleaderscontinuedtobelligerentlydefythebanontheirinter-provincial movementsonthegroundsthatasthegovernmentitselfhadbeenviolating constitutional laws for the past six years, it could hardly expect us to obey its illegal instructions.WhentheissuewasraisedbytheNDPatanMRDmeeting'therewere somesharpdifferencesofopinionandtheparticipantsthoughtitwisertodropthe issueforthetimebeing'.679'Thehesitancyoftheotherpartieshadlittleeffectonusas theNDPleadershadbornealargebruntofthese'externment'orders.Ihadalready beenbannedfromenteringtheNWFP,PunjabandBalochistan.Thehostileregime wouldensurethatthesebanswouldremaininforceforanumberofyearstofollow.

TomymindtheMRDwasatcrossroads.AsMazharAliKhanofViewpointcommented:

Since the MRD was set up two-and-a-half years ago, its aims have been stated in fairlyclearterms.Inputtingforwarditsfour-pointdemand,thenine-party alliance has repeatedly declared (no matter whether this was seen as a threat or promise) that if its appeals were disregarded it would be compelled to launch a movement.Resolutionsontheselineswerepassedagainandagain,sooftenin fact that many of its sympathizers and even Government's supporters began tomakefunoftheMRD'sincapacitytomovefromwordstoaction.Duringthis period, differences within its camp were highlighted,thelack oforganization among component parties was stressed, and above all, the lack of will among its leaderstostruggle waspointedoutasthemainreasonfortheMRD'sfailure to keepitspromiseofdoingsomethingfortherestitutionofpoliticalrights.680

There were only two alternatives before us; call it a day or pursue our original goal withfullvigortowardsopenconfrontationwiththeregime.DeeplyupsetasIwaswiththe

677Intheperiod1982-3overseasworkerremittanceshadreachedanalhighofUS$2.886billion(ParvezHasan,

Pakistan'sEconomyattheCrossroads,Oxford,Karachi,1998,p.238).

678Diaryentry:10March1983.

679TheLeader,Karachi,13March1983.

680TheViewpoint,Lahore,8September1983,('BetweentheLines').

continuationofmartiallaw,theabjectsightofpoliticalpartiespursuingtheirselfish planswasequallyfrustrating.Thereremainedahopethatahighermoralpurpose mightgalvanize themtowardsgreaterunity.Onthe day ofmyappointmentasthe ConvenoroftheMRDwebegantotakestepstowards,whatIbelieved,wastherightdirection.

TheMRDcommitteeheadedbythedefunctNationalDemocraticParty(NDP) chief Sardar Sherbaz Mazari has started drawing a detailed programme for launchinganon-cooperationmovementfromAugust14,thisyear.The Committee has formulated a 31-point charter which was approved by MRD lastweek.681

As chairman of the MRD's National Action Committee I had tried to enlist the. support of non-MRD parties, such as Jamaati-lslami, Maulana Noorani's JUP, and Ghous Buksh Bizenjo'sPNP. The religiouspartieshad objected tothe PPP'spresence inthe MRD and insisted on keeping their distance from the MRD. The PNP had refused to join the MRD forthe ostensible reasonthatitwasatoddswithWaliKhan'shostility towardsthe Babrak Karmal government in Afghanistan.

When I took over as Convenor of the MRD on 12 May 1983 I faced a movement that was close to disintegration as a result of petty rivalries and outside conspiracies. ThemovementhadmorethanitsfairshareofinternaldissensionandAsgharKhan's Tehrik-i-Istiqlal(TIP)wasoftenthecause.AttimesTIPwouldnotsenda representative,atothertimesMRDdecisionswouldbedelayedbythem,andon occasion the alliance wouldbe subjectedby them to public criticism.682Even the MRD's31-point programme which had been accepted by all other component parties met with rejectionbytheTIP,whichcalleditan'NDP-plan'.InanefforttoinduceTIPbackinto theMRDmainstream,theNDPevenpubliclysuggestedthatAsgharKhan'spartybe giventheMRDpresidency onapermanent basis.683

LatereventheJUI,acomponentparty,wastobacktrackfromitsfirmcommitmentto theMRD.Overlookingitsearlieragreementtothe31-pointprogramme,Maulana FazlurRehmaninformedmethathispartynowwanteda'permanentorganizational structure'and'anIslamicslogan'forthemovement.Thoughhefavouredtheremovalof martial law, he believed that an interim government should be accepted by all.684

The MRD was wracked with other problems as well. Some of its leaders had been discovered to be quietly consorting with senior Zia associates - such as KhawajaKhairuddinwhometwithGeneralRaoFarmanAli.Thesemeetingshelpeddamagethe

681TheLeader,Karachi,18May1983.

682DailyNews,Karachi,24November1982('AsgharNotHappywithMRD').

683TheStar,Karachi,28April1983.

684Diaryentry:2June1983.

movement's credibility in the eyes of the people. Then there were the conflicting views regularly aired in public, such as when the then secretary general of the PPP, Farooq Leghari,obtuselydisregardingNusratBhutto'swrittencommitmentmadetome, claimed that his party had not agreed to annulments of amendments to the 1973 Constitution.685Some days later, I learnt from Mir Afzal Khan that Aftab Sherpao and Farooq Leghari were opposed to NDP and were trying their best to influence the Bhutto ladiesagainstus.686AlittlewhilelaterKhawajaKhairuddinsurprisedmewithyet another revelation. He informed me that General Rao Farman Ali was adamant thatBenazirBhuttowill'remainsilent'duringthecourseoffutureanti-government activities because of an agreement secretly entered into by the Bhutto ladies with the martial law authorities.687

Equally serious for the MRD were the divisive actions of those that were acting in conjunction with the intelligence agencies and the government. As a newspaper would report some months later: 'some of the leaders who are sincerely interested in the restoration of democracy feel that some elements at the behest of the vested interest are trying to destroy the alliance'.688In absence of conclusive proof there was little we coulddo to deal with these stool pigeons.

Despiteourstrenuouseffortsothercomponentpartiescontinuedtofollowtheir independentagendas.Incompletecontraventionoftheoriginal4-pointswhichledto the formationofthe MRD,JUI andTIPhadnowagreedtoparticipate inthe latestround of local bodies elections announced by General Zia. In the meantime in a bid to raisethepoliticaltempoIoncemoredefiedthe'externment'ordersbyvisitingPunjab andBalochistan.OnthefirstdayofJulyweaddressedapublicmeetingintheSherShahareaofKarachiindefianceofthesection144restrictionsonpublicgatherings.The official response was soon in coming. On 3 July I was officially 'externed' from Sindh. It createdaludicroussituationthatcanonlybedreamedupbyPakistanibureaucrats.I hadnowbecome'externed'fromallthefourprovincesthatmadeupPakistan.Iwas placedbythepoliceonaplaneboundforLahore.MyarrivalatLahoreledto bureaucraticpandemoniumasthePunjabmartiallawauthoritiesrefusedtoletme disembarkandinsteadissuedanairticketformyreturntoKarachi.Aftermuch confabulationtheabsurdityofthesituationdawneduponthem.Iwasthendriven under police escort to Begum Kishwar Abid Hussain's house which was then promptly declared as a 'subjail'. The next morning I was flown to Multan escorted by a strangely frightenedpolice inspectorwhokeptpretending thathe wassuffering fromaheart seizure. FromMultanthepolicetook metoRojhan, withabrief stopinRajanpur where theseniorpoliceofficialinformedmethatIwasforbiddenunder'theseveresanctionof martial law' to leave Rojhan.

685TheLeader.Karachi,18April1983.

686Diaryentry:28April1983.

687Diaryentry:3May1983.

688DailyNews,Karachi,8May1983.

AfteraweekofenforcedrestatRojhanwhereIcelebratedEid-ul-FitrIsoondefied Punjab martial law orders by travelling outside Rojhan to Rahimyar Khan to offer condolences to the son of a former MNA and NDP leader Abdul Nabi Kanjoo who had recentlydied.ThenIdecidedtoviolatetheSindh'externment'bytravellingtoKarachi, adistanceofsome400miles,byroad.UponarrivinginKarachiIimmediatelygot togetherwithmyMRDcolleagues.IwasdisturbedtohearItaramulHaqThanviofthe PPPtellmethathispartywasaboutto'sellout'theMRDbyannouncingits participation in the local bodies elections. This disappointing news was confirmed the following day by Mumtaz Bhutto who telephoned to tell me that the PPP's official announcementwouldsoonbemadebyFarooqLeghari.Iimmediatelyrequestedsome ofmycolleaguestogetintouchwithPPPofficialsandadvisethemtourgently reconsider their decision. Meanwhile the PPP's acting-leader. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, continued to stay out of Pakistan. In view of the MRD's planned campaign of action, his absenceappearedhighlyunusual.ItwasunlikelythatthePPP'scontributiontothe MRD'scampaignforcivildisobediencecouldbeorchestratedfromLondon.

The next day, 18 July, while I was out, a large contingent of police blockaded the road andsurroundedmyhouse.SoonafterIwasre-arrestedandflownunderescortto Multan,thendrivenstraighttoMultanJailandputintosolitaryconfinementina'C' classcell.689While itwasobviousthattheregimewantedtodetachmefromtheMRD and our planned programme of protest, I remained perturbed about its future.I noted inmydiary'Ihopethose whohave replacedmesincemyarrestdo therightthing'.690A fortnightlaterIwasshiftedtoaremotegovernmentresthouseinthePirowalforest nearKhanewal, whereI wastospendthenexttwoandahalfmonthswithaconstant guardofthirty-threepolicemen.Inmid-Octoberaftersufferingaheartattack,onthe adviceofdoctors,IwasshiftedtoKarachiandplacedunderhousearrestatmy residence. In Karachi I was looked after by Dr Shaukat Ali Syed. It was to take another twoand ahalfmonthsbeforeI wasfinally released fromconfinementandsetatliberty.

***

While in jail I kept abreast with events thatwere taking place by faithfully listening to BBC'sUrduservice.On3AugustIwaspleasedtolearnthattheNDPexecutive committeehadtakenaverystronglineatMachiavellianmaneuveringsofthePPPby recommendingthatanypartywishingtocontestthelocalbodieselectionsbethrown out of the MRD. By 10 August the PPP 'relented and announced its decision to boycott thelocalbodypollsonpretextthattheircandidates'nominationswerebeingrejectedby theauthorities.Noticeably,nomentionwasmadeofthepressurethathadbeenexerted by its partners in the MRD.

689Allcontactwithotherprisonerswasforbidden,includingjoiningthecongregationforFridayprayers.

690Diaryentry:24July1983.

The following day the actions ofsomeof mycolleagues sent meinto deep depression. BBC announced that NDP's Ghulam Ahmed Bilour had resigned as acting Convenor of theMRD,apositionhehadheldsincemyarrest.ThegeneralsecretaryNDPmember AbdulKhaliqKhanhadresignedfromtheMRD.TheyhadacteduponinstructionsgivenbyAbdulGhaffarKhan.Ifeltthat'allmy8yearsofhardworkhadsuddenly gonedownthedrain'.691ThatclaymyeldestsonSherazamrangBilourand remonstratedwithhimabouthisactions.Hiswordswere:'Howcouldyoubetraymy fatherwhilehe is in jail?Isthis howyourepayhimafterall hiseffortstogetyouand otherNAPleadersoutofHyderabadjail'.AccordingtoSherazam,Bilourrepliedina voice choked with regret and emotion, that he was bound to the Wali Khan family and was helpless before them.

It was only much later that I learnt from my friend Fazle Haq, then Governor of NWFP, astowhathadactuallytakenplacebehindthescene.TopreemptMRD'splanned campaignofprotestintheNWFP,FazleHaqhadobtainedtheservicesofalocal politiciannamedIbrahimKhanofTulltopassamessage ontoGhaffarKhan.Ihad earlier, in 1997, got a PNA ticketfor the same Ibrahim Khan who then was successfully elected from the Mardan area.In his message Fazli shrewdly conveyed the impression thatthesuccessoftheMRDcampaignwouldonlyhelpthePPPregainpower.'Just remember what Bhutto did to you and your family', FazleHaq warned Ghaffar Khan 'It willallhappenonceagain!'WiththiswarningringingintheelderlyPathanleader's ears,GhaffarKhansummonedBilourandKhaliqKhan,anddirectedthattheNDPadopthisBannuResolutiondemandinganautonomousPakhtunistan.Unableto contactWaliKhanwhowastheninEngland,BilourandotherseniorNWFPNDP membershastilysummonedapressconferenceandinGhaffarKhan'spresencepublicly announcedtheirresignationsfromboththeNDPandtheMRD.Itwasarecipedesigned for chaos.

FromthesidelinestheViewpointcommented:

As a key figure in the defunct NDP, it was [Bilour's] duty not only to abide by his party'smandatebutalsotoensureallegiancetoitbyallothermembers.He would have been perfectly right in quitting the party if he found himself in disagreement with its course of action. There is no justification whatsoever for actingcontrarytoone'sownbeliefatthebiddingofanelder,howevereminent orrespectablethelattermaybe.Theincidentonlyreflectsonalackofmaturity in the country's political councils and a persisting tendency to compromise principles for personal considerations rooted in feudal habits.692

691Diaryentry:13August1983.

692TheViewpoint,Lahore,18August1983,('BetweentheLines'),p.7.

A few days laterBegum Wali Khan returned from London and attempted to correct the confusionbyannouncingat apress conferencethat theNWFPNDPhad'nodifferences' with the MRD. Thefollowingday, on 17August, she was arrested aswell. Subsequently theNDPheldaprotestrallyatPeshawarwhichattractedafewhundredpeople.This ledtothearrestofBilour,KhaliqKhananddozensofseniorNDPmembers,andthe protestmovementintheNWFPeffectivelycametoanend.AsfarasIwasconcerned considerabledamagehadbeendonetotheMRD,andthebelatedattempttorally support for the MRD was a question of too little and too late. It had largely been a face saving exercise. I was deeply disappointed by my colleagues. A depression sank in and myhealthsuffered.On2SeptemberIstartedsufferingextremepainsinmychestwhich waslaterdiagnosedbydoctorsfromNishtar HospitalMultantohavebeenananginaattack.

The MRD protest only took spark in rural Sindh. With all the senior leaders of the MRD indetention,themovementleadershipfellintothehandsoflow-levelworkerswho lackedtheabilitytolead.Theprotestthentookasuddenandviolentturn.Depressed bytheturnofeventsInotedinmydiary:'Itseemsnow[that]theMovementfor RestorationofDemocracy hastakenanugly turn.Itismore ofaSindhinationalist movementandcanbecomedangerous...makesme worriedandsad'.693The violence was to carry on for a number of months. Troops were eventually called in to forcefully pacify the province. A foreign periodical covering the events at the time stated:

TheMRDdemonstrationshaveoftenbeenviolent,andsomeoftheSindh casualtieshavebeenthepolice,whowerefiredatbydemonstrators.The violence has also become communal in places, with pro-PPP native Sindhisattacking Punjabi settlers who the Sindhis accuse of backing the armed forces. Despite the PPP's claims ofa mass followingin Punjab,the anti-Punjabnature of thecampaigninSindhhaskepttheprovincefromparticipatinginthe movement. Karachi, the capital of Sindh and Pakistan's largest city, also has been little affected ... This is attributable in part, to the predominantly non-Sindhi populationinthecity,whichisapprehensiveaboutSindhidomination.694

In return the regime retaliated harshly. A local journalist, Maleeha Lodhi, writing in a foreign journal commented:

The teeth for eating were bared in rural Sindh... Security forces launched an operation against 'dacoits and criminals' with a ferocity reminiscent of the army's actionintheformerEast Pakistanin1971...Afterreportsofofficialbrutality leaked out, the government felt forced to deny that homes had been bulldozed,cropsburnedorhelicoptergunshipsusedin'securityoperation'...independent

693Diaryentry:22August1983.

694FarEasternEconomicReview,('Pakistan:AQuestionofStability')29September1983,p.54.

sources put the number killed since the protest campaign began in August at 250. More than 6,000 people have been arrested'.695

Laterthereweresomeharshpost-mortemsdoneontheMRDprotestcampaign.In1983 aSindhipolitician,usingthepseudonymof'APatriot',wroteandcirculatedaletter whichwasinrealityanexcerptof anearliernewsletterpublished byaso-called 'Sindhi EmployeesAssociationofLarkana'.BoththesedocumentsbitterlyattackedGhulam Mustafa Jatoi.696It accusedhim of havingmet GeneralK.M.Arif,Zia's Chiefof Staff, at a private house in Hertfordshire, England. According to the newsletter at the meeting

...itwasagreedthatthemovementwastobeatokenonetolastaboutfifteen days just to build Jatoi's image as a national and real leader of the PPP so that he carried the Party with himself when after a dialogue, and minor concessions, he joined the military government...

ThearrangementsforthecivildisobediencemovementwerethatJatoiwasto court arrest at Jinnah's Mazar [at Karachi] on 14th August 1983, and a letter was issuedtoall[PPP'sformer]MNAsandSenatorstodothesameintheirareas. Thatwasall.NoeffortwasmadetoprepareandinvolvethepeopleofSindh muchlessinanyotherprovinces.Thusaccordingtotheplan,Jatoicourtedarrest at the Mazar on the 14th of August 1983, but was not arrested. The Government allowed the media to give the incident maximum coverage although strictcensorshipisenforcedregardingnewsofMissBenazirBhuttoandBegum Bhutto.HeturnedupatRegalChowkthenextday,andwastakenawayinthe DIGpolice'scarandplacedunderhousearrestinhisDefenceSocietyresidence

... The PPP flag and a black protest flag was allowed to remain on the top of his ... house although it had been transferredinto a sub-jail...697

'ThePatriot'explainedawayJatoi'ssubsequentencouragementofthemovementin Sindh by adding that

Once the London scheme broke down [because of the uncontrollable violence in Sindh], everyonewasonhisown.Jatoichangedhistacticsandtried tosponsor the movement as it was. He mobilized his sons, brothers and hirelings, spending largesumsofmoneytoappeartolead,whileZiasensingextremedanger,turned his army loose on the people.698

695South,December1983,London,('ANationatRisk')p.22.

696ItwascommonlybelievedatthattimethatthewriterofboththeletterswasMumtazBhutto.

697Newsletter of the Sindhi Employees Association. Larkana, titled 'The Truth about the Situation in Sindh' dated November 1983, pp. 1-3 (in my possession).

698'The Truth about the situation in Sindh' by 'A Patriot'. A photocopy this publicly circulated letter came into my possession in March 1984. I most part the wording of this shorter letter and the newsletter of the SindhiEmployees Association. Larkana is identical.

AsthesuspectedwriteroftheseletterswasanavidpoliticalrivalofJatoi'sitisnot possibletoascertainthe truth ofthese accusations. Therewasundoubtedlyacloselink betweenthebureaucratic/militaryestablishmentandJatoiwhichlastedwellafterZia's death.699ButwhetherthislinkwassecretlyenhancedduringtheMRDprotestsonly future historians can decide.

AnotherMRDmembertobelaterpubliclyexcoriatedforhispartintheMRDmovementwasKhawajaKhairuddin.Oneofhisdeputies,SheikhBashirAhmed,a senior vice-president of the Muslim League in 1983, accused both Khawaja Khairuddin and Malik Qasim of being responsible for the failure of the MRD movement. He alleged thatthesetwoMRDleadershad'spied'forthe government.According tohim'any decisionoftheMRD[was]leakedtothe[GHQ]bythealliance'sSecretaryGeneral [Khairuddin],enablingtheregimetoforestallanyactionthattheMRDmighttake'.700BashirAhmedalsoaccusedKhairuddinof tryingto'blacken'theMRD'sreputationby asking the US Consul General to provide funds for the MRD movement.

Whileit would seem unfair to damageKhawaja Khairuddin's reputation on the basisof accusationsmadebyadisgruntledMuslimLeaguer,unfortunatelytherewas subsequentcorroborationofhisratherinvidiousroleinthewholeaffair.Without naming him General Arif states in his memoirs:

TheMRDleadershipcouldnotensurethesecurityofinformationoftheirown actionplans.Thegovernmentusuallyremainedonestepaheadoftheir agitationalactivities.Oneofthetoppoliticalleadersintheirfoldactively cooperatedwithanationalintelligenceagency.TheMRDwasthusparalyzed from within.701

What finally exposed Khawaja Khairuddin was his acceptance of a valuable 5035 square yardcommercialplotoppositetheSabziMandiatKarachi.Thelandhadpreviously beendesignatedasapark.Thepropertywasquicklyre-designatedas'commercial'by theprovincialgovernmentofSindhbeforeitwasdeliveredtoitsrecipient.702

699ItiswidelybelievedthatGhulam MustafaJatoiwasPresidentGhulIshaqandGeneralMirzaAslam Baig'schosen candidate for prime minister at the time of the 1988 elections. Unfortunately their plans came adrift when Jatoi lost the election from his home seat. By the time he go re-elected from his friend Khar's vacant Muzaffargarh seatit was all too late.

700DailyNews,Karachi,12May1986.

701GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.220.

702I have an undated clipping of the Public Notice published in Dawn in the name of the Commissioner of Karachi proposing 'the conversion of amenity plot ST-10 measuring 5034.65 Sq.yds. (For Park) ... for allotment to Khawaja Khairuddin for commercial purpose ... interested parties may file their objections within thirty days', etc. The only date stated in the advertisement is simply the month and the year: April 1984.

AssomeonewhohadaleadingroleinthecreationoftheMRD,aswellasbeingthe ChairmanofthePakistanBachaoCommittee,Iwasgreatlydisappointedwiththe resultsofour1983campaign.ButwithhindsightIbelievethattheMRD,despiteits manyweaknesses,didserveitspurposebycontinuingthestrugglefordemocracy duringthelongestperiodofmartiallawthecountryhadeverexperienced.I.A. Rahman,oneofPakistan'sseniorjournalistsoncedecidedtolisttheMRD's achievements. According to him they were:

1. Itfrustratedtheregime'seffortstoisolatethePPPandliquidateitpolitically.

2. Itdeprivedthe MartialLawregime ofanypoliticalsupportthatcould satisfy the ruler's need for legitimacy.

3. In1983theMRDagitationexposedthesoftbellyoftheStateandforced theMartialLawgovernmenttocompetewiththepoliticaloppositionon the basis of an elected parliamentary system. The August 1983 plan ofphasedwithdrawalofMartialLawwasthedirectresultoftheMRDpressure.

4. Thealliancetookacorrectstandonthe ReferendumofDecember1984 andelectionsof1985.Adecisiontoparticipateintheseaffairswouldhave nullified all the political gains the democratic forces had achieved.

5. Aboveall,theMRDhassymbolizedthedemocraticaspirationsofthe people and their rejection of any surrender of or encroachment upon their sovereign rights. In a country where democracy has never had a chance to grow, this is an achievement of the highest order.703

TheMRDwasinitiallyconceivedonafirmbasisofidealismonly.Whenoneis confrontedwithdespotismrealitymightteachone tobe overly cautious.Butifone desires for a change in that reality, then one's beliefs and how strongly one holds onto them are all that matter. At the time we conceived the MRD I personally did not know what the MRD wouldachieve.All that concerned mewas that Zia's omnipotency had to bechallengedandMRDwastheonlypossiblemeansofachievingit.Evenwiththe benefit of hindsight I still remain convinced that in the absence of the MRD Zia would have been let off the hook completely.

703I.A.Rahman.PakistanUnderSiege,RhotasBooks,Lahore,1990,p.261.

CHAPTER11

FinalYearsinPolitics

After five years of total power the aura of legitimacy still continued to evade Zia, much to his chagrin. As his deputy, General Arif, would later confess:

Power[had]addictedZia.Therewasapinch-themorehewieldedauthority,themoreitcreatedthefeelingofguiltinhimthathewasnotanelected president. He wanted the stamp of legitimacyon his rule, without facing the risk of an election.704

ToovercomethisstigmaZiatookrecourseindevisingnewpoliticalstructurestobolster his position. The PCOof 1981had provided for aMajlis-i-Shooraof 350 membersto be nominated by him, It was a toothless body. As Professor Lawrence Ziring pointed out:

[T]heMajlis-i-Shoorawasnotatruelegislature,norapermanentfixture. Although given the powers to scrutinize the work of an administration, it could neither initiate laws nor demand that itsrecommendations be adopted. Lawmakingthereforeremainedamonopolyofthejuntagovernment,andmartial law rules and regulations were unaffected by the creation of this 'representative'institution.705

BythetimetheShoorahelditsfirstmeetinginFebruary1982itwasclearthatithad faileditpurposes.Despite Zia'seffortstoentice politicianswithfinancialandother rewards'theShoorafailedtoattractevenasinglefront-rankingpoliticianandthus belied Zia's hopes of enlarging his political base'.706

On 12 August 1983 Zia tried to counter the MRD's 14th August protest movement by announcinganewpoliticalblueprintforthecountry.Hisnewplancalledforthe holding of local, provincial and national elections over an eighteen-month period. The national and provincial elections were to be held by 23 March 1985. The scheme also envisagedaPresident with greatlyenhancedconstitutionalpowers andaNational SecurityCouncilmadeupofseniorarmedforcespersonnelandotherofficials.

Anumberofcrucialpointshadbeenglossedover.Nomentionhadbeenmadeabout liftingthebanonthe'defunct'politicalparties.Thecriticalquestionofwhetherthe

704GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.226.

705LawrenceZiring,PakistanintheTwentiethCentury,OxfordKarachi,1997,p.463.

706R.G.Sawhney,Zia'sPakistan,ABCPublishing,NewDelhi,1985,p.12.

electionswouldbeheldunderthenormalparty-basedsystemorona'party-less' basis hadalsobeenleftunanswered.Alsotheissueofwhetherpartiesweretobeallowed, then would all be allowed or only those that been 'registered' with the regime was unresolved.Therulesonqualifyingstandardsoftheeligibilityofcandidateswerenot spelt out either. Finally, there was much concern over the proposed 'National Security Council'.Itscompositionseemedtohavehadbeendeliberatelyleftvague.Mostpolitical parties, particularly those in the MRD which was about to commence its civil disobedience movement, correctly viewing Zia's latest move as a ploy to pre-empt the comingagitation, expressed their hostilitytowards it.

'Zia was a clever tactician who kept his final decisions hidden even from his own advisers.707Whileheovertlyrespondedtooppositionmovesbyconstitutionalchanges, he would also use covert means to keep them at bay. As the existence of the MRD had denied him the chance to isolate the PPP and liquidate it politically, he pursued analternate option. His bete noire was the Bhutto family and for his future well-being, he considereditessentialtodisconnectthemfromthePPP.Hiseffortshadsucceededby mid-1981,whenas mentionedearlier,Nusrat Bhuttostruckadealwiththeregimeto leavequietlyforabroad.ThePPP's questionablecommitment totheMRDagitation in 1983was,inhindsight,duetothefactthatBenazirBhutto,thenunderhousearrest, keptfirmlytohersecretcommitmentandpurposelyduckedfromopeningupanew frontagainsttheregime.Thepublicitygivenbythegovernment-controlledmediato Jatoi,afterhislatereturnfromLondonandhissubsequentmovestocourtarrest,had laidopentheregime'sattempttomanipulatechangesinthePPPleadership.Thefinal act of this secret deal, as confirmed by General Sadiq Abassi, was Benazir Bhutto's unexpectedlysuddendepartureforLondononlyafewmonthslaterinJanuary1984.

***

InearlyApril1984,shortlyafterIwasreleasedfromhousearrest,Ipresidedoverthe NDP's National Executive Committee meeting held at Wali Bagh in Charsadda, NWFP. During the course of the meeting I submitted my resignation as party president on the grounds that the NDP had failed to honor its commitment to the MRD during the 1983 protestcampaign.I believedsomeone hadtoanswertothemembersforthe lapses committedbytheparty'sseniorleadership.Andastheparty'sleaderIinsistedon shouldering the blame for the betrayal of our cause. However, I was prevailed upon to temporarilywithdrawmyresignationforthesakeofpartyunity.Butmymindwas madeup.AfterBilourandKhaliqKhan'slastminutedesertionsatGhaffarKhan's instructions, I no longer felt I could lead the NDP. A few months later on 16 November 1984,atthetimeofpartyelectionsIsteppeddownfrommyofficeandthenofficially proposed Wali Khan for the office of party president. Andso, eightyearsafter founding the party, I happily quit its leadership.

707GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.226.

Havingcommittedhimselftoholdingparty-lesselectionsinMarch1985,Ziawasaware that the formation of a new 'National Assembly' would ultimately lead to a withdrawal ofmartiallaw.Toprotecthimselffromfuture uncertainty on1December1984,Zia announcedplanstoholda referendum. The aimofthereferendumwastogethimself 'elected' as Presidentfor afurtherfive yearperiod after the martiallawwaslifted.

Theludicrousquestionputtovotersonthereferendumwas:

DoyouendorsetheprocessinitiatedbythePresidentofPakistan,General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctionsofIslamaslaiddownintheHolyKoranandSunnahoftheHoly Prophet(peacebeuponhim)andforthepreservationoftheideologyof Pakistan;andareyouinfavorofthecontinuationandfurtherconsolidationof thatprocessandforthe smoothandorderly transferofpowertotheelected representatives of the people?708

UndoubtedlydraftedbyeitherSharifuddinPirzadaorBrohi,thequestionputthe votersinatotalquandary.Iftheyvoted'no'theycouldbeaccusedofbeingagainst Islam,theKoran,theProphetandtheideologyofPakistan.Iftheyvoted'Yes',thenas Ziahadannounced,itwouldbetakentomeananendorsementofthemartiallaw regimeanditspolicies,andfivemoreyearsofZiaasPresident.Iftheabsurd referendumhadnotbeenreinforcedinthebackgroundbythemightofthearmed forces,it mayhave justifiablybeen deridedoutofexistence.

Havingsetthedateofthereferendumfor19December,Ziathenbeganbehavinglike an election candidate at the hustings. He went on a whirlwind 'campaign' tour of all thefour provinces with the local administrations ensuring that there was a heavy turnout atthe meetings. He even cancelled the existing election Rile requiring voters to - produce national identity cards prior to casting their vote. And, to ensure that that there was no publicmoveagainstthereferendum,anumberofhostilepoliticiansweredetained.I was among them.

Asexpectedthegovernmentmachinerywentintoactionandannounceda97.71percent 'Yes'voteandavoterturn-outof62.2percent.709Thetruthwasaltogetherdifferent. Reportsreachingmeassessedtheturn-outtohavebeennomorethan16percent.710

708President's Order No. 11 of 1984, the Referendum Order, 1984.Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary. Part I, of 1 December 1984.

709PakistanYearBook1987-88,EastandWestPublishingCompany,Karachi,p.235.

710According to another source on the Referendum turn-out: 'independent estimates were around 10 to 20 percent, because the response of the electorate was visiblylukewarm'. (Safdar Mahmood,Pakistan Political Roots and Development, Vanguard. Lahore. 1990, p. 242.)

RoedadKhan,whowasthentheSecretaryoftheInterior,himselfwitnessed:

TheturnoutfortheReferendumwasembarrassinglylow.Accompaniedbythe Director,IntelligenceBureau,Ivisitedanumberofpollingstationsinand aroundRawalpindi.Theywerealldeserted.Atonepollingstationforladiesin Lalazar,IcomplimentedthePollingOfficerandherstaffonthequickand efficient disposal of voters in record time as Isaw no voters waiting to cast their ballotpapers. Onhearingthis, theyall said withonevoicethat theyhad notseen a single voter since early morning and had been sitting idle.711

SurprisinglyZiaseemedtohavetakentheresultseriously.Itissaidthatthe ReferendumprovidedZiawithsuchaboostinconfidence thathebegandistancing himself from his military colleagues. General Arif would comment:

ThePresidentfeltgreatlyassuredafterhissuccessinthereferendum.A discernible change appeared in his attitude and style of work. He graduallysidelined the [Martial Law Administrators'] meetings. Their frequency decreased and issues of substance somehow lost their importance and urgency. The [March 1985] elections were due soon but they no longer appeared a priority matter. The governors, keen to discuss election matters with the President, received alukewarmresponsefromhim.Ononeoccasion,GeneralsJilaniandFazleHaq, theGovernorsofPunjabandtheNWFP,virtuallyforcedameetingonGeneral Zia.[Eventhen,themeeting] remainedinconclusive.712

LikealldictatorsbeforehimZiaappearedtohavebecomecocoonedfromreality.He had started believing the inventions spread by his own sycophants and now considered himselftobeanelectedpoliticalleader.Intheendprobablytheonlypersonconnedby the referendum was Zia himself.

Thegeneralfeelingamongpoliticalcircleswasthattheabysmallylowvoterturn-out haddamagedZia'sauthority.On12JanuaryZiaannouncedthatnationalelections would be held on 25 March, followed by elections to the provincial assemblies on 28March. All those who had held office in the banned political parties were debarred from contesting.FourdayslaterZiawithdrewtheserestrictions.ThefollowingdayMushahidHussain,thentheeditorofTheMuslimnewspaperofIslamabad,calledon me.Hussain was convincedthat Zia's position hadweakenedconsiderably as a result of thereferendum.Accordingtohimtherewerealreadysignsofdiscontentwithinthe army and the bureaucracy.713

***

711RoedadKhan,Pakistan-ADreamGoneSour,OxfordUniversityPressKarachi,1997,p.90.

712GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.229.

713Dairyentry:17January1985.

The announcement of party-less elections posed a serious dilemma for some of the members of the MRD. To abstain risked exclusion from a government that might stay in power for years and to participate would have given legitimacy to the regime and the arbitrary constitutional structure forced upon us by the PCO. To my mind the issue was clear.Oneof thecriticaldemandsmade bytheMRDfromitsveryonsethad beenthat fresh and free elections be held under the 1973 Constitution. Consequently, anyassociation with these elections would have nullified theraison d'êtreof the MRD. Yet, ithad already become obvious to us that the public was keenly awaiting elections. Ten monthsearlierRaoRashidofthePPPhadwrittentousfromLahoresaying:

WeagreewithyourhunchthattheJuntaisdeterminedtogoaheadwiththeir12 August formula, but unfortunately Punjab isnot justsleeping, it is preparing to participateintheelectionwithallfervor.Ourassessmentisthatwewouldfindit verydifficulttoimposeorarrangeaboycott.Howeverallthinkingpeoplefeel thatelectionsofthetypeZiaiscontemplatingwouldbedisastrous.Thereforewe must do our best to foil them.714

Sensingthemoodofthegeneral publicsomeoftheMRDpoliticiansseemedtowaver from their earlier commitments. Taking advantage of the situation the regime gave the MRD leaders permission to hold a meeting at Abbottabad on 18 January 1985, thereby enablingthemtodecideontheMRD'sstanceonparty-lesselections. Twodays before themeetingtheordersweresuddenly issued prohibitinga numberof politiciansfrom entering the NWFP province. Among those banned were Jatoi, Khairuddin and myself. ThefollowingdayBizenjocametoseemeonhiswaytotheairportboundfor Abbottabad.Hesurprisedmewiththenewsthattheordersregardingtheothershad beenrescindedand,accordingtohim,JatoiandKhairuddinhadalreadyleftfor Abbottabad. Early next morning I received a visit from the police who served me with yet another notice banning me from proceeding to the NWFP. It seemed that I was the onlyMRDpoliticianbeingofficiallypreventedfromattendingtheMRDmeeting. Obviously something was afoot.

DespiteJatoi'sdenialatthetime,ZiarevealedinalaterinterviewthatJatoiandtwo MRDleadershadbeenincontactwithhim.Infact,theyhadmetwithhimsecretlyon 19JanuaryandpleadedwithhimtogivetheMRDmeetingatwodayextensionsothat thethreecouldgetenoughtimetoconvincetherestoftheMRDleadershipnotto oppose the party-less elections.715According to Zia, he then telephoned the Governor of NWFPandrequestedhimtoholdoffanyproposedactionforafurthertwodayperiod.

714LetterfromRaoRashidKhantothesecretarygeneraloftheMRD,2July1984'.

715Jang, Karachi, 9 March 1985. One of the other leaders was suspected be Khawaja Khairuddin. The identity ofthe third leader remained unknown.

StrandedinKarachiI immediatelyissuedastatement tothePressforcefullyreiterating the MRD's commitment to its fundamental 4-points and stating that any compromise ontheforthcomingelectionswastotallyoutofthequestion.716ItappearedthatIwasnot theonlyoneperturbedbythestrangesequenceofevents.TheBhuttoladiesalsoissued astronglywordedstatementfromLondonwhichhighlightedthe4-pointsandwarned any PPP member who either participated in the elections or offered support to any candidateofinstantdismissal.Whateverhadbeenplannednowcameadrift.That eveningthegatheringofMRDleadersforcefullyannouncedfromAbbottabadthatthe MRDwouldbe boycottingthe'so-called' elections.

Intheearlymorningof18February,eightdaysbeforethescheduledelections,a numberofuswerebackunderhousearrest.Afterthepolicehadsurroundedmyhouse theDeputySuperintendentofJailsarrivedtoannouncethatmyhousehadbeen officiallydeclareda'sub-jail'.Soonthereafterbothmytelephonelineswere disconnected. As the election date neared, more policemen were sent as an extra- precautionarymeasureincaseImanagedtoslipoutandattendanMRDprotestrally.

WhileindetentionIlearntthesadnewsthatoneofmycousins,Saif-ur-RehmanKhan, had died. The following day I heard that Saif-ur-Rehman Khan's brother Anwar-ur-RehmanKhanhaddiedofshockuponlearningofhisbrother'sdeath.Thedouble tragedyasdeeplyupsetting.UnabletotraveltoRojhan,Imournedtheminprivate.It was only after I was released on 28 March that I got the chance to offer condolences totheir immediate families at Rojhan.

***

In the absence of political party 'tickets', there was a large scramble of candidates for election seats. A subsequent chronicler would note:

A large number of candidates were political non-entities who wanted to try outtheir luck in a party-less election. About one quarter belonged to thenoveau richecategorywho[had]madeafortuneduringthelastfivetotenyears.These included [people] engaged in manpower export to the Gulf states, transporters. contractors and middle-ranking traders.717

Mostoftheruralfamilies, involvedastheywereinritualdistrictpowerrivalries,had nominatedtheircandidates.WhiletheJamaat-i-Islamiencouragedtheirpartymento standintheirindividualcapacities,PirPagaroandhisbranchofMuslimLeaguers openlysupportedcandidatesoftheirchoosinginSindh.AllpartieswithintheMRD,

716One ofMRD's 4-points beingthat elections could only be held underoriginaland untampered version ofthe 1973 Constitution.

717HasanAskariRizvi,TheMilitary&PoliticsinPakistan1947-86,op.,cit.,p.247.

along withJUP,boycotted theelections.Butanumber ofself-interested party members broke away from political allegiances to pursue their personal ambitions.

The election campaign was heavily regulated by the regime. The candidates were not allowed to use loudspeakers, hold public meetings or take out public processions. In the absenceofpartymanifestosorpoliticalplatforms,thecandidatesfocusedinsteadon local issues andbiradaririvalries. As a historian later commented, 'Parochial and ethnic considerations, local alliances and local feuds figured prominently in the electioncampaigning'.718

WhilePakistanhashadthemisfortuneofregularlyproducingapoorlotofpoliticians, thebatchofnew1985drafteeswereprobablytheworstonrecord.Mostofthemhad little experience of political concepts, ideologies or dedicated beliefs. In the absence ofparty loyalties a large number of these new entrants were under no obligation to any democraticidealsbutinsteadowedtheirpositions,andconsequentlytheirloyalties,to themartiallawregime.Itwastoproveadisastrousportentforthefuture.

***

Theelectionsweretoprovidemixedresultsfortheregime,andasZiringcommented:

TheZiagovernmentwasdistressedthatlessthantheanticipatedelectorscast theirballots...TheoppositiontookheartfromthefactthatZia'sslateof candidatesfailedtoachievea ringingendorsement,andthatonlytwoof[Zia's] nine cabinet-level officials were successful. Moreover, voters drove from officesomethirtymembers oftheNationalAssemblywho werecloselyidentified with the administration.719

WhiletheMRDconsideredthese1985party-lesselectionsnullandvoid,theydid however provide Zia with some form of dubious legitimacy. There were other benefits for him as well. As a historian subsequently pointed out:

Not only did they provide a new forum for his perpetual state restructuring exercises, but they also gave him an opportunity to split his political opposition between parliamentary and extra-parliament arenas, creating political divisionsand overlapping

political-military alliances that outlasted his rule. Together they made prospects for untrammelled civil rule seem remote.720

718Ibid.,p.247-8.

719LawrenceZiring,PakistanintheTwentiethCentury,op.cit.,p.478.

720PaulaR.Newberg,JudgingtheState,op.cit..pp.189-90.

Zianowfacedthetaskofselectingaprimeministertoheadanewlyformed government.Herequiredsomeonemalleable.Alsorealizingthathehadtosomehow pacify the hostility that had recently been unleashed in Sindh, Zia determined that the candidatewouldhavetobeaSindhi.Twonameswerethenselected:EllahiBuksh Soomro,thesonofZia'ssupporterMoulaBukshSoomro,andMuhammadKhanJunejo, afollowerofPirPagaro.AtaMartialLawAdministrators'conferenceitwassuggested that Zia propose both the names to the new members of the National Assembly, givingthem the option of selection. Both at the Martial Law Administrators Conference and a subsequent meeting, Zia's inner council made clear their preference for Soomro over Junejo.721It appears Zia then endorsed their suggestion but later changed his mind. According to General Arif:

ThePresidentthenmetthePirofPagaroanddisclosedthenamestohim.ThePir of Pagaropleaded thatthe Presidentshould propose only one name, andbeing a well-wisher of the Pakistan Muslim League, he should propose the name of Mr. MuhammadKhanJunejo.PresidentZiaulHaq,disregardingtheadviceofhis colleagues,agreedwiththePirofPagaro.He[had]playedagimmickwithhisstaff.722

In theinterval between theelections andthetimetheNational Assemblywas convened Zia 'revived' the Constitution by issuing a Presidential Order which altered the constitutional structure yet again. His legal team had now formulated provisions that significantly transformed the 1973 Constitution. The changes considerably enhanced the powersofthePresidentattheexpenseofthePrimeMinister.Zia'sapproachcanbe judgedfromtheincidentrecountedbyRoedadKhan,thentheSecretaryoftheInterior:

InanswertomyquestionastowhowouldbetheChiefExecutiveunderthe amendedConstitution,[Sharifuddin]PirzadasaiditwouldbethePrime Minister.Ipointedoutthat,ifthatwastheposition,itshouldbeclearly understoodthattheSecretariestothegovernmentshouldsubmittheircasesto thePrimeMinisterandnottothe President.ThePresidentremarkedthatthe ChiefExecutivewouldbethePrimeMinisterbuthewouldbetheSuperChiefExecutive.723

Soon after the National Assembly met, it timidly agreed to give Zia all the powers hewished to retain for himself and passed an indemnity bill (better known now as the 8th Amendment),retrospectivelylegitimizingallstepstakenbyZiaandhisregimefrom 1977 onwards. It was an indemnity of unprecedented scope in Pakistan's history which changedtheessentialcharacteroftheConstitution.S.M.Zafar,formerlyAyubKhan's

721Zia's inner council consisted of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, General Rahimuddin, General Arifand General Malik Abdul Waheed. (General K. M. Arif,Working with Zia. op. cit., p. 234).

722GeneralK.M.Arif,WorkingwithZia,ibid.,p.234.

723RoedadKhan,Pakistan-ADreamGoneSour,op.cit.,p.91.

Law Minister, accurately predicted that the change would move the government 'from a blackouttoabrown-out,convertingmilitaryruletocivilianmartiallaw.724

Thedraftersofthe8thAmendmenthadalsodisplayedlegalinsolenceofthehighest order by enshrining Zia's name indelibly into the Constitution of Pakistan.725It was probably the only instance in the two, hundred year old international constitutionalhistory where an individual was specifically referred to by name in a constitution. Unfortunately there was little protest from newly elected members of the National Assembly against this constitutional transgression.

Afterhaving forcedthe countrytoundergoparty-lesselections,Ziadidacomplete somersaultbyallowingJunejotoformapoliticalpartywithinparliament.LikeAyub Khan'sgovernment,theregimewaskeentousethenameoftheMuslimLeaguewith thehopeofborrowingtheaurathatwentwithitsnamerightfromMr.Jinnah'sdays. Mazhar Ali Khan later commented:

WhattheMuslimLeaguehasdone(andundone)duringthelastfortyyears makes onethink back totheQuaid's prescience when he decided soon afterthe birthofPakistanthattheMuslimLeagueshouldbewoundupandaNational League formedtobecome the country'sinitialruling party.Thisshowsagain that wherever the Quaid's wishes havebeendisregarded, thecountry has hadto pay a heavy price.726

After Mr. Jinnah's death no one, not even Liaquat Ali Khan, could rightly claim that his versionoftheMuslimLeagueboreanyresemblancetotheoriginal.MazharAliKhan again quite correctly pointed out:

[The Muslim League's] spirit expired long decades ago when it became the handmaidenofthegovernment,anygovernment.Therotstartedwiththe strange principle that the Prime Minister of Pakistan should always also be the President of the Muslim League. And when the party was reconstructed under General Zia's auspices, it was considered useful that the Prime Minister and theChief Ministers should become virtuallyex-officiopresidents of the Central and Provincial Muslim Leagues.727

***

724PaulaR.Newberg,JudgingtheState,op.cit.,pp.190-1.

725'Article 270A (assubstituted by the ConstitutionEighth Amendment Act,1985,section 19): The Proclamation of the fifth day of July 1977, President's Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders, including the Referendum Order, 1984 held on nineteenth day o 1984, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq became thePresident of Pakistan...'

726Viewpoint,25August1988('BetweentheLines').

727Ibid.

ThreeweeksaftermyreleasefromhousearrestIwasfacedwithanothermajorturning point in my political life.

On18April1984atanMRDCentralWorkingCommittee'smeetingheldatKarachi, WaliKhanchosetoannouncethathe wasagainstthe restorationofthe 1973 Constitution and as far as he was concerned the Constitution 'was dead and buried'. A large number of the MRD leaders present, including myself,were left aghast. A number ofthemwalkedoutindisgustandIwastemptedtojointhem.WhenIprotestedto KhaliqKhan,aseniorNDPcolleague,heinformedmethatNDP'scentralcommitteehad metintheNWFPthreemonthsearlierinJanuaryandhadinformallydecidedthata newconstitutionwasnecessary.AmazedatthispieceofinformationIalsothen withdrew from the meeting.

ThateveningIinformedWaliKhanofthegraveembarrassmentthathehadcausedme by repudiating the commitment given by me, on behalf of the NDP, to the FourPointcharteroftheMRD.AspartypresidentIhadbeenauthorizedbytheNDPnational counciltodoso.InfactthespecificreferencetotheConstitution,intheMRD'scharter, asheoughttohavebeenaware,hadbeendraftedbytheNDP.WaliKhanthen regretted his lapse and the following day announced his firm support for the 1973Constitution.

A week later, on 25 April, the NDP's central committee held a meeting at Quetta, whichIattended.AttheeveningsessionIbrieflyabsentedmyselfandwenttooffer condolences to the family of Mahmood Aziz Khurd who had recently died. During my absencearesolutionwaspassedatthemeetingdemandingfreshelectionsforthe formation of a new constituent assembly. Mycolleagues had decided to reject the 1973 constitutionaltogether.Alsoitisunfortunatethatitwasdoneinafurtiveand underhandedmanner.Noonehad thecouragetoinformmeof thiseventwhileIwasin Quetta.Onlylater,whenIhadreturnedtoKarachi,didIlearnaboutit.Iwasdeeply disillusioned,laterevenmoreso,whenaftersixteenmonths,on2August1986,Wali Khan did another volte-face by accepting the 1973 Constitution once again.

The actual issue was that Wali Khan and a number of his close supporters had come to theconclusionthataconfederacywastheanswertotheproblemsfacingthesmaller provinces.Zia'sactofalteringthe1973Constitutionbeyondrecognitionhadprovided them the pretextof doing away with italtogether. Tomy mind a constitution was more than a mere booklet of paper to be throwninto the waste-paper basket after every few yearstobereplacedbyanother.Whilethe1973Constitutionwasbynomeansaperfect document,ithadbeentheonlyconstitutioninournation'shistorythathadbeen unanimouslypassedbyademocraticallyelectedparliament.Andassuch,itwasworthy ofsanctity.Once cleansedofallthetrappingsofdictatorshipthathadbeen appendedtoitbythelikesofBhuttoandZia,itwasstillanobledocument.Ifitdidnot

adequatelyallocatepowerequitablybetweentheprovincesandthecentrethenwith time and proper reflection it could be duly corrected.

For the next few months I remained undecided. I found itimpossibleto reject the 1973 Constitution,andatthesametimetheideaofresigningfromthepartyIhadmyself foundedwasdeeplydisturbing.TomysurprisewithinamatterofdaysIreceived messagesofsupportfromBizenjoand hisPNP.InearlyMay Bizenjosuggestedtome thatNDPandPNPshouldmergetorecreatetheoriginalNAP.Duringasecondvisit, on18May,Bizenjo,probablystillholdingbittermemoriesaboutWaliKhan'spublic chastisementataNDPcommittee meeting in1978,728nowurgedme toannounce a revivalofNAP.Irefrainedfromcommentingandjustlistenedtohim.By27Mayhis message,thistimeconveyedtomebyhisPNPcolleagueYusufMustikhan,waseven more overt: 'Take advantage of Wali Khan's absence abroad.Just revitalize NAP, revive KaswarGardeziaspartysecretarygeneral,andwewilljoinyouasone'.729AsIhave neverbeen inclinedtowardspoliticsofsubterfugeand conspiracy, I justletthematter die quietly.

InthemeantimeIavoidedallpartyactivities.TherewereNDPcentralcommittee meetings held at Peshawar and Quetta that I did not attend. By late July my mind was made up to resign fromthe NDP. Ratherthan shocksomeof my closesupporters and seniormembersofthe party onthe day Iwastomake the publicannouncement,I privately informed them of my decision. On 2 July with deep regret I cut my ties from theNDPandgavemyreasonsfordoingsoinpublic.Inaninterviewgivenamonthlater I tried to summarize my views.

Iwasverydejectedatthemannerinwhichthe1973Constitutionhasbeen brushedaside.Myreactionwasnatural.Ihavealwaysbelievedinthesupremacy oftheunanimouslyadoptedconstitution.Thishasbeentheveryfoundationof mypolitics.ItisthebasicpointoftheMRDdeclaration.FromthePNAtothe MRDwehavebeenpersistentlydemandingitsrestoration.Buttheamendments inthisConstitutionhadnotthenbeenannounced.Inthelightofthissituation, the NDP resolution is meaningless. I am boundby the 1973 Constitution.It bearsmy signature [as well as Wali Khan's]. I cannot compromise on it under any circumstances.IfatthisjuncturewegoagainstthisConstitution,what justificationthenistheretoremainintheMRD.Thiswouldbetantamountto directacceptanceoftheMartialLaw.IamboundbyMRD'sFour-points.Ihave been [Chairman] of MRD's 'Pakistan Bachao' Committee. I have signed its declaration. I cannot overlook it...730

728See,Chapter10.

729Diaryentry:27May1985.

730TheLeader,Karachi,(InterviewbyA.H.Haqani),25August1985.

OnefactthatIcouldnothelpbutpointouttomyformercolleaguesintheNDPwasthatthedemandfortherestorationofthe1973Constitutionwaspartofthefive principalclausesinthepreambleofthedeclarationleadingtotheformationof theNDP inNovember1975.EventheNDP'scommitmenttothe1973ConstitutionintheMRD charter had been endorsed officially by the party. What I did not wish to remind them wasthatwhentheNDPhad beenformed,mostif notall, theprominentmembersofthe Central Committee had noteven joineditasthey had thenbeenlanguishinginBhutto'sjails.

On19JulyIheardontheBBCthatShahnawazBhuttohaddiedinCannes.I remembered him as a young boy and felt saddened by the tragedy that had struck the Bhuttofamilyyetagain.AccordingtoareportIreceivedthefollowingdayFakhri Gulzar. Nusrat Bhutto's niece,upon hearing the news, was said to have remarked that Shahnawazhadbeensufferingfromacutedepression.Shehadalsorevealedthathis marriagehadbeenclosetodisintegrationashiswifewishedtoreturntoherhomein Afghanistan.731Whether hisdeathwascausedby suicideoranaccidentwastilltheend impossibletoestablish.Oneofhisformerassociates,RajaAnwarmentionsthatthis sensitiveyoungsterhadpreviouslysufferedtwonervousbreakdowns.732Itwas reportedthatShahnawazhadtakentocarryingavialofcyanideincasehewasever caught by Zia's men. The vial was found empty upon his death.733

The Bhutto family used Shahnawaz's death as a weapon against Zia by accusing him of beingresponsible.WhenBenazirBhuttoarrivedinPakistanbringingherbrother'sbody forburial, itmadeforapowerfullyemotivescene. Sheattracted enormouscrowds. The sight of the thousands of people thronging to see her made her decide that it was time torenegeonhercommitmenttotheZiaregime.Signsofhernewdeterminationbecame apparentasshebegantakingactivestepstodislodgeGhulamMustafaJatoi'ssenior positioninthePPPhierarchy.InearlyDecemberanexasperatedJatoicalledonmeto complainaboutBenazir'sactions.ItappearedthatBenazirwasbuildinguphisrivals, such asQaim Ali Shah, Khaliquzzaman and others, to weaken Jatoi. According to him thirty percent of recently appointed PPP political office holders in Sindh were from his rivalfaction.734Afewmonthslater,inApril,Jatoionceagaincametoconferwithme. HesaidthataccordingtohimBenazirhadbecomeimpossiblyarrogant.Hesaidthat nowhehadtodecidewhether'tostaywiththePPP,putupwithpersonalitycult worship and be constantly humiliated', or to venture out on his own.735

On10April1986BenazirBhuttoarrivedinLahoreandwasaccordedatumultuous reception.ItwasreportedontheBBCthatsheaddressedthelargestpublicmeetingever

731Diaryentry:20July1985.

732RajaAnwar,TheTerroristPrince,op.cit.,p.191.

733Diaryentry:9December1985.

734Diaryentry:5April1986.

735Diaryentry:19April1986.

held in the city. Excerpts from her speech were also broadcast in which she announced thatifshehadwantedto,shecouldhaveorderedthemassivecrowd,numbering hundredsofthousands,toleveltheProvincialAssemblybuilding,theArmycantonment,andthehousesofthegovernmentministers.Emboldened bythecrowds, she publicly asked Ziato resign forthwith andmade ademandfor immediate elections. BenazirBhutto'smammothgatheringatLahoreservedtounnervethemartiallaw authorities.KhavvajaKhairuddin,whohadcontinuedtomaintainhiscloselinkswiththeauthorities,soonconfessedtomethatthemilitarywasperturbed.Accordingtohim theGovernorofSindh,GeneralJahanDadKhan'seemedquiteworriedatthe tremendoussuccessofBenazir'spublicmeetingsandprocessions,andtheirconsequent impactwithinthecountryaswellasabroad'.KhawajaKhairuddinintimatedthatthe Junta now wanted a unifiedforce of moderatepoliticalleadersto oppose Benazir.736

Benazir Bhutto announced'Black Day' observances in July but as Time reported, 'theralliesgatherednowherenearthemultitudesthathadgreetedBenazironherreturn' only three months previously.737Some of the other component parties of the MRD soon joinedinwiththePPPandalsoissuedcallsforimmediateelections.14August1986 was declared as the starting date for a nationwide campaign of non-violent civil disobedience.Junejo,whoisearliersaidtohaveresistedZia'spressurestoarrest Benazir, launched a crackdown. Soon after addressing an Independence Day crowd at Karachi, Benazir was arrested. The same day hundreds of MRD activists were similarly jailed.Withindaysthemovementgroundtoahalt.

HavingresignedfromtheNDPIwasforthemomentinthesidelines.Whilemy sympathywasclearlywiththemovementIbelievedthatitcouldhavebeenbetterplanned.

Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, a former MRD leader who organized the 1983 demonstrations, said ... that the government's mass arrest of opposition leaders effectively stopped the movement in its tracks. 'The authorities strategy was to preempt the campaign,' said Mazari. 'Benazir Bhutto has played into their hands.The first few days should be when the campaign reaches a peak, but this has not happened. The rallies have been disappointing'.738

AftermyresignationfromtheNDPIkeptmyowncounselforanumberofmonths. DuringthisperiodIreceivedinvitationsfromseveralpartyleaderstojoinupwith them.HavinggivenupontheideaofrevivingNAP,GhousBukshBizenjowaskeen that I join him in his PNP. Asghar Khan personally invited me on two occasions, first, in February1986,andthenafewmonthslaterinAugust.GhulamMustafaJatoiwas

736Time(Asiaedition),21July1986,p.13.

737Asiaweek,HongKong,31August1986,pp.20-21.

738The message was conveyed through Sanaullah, a senior journalist a representative of the newspaperHurriyat. (Diary entry: 15 March 1986).

perhapsthemostenthusiastic,andbeingawareofmysevereallergytohisclose politicalassociateKhar,triedtobringaboutapatchupbetweenusearlier.Kharhad even sent a message to me asking for forgiveness.739While admitting that Khar had behavedbrutallyduringhisdays asgovernorofPunjab,Jatoiplacedthe blame squarely on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's shoulders. According to Jatoi, Khar had only been acting onBhutto's orders. Then he made a very revealing confession: he said that Bhutto had also askedhimtoarrangethemurderofafewpeopleinSindh,butunlikeKharinPunjab, he had chosen to 'decline politely'.740

I also received a message from Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan via an emissary. It wasconveyedthatifIexpressedanysignordesireofjoiningthePDF,NasrullahKhan would visit me in person to offer the invitation. While I appreciated these thoughtful gesturesfrommypoliticalcolleagues.Iwasinnomoodtojoinwithanyparticular party. My recent experience with the NDP had made me wary of making uncautious commitments.AtthesametimeIwasreceivingconstantadviceandencouragement from a variety of other sources. Mahmood Haroon told me that he was seriously contemplatingforminganewpoliticalgroupwithJatoiandme,alongwithFazleHaq, torepresentNWFP,andZafarullahJamali,astheBalochistanrepresentative.741And then there were others like Murtaza Pooya, owner of the Islamabad newspaper TheMuslim, who initially wanted me to bring Asghar Khan's TIP, Noorani's JUP, Fazlur Rehman'sJUI,theMuslimLeagueandtheJamaat-i-Islamitogetheronasingle platform.742But thenPooyachangedhismind afewmonthslater, ashefelt that the masses were 'totally disillusioned with the idea of any new alliance', and stronglyadvocatedthatIformanewparty.Thepressuretoformanewpartyhadbeenbuilding up considerably over the past few months. A large number of senior NDP members, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, were disgruntled with the new leadership and were demanding an alternative.

After the creation of ANP by Wali Khan, the pressure on me increased considerably. It was no longer a question of forming anew party, but of reviving the old NDP. The task hadbecomeeasierbutneverthelessIsoughtadviceofsomeofmyseniorpolitical colleaguessuchasProfessorGhafoorAhmed,MaulanaNooraniandothers.Theyall seemedvery positive aboutthe idea.The only personwhothoughtsomewhat otherwisewastheoctogenarianGhulamFaruqueKhan.HeadvisedmethatIneeded'to make enough money to be in politics'.743His advice, though pertinent, was a bit late forme.OvertheyearsIhadbeensellinglargesegmentsofmyagriculturalproperty simply to stay in politics.

739Diaryentry:30July1986.

740Diaryentry:15July1986.

741Diaryentry:15July1986.

742Diaryentry:18July1985.

743Diaryentry:24September1986.

InlateSeptember1986NDPwasrevivedasapoliticalpartyandon26thofthemonthI was once again elected as its president.

***

Inreturnforpassingthe8thAmendment,thestateofmartiallawhadfinallybeen lifted.Ziahadnow,ashisMinisteroftheInteriorMahmoodHaroonwouldtellme, 'placed himself in a very awkward position'.744With the return to a 'civilian' system Zia soonlearntthathisunlimitedpowershadbeenclipped.Junejowouldnotlethimhave hiswaywhenitcametotheselectionofthefederalcabinet.GeneralArifobserved:

Mr Junejo wanted a maximum number of new political personalities to helpestablishhisowncredibility.SahibzadaYakubKhanwasselected.Junejo acceptedDr.MahbubulHaq,albeitreluctantly.DespiteZia'sinsistence,Mr.JunejodeclinedtoaccommodateDr.Asad.AdejectedAsad,whoseemedtofeel thatPakistanwasworthlivinginonlyasaminister,resignedfromtheSenate and returned to the USA from where he had suddenly arrived to become aminister.745

Zia even found himself blocked when it came to appointing new governors. Once again Junejosuccessfullyimposedhischoiceuponhim.ZiahadwantedretiredGenerals HabibullahKhanfortheNWFPandAtiqurRehmanforthePunjab.InsteadGhafoorHotigotNWFPandSajjadQureshithePunjab.RetiredGeneralMusawasJunejo's choiceforBalochistanandGhousAllShah?theSindhChiefMinisterarranged forthe incumbentgovernor,GeneralJahanDadKhan,toretainhispost.746Thesimmering tensionsbetweenZiaandJunejoweretoonlygetworsewhenJunejostarted'meddling' inarmyaffairs.OnesuchinstancewaswheninMarch1987Junejo,whodisliked General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, had him replaced as Director General of Inter-Services IntelligencewithGeneralHamidGul.747ItmusthaveaggravatedZiaconsiderablyas AkhtarAbdurRehmanwashismostdependableconfidantatthetime.Thenamong otheractionsdirected atthearmy,Junejoproceeded tocausegreatvexationamongthe generalsbyreducingtheirofficiallimousinesizetopint-sizedSuzukimotorcars. Clearly, Junejo was out to prove that he was not simply a product of Zia's martial law.

Having conceded a loss in his powers, Zia still held the most powerful job tightly in his grasp,for,unlikeAyubKhan,hehadrefusedtorelinquishthepostofarmychief. Nevertheless,reportswerearrivingofdiscordevenwithinthearmy.Somesenior

744Diaryentry:15July1986.

745GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.239.

746Diaryentry:7January1986.Theinformationonthegovernor'sappointmentwasgiventomebythethen Speaker's wife, Abida Hussai (Chandi) at Karachi.

747GeneralK.M. Arif,WorkingwithZia,op. cit.,p. 243 and 395 (Gen AkhtarRehman and Junejoapparentlygreatly disliked each other).

generals, by gettingextensionstotheir tenures,had been blocking promotionsoftheir subordinates.WhileZiasolvedthisproblembyretiringthesegenerals,therewasno gettingawayfromthefactthathehimselfwasbyfar theworstculprit. Atthetimeof hisdeathinAugust1988,hehadbeenarmychiefforarecordperiodoftwelveanda half years-over four times the regulation tenure for the post.

There had already beentwominor coup attemptsagainsthim fromwithinthe army: in 1980aretiredMajor-GeneralenlistedsomeofficersinaplantooverthrowZia.Theplot wasuncoveredbeforeitcouldbelaunched.Later,in1984,GhulamMustafaKhar musteredthesupportofnineteenrelativelyjuniorofficers(thesenior-mostbeinga colonel) and travelled to India and obtained a supply of weapons for them. Once again theywerecaughtbefore theycould make theirmove. Nevertheless, Ziawassittingon a potentialpowderkegofprofessionalresentmentforassumingunlimitedpersonal charge of the country's armed forces.

***

The relationship between Zia and Junejo continued to deteriorate. In November 1987 withoutconsultingZiahesackedSahibzadaYaqubKhanasForeignMinisterandtook over the portfolio Tor himself. He then ordered the Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar to discontinuethepreviouspracticeofsendingpapersrelatingtoallimportantforeign policydecisionstoZia.AccordingtotheForeignSecretary,thoughthisnewprocedure wasconstitutionallycorrect,'Ziawasnotusedtothis,itupsethimgreatly'.748Junejo would now try and hijack Pakistan's foreign policy on Afghanistan from the entrenched handsofZiaandhistrustedcolleagueGeneralAkhtarAbdurRehman,theISIchief.

ZiahadbeenresistingthesigningoftheGenevaAccordonAfghanistanbydemanding thatacoalitiongovernmentbeinstalledinKabulaftertheSovietwithdrawal.Accordingtohim,'Thethreemaincomponents-thefreedomfighters,therefugeesand thepresentpartyinpower-shouldformthegovernment'.749Inrealityhewantedthe ISI-controlled seven resistance leaders (who formed the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen) to determine the future fate of Afghanistan. In late February 1988 Junejo circumvented Zia by shrewdly inviting all the opposition party leaders to a round-table conferenceto discuss Pakistan's positionat theGenevatalks.

Junejo'sinvitationtomewasdeliveredbyoneofhisministers,KaziAbid,who, according to my diary:

triestoconvincemeaboutthesincerityofthegovernment.[He]saysJunejois facedwithZia'sattemptstofoistaninterimgovernmentheadedbyMujahideens

748DiegoCordovezandSeligHarrison,OutofAfghanistan,op.cit.,p.258.

749TheWallStreetJournal,NewYork,1December1987(PhillipRezvincorrespondent).

whichiscontrarytotheinitial4-pointdemandsmadeintheGenevatalks.So [theoppositionleaders]mustattendandthushelpinstrengtheningthe democratic process. [The] decision will be made by the government only after consulting all the political leaders.750

WemetatIslamabadonMarch1988.OnthefirstdayoftheconferenceIexperienced severechestpains.AsanearlyresolutiontothequagmireinAfghanistanwasofutmost importancetome,Idecidedthatmyhealthcouldbrieflytakeabackseat.Duringmy stay at Islamabad Junejo solicitously enquired about my health on thetelephone every morning.He evensuggestedthatIbe examinedby amedicalboard,butIdeclined politelyasIwassatisfiedbythemedicalcareIwasalreadygettinginKarachi.Atthe conferenceallthepartyleadersweregivenanopportunitytopresenttheirviews.As expectedthereligiouspartiesfavoredthe representationofMujahideenbutallother partyleadersincludingBenazir,Jatoi(representinghisnewlyformedNationalPeople's Party), Wali Khan, Bizenjo, and myself,weresolidly behind Junejo'smove. Whileoneof themore'progressive'leaderscreatedabriefhubbubwhenhereferredtotheAfghan refugeesas'cowardlydeserters',theconferenceremainedsedateandbusinesslike.To most the turmoil in Afghanistan was not simply a tragedy of a neighbor but a bleeding sore on the body politic of Pakistan. When it came to my turn to speak, I made it clear thatwhileIdidnotrecognizethelegitimacyofJunejo'sgovernment,theissuebeforeus was too vital to ignore because of our domestic political disputes.

The NDP President said that during the conference, he had urged the Government that anyfurtherdelayinsigningtheaccordwouldamounttoplayingwiththevery existenceofPakistan.Hesaidthat[ourfirst]priority...wasthattherefugeesshould returntotheirhomesafelyandinternationalguaranteesbeprovidedtoensurean independent and non-aligned Afghanistan where the people's will should be supreme. HesaidthatafterthemilitarypulloutbytheSovietUnion,acaretakergovernment, acceptable toall concerned, could notonly ensure Afghanistan's journey todemocracy, but also play an effective role in preventing bloodshed.751

In th* end it was the support which Junejo received at the round-table which 'ultimately paved the way for the accord [being] signed'.752Junejo quickened the pace of the negotiationsbyabandoningZia'sdemandforacoalitioninterimgovernmentinKabul. A month later, on 14 April 1988, the Geneva accords were signed by Zain Noorani, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Abdul Wakil, the Afghan Foreign Minister.WhileJunejohadtriumphedatGeneva,thePakistanmilitarypersistedwith theirsingle-mindedaimofsupportingtheMujahideen,inparticulartheHizbeIslamiled byGulbadeenHikmatyar.Later,onceHikmatyarprovedafailure,thearmywould drop him in favor of the Taliban.

750Diaryentry:28February1988.

751Dawn,Karachi.9March1988.

752Time,13June1988,p.21.

Only four days before the signing of the agreement, disaster struck the Islamabad- Rawalpindiarea.On10ApriltheOjhriammunitiondump,themainclearinghousefor USarmssuppliestotheAfghanMujahideen,exploded.Locatedasitwashalfway between the twin cities, there was a very destructive rain of missiles on both IslamabadandRawalpindi.Aboutahundredpeoplediedandelevenhundredwerewounded.A two-manCommissionofEnquirywasquicklyformedunderGeneralImranullahKhan. The Commission submitted its report to a five-man ministerial committee which then submitteditsclassifiedrecommendationstothePrimeMinister.Junejoplacedthe blamedirectlyonGeneralAkhtarAbdurRehmanforselectingsuchadangeroussitein the first place, and then for keeping it in use for so long. General Hamid Gul, as thesuccessortoAkhtarAbdurRehmantothepostofISIchief,gotthelesserblameashe hadonlytaken charge the previous year. Junejo demandedthe resignation ofAkhtar AbdurRehman,whohadbeenelevatedtothepositionofJointChiefofStaff,fromthe armyandthetransferofHamidGulfromtheISI.753

Zia's reply was not long in coming. On 31 May he addressed a hastily arranged Press conferenceandannouncedthedismissaloftheJunejogovernmentandthedissolution oftheNationalAssembly.Thefourprovincialgovernmentswerealsodismissedandthe provincialassemblies dissolvedby the governors.

The decisiontosack Junejowouldprove very costly toZia.By subverting the very politicalsystemhe hadhimselfcreated,he hadweakenedhisposition.Thegeneral public perception was well summed up by theViewpoint:

Itneeds...toberememberedthatifJunejowaspoorprimeministerialmaterial, he was the President's own choice, made with studied care; blame for his faults must,therefore,besharedequallybytheappointingauthority.Further, differencesoverJunejo'sactionsorinactioncannotberegardedasgroundsfor hisdismissalbyanyonewhoacceptedhimastheelectedPrimeMinister,backed byaNationalAssemblythatwassupposedtorepresentthepeopleofPakistan. On the other hand, for the people, the weaknesses and failures of the Junejo Government were certainly not unexpected, because they stem from the strange systemgiventothecountryafterapoliticalelections,withalltheattendant venality and vote manipulation.754

Trappedashewasbyhisown1985versionoftheConstitution,Ziacouldnolonger hoodwinkthepeoplewithpromisesofphantomelections.AstateofMartialLawno longer existed and he was now proscribed by his Constitutionto hold elections within ninetydays.Heformedacaretakergovernmentbyappointingahand-pickedcabinet.

753Independent,London,31May1988,('Ziareviles"Corrupt"CivilianGovernment').

754Viewpoint,2June1988.

HalfthechosenministerswerefromthepreviousJunejocabinet,therebybelyinghis grounds for the dismissal. But with all the power back in his hands the 'old' Zia began to re-emerge.Timereported:

AlthoughZiainitiallyannouncedthatpoliticalpartiescouldparticipatein electionsforanewassemblywithin90days,hesubsequentlycommittedhimself only to adhering to the constitution. His vagueness raised the possibility that he mightyetdeclareastateofemergencyorcallareferendumtoendorsehis continued rule without elections.755

Iwasquotedinthesamearticleassayingthe'pastrecordofPresidentZiashowsthat he does not keep his promises. Therefore, I view his statement about the new electionswith suspicion'.756

Clearly,aftertwelve long yearsthe publicwantedachange.The MRD,particularly BenazirBhutto,wasattractingenormouscrowds.On12JulyBenazirBhuttohada mammothmeetingatMochiGateinLahore.Tensofthousandsofhersupporters bravedthesummerheattohearherspeak.HavingallowedtheformationofMuslim League, Zia could hardly prevent political parties from returning openlyinto the public arena.Hewascaughtinatrapofhisownmaking.Withtheprevailingmoodofthe publicZiariskedincurringseriouspublicunrestifhewentbackonhiscommitment and oncemoreinsisted upon holding party-lesselections. It had becomea very volatilesituation.

Findinghimselfinadilemmahetinkeredaroundwithideas.HeissuedaShariat Ordinance ostensibly toadvance the use of Islamicjurisprudence.Asone commentatorsaid:

... the nomination of unqualified ulema to practice the law or act asamicus curiaeandjudges,ortheinductionofsimilarpersonsasmuftis,willnothelptomake thedispensationofjusticeeithersmoother,speedierormorejust.Apartfrom these important considerations, many observers believe that the whole exercise undertakenbyPresidentZiawithsuchspeedandsuddennessismeantprimarily to put extensive powers in his hands - to be exercised through the President's nomineesonvariouscourts.Thecourtswillbeabletochallengealmostall existinglaws,andifthisisallowedtohappenitcanleadtoutterchaosinall major fields - political, social and economic.757

On20JulyZiadecidedtoannouncethemodalitiesoftheelections.Theelectiondate wastobe16November,whichwas168daysafterthedismissaloftheJunejo

755Time,13June1988,p.20.

756Ibid.

757Viewpoint,23June1988.

government,andinopencontraventionoftheconstitutionalrequirementof90days. Zia justified the delay by asserting that an earlier date was impossible because of the monsoonseason,religious holidays,theabsenceofsome80,000Hajpilgrims,andthe needtoredrawelectiondistrictstoreflectpopulationshifts.Itwaswidelysuspected that thereal reason for thetiming was because Benazir Bhutto was expecting her firstchild at the end of the year. Zia was hoping that being in the late stages of pregnancy, BenazirBhuttowouldbeunabletoundertakeafullelectioncampaign.

Thefollowingdayhedroppedthebombshell.Theelectionswouldbeconductedona non-party basis and candidates would have to run as independents without party affiliations.Whenhe wasaskedbythePresswhetherheexpectedtheoppositionparties toboycotttheelectionsastheyhaddonein1985.Ziareplied,Theywillallconformto the rules that I lay down for the game'.758

Timemagazinereported:

Forcing candidates to run as independents means that in all probability Zia will beabletowinthesupportofamajorityofthelegislatorswithoffersofpatronage andgovernmentposts.'Judgingfromourhistory',saidSherbaz KhanMazari, a leading politician, last week, 'there will be a long queue of politicians willing to sign up with Zia after the elections'.759

With Zia determined to cling onto power, and the mood of the masses clearly aspiring for a change, the future looked very volatile. In the monthsleading up to the November electiontherewasevery likelihood of violentupheavalsintheurbanstreets, withrural Sindhprobablyinthelead.Thepolicewouldbeunabletocope,andthetaskwould havetoberelegatedtothearmy.Thequestionwas:howwouldthetroopsfeelabout quelling riots in the streets of Lahore on the orders of their army chief? In1977 during the PNA uprising, when Bhutto had only held the position of prime minister, the army hadquicklyreacheditslimitsandeventuallyoustedhim.ThoughthePakistanArmy had ahistoryof overthrowingpresidentsandprimeministers,ithad remainedahighly disciplined force.Disobeying the directives of a senior officer, in this case General Zia, the Army Chief of Staff, would have been an act of mutiny.

***

ThedayhesackedJunejo,Ziawentontelevisionintheeveningtojustifyhisactionto the nation. He stated:

758Time,1August1988,p.20.

759Ibid.

[that]thePrimeMinisterwascompelledtosuccumbtounwholesomepolitical pressure,whichledtorampantcorruption,nepotismandmaladministration, finallyleadingtoacompletebreakdownofmoralityandlawandorderinthecountry.760

If he had only added the word 'hypocrisy' to the charge then it would have been tailor- madetofitZiahimself.NeverbeforeinthehistoryofPakistanhadthewheelsof corruption, nepotism and flagranttheftof public property been sowell-oiled as in Zia's twelve-yearruleoverPakistan.HavingtakenpowerbyforceofmilitaryarmsZia remainedinsecurethroughouthisperiod of power. Heplacedloyaltyatapremiumand believed those opposed to him could be purchased at a price. While the fortunes of his family, such as his brother-in-law, soared, he actively bribed politicians with sugar mill licensesandotherinducementstopurchasetheirsupport.Zia'ssupportersalsohada field day. Families such as the Choudhries of Gujrat, the Saifullahs of NWFP, the Sharifs ofLahorewentonabingeofcronycapitalismneverwitnessedbefore.Thecoffersofthe nationalized bankswerelaid opentoanyonewiththeappropriateloyalistconnections. Quietlybehindthescenesthecountrywasbeingbleddrytofattenthefew.Eventhe 'honest'MuhammadKhanJunejowasreportedtohave,withthe helpofabusiness partner, built himself a sugar mill after arranging a bank loan at the lowly interest rate of 3 percent.

Taking shelter behind his regular protestations of Islamic piety, Zia and his close companion General Abdur Akhtar Rehman managed to accumulate the most ill-gained wealthofall.Thedamningevidenceoftheircorruptionwasrevealedbynoneother thanAkhtarAbdurRehman'sson,HumayunAkhtar.ShaheenSehbai,thenthe IslamabadcorrespondentofDawn,writingaboutGeneralAkhtarAbdurRehman, related a revealing incident:

Therichesremindmeofastorytoldby[HumayunAkhtarAbdurRehman]tomeandanotherjournalistfriendintheearlyhoursofonefinemorninginthe fivestarluxuryhotelofIslamabad.Allthree ofuswereingoodspiritsandthe General'ssonwasspeakingmostlyagainstanothersonofaGeneral,hisonetime friend but now deplored foe, Ejaz-ul-Haq.

'What does he boast about? He thinks he has a lot of money. I have made him a politician. I called him from the Gulf to play politics. He knew nothing and had nothing. What if now he has 250 million dollars. Is that all? Look at me. God has givenuseverything.EverythingIsay.Ejazjusthaspeanuts',hesaidthumping his chest with a straight hand.

760Dawn,Karachi,31May1988.

Whenwehadleftthehotel,we werewonder-struckattheaudacity oftheclaim, buttherevelationthatEjaz-ul-Haqwassucharichmanhadbeendrownedwith thethoughtofhowbigthebootywouldbethathedescribedas'everything'.761

Sehbai would repeat the story in his columns on two further occasions.762Later when ShaheenSehbaiwasremindedaboutHumayunAkhtar'srevealingadmissionhesaid:

IremembervividlymyconversationwithHumayunAkhtaronthesubject.It waspublishednotonlytwicebutrepeatedmanytimesinmycolumnsandin others as well. At one stage Humayun virtually begged me to stop repeating it because he was feeling embarrassed. [The] interesting thing is that he never once denied either inheriting themoneyor braggingabout it.763

It is not difficult to imagine where this vast wealth came from. The first real indication I received was when the new US Ambassador, Arnold Raphel called on me in September 1987.764DuringourdiscussiononAfghanistan,hementionedthattheUSgovernment wasdeeplydisappointedtodiscoverthatasignificantportionofweaponrybeing supplied by them for the Afghan cause was ending up in foreign hands. Later I heardreports which suggested that with Zia's blessings General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, his personallychosenISIchiefwithcompleteresponsibilityoverAfghanpolicy,had siphonedofflargequantitiesofUSmilitaryhardware,destinedfortheAfghanMujahideens, and sold to clandestine buyers. In the 1980s the shoulder-fired anti-aircraft Stinger missile was a highly restricted item of export fromthe US. Apartfrom certainNATO powers, only the Israelis had them. TheMujahideensgot them only after much Americansoul-searching.EventuallytheideaofSovietgunshipsbeingshotdownwon the day. Subsequently they were found to be to be in possession of Iran^765and someMiddle Eastern countries. There was a large variety of weaponry for sale and the international arms market were eager buyers.

761Dawn,Karachi. 11June1993,p. 8('Benazir'sfrontfootattack').

762The second time Shaheen Sehbaimentioned the story wasin Dawn,Karachi,16 October 1993,p. 8 ('The Fragile House of Heavyweights'):

Humayun [Akhtar Khan] had all the reason to laugh in the new House, as he had beaten a PPP stalwart, Choudhry Aitzaz Ahsan, buthadearned for himself the name of Humayun Dollar Khan, areference tothe huge trunks of dollar left behind by his ancestors who fought the recent Afghan wars.

By his own account Humayun had once joked about 250 million dollars that another son of a general Ejazul-Haq, gad claimed he had. 'God has given me everything', Humayun had boasted. 'What does Ejazul-Haq have peanuts', he has told me.

Shaheen Sehbai would repeat the story for the third time inDawn, Karachi, 24 January 1995, p. 14 ('Babar Knocks Right-WingersHard').

763E-mailfromShaheenSehbai(DawncorrespondentinWashingtontothewriter,dated28July1998.

764ArnoldRaphel,theUSAmbassadorvisitedmeon22September1987.

765DiegoCordovezandSeligHarrison,OutofAfghanistan,op.cit.,p.316.

Apart from Zia's financial corruption, he was responsible, over a prolonged twelve year period,oferadicatingtheremnants ofwhat Bhutto hadleft ofournationalinstitutions. The Supreme Court and other courts of the superior judiciary were rendered totally ineffectual, the bureaucracy was able to engage in unchecked corruption, the Press was subjugatedbythreatsorgrewaccustomedtobeingwooed,somebymeansof chequebookjournalism,andthearmedforcescameunderabanefulinfluence.A number of senior military officers profited immensely from the opportunities that came theirway.Corruptionhadbynowseepedthrougheverylevelofsociety;from electricity meter readers to high court judges. Businessmen found they could buy governmentpolicydecisionsbyleavingmoney-filledbriefcasesatgovernment ministries and make fortunes by any means other than fair market competition. Therewerenocheckswhatsoever.Thebodypolitichadbeguntorotfromthecore.Allthis was Ziaul Haq's doing.

Lessthanamonthafterannouncingtheparty-lesselectionsZiadiedwhenhisC-130 planecrashedshortlyaftertakingofffromBahawalpur.Anumberofseniormilitary officersperishedwithhim,includingGeneralAkhtarAbdurRehman.Thesuddendeath of Zia who had monopolized the national stage for twelve years left the country in a dazed state.

Among the dead were two Americans, the US Ambassador, Arnold Raphel and General HerbertWassom,headofthe USmilitary-aidmissiontoPakistan.Normallythe US FederalBureauofInvestigations(FBI)hasthe statutory authority toinvestigate suspiciousplanecrashesinvolvingUScitizens.TheFBI'sCounter-terrorismSectionhad alreadyassembledateamofforensicexpertstosearchforevidenceatBahawalpur,but itwastoldtokeepoutofPakistan.InsteadtheUSsentsixairforce accidentinvestigators-andexcludedanycriminal,counterterroristorsabotageexperts-toassistPakistan's official enquiry into the crash.

Relevantsections ofthe365-pagesecretreportcompiledbythesixAmericanAirForce expertswererevealedtoanAmericaninvestigativejournalistandauthorEdwardJay Epstein who wrote:

First, they were able to rule out the possibility that the plane had been blown inmid-air. If it had exploded in this manner the pieces of the plane, which haddifferent shapes and therefore different resistance to the wind, would have been strewnoverawidearea-butthathadnothappened.ByreassemblingPakOne likeagiantjigsawpuzzle,andscrutinizingwithelectron-microscopescanners the edges of each piece, they could establish the plane had been intact when it hitthe ground.

Nor had the plane been hit by a missile. That would have generated intense heat, whichinturnwouldhavemeltedthealuminiumpanels,andastheplanedived, the wind would have left telltale streaks in the molten metal. But there were no streaks on the panels. And no missile parts or other ordnance was found near the crash site.766

Theinvestigatorsalsoconclusivelyprovedthattheplanewasinsoundmechanical order, with all it systems functioning properly. In fact they established that the engines were running at full speed when the plane hit the ground. Furthermore, the pilots were absolved from any error.

Thecrashhadoccurred moreoverinperfectlyclear daytime weather. Andthe pilotswereexperiencedwiththeC-130andingoodhealth.Sincetheplanewas not in any critical phase of the flight, such as takeoff or landing, where poor judgment on part of the pilots could have resulted in a mishap, the investigators ruled out pilot error as a possible cause.767

Intheendtheinvestigatorscouldonlyleadtoonelogicalconclusion:

Having ruled out all mechanical malfunctions that could cause a C-130 to fall from the sky in the mannerPak Onefell, the American teamcould only conclude that'theonly otherpossiblecauseoftheaccidentistheoccurrenceofacriminalactorsabotage leading to the loss of aircraft control.

Theconclusionwasreinforcedwhenananalysisofchemicalsfoundinthe plane's wreckage discovered traces of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), an explosivecommonlyusedbysaboteurs.Aswellasantimonyandsulphur. Pakistani ordnance experts reconstructed a low-level explosive detonator thatcould have been used to burst a flask the size of a soda can, which, the board suggested, could have contained an odorless poison gas that incapacitated thepilots.768

Epstein interviewed several American chemical warfare experts on the poison gasthat may have been used, then added:

thechemicalagentscapableofinstantlyknockingoutaflightcrew,while extremelydifficulttoobtain, arenotbeyond thereachof anyintelligenceservice orundergroundgroupwithconnectiontoone....[T]heAmerican-manufactured VX nerve gas is odorless, easily transportable in liquid form, and a tiny quantity wouldbeenough,whendispersedbyasmallexplosionandinhaled,tocause

766'HowGeneralZiaWentDown',EdwardJayEpstein,VanityFair(NewYork),June1989,p.54.

767Ibid.

768Ibid.

paralysisandlossofspeechwithinthirty seconds.According tothe scientific expert, the residueitwould leave behindwould be phosphorus. And asitturned out,thechemicalanalysisofdebrisfromthecockpitshowedheavy tracesofphosphorus.

Insupportofhiscontentionthatthepilotswererenderedunconsciousordeadby meansofpoisongas,Epsteinmentionsthatcrewmembersoftheothermilitaryplanes inthevicinityoverheardtheconversationthat tookplaceonradio betweenZia'splane andtheBahawalpurcontroltower.TherewasthreetofourminutessilenceafterPak One failed to respond. Then a faint voice in Pak One was heard to call out, 'Mashood, Mashood', which was later identified to be that of Brigadier Najib Ahmed, Zia's military secretary.ThefaintnessofhisvoicewasascribedtothefactthattheBrigadierwould not have been in the cockpit and was perhaps shouting at the crew from the rear.769Epsteinreachedtwoconclusionsfromthispieceofevidence.First,theradiowas workingandhadbeenswitchedon.Secondly,WingCommanderMashood,thepilot (alongwiththeco-pilot,thenavigator,andtheengineer),wasnotheardtorespondto the frantic calls.

GoingbytheUSinvestigatingteam'sreportandEpstein'saccountoftheplanecrash oneclearfactemergesandthatisthatZia'swasasuccessfulassassination.Thisnext leads to the all-important question: Who killed Zia? Not surprisingly there were many theoriesinvolvingtheAl-Zulfikar,Afghanistan'sintelligenceagencyKhad,theSoviet KGB, India's RAW and the US CIA. It is worth examining each theory.

WhileAl-ZulfikarhadalreadymadetwounsuccessfulmissileattacksonZia,itwas strictly a ragtag army. It had access to hand-held surface-to-air missiles but clearly no missiles were involved in the crash of Zia's plane. It is unlikely that Al-Zulfikar had the resources or the contacts to acquire highly restricted nerve gas. By 1988 Al-Zulfikar had very few active members and even fewer international contacts, and despite Murtaza Bhutto'sinitialattemptatclaimingcreditfor theassassination,itwassheerbravadoon hisparttoenhancehisimage.Noonetookhisclaimseriously.Evenwhenhereturned to Pakistan, when he was accused of several acts of terrorism, Zia's death was not one ofthem.

Afghanistan'sKhadmighthavebeenabletoobtainthegasfromtheUSSRbutthe intelligenceagencylackedprofessionalexpertise.Itspecializedinarrestingandbrutally interrogating the perceivedenemiesofitscommunistgovernment.While Khadwas oftenengagedinrecruitingmercenariestoexplodebombdevicesalloverPakistan, theseactsofterrorisminvolvedrelativelylow-techdevices.Asmallexplosivedetonator triggeredbyaplaneincreasingitsaltitudewasprobablybeyondtheiroperatives.

769Brigadier Najib Khan's shout was probably due to uncontrolled 'phungoid' up and down pitching the C-130 was undergoing because of lack of pilot control.Ibid., p. 56.

Besidestheiroperatives,mostly Pathans,wouldhave founditextremelydifficultto breach the army security at Bahawalpur.

TheKGBhadalltheresourcestocarryouttheassassination.AtthetimeofZia'sdeath it was one of the prime candidates. There was a feeling that Zia's role in the USSR's humiliatingdefeatinAfghanistanprovidedtheSovietswithastrongmotiveofrevenge.Thistheoryoverlookedthechangedpoliticalconditionsthencurrentinthe USSR.ItwasaneraofGorbachev'sglasnostandperestroika,theeraofStalinistmentality of terror and brute force was well past. Besides, the desperate economic conditions had placedforeignfinancialaidasoneofthemajorprioritiesofGorbachev'sgovernment.It is unlikelyhewouldhavewishedto haveriskedaninternationalscandalinvolved in killing a staunch ally of the west as Zia was then perceived to be because of his role in Afghanistan. The cutting off of badly needed western assistance because of an act of internationalterrorismwasprobablythelastthingGorbachevwouldhavewantedat this time.

India'sRAWwasanother leadingsuspectin Zia'skilling. Revengefor IndiraGandhi's deathatthehandofSikhnationalists,whohadbeenprovidedwithKalashnikovs, rocketlaunchersandsanctuariesbyZia,wasconsideredtobeaprimemotive.While over the decades intelligence agencies of both countries had engaged in serious acts ofterrorism against each other, neither had ever targeted each other's political leaderships,forobviousreasons.ThereislittleinformationonRAWotherthanthefacttheIndian PressoftenderideditforitsincompetenceandinferiorityincomparisontoPakistan's ISI. RAW could have obtained the vital poison gas but whether it could have found an operativeatsuchshortnoticecapableofbreachingthestrictarmysecuritysurrounding Zia's plane remains open to question.

The final and much-accused suspect was the American CIA. Ziahad been a staunch ally of the USthroughout theSovietoccupationof Afghanistan and it was only during the GenevaAccordsthetwogovernmentsdivergedintheirviews. Besides,intheendthe problemabatedwhentheagreementwassignedafterJunejobypassedZia's intransigence on the issue. There appears to be insufficient motives for the CIA to have been involved. Nevertheless, even assuming there was one, could the CIA havedoneit?

In the 1950s, 1960s and well up till the early 1970s there is no doubt that the CIA was covertlyinvolvedintheassassinationattemptsofseveralinternationalleaders.Ngo Dinh Diem of South Viet Nam (1963) and Salvador Allende of Chile (1973) were two PresidentswhosedeathswereabettedbytheCIA.Inthe1960stheCIAwasalso activelyengagedinseveralunsuccessfulassassinationattemptsofFidelCastroofCuba. In the mid-1970s in the post-Watergate era of weakened executive control and a domineeringCongress,theLegislativebranchesofgovernmentseverelyrestrictedthe

CIA's covert activities.770In 1981 President Reagan issued an Executive Order 12333which said:'Prohibition on assassination.Noperson employedby or acting on behalfof the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination'.771Thedirectivewasveryclearandunambiguous.AfterthatUSattemptstokillleaders such as Qaddafi of Libya (1986) and Saddam Hussain of Iraq (1991) have been blatantly overteventscarriedoutunderexpresspresidentialsanction.So,itwouldappearthat theCIA,withitscovertactivitieshavingbecomeseverelycurtailed,couldnothave donesowithoutincurringthewrathofitsPresidentaswellasitsCongress.

It was reported that in the final weeks Zia had become increasingly insecure and would refuse any engagements outside the capital. He was said to have lost trust in all but the closest of his companions, such as General Akhtar Abdur Rehman. His trip to see the Abrams tank demonstration in Bahawalpur was a departure from recently adoptedpracticeofstayingput in Rawalpindi.Accordingto his son Ejaz-ul-Haq,'his fatherhad been persuaded to go to the tank demonstration that day by his generals, despite hismisgivings'.772

Itwassaidthataparticulargeneral'wasextraordinarilyinsistentinhisphonecalls. [TheMajor-General]arguedthattheentirearmycommandwouldbetherethatday, andimpliedthatifZiawereabsentitmightbetakenasaslight'.773

GeneralAkhtarAbdurRehmanhadnotbeeninvited.AccordingtoGeneralArif,GeneralAkhtarwasexceedinglyeagertogetinvitedonthetriptoBahawalpur.774His sons insist that he was manipulated into going. It is claimed that General Akhtar was advisedbyacolleaguethatZiawasonthevergeofmakingmajorchangesinthearmy andintelligencehighcommandandsuggestedthathiscounselwouldbeneeded.775SonsofbothZiaandAkhtarAbdurRehman,accordingtoEpsteinwhointerviewed them,wereoftheopinionthattheirfathershadbothbeenluredtoBahawalpur.

Zia'splantovisitBahawalpurwasmade withinafewdaysofthescheduledtank demonstrations. His state of insecurity would have ensured that his travel would have beenknownonly toafew people. Itisunlikely thenewswould havereached any of the suspected saboteurs, and if itdid theywould havelittletimeto putany planintoaction onthegroundatBahawalpur.Norwouldtheyhavebeenableto,asEpsteinputsit,'stoptheplannedautopsiesatamilitaryhospital,stifleinterrogations,orforthatmatter,

770In 1950 covert action had taken up to 50 percent of the CIA budget 1975 it was down to about 4 percent: Bob Woodward,Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, Simon and Schuster, UK, 1987, p. 64.

771Ibid.,p.366.

772'HowGeneralZiaWentDown',EdwardJayEpstein,op.cit.,p.46.

773Ibid.,p.42.

774GeneralK.M. Arif,Working withZia,op.cit.,p.405.

775'HowGeneralZiawentdown',EdwardJayEpstein,op.cit.,p.42.

keep the FBI out of the picture'.776Later the original ISI enquiry into the crash was transferredtoaciviliancommitteeformedunderF.K.Bandial.

WhileitishardtofindsolidevidencetoestablishtherealtruthbehindZia'scrash,it does look as if it might have been a surgical coup. And if this was the case then in the absence of proof, it would be unjust to point the finger at those who had invited Zia to Bahawalpur.Theymayhavequitesimply andinnocentlyprovidedotherswiththe opportunity to carry out their plan. If a coup of sorts did take place then it was clearly notanactofambitiousofficerswishingtheirchanceatpower.Itwouldhavebeenmore in a vein of a cleansing of the system. The coup plotters would have believed that they weresavingthecountryandthearmyfromthedestructivepaththatZiawasbentupon takingfollowing Junejo'sdismissal.Zia'srefusaltoyieldcontroloverthecountry,and thearmy,aswellhisaccumulationofvastwealth,hadprobablydamagedhiscase beyond repair.

Ten years after the crash the truth remains buried in a mysterious maze. In his memoirs General Arif berates the subsequent Benazir Bhutto administration for its indifference, quite ignoring that the real power during those days remained vested in the hands of PresidentGhulamIshaqKhanandGeneralMirzaAslamBaig,bothcreationsofGeneral Zia. Perhaps General Arif should have questioned them for their inaction. Were they perhaps wary of stirring up a hornet's nest?

***

AfterthecivildisobediencecampaignofAugust1986fizzledtoahalt,thepolitical parties were forced to go back to the drawing boards. It had become apparent even to BenazirBhutto,thattheabilitytodrawlargecrowdstomeetingswasinsufficientin itself unless it was converted into a movement against Zia. But the time was not yet ripeandit washardtotellwhenthetide wouldturn.

BenazirBhuttovisitedmeinApril1987,inthecompanyofhercousinFakhriGulzar. She discussed some of the problems being encountered in the PPP with the 'leftist and regionalistelements,andhereffortstocontainthem.Shewasarticulateinexpressing herviewsinmattersofdomesticandforeignpolicyandweseemedtoshareasimilarity of opinion on many points. When Benazir Bhutto asked for 'my moral support andappealedformypersonalco-operation',Ireadilyagreed,Thiswouldprovetobethe firstofmanymeetingswewouldhaveoverthefollowingeighteenmonths.777

Having restarted the NDP in September 1986, I was determined the party would chart a distinctcourseofitsown.Allprospectivemembersweretoldincleartermsthatifthey

776Ibid.,p.60.

777DiaryEntry:29April,1987.

wished togetintopower then the NDPwasclearly the wrong political party for them. I even discouraged myfriend Fazle Haq. now retired fromthe army, fromjoining.778The rolefortheNDP;inmyopinion,wasnowamissionaryone.Overaperiodofsixteen yearsIhadestablishedgoodrelationswithpoliticalleadersofmostpersuasions,both religious and progressive. It was the goal of the NDP to play a unifying role among the divergentOppositionparties.Withoutasemblanceofunity,therewaslittlechanceof successagainstZia.And,acommonunderstandingamongpoliticalparties.Iwas convinced,couldonlytakeplacebyageneralacceptanceofthe4-pointcharterofthe MRD,inotherwords,by upholding theoriginalunamendedConstitutionof1973and demanding that elections be held according to its conditions.

InJune1987NawabzadaNasrullahannouncedtheholdingofan'AllParties Conference'(APC).LaterwhenhevisitedmetorequestNDP'sparticipationatthis meetingIdemurred. ThePDFseemedunhappywiththeMRDandfelt that alarger politicalgroupingwasnecessary,andhencehiscallfortheAPC.Itoldhim'thatunless he [was] sure of some positive and concrete results' there was little point in holding anAPC. I warned him that if the meeting 'proved to be of no particular purpose it wouldcreate further public despondency and distrust of political parties'.779Later MaulanaFazlur Rehman and Ghous Buksh Bizenjo made separate attempts to coax me intoattendingtheAPCbutIresisted.Thereasonsformyrefusalwereplain.TheAPChad alsoinvitedthosewhohadparticipatedintheparty-lesselectionsof1985including thosewhoweremembersofZia'scabinet.IntheendtheAPCendedinafiascowith bothWaliKhan'sAwamiNationalParty(ANP)andthePPPaccusingthesponsorsof being in secret collusion with Junejo in trying to sabotage the MRD and creating a larger alliance.DuetotheactionsofsomeoftheseMRDcomponentpartyleaders,theMRD had by now all but collapsed. Subsequently when I met Benazir Bhutto she expressed a feeling of political isolation and seemed convinced that 'the "old guard" of Nawabzada NasrullahKhan,GhousBukshBizenjoandFazlurRehman'wereconspiringagainsther 'in support ofGhulam Mustafa Jatoi'.780Icouldsense hermoodofdeep despondency. A few months earlier she had sent a message asking me 'to take the lead...as she was convinced that the establishment would never allow her to come into power'.781I had quietly declined the offer. It appeared that Benazir Bhutto had decided that I could be trusted as an impartial observer.

ByFebruary1988BenazirBhutto becameevenmoredisheartenedby,what shetermed as, 'betrayals of her party members' and seemed particularly upset with Mir Afzal Khanand Hazar Khan Bijarani for deserting the PPP. She dejectedly, as my diary entry states 'admitsthatitwillbecomemoreandmoredifficulttofind[suitablePPP]candidatesfor

778DiaryEntry:25May1987.

779DiaryEntry:17June1987.

780DiaryEntries:22and24September1987.

781DiaryEntry:2June1987(BenazirBhutto'smessagewasconveyedmebyGhulamFaruqueKhan).

theelections'.782Shewasnottheonlydepressedpolitician.Thepoliticalclimatehad stagnatedsignificantly.ProfessorGhafoorAhmedbelievedthat'Ziawasfullyincontrol'andsuggestedthatIplay'aroleinbringing democraticforcestogether'.783He seemedinfavoroftheJamaat-i-IslamiholdinginformaldiscussionswiththePPPand requestedmyassistance.LaterBenazirBhuttowouldalsoaskmetocontacttheJamaat- i-Islami, JUP and Jatoi's NPP with regard to a proposal asking Junejo for a formation ofa'SupremeCouncil'tosupervisetheelectionsscheduledin1990.784

On29May1988ZiasackedJunejo.ThefollowingdayIreceivedatelephonecallfrom myfriendFazleHaqwhoinformedmethathewasmeetingZiaat10p.m.thatevening andwouldbeappointedasthenewchiefministeroftheNWFP.Hethentoldmethat Ziawishedtoknow,ifIwaswillingtobemadetheGovernorofBalochistanora FederalMinister,asAsgharKhanhadalreadyagreed.IrefuseandtellhimthatI'mnot a sellable commodity'.785

ThedismissaloftheJunejogovernmentandthenewsofimpendingelectionsthrew most political parties in a tumult.

Whilepartiessoonbecameengagedinbusilycreatingelectionalliances,thereremained a strong shadow of doubt about Zia's intentions. In early July Professor Ghafoor Ahmed returned from a trip to the Punjab and told me that the caretaker government, worried about the sudden upsurge in PPP's popularity, was desperately trying to unite all the factions of the Muslim League under a' single banner.786Other reports reaching me hadalsoindicatedthatthepoliticalmomentumwasshiftingheavilyinPPP'sfavor.Given Zia's obsessive hatred for the party it was likely that he would be planning frantically to extricate himself from the situation.

On20JulyZiaannouncedintheeveningthathewouldnotbefollowingthe constitutionalrequirementofholdingtheelectionswithinninetydaysofa government's dismissal, but instead would hold them on 16 November. The following eveningProfessorGhafoorAhmeddroppedintodiscussZia'sannouncementand flagrantviolationofhisown1985Constitution.NeitherofuswereconvincedthatZia had, as yet, revealed his full hand. Partyless elections, we believed, were sure to follow. Shortly afterwards during the same evening, Benazir Bhutto accompanied by Farooq Legharivisitedme.Shewasnowbubblingwithconfidence,undoubtedlyasaresultof themassiveturn-outatherrecentMochiGatepublicmeetingatLahore.ThePPP wanted an election pact that would remain in force even if Zia declared party-lesselections.Ididnotthink,giventheupsurgeinPPPsupport,thatanyoftheotherparties

782DiaryEntry:10February1988.

783DiaryEntry:2February1988.

784DiaryEntry:26May1988.

785DiaryEntry:30May1988.

786DiaryEntry:5July1988.

intheMRDwould object.787Shortlyafterthey leftI learntfromthePressthatZiahad just declared that the elections would be party-less. By now Zia could no longer spring surprises,asforoverelevenyearsweallhadbeengivenaprolongedopportunityto cometotermswithhisdeceitfulnature.Thistimehehadmanagedtoonlypulla shabby looking rabbit out of a moth-eaten hat.

Inthemeantimepoliticalpartiescontinuedwiththeirpre-electionmaneuverings. MaulanaNoorani,duringavisit,bemoanedthathisvolunteerworkershadbeenarmed to protect themselves from the threats they had received from the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM),788nevertheless he was confident of his chances. Karachi by now had unfortunately fallen into a spiral of violence between Sindhi extremists and the Urdu- speakingcommunity.AfterNooraniMian'svisitIwouldnoteinmydiary, 'unfortunately[theoldKarachipoliticians]arelivinginafool'sparadisebynot realizing that the local political situation has dramatically changed in favor of ethnic groups'.789Onthenationalscene,Jatoi,accordingtoProfessorGhafoorAhmed,was trying to use his services to make amends with Benazir Bhutto. And, Asghar Khan, who calledonmealongwithhiscloseadvisorKhurshidKasuri,advocatedtheholdingof 'unity talks of all political parties to at least cooperate with each other during theelections'.790

From government sources I learnt that in Punjab the chief minister, Nawaz Sharif, had privately announced that he would see to it that all the government's nominees were electedwithinthePunjabprovince.Accordingtothemarrangementswere already in place to rig the election results.791But the government party, the Muslim League, then suffered a major setback. A meeting was held of the Muslim League at Islamabad, on 13 August,where'aconcertedbid wasmade by thegangof fourChiefMinisters tocapture theMuslimLeague'.792ViolencebrokeoutbetweenJunejosupportersandthe governmentusurpers.MirAfzalKhan,whowaspresentatthemeeting,wouldlatertell me that total pandemonium prevailed as the party attempted to select a new Muslim Leaguepresident.793Duringthescenesofchaos,severalleaderswerebadly manhandled,includingthechiefministerfromPunjab.Intheendbothsidesretired hurt,anddecidedtosetuptheirownsub-branchesoftheofficialMuslimLeague.

Suddenly,on17August,like aboltfromthe blue,Ziaperishedinhisaircraftnear Bahawalpur.TwodayslaterBenazirBhutto,accompaniedbyFarooqLeghari,and

787DiaryEntry:21July1988.

788NowknownastheMuttahidaQaumiMovement.

789DiaryEntry:28July1988.

790DiaryEntry:4August1988.

791Diary Entry: 4 August 1988 (The information about the Punjab government's election plans had originated from Nasrullah Drishak, the a provincial minister in the Punjab government).

792Viewpoint,8December1988('BetweentheLines').

793DiaryEntry:16August1988.

retiredGeneralTikkaKhan,cametocallonme.794Initiallysheexpressedherangerat the factthatsome MRDleaders,suchasAsgharKhan,WaliKhanandNawabzada Nasrullah,hadoptedtoattendZia'sstatefuneral.Inviewofthewaveofsympathy generated for Zia by the media, by attending his funeral, I told her, the politicians were takingadvantageof thepublicity. Itwasmerepoliticsontheir part. Shedidnotagree withmyview. BenazirBhuttoexpressed her concernabout futurearmyinterferencein politics.Wethenagreedthatallpoliticalpartiesshouldnowbecarefulintheirpublic utterances,adoptamoderatestance,andopenlyextendcooperationtothenew government,therebypreemptinganypossibleobjectionfromthearmedforces.She thenaskedmetoconveyamessage tothegeneralsonherbehalf,sayingthatshewould befarmoreaccommodativeinherpoliticalapproachinthefuture.Surprisedbyher request,IpointedtoGeneralTikkasittingbesideusandsaid,'Youshouldusehim,after all heis a former Army Chief of Staff. Tikkalooked a bit crestfallen, and Benazir Bhutto added, They don't listen to him anymore'.795

Despite Acting-President Ghulam Ishaq Khan publicly proclaiming his commitment to holding elections on 16 November, his actions belied his claim, and disbelief continued toprevail.GhulamIshaqKhan'sdeclarationofastateofemergencywasnotwell received,norwashisdecisiontodelayappointingacaretakerPrimeMinisterand Cabinet.Inthemeantimetheprovincialcaretakergovernments,whichhadbeenwidely adjudged to be partisan, continued to be in office. Within days of Zia's death I publicly castigated the Acting-President for not dismissing Zia's appointees, butto mysurprise thenewspaperstoneddownmycriticismwhenmystatementsappearedinthePress.796For along period uncertainty existed aboutwhether infacttheelectionswould everbe held. As late as 22 September Muzaffar Hussain Shah, who later become chief minister Sindh,meetingmeatadinner,confessedthathewasfirmlyoftheopinionthatthe electionswouldnotbeheld.797Theelectionissuewasfinally resolved bytheSupreme Courtonlyamonthbeforetheywereheld.TheCourtsannouncedthattheelections should not only be held, but be held on a party-basis. Soon thereafter the scramble for party election tickets began.

Zia's unexpected death had also brought about a change in the thinking of some of the politicalparties.WhilePPPremainedkeentocontinuetheirdealingswithProfessor GhafoorAhmed,henowfounditimpossibletocarryonwiththediscussions.The Jamaat-i-lslamihierarchywasnolongereagertoassociatewiththePPP.EvenJatoiwho hadearlierexpressedadesiretoresolvehisdifferenceswiththeBhuttoladieshad changed his mind.

794Though her husband Asif Zardari came along with heras well, he did not participate in any of our discussionsand sat in another room.

795DiaryEntry:19August1988.

796Dawn,Karachi,27August1988andNawa-i-Waqt,Karachi,27August,1988.

797DiaryEntry:22September1988.

AtthesametimetherewereothersoftheopinionthatthePPPwouldsweepthepolls. Thequeuesofprospectivecandidatesat the gatesofBilawalHouseresembleda scene akin to a public fairground. Much to my astonishment a large number of PPP membersevenbeganbesiegingmetointercedeontheirbehalf,andobtainapartyelectionticket forthem,theirsonsortheirnephews.WhenItoldthemthatIhadnothingwhatsoever todowiththeirparty,Iwouldbetold,'Weknowthat,butBenazirlistenstoyou'. Despite the persistence of these people I never passed on their requests. To me nothing could have been more ridiculous.

Ajournalistcommentingonthescenesaid:

Ifthenumberofticket-seekerswasanycluetoaparty'sratinginthepublicthe PPP would easily qualify as the favorite, Sometimes public perceptions becomemore decisive than reality and the PPP has managed to stage a show of its 'grand revival' by opening its doors to all and sundry. Gone are the days when the PPP leadership was choosy and discreet in accepting in its ranks politicians of suspect loyalty; among new entrants are deserters of all hues, vocal adversaries, collaborators of martial law and even those who served as ministers in the Zia regime...[T]he PPP leadership seems all set to play on the government party'swicket,byadmittingalltheelementswhohaveanymeasureofpersonal influence, regardless of their orientation, reputation or track record. The party apparatus is being geared to the requirements of an electoral exercise where big moneyandpersonal influencewill bethe big determinants.798

On 4 October a retiredBrigadier,visitedmy house. Duringour conversation he told me 'TheChiefwantstomeetwithyou!'SlightlyperplexedIreplied'WhatChief?'Witha smile he replied, The new Chief of Army Staff. General Mirza Aslam Baig'. Getting even more confused I asked him, 'Why?'According to the Brigadier, Mirza Aslam Baig was currently meeting leading political leaders. Having always opposed the Army's role in politics most of my life, the idea of meeting him did not enthuse me particularly. I told theBrigadierthatitwouldbedifficultformetotraveltoIslamabadatsuchshortnotice. Remaining unconcerned, he said thattheGeneral was visiting Karachi soonand that I couldmeethimprivatelyathisguesthousewithoutanyonefindingoutaboutit. Meeting Generalssecretly heldevenlessappealforme.Realizing my reticence,the Brigadier asked me to think over it and left smiling with a warning that, 'Notmeeting himcouldresultinalossforyou!'799IneverdidmeetMirzaAslamBaig.Butquite coincidentally,I mettheBrigadier againon7 OctoberasIwas being takeninthrough the front door at Bilawal House, Benazir Bhutto'sresidence,where she had invited me forafternoontea.TheBrigadier,whowasbeingescortedoutbyFarooqLeghari,

798Professor KhalidMahmud,Pakistan's Political Scene 1984-1990,RhotasBooks,Lahore,1990, pp. 128-9 (Excerpt from a newspaper column titled 'The Tricky Game of Political Alignments', written by the author which was originally published on 28 October 1988).

799Hisactualwordswere'Agarapnahinmilaingaytophirapkanuksaanhosukthahai'.

claspedhishandsabovehisheadandsmiledatmeindicatingthatunlikeme,Benazir BhuttohadacceptedtheGeneral'sinvitationtomeetwithhim.Inever did learnwhat wasintheGeneral'smind,buttendayslaterIwasabletomakeafairguess.Atthis stageGhulamIshaqKhanandtheISIwerepreparingthegroundworkfortheformation oftheIslamicDemocraticAlliance,whichwaslaterrenamedIslamiJamhooriItehad (IJI). Why the Generalwishedtomeetwith the targetof the projected alliance seems to be a bit of a mystery, unless he wanted toinvestigate her future plansfor himself.

A fortnight before IJI was officially formed, Fazle Haq, then chief minister NWFP, whoknew what was happening behind the scenes, had sent me a private message that he wantedmetogowithhimtomeetNawazSharif,thePunjabchiefminister.800Fazli knew by then that I might be planning to stand from Rajanpur and perhaps wanted tomakethingseasierformeduringtheelections.Unawareofwhatwasbeinghatched, and reluctant as I always was about backdoor politics, I expressed my reluctance and declined his invitation.

The formation of the IJI was officially announced in the second week of October. It was an alliance of seven parties, of which the government-sponsored Muslim League (Fida group)wasthemajorcomponent,withtheJamaat-i-IslamiandJatoi'sNPPplaying secondfiddle.The remaining fourpartieswere ofnosignificance.The IJI hadbeen createdatthebehestofGhulamIshaqKhanandwithGeneralHamidGul'sISIproviding its full assistance, with the sole intention of opposing the PPP.

While some of the MRD componentpartieswere demanding a larger share of the seats, thePPPrespondedbymakingatokengestureofannouncingthatitwouldnotbe puttingupcandidatesagainstthetopMRDleaders.Thoughtheylaterwentbackon theirword,bythismaneuverthePPPinitiallydefusedtheacrimonythatusually develops in such situations, and successfully overcame the demands that it considered unreasonable.ThePPPalsopromisedtosharepowerwithitsformerMRDalliesifit won the election and left the door open for future cooperation. Having left a few seats for the MRD leaders, the PPP adopted a 'go-it-alone' election policy and confronted the IJI alliance head-on.

OncetheelectionhadbeenannouncedIhadtodecideuponaconstituencytostand from.MyfirstpreferencewasKarachi,asithadbeenmyplaceofresidencesincethe early 1950s, and my second option was from Kashmor-Kandkot seat in the Jacobabad districtofnorthernSindh.TheKashmorarea,whichabuttedmyhomedistrictof Rajanpur, had been part of the original pre-British Mazari Tuman and contained a large population of Mazari tribesmen. Besides the Mazaris in the Kashmor area, there were influentialpocketsofstrongNDPsupportintheKandkotandJacobabadarea.

800DiaryEntry:23September1988.

Rather than choose hastily I let the matter rest until the final dates for the elections were sortedout.InlateJunewhileIwasdiscussingthecomingelectionswithBenazirBhutto at Hakim AH Zardari's dinner at Karachi,she expressedher keenness for me to standeitherfromtheRajanpurseatorfromtheDefence-CliftonareaofKarachi.Whileshe hadmadeitclearthatthePPPwouldnotputupacandidateagainstme,sheconfided that her father-in-law Hakim Ali Zardari was 'pleading' that the PPP election ticket for RajanpurbegiventoAshiqMazari.801Someweekslater,whenIrelatedwhathis daughter-in-law had told me to Hakim Ali Zardari, he became visibly embarrassed and mumbled some non-sequiturs before changing the topic of conversation.802After the elections were over, in December Ashiq Mazari called on me while I was at Islamabad. During our meeting he confessed that he had paid the sum of Rs. 2,500,000 to Zardari to obtain a PPP ticket for the elections.803Later when I mentioned the matter to Zardari, he insistedthathehadacceptedthemoneyasdonationforthePPPpartyfund.

InthemeantimeIhadbeengettingreportsthatmypositionwasextremelystronginthe Kashmor-Kandkotconstituency.Ihadalsobeenreceivingdelegationsofinfluential peoplefromthatarea-suchasDaryaKhanKhoso,MirSunderKhanSunderaniand others - appealing for me to contest from their constituency. It appeared that my likely rivalinthisconstituency,HazarKhanBijarani,wasbesetwithaserioussquabble amonghissupporters.AboutthesametimeIhadalsobecomeconvincedthatMQM's strongethnicappealwasabouttochangeKarachi'spoliticallandscape.Logicdictated that my choice would have to be northern Sindh.

On13Julymyelderbrother,MirBalakhSher,flewfromLahoreandsuddenlyarrived atmydoorstepinsistingthatIstandfromourfamilyseatatRojhan.Hetriedto dissuade me from standing from northern Sindh and told me that our home district wasthe place for me to contest the elections. Having already decided to stand from northern Sindh,Itoldmybrother,itwouldnowbedifficulttoreversemyposition.804

Zia's death on 17 August and the declaration of a state of emergency by the Acting- President created a climate of political confusion. Once the dust began to slowly settle people began to refocus on the 16 November elections.On 23 August I receiveda visitfromShaukatMazari,Ashiq'sson-in-law,andaveteranPPPmember.Hetoldmethat 'his chairperson (Benazir Bhutto)hadhigh regardformeandsays that shewillsupport me from whichever constituency that I decide to stand'.805Much to his relief, and to his father-in-law'srelief,IinformedhimthatIhadnointentiontocontestfromRajanpur.

801DiaryEntry:24June1988.

802DiaryEntry:6August1988.

803DiaryEntry:3December1988.

804DiaryEntry:13July1988.

805DiaryEntry:23August1988.

In mid-September I made a tour of central Punjab where I met with a number of other politicians,includingQaziHussainAhmed,theJamaat-i-Islamichief,whoexpressed greatreluctanceaboutthePPP.Atthesametimeandquiteunasked,hevolunteered that 'he would support me unreservedly' wherever I chose to stand from. From Farooq LeghariIlearntthatmybrotherMirBalakhSherhadbeentryingtojointhePPPbut had been unsuccessful in his attempt. When I met my brother at Lahore he still seemed quiteuncertainabouthiselectionplansbutbythetimeIreturnedtoKarachiit appearedthathehadmadehismindup.MirBalakhShercontactedmeonthe telephoneandinformedmethatheandthetribehaddecidedthatIwastobetheir chosen candidate from the National Assembly seat from Rojhan. I received a number of phonecalls,bothfromhimand,onoccasion,fromhisclosefriend,andmybrother-in- law,AhmedNawazBugti.FinallyIyieldedtofamilypressureandgaveinbyagreeing to stand from Rojhan and contest the Rajanpur seat.

On7October,IwasinvitedtoteabyNusratBhutto.WhenImettheBhuttoladiesI informed them of my late decision to contest the elections from Rojhan and mentioned tothemabout the pressurethathadbeenappliedonmebymybrother.BenazirBhutto expressed her extreme disappointment and mentioned that it was now impossibly late forhertowithdrawthe PPPticketthathadbeenawardedtoAshiq.NusratBhutto becamesomewhatemotionalandsaidthatitwasallaterriblemistake.Theywerekeen thatIrescindmyrecentdecisionandstandfromtheKandkot-KashmorseatasIhad earlierplanned.Buthavinggivenacommitmenttomybrother,Itoldthem,Iwould have to stand by it.

On12OctoberIbeganthe1988electioncampaignfromJacobabaddistrict.Ispentthe dayintheKandkotconstituencythankingallthosewhohadpledgedtosupportmeand torallysupportforalocalNDPprovincialcandidate.Thatevening,atJacobabad,I received a phone call from Farooq Leghari, who as my diary records, was 'pleading on Benazir's behalf to (get me to) contest from the Kandkot seat'.806Despite the efforts of all the NDP party members present there, who were still very keen for me to contest from KashmorKandkot,IoncemoredeclinedBenazir'sappeal.ItoldFarooqLegharito conveymyappreciationtohis leaderforherapparentconcernforme.

IarrivedatRojhanlateintheeveningof13October1988.ThenextdayImetmy brother, Mir Balakh Sher, who, according to my dairy entry for the day, was very 'very enthusiasticaboutmycampaign'.807ThenextdaywedepartedseparatelyforRajanpur forthefilingofmyelectionpapers.Theretomyastonishmentmybrotherfiledhis,as wellas,NasrullahDirshak'snominationpapers(bothonIJItickets),alongwithmine. Ourrelationssuddenlybecameice-cold.Iwastosubsequentlydiscoverthatthe previousnightmybrother'spoliticalassociateNasrullahDrishak,acaretakerprovincial

806DiaryEntry:12October1988.

807DiaryEntry:14October1988.

minister,hadtelephonedhimfromLahoreandinformedhimabouttheformationofIJI. DrishakhadadvisedhimthatinstructionshadbeenissuedinIslamabadrequiringall candidates to join the new alliance to oppose the PPP. All this was unknown to me the following morningaswefiledournominationpapers.ItwasthenthatI receiveda strangeoffer: If Ijoined theIJI, theothertwo nominationpaperswould immediatelybe withdrawn.Theideaofjoiningagovernment-cumISIsponsoredalliancewasan anathematome. Alinehad unexpectedlybeendrawnand itnow appeared that abitter contest lay ahead.

IntheDistrictatusslenowcommencedbetweenthePPPandthegovernment sponsoredIJI.Thegovernment'scandidate,NasrullahDrishak,hadthefullbackingof the district administration andhad a free supply of allofficial resources.The PPP candidate Ashiq Mazari, since his retirement from the bureaucracy had transformedhimselfintoanextremelywealthybusinessmanandwaspouringcroresofrupeesinto hiselectioncampaign.Thechancesofmysuccesswerenownegligible.Iwasleftwith two options. Either I retired from the fray or pursued retribution for the last-minutebreach of faith, by ensuring Nasrullah Drishak's defeat. My nature being what it was, Ioptedtofightsimplytodefeatthegovernment-sponsoredcandidate.

ThemonthleadinguptotheelectionswassomethingIwouldcaretoforget.Itwasa time made of painful memories. I campaigned alone with the supportof justmy sons. TheMazaritribesmenprovedtobemyonlytrueandtrustysupporters,butalarge number of them,lackingnationalidentitycards, were unable to cast their vote.Despite my brother and the rest of the family members actively canvassing against me, I won a commandingmajorityofthevoteintheMazariTuman.Ifeltproudofthatachievement.OutsidetheMazariareaIhadheldlittlehopeasthetwodistrict groupingswereengagedintheirtraditionaldistrictpowertussle.IntheendIlostbyan expectedlarge margin,having receivedfewvotesinthepopulousurbancentresof Rajanpur township and Kot Mithan.808But I achieved what I had angrily sought, which wasthedefeatofNasrullahDrishak.SubsequentlyIalsoensuredthedefeatofthe government-sponsoredcandidatefortheprovincialassemblywhohappenedtobea nephewofmine.IthenreturnedtoKarachiandannouncedmyresignationaspresident of the NDP and my decision to completely retire from politics.

I then realized that I had come a full circle. The journey, that I had started so long ago. full of hopes and high aspirations, had ended in disillusionment.

808Qazi Hussain Ahmed's self-made promise to 'support me unreservedly' proved to be pure fiction. Despite Professor Ghafoor Ahmed's attempts, Qazi Hussain Ahmed and his party instructed their followers in the urban areas of Rajanpur and Mithankot not to vote for me but instead for the IJI candidate.

Epilogue

Theresultofthe1988electionfailedtoprovideamajoritypartyintheNational Assembly. The PPP succeeded in obtaining 92 out of a total of 215 contested seats. In contrast, the IJI received only 54. It is widely believed that the Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the ISI,809who were considered to be the joint-creators of the IJI, had plannedtoinstallGhulamMustafaJatoiasthenewPrimeMinister.Theirhopeshad been shattered by the defeat of Jatoi in his home constituency. Reluctant to hand over powertoBenazirBhutto,thepowerbrokersofIslamabadprocrastinatedforthree weeksbeforegivingintoreality.Eventhen,unknownatthetimetomostpeople,they did so by extracting concessions from Benazir Bhutto, which greatly circumscribed her primeministerialauthority.MatterssuchasDefenceandtheAfghanistanpolicywere to remain outside her orbit of control. Ghulam Ishaq Khan also ensured that the finance policy stayed within the direction of his chosen official. More importantly, the Acting President obtained a firm commitment from Benazir Bhutto that she would ensure his election as President.

IwasinvitedbyGhulamIshaqKhantoattendBenazirBhutto'sswearing-inasPrime Minister. Benazir had alsopersonally askedmetoattend. After many yearsof playing a roleinthestrugglefordemocracyIbelievedthatanewchapterhadbeguninour politicalhistory.On2December1988wewitnessedademocraticallyelectedprime ministerfinallybeingswornintooffice.Aftermanydecadesofhopeitwasaspecial momentof happiness for me. The nextmorning as I was getting ready tocatch an early flightbacktoKarachi,IreceivedatelephonecallfromNaseerullahBabarsayingthat BenazirBhuttourgentlywantedtomeetwithmeat10a.m.thatday.Iarrivedatthe Prime Minister'sSecretariattofindalong line ofministerialaspirantsseatedinthe waiting room.810

WhenImetBenazirBhuttoshesurprisedmebyinsistingthatIjoinherCabinet.I refused but thanked her for the offer. She remained adamant. Finally I told her that as IwasnotamemberofParliamentitwasinconceivableformetojoinanyCabinet.Then she told me that she deeply regretted putting up a PPP candidate against me during the elections,andinsistedthatthemattercouldeasilyberectifiedbygettingmeelectedto theSenate.ButIcontinuedtodemur.BeforeIleftsheaskedmetoreconsidermy decision and insisted that I contact her the following week. During my meeting I found BenazirBhuttotobebitterabouttheelectionresults.ShewasconvincedthatGeneral

809Professor Ziring points out that by now General Hamid Gul 'had developed the ISI into a formidable institution that was relatively free of the Army Chief, General Mirza Aslam Baig's authority': Lawrence Ziring,Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, op. cit., p. 517.

810The waiting number included, as I recall from my diary entry, Aitiza Ahsan, Farooq Leghari, Tikka Khan, Naseerullah Babar and Rao Rashid among others.

Hamid Gul and his ISI had willfully manipulated the elections in line with their secret objectives. Not only did she believe that she had been deprived of a majority in theNationalAssembly,butshewasalsooftheopinionthatthroughtamperingofthe election results in Punjab, the key province had deliberately been placed beyond her politicalcontrol.Expressingadeterminedresolvetorectifythesituationinherfavor, shetoldmethatshewouldbetakingfirmstepstopreventNawazShariffrom becoming the chief minister of Punjab. Farooq Leghari had been assigned the task of wresting Punjab from the Muslim League by trying to cobble together a majority in the provinical parliament.

Later, upon my return to Karachi, when I related the offer Benazir Bhutto had made to me, to my family and friends, many felt that I should reconsider. A significant number of them believed that with my lengthy commitment to democracy I could play a useful advisory role in helping guide the new democratic government over the initial period, butIremainedreluctant.FinallyIwrotetoBenazirBhuttothankingherforheroffer withoutmakinganycommitment.OverthenextfewmonthsIreceivedanumberof BenazirBhutto's emissaries bringing her messages to me.She wanted me to accept the positionofChairmanofaproposedHumanRightsCommission,withtherank ofa federalcabinetminister.I declinedthe offerandinsteadsuggestedthe name ofthe retiredSupremeCourtjudge,JusticeDorabPatel,amanwithimpeccablecredentialsfor the position. My advice was not taken.

A large sectionofthe country waseuphoricwiththe adventofdemocracy andthe arrivalofan'educated'and'sophisticated'newleader.Unfortunatelywithinmonthswe weretoexperienceseveredisappointmentwhenitbecameobviousthatBenazirrefused to adopt democratic practices and hadsuccumbed to autocratic tendencies.

The ChiefMinister ofPunjab,Nawaz Sharif, untilthen,had little to do with national politics.ComingfromaminorbusinessfamilyinLahore,hehadenteredpoliticalaffairs in1982whenhewasappointedaprovincialministerbythemartiallawregime. Favored by General Jillani, then Governor of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif rose to become the province's Chief Minister. Starting with only a seventh-share in a family-owned steel foundry, the Sharif family's business fortunes prospered at an electrifying speed and itsoonbecameoneofthewealthiestinthecountry.AsDawn'sweeklycolumnist, ArdeshirCowasjee,commented...inthefirstplacetheShariffamilywouldnothave beenabletoborrowevenfivepercentofwhattheydidborrowhadNawazSharifnot beenfirstly financeministerofPunjab,then itschiefminister,andfinallyprimeminister of the country, in all of which positions he misused his powers to borrow what was borrowed,toamasswhatwasearned,andtoissueSROs[governmentregulatory orders] for the particular benefit of his family's businesses.811

811Dawn,3January1999,('EndofStory'byArdeshirCowasjee).

GeneralZia'slongperiodofrulebeganabingeofcronycapitalismthatwould eventuallyleadtothecreationofvastsumsofnewlycreatedwealthamongahandfulof families.IthelpeddestroyPakistan'sbankingsystemandlateritseconomy.Unlike Benazir,NawazSharifhadlittlechancetoacquireanunderstandingofthenatureof democracy. At a relatively youthful age he had obtained power as a provincial minister andgrewaccustomedtousingit.WhileBenazirknowinglyfloutedvirtuallyevery preceptofdemocracy,NawazSharifknewlittleaboutthem.Intheensuingstruggle betweentherivals,politicalprincipleswerecastaside.Theapogeewasprobably reachedinlate1989whenamotionforavoteofno-confidencewasfiledagainstthe PPP government in the National Assembly. As Professor Ziring vividly wrote:

Itwassaidthatneverin thehistoryofPakistanhadtherebeensomuchtrading andpurchasingofpartyloyalties.Millionsofrupeeswerereportedchanging hands in the maneuver, and when government overtures sought to win back the defecting members, the more 'vulnerable' were placed in what were described as safehouses,andpoliceescortswerearrangedtoferryMNAsbetweentheirplace ofrefuge and the Assemblyin Islamabad.812

Over the intervening years both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir have had two stints each as Prime Minister. While they may dispute it, their approach to wielding power hasinherently been the same. Both of them have sought to enhance their personal powers whiledisplayingundisguisedhostilitytowardsotherinstitutions.Whetheritwasthe officeofthePresident,theSupremeCourt,thePressortheArmy,nothingwasspared towhittleawaytheirinfluence,viewedastheywereasrivalsourcesofpower. Fortunately while the Press, through its own resilience, still manages to retain a large degreeoffreedom,itsfuturecontinuestobeworrisome.Onetragic resultofthis pursuit of unfetteredpower was unbridledcorruption.As politics were basedsolely upon personal allegiances to party leaderships, corruption remained totally unchecked. With little fear of retribution, corruption entered every sphere of the national infrastructure leading to a virtual collapse of state institutions. The enrichment of a few has left manytensofmillionsofcitizensinastateofwretcheddespair,crushingpovertyand crippling illiteracy.

Tomymindtherehavebeenthreenotableeventsthatdictatedthecourseofour fractured political history. The first occurred in October 1954 when Chief Justice Munir connived with Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and overrode the sovereignauthorityoftheConstituent Assembly.Used to the'steeelframe' oftheBritishcolonial civil service, both men were of the opinion that 'it was not democracy but efficiency in government,astheyhadexperiencedundertheautocracyofBritishIndia,thatwasthe

812Lawrence Ziring,Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, op. cit., p. 519. Also, a member of the National Assembly representing the minorities told me that he was one of those instrumental in distributing cash on behalf of thegovernment.

goalofgoodgovernment'.813ThedismissaloftheAssemblyledtoalengthyseventeen yeardictatorialrulebybureaucratsandgenerals,whichwasfinallyendedbythe tragedy of East Pakistan. The pre-eminent responsibility for this debacle lay with these autocratswhohadpersistentlydeniedtheEastPakistanistheirdemocraticmajorityrights.

ThesecondeventwasbroughtonbyZulfikarAliBhuttohimself.Facedwitha shattered remnant of a country he was given a remarkable opportunity to set it on therighttrack.Instead,inanobsessivequesttoattaintotalandabsolutepower,he destroyed its national institutions and made a mockery of the rule of law by engaging in brutal political victimization of his political opponents and creating a rule of terror in Balochistan. His actions would ultimately lead to creating a political chaos that wouldallow the Army to once more seize the reins of power. The responsibility for the twelve draconianyearsofZia'srulecanquiteproperlybelaidatBhutto'sdoorstep.

The final event was Benazir Bhutto's refusal to abide by democratic principles once she became prime minister in 1988. Despite her insistence that the election results had been manipulated, she did however, opt to accept the restrictions imposed upon her by the Islamabad'srulingestablishmentasaconditionofattainingtheoffice.814Then,rather thanacceptingtherealityandcomingtotermswithNawazSharif,sheelectedto destroyhimpolitically.Leftwithlittleoption,NawazSharifmetherhead-onina viciousstruggleforpoliticalsurvival.Havingthrownthebasicprinciplesofdemocracy to the wind, Benazir Bhutto succeeded in engendering a legacy of political hatred that terminallyweakenedthegive-and-takenatureofdemocraticpolitics.Heractionsledto astateofpoliticalintoleranceandmutualloathingwhichbedevilourbodypoliticto this very day.

Sadly, in recent times Pakistan has been described by some foreign observers as a failed nation state. While this is clearly disputable, nevertheless, the fact that our country is viewedbysometohavebeenafailure,isinitselfadamagingreality.Whowouldhave

813AllenMcGrath,TheDestructionofPakistan'sDemocracy,op.cit.,p.190.

814On 27 June 1990 I had a meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan athis request at the Presidency in Islamabad. At the meeting he told me about his total disenchantment with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. In a nutshell, he said to me:

Benazir hasn't kept to the commitments she made to me when I agreed to her becoming the Prime Minister. And, every time I remind her of the shortcomingsof her government she begins weeping in my presence. My patience has sorely tested and now I am seriously contemplating dismissing thegovernment.

He then asked for my advice. I made it clear to him that, as I was not privy to the innermost details of the functioning of Benazir's government I could not comment on its possible dismissal. But if Ghulam Ishaq Khan was determined to pursue his suggested course of action then it must be 'in total accordance with the 1973 Constitution'. When asked to suggest names for the composition of a future caretaker government, I replied he should choose a small number of 'competent, hardworking and honest people'. Ghulam Ishaq Khan's reply was memorable. He said, 'Tell me where can I find such angels in Pakistan?'

thoughtin 1947, as many of us stood proudlywatching our new national flag fluttering inthebreeze,thatfiftyyearslaterwewouldstoopsolowintheeyesoftheworld. Today Pakistan is widely known for its dishonest leadership, religious intolerance and widespreadviolence.WithinPakistanwesufferfromendemiccorruption,anabsenceof theruleoflaw,lackofcivicfacilities,adisintegratingeducationalsystem,asevere shortageofmedicalfacilities,rampantunemploymentandanearcollapseinlawandorder.

There is a much-quoted story of Mr. Jinnah. He was said to enjoy his Sunday drives in thecompanyofhissister,Miss FatimaJinnah.Duringoneoftheseweekly excursions, hischauffeurdecidedtobreakaredtrafficlightbecauseofthelackoftrafficonlyto findhimselfbeingseverelyadmonishedbyMr.Jinnah.Nooneisabovethelaw,Mr. Jinnah is said to have told him, least of all the Governor-General as he has an exampleto set to others. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah's lesson fell on deaf ears.

Observance ofthe rule oflawservesasabasicfoundationofany moderncivilized nationstate.Evensomeofthemostpowerfulmenin theworld, havefoundthateven theirexaltedpositionofferslittledefencewhentheytransgressthelawsoftheir country.UnfortunatelyinthecaseofPakistanthesituationhashistoricallybeenquite the reverse.

Asearlyasthe1950s,unprincipledpoliticiansrealizedthattheycouldindulgeincrimes such as political kidnappings and other nefarious activities, without fear of retribution, providedofcoursethat theirserviceswereindemandbythegovernment ofthe day.815InSindh.whenChiefMinisterKhurowaschargedwithacrime,hefoundhimself pardonedthemomentGhulamMuhammaddecidedtousehisservicesagainsta recalcitrantConstituentAssembly.ByAyub Khan'stimetheruleoflawwasregularly tested and often found wanting. One needs to look no further than the activities of the presidentialfamilyofthosedays.HissonGoharAyub'sopendefianceoftheSection

144imposedinKarachiatthetimeofthe1965election,whenheledavictory processionthoughtheoppositionbeltinKarachicausedanightofmayhemand resultedinanofficialdeathtolloftwenty,butledtonocensure.EvenGoharAyub's elevationfromthepositionofaretiredarmy captaintotherankofaleadingmagnate with an estimated wealth of US $4 million had the blessings of his father. And yet Ayub Khanwasthesamemanwhoforcedhiswaytopoweratgun-pointwiththeavowed aimoferadicatingthecorrupt'sharksandleeches'.816Clearly,thelawwasnolonger applicabletothoseinpower. Ithad beensacrificed atthealtarofpersonal self-interest. These autocrats were settingexamplesfor others to follow.

815On one occasion the chiefminister of Sindh,Khuro,had theSpeakerthe Sindh Assembly,MirGhulam Ali Talpur, kidnapped. He was subsequently released in an isolated region of Thar near Mithi.

816AyubKhan,SpeechesandStatements,PakistanPublications,Karachi,Vol.1,p.4.

During Bhutto's days the rule of law underwent a drastic rewrite. Now it became permissibletocircumventthelawtooppresspoliticalopponents.Bhutto,asthethen Chief Minister of Sindh, Jatoi's subsequent confession corroborated,817often resorted to orderingthekillingofhisopponents.Thelawhadbecomeaprerogativeofthe powerfulandcouldbeusedatwilltojustifyanyextreme.Whenseniorofficialsofthe PPP began indulging in open corruption, reports of their activities were quick to reach Bhutto.Hechosetousetheinformationtoridiculetheperpetratorsandkeepthemin their place. There were no prosecutions. Bhutto, himself, was subject to charges of corruption.AUSinvestigationofPIA'spurchaseofDC10aircraftsstatedthat 'prosecutors uncovered evidence that senior executives [of McDonnell Douglas Corporation] had paid bribes to a relative of former Pakistani President Zulfikar AliBhutto... The bribes amounted to [US] $500,000 for each aircraft purchased by Pakistan's nationalairline'.818PersistentrumorsovertheyearsalsomaintainthatBhuttopocketed alargeportionofthemillionsofdollarsthatLibyadonatedasearthquakerelieffunds for victims in the northern areas in the early 1970s. Undeniably, after Bhutto's execution, his family could neither have maintained their lifestyle nor their various residences in London, Avignon, Cannes and Damascus, Karachi and Larkana simply from the income derivedfromtheirsmallfarmlandholdingsinSindh.

Zia'stwelveyearsofpowergreatlyexacerbatedtheissue.Insecureashewas.heturned a blind eye to all those who exhibited personal loyalty towards him. During his time corruption became common among those who held senior positions within the government. Ministers, bureaucrats, loyal politicians, businessmen and even seniormilitary officers began enriching themselves often at the expense of the nationalexchequer.Thesecrimeswereforgivableprovidedtheperpetratororhisfamilyhad accesstoZia.Inonewell-knownincidentZiapersonallyintercededwithPresident Reagantogetapresidentialpardonforadiplomatson-in-lawofoneofhissenior officialswhohadbeencaughtsmugglingdrugsintotheUS.Ziawashardlyina positiontocondemntheacquiringofill-gottenwealthconsideringthefactthathewas saiduponhisdeathtohaveleftasumofUS$250millionbehindforhisfamily.His closestcolleagueGeneralAkhtarAbdurRehman,inthewordsofhisownson,lefteven agreaterfortuneindollarsforhisfamilytoenjoy.Self-interestandself-preservation werethetwincatch-callsofthelegacyZialeftforhispoliticalheirs.

EvenPresidentGhulam,IshaqKhan,whohadsupposedlyenjoyedablameless reputation as a bureaucrat, let his personal agenda override the narrow constraints of lawfulauthority.In1990aimingtoenfeeble Benazir inSindh,GhulamIshaqappointed JamSadiq,amanchargedwith,andwidelybelievedtobe responsible forthemurderof sixmen.AtthesametimeheappointedGhulamMustafaKhar,theonlypolitician knowntohavecriminallycollaboratedwithanenemypower,aFederalMinister,

817Footnote,Diaryentry:30July1986.

818Excerpt from: Douglas Frantz and David McKean,Friends inHigh Places. The Rise and Fall of Clark Clifford, Little Brown and Company, New York. 1995, (cited in Dawn, 3 January 1999, 'End of Story' by Ardeshir Cowasjee).

simplytoweakenthePPPinPunjab.Clearly,theruleoflawheldlittlesignificance whenpoliticalvendettaswereinvolved.GhulamIshaqKhandamagedhimselfeven furtherbyexoneratinghissons-in-lawfromtheircriminalactivities.Ononeoccasion thelocalCorpsCommander,GeneralBangash,visitedmeatmyhousebringingafile with him. The file contained what the General referred to as incontrovertible evidence againstIrfanullahMarwatforahostofcrimes,includingachargerelatingtoasordid actofrape.SometimelaterGeneralBangashtoldmethathehadsenttheevidence directlytoPresidentGhulamIshaqKhanafterconsultingArmyChief,GeneralAsif Nawaz. Marwat'sfather-in-law.Ghulam IshaqKhan,receivedthefile andthenensured that nothing evercame out ofthese charges documentedagainst his son-in-law.Once again self-interest and self-preservation prevailed.

DespitetheiraversiontoeachotherthereislittlethatdistinguishesNawazSharifand Benazir Bhutto when it comesto upholding the rule of law. It is a case of tweedledum and tweedledee. At times it becomes an inescapable fact that bothview the country as their personal domainwiththespoilstherewaiting for thetaking.Itisalmostasif they wererivalclaimantsto'thethrone'ofPakistan,withtheirbattlefor'regal'supremacy being waged at every election. That, it would appear, is their only visible concession to the notion of democracy-contesting the elections.

There have been copious reports in both local and foreign newspapers of the vastbank accountsandpropertiesheldoverseasbyBenazirBhutto,NawazSharifandtheir families.819Electiontimebringswithitregularvowsofaccountability,butallthe processes of 'accountability' have proved to be one-sided andlargelyineffectual.There islittle hope,giventhe knownpropensitiesofbothleaders,thatwe canexpectany change in the future.

***

InPakistan'sfifty-oneyearhistory,thecountryhasbeenruledfortwenty-nineyearsby eitherthemilitaryorthebureaucracy.Wehadseveninitialyearsofdemocracyinwhich wesawpoliticiansstruggleamongsteachotherforascendancy.Initiallyitbeganasa strugglebetweenthefederalistLiaquatAliKhanandthePunjabipoliticianssuchas MumtazDaultana.LateritturnedintoaconflictoverthecompetinginterestsofEast Bengal and Punjab. In 1954 thebureaucracyhad assumed control ofthe country under GhulamMuhammadandlaterIskanderMirza.In1958itwasthe turnofthe army generals.UntilDecember1971Pakistanremainedinthepowerfulgripofitsmilitary leaders, aided and abetted throughout by the bureaucracy.

819Benazir Bhutto's spectacular wealth is reported to have been amassed by raking in vast commissions from any project or business that she and he husband, Asif Zardari, could lay their hands on. Using techniques borrowed from the Sharif family, Asif Zardari is reputed to have raised large loans from nationalized banks in the names of front men. This money is said to have been invested in businesses and properties, inducting several sugar mills.

ZulfikarAliBhuttowashimselfacreationofmartiallaw.When Iknewhiminthe1950s he was trying desperately to become elected as a member of the Sindh provincialassembly, but the odds appeared to be against him. It was only by seeking favor from IskanderMirzaandlaterfromGeneralAyubKhanthat heemergedonthenational political scene. He had learnt his politics under the tutelage of an autocratic rule. When Bhuttocametopowerheeschewedhislittlepracticeddemocraticprinciplesinfavorof allthathehadlearntasaministerunderthearmy-bureaucracyruleofAyubKhan.

DuringthetwelveyearsofGeneralZia,Pakistanoncemorecameunderthefirmgripof an Army general who relied upon the bureaucracy to maintain his rule. Even duringBenazir Bhutto's initial stint in power after 1988, the bureaucracy led by Ghulam Ishaq Khanprovedreluctanttoyieldpower.Nawaz,Sharif,likeZulfikarAliBhutto,wasalso acreationofmartiallaw.Unlike Bhuttohedidnotturnagainsthis mentorsbutrelied uponthemtodefendhim.Notsince1977hasanelectionbeenasheavilyriggedasthe onethattookplacein1990whichbroughtNawazSharifintopower.Itwasonlywhen hewishedtoattainmorepersonalpowerthathestruckoutagainsthiserstwhile mentors,whichendedinhissackingbyGhulamIshaqKhanin1993.

ThroughoutthehistoryofPakistanthegeneralsandthebureaucracy,withthetimid acquiescenceofselfservingpoliticians,have largelybeentheunfortunatecauseofthe disintegrationofthesystem.Inheritinganimperialcolonialsystemofadministration, thebureaucracyhasjealouslyguardeditsprerogativesandhasconsistentlyhoardedits colonial legacy. IthasActively aided and abetted every dictatorial ruler probably inthe beliefthatautocraticruleservesonlytofurthertheinterestsofthecivilservice.The blame for the state of the country after half a century of existence weighs heavily uponthem.

Over the years the politicians have much to answer for as well. Mired in politics of self- interest,thegreaternationalinteresthasseemedtohavelargelyescapedthem.Instead of national issues they have concentrated on personalities, provincialism, and obscurantism. Many of them have enriched themselves through selling jobs, illegally acquiring urban property at throwaway rates and obtaining bank loans without any intentionofrepayment.Historicallyalarge proportionofpoliticiansbelongtorural landedfamilies,popularlyknownas'thefeudals'.Thesepeople,beingproductsof district rivalries, are more interested in enhancing or preserving their local power bases rather than seeking any improvements in national welfare. Consequently, they haveeagerly supported whoever happened to be in power in Islamabad rapidly switching loyalties when the need arose. In their devotion to power they have rendered little or no service to the country.

Last, but not the least, is the tragic state of our senior judiciary. Ever since Chief Justice Munir'svoluntarycapitulationtothegovernmentin1954,thejudiciaryhasrarely displayedtheindependencethatisvitalforthefunctioningofajustsociety.Constant

governmentmeddlingintheselectionandpromotionofsuperiorcourtjudgeshas underminedthismostimportantofinstitutions.Itisasadreflectionthatwhenour SupremeCourtwaspubliclyhumiliatedbyanofficiallysponsoredmobattackonits premiseson28October1997,aftereighteenlongmonthsthecourtacquittedeveryone despite strong evidence tothe contrary.In1997we alsohadtosufferapublicspat among Supreme Court judges in the national Press as they warred amongst each other overtheissueof judicial seniority. Undoubtedly, itseverelyundermined theprestigeof thateminentinstitution.WhileatthesametimethepatheticstateoftheHighCourts can perhaps be best summed up by the following report printed in a local magazine:

It is hard to decide what is worse, a lawyer telling a High Court judge that dogs would devour his corpse or the judge snapping back and calling him 'that' dog? This is exactly what happened on October 13th [1998] in the court of Mr. Justice Ehsanul Haq of [the] Lahore High Court... What does it take for two small-time lawyers to disrupt the proceedingsofadoublebenchofahighcourtandabusethehelloutofthesenior judge? A discredited judiciary appears to be the only plausible reason. The erosion of authorityandrespectabilityofthejudiciary,whichbeganinthe1950s,hasstartedto tell. Who is responsible?820

***

Pakistanisdeserve betterthanthe crisesthatare regularlyinflicteduponthem.The peopleofPakistancryoutforhonestyandintegrity.Todaytheyseemtohavelostall hope of a better future. With a hundred and forty million people mired in poverty and illiteracyitisdifficulttoseehowtheissuecanberesolvedquickly.Lookingfora messiahtosaveusisnottheanswer,butanexerciseinwishfulthinking.Whileweneed torein inthe viceregal pretensions of our politicalleadership,wemustwork towards a futurewheretheruleoflawexists.Nopersonshouldeveragaindeemhimselftobe abovethelawoftheland.Toattainthatgoalweneedatrulyindependentjudiciary whichisselectedsolelyonthebasisofintegrityandmerit,andnotonpoliticalpatronage.

We must once more examine whether the Westminster parliamentary system is appropriateforournationallevelofeducationandrefinement.Pakistanclearlylacks thecenturiesoftraditionsandpracticesthatresolutelyobstructanychanceoccurrence ofdictatorialtendenciesinaBritishprimeminister.ArampantPakistaniprime minister, with a subservient majority in parliament disallowing any constitutional safeguards to check him, only provides for an intimidatory government. At best, such a scenario, leads to weak one-man governance. As a noteworthy commentator observed, 'ViceregalismcanpreservePakistan,butitwillnotsustainit'.821Perhapsavariationof

820TheTribune,25-31October1998.Karachi('ACrisisofCredibility'byMuhammadMalickandMubashirZaidi).

821LawrenceZiring,PakistanintheTwentiethCentury,op.cit.,p.614

theFrenchandtheUSconstitutionalmodels,whichprovideforthenecessarychecks andbalances,couldproveto bemoresuitable forourpeople.

Theothervitalaspectofanysuccessfulnationstateisahealthyeconomy.Agood economy means more than a handful of rich politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists and textilebarons.Toattainthislocalbanksmustbeprivatized.Whilethiswill unfortunatelyengenderunemploymentintheshort-term,thebankswillnolongerbe captive tothe whimsof influential politiciansand avariciousbusinessgroups.Needless toadd,publiccorporations,whichhavebeenbroughttotheirkneesby mismanagement, politicalnepotism, over-staffing and chronicinefficiency,alsoneed to be privatized. It will be a painful process but the country can ill-afford the drain on our limited resources if they are not.

Lastly,andperhapsmostimportantly,thefutureofacountryalwaysrestswiththe cominggenerations.Oureducationalsectorhasbeenabysmallyneglected.Nonation caneverhopetosucceedwithtensofmillionsofimpoverished illiterates.Ratherthan squanderwhatlittleremainsofournationalwealthongrandioseprojects,suchas motorwaysandairports,itisvitalthatitbeexpendedonprovidingdecenteducation forall.Whilethepresentgenerationsufferstheiniquitiesofthepastandpresent,we shouldendeavortoensure thatPakistanisof thefutureare betterplaced thanweever were.Wemustneverforgetthatacountryisheldintrustforthegenerationsthatareto follow, for it rightly belongs to them.

Glossary

Ahle Kitab      'The people of the Book'. A term used in the Koran for believers in arevealed religion.

Amanat      Anobjectheldintrust.Also,applies towomenandchildrenheldunder one's protection.

Awami      Relatingtoorbelongingtotheawamorthepeople.

Azaan      Thecalltoprayerproclaimedbythemuezzinofamosque.

Badshah      Asovereignrulerorking.

Balochiyat      TheBalochcultureanditstribaltraditions.

Baniya      A Hindutrader ormoneylender.Originallybaniyawasthe nameof a Hindu trading caste.

Beghairat      Apejorativeterm.Literallymeans'devoidofhonour'.

Bhainjee      An Urduterm ofrespect foran eldersister.Bhain(sister)anditslesser- usedvariation,bhainjee,arecommonlyusedasapoliteformofaddresstowomen.

Biradari      Literally'abrotherhood'.Generallyusedtorefertoacaste,communityor apatrilinialkinshipgroup.MorecommonlyusedinPunjab.

Bolak      AnancientBalochtermforatribeoftheBalochrace.

Budhi      Apejorativetermforanoldwoman.

Chaikhana      Aruralorroadsidetea-house(atraditionalruralgatheringplace).

Cholo      AlongbaggywhiteshirttraditionallywornbytheBaloch.

Dupatta      Alongscarfworn bywomen.

Durbari      Relating to a durbar (a ruler or governor's court) and traditionally used to refertothosewhowouldregularlycollectthere.Nowcommonlyusedas a politically derisive term for sycophants oryes-men.

Farman      Historically,royalsummons.

Fateha      Funeralprayer.

Gaddha      Adonkey,anass,andalso usedinaderogatorywayforastupidperson.

Geydan      Asimple tribal dwellingmadefromtheplaitedleaves ofa particular desert plant.

Gherao      Encirclement, also a form of political or labour protest in which a particularbuilding(orbuildings)issurroundedbybesiegingagitators.

Goondas      Hiredthugsorhooligans.

Hari      ASindhibondedagriculturalworker.

Hartal      Astrike.

Hujra      Segregatedmalelodgingsintraditionalresidences.

Ifiar      ThetimeforbreakingafastduringRamzan.

Jagir      Landbestowedbyaruler,inmostcasesbytheBritish.

Jawan      Youngman,aprivateinthearmy.

Jhoot      Alie.

Jiyeh      'Longlive'.

Juth      AmongtheBaloch,ageneraltermforpeopleofnon-Balochextraction.

Kaffir      Anon-believer.Broadly speaking,someonewhodoesnotacknowledge theonenessofGod,though itsinterpretation canbemore restrictive.

KalimaThebasiccreedofIslam,whichisrecitedbyallMuslims.

Kameez      Shirt.

Karaiz      AnundergroundirrigationsystemofPersianorigin.

Khaddar      Handloomcloth.

Khalifa      TheleaderofallMuslims.ThetermisusedinSindhforanassistantofthe Pir or religious leader.

Kilim      Atribalrug.

Killadar      Theofficerinchargeofafort.

Kuicha      Temporary.

KutchaIlaka      Landsubjecttoseasonalriverflooding.

Lathi      Asteel-tippedcanecarriedbypolice.

Lota      Awatercontainerusedforablutions.Nowalsoaterraofcontemptfor politicians who regularly switch political loyalties for rich rewards.

Lungar      Afreesupplyoffood.

Madrassah      Areligiousschool.

Maghrib      West, also the prayer held after the sun has set in the west, as well as thetime of that prayer (i.e., sunset).

Mahal      Apalaceorlargemansion.Alsousedtobeaterritorialunitintherural area for revenue collecting purposes.

Mahaldar      Arevenuecontrollerforaterritorialunit.

Maidan      Anopenground.

Mal-e-GhanimatAfter conqueringa country,underIslam, it isdeemed lawfultotake possessionofmovableproperty (mal-e-ghanimat)of non-Muslim enemies

fordivisionamongthetroops.One-fifthbetweenrelieffororphans, feeding of the poor and welfare of travellers.

Malik      Avillageheadmanamongthetribal Pathans.Atitleinferiorinrankto that of Khan or clan chieftain.

Mama      Amaternaluncle.

Mazar      Commonly a mausoleum, but in Balochi, a lion. Mir , A Baloch titlederivedfromtheArabicAmir(rulerorprince).Insometribes(suchasthe Mazaris), the paramount chief.

Mirri      TheMir'scourthouse.

Mohib-e-Watan      Apatriot.

Mothabar      AtribalnotableinBalochi,otherwiseanelderorasage.

Mujjahdeen      AnIslamicwarrior.

Mukhtiarkar      Revenueofficialinchargeofasub-DistrictinSindh(equivalentofaTehsildar).

Mukkadam      ABalochclanchieftain.

Munshi      Anaccountanttoruralgentry,incitiesitreferstoaclerk.

Murdabad      'Death to' (a person, etc.).Mureed      A devout follower ofaPir.Namaz      Islamic prayer.

Nath      Anose-ring worn by women. Theterm wasusedfor thewomenpolice force, raised by Bhutto, to lathi-charge women protesters.

Nikah      Islamicweddingcontract, theweddingceremony.PaiyajaamAgeneralstrike,blockingallvehicularmovement.Patwari      A rural revenue officer of junior most rank.

Pukkah      Proper,permanent(asopposedtoKutcha).

Sakhi      Agenerousopen-handedhumanitarian.

Salaam      'Peace', an abridgement of the Islamic greetingA 'Salaamu Alaikum(Peace be upon you).

Sarbara      Theleaderand,attimes,whenatitlecannotproperlybeassumed,aregent.

Sarri      TheBalochwordforadupatta(alongscarfwornontheheadbywomen).

Shalwar      ThebaggytrouserswornbymostPakistanistoday(ofCentralAsian origin and native dress of the Baloch; Pathan and other historical migrantraces from the western borders of the subcontinent).

Sherwani      Afully-buttonedknee-lengthcoat,withatight-fittingcollaradaptedfrom European military tunics, which for the past hundred years has come to serve as the formal dress of most Muslimsin the subcontinent. Buttons were also a western introduction.

Shikar      Huntingofwildgame.

Shikari      Ahunter,alsoaSindhi scheduledcastethatonceusedtodependupon snaring wild animals for subsistence.

Sikha Shahi      OriginallyreferredtotheSikhKingdomofthePunjabunderRanjitSingh and hissons, butlater became synonymous with any repressive regime.

Siyal      ABalochimplyingouterboundariesofkinship.Withinatribeaclan would consider other clans assiyals, but in the larger tribal context each tribe would consider another Baloch tribe to be theirsiyals. The word implies a degreeof'socialequality'as well.A Sirdarofa tribewouldonly consider Sirdars of other tribes to be hissiyals.

Siyali      Atribalconceptofself-esteem,orpride,whendealingwithSiyals.

Syah Kari      Literally'aBlackact'inBalochi.Atermforadultery.Morerecentlythe word has been adopted in Sindh asKaro Kari.

Subedar      Historicallyagovernorofaprovince(subah),laterthistitlewasbelittled by the British who used it in their Indian Army for a 'native' noncommissioned officer of the rank of a sergeant.

Tehsil      Asub-district.

Tehsildar      Arevenueofficerinchargeofasub-district.ThanaApolicestation.

Thanaydar      Thepolicemaninchargeofapolicestation,oftenalsoreferredtoasan SHO (Station House Officer); usually of the rank of an Inspector.

Topkhana      Literally 'CannonHouse'.TheTopkhanaat Lahorewastheheadquarters of the Sikh artillery.

Tuman      TheareainwhichalargeBalochtribeissettled.

Tumandar      The paramount chief of any major Baloch tribe. Originally from the CentralAsian(Mongol)termfortheleaderoftenthousandhorsemenorTuman.

Wadera      Amongthe Baloch a clan chieftain (along withMukkadum). It was adaptedfromtheSeraikiandSindhiwordforvillageheadman.

Zamindar      Untilrecentlyitmeantamemberofthelandedgentry,nowitismore commonly applied.

Zananah      Segregatedlodgingsforwomenintraditionalresidences.

Zindabad      'Longlive!'

Table of Contents

Dedication

Foreword

EarlyYears

1950s-YearsofDisastrousIntrigues

TheAyubKhanRegime

The1970ElectionsandtheirTragicAftermath

EntryoftheCivilianMartialLawAdministrator

BalochistanandtheUDF

BhuttoattheHeightofhisPower

PNAandtheFateful1977Elections

ZiaulHaqandtheRevivalofMartialLaw

MRDandOpposingZia'sMartialLaw

FinalYearsinPolitics

Epilogue

Glossary