

**ADOLESCENTS AND ISSUES IN NIGERIANS NARRATIVES ON CONFLICTS**

**(AIINNOC)**

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 **FORWORD:**

I am very humble to my Creator Almighty Allah, Who, have given me the breezes to breath, life, health, knowledge and making the production of this Book “ADOLESCENTS AND ISSUES IN NIGERIANS NARRATIVES ON CONFLICTS” in to reality. The Book would serve as awareness to the Youth in the tertiary institutions, like University Students, Polytechnics, Collages of Educations, Communities, Societies, Leaders, Preachers, Stakeholders, Political Elites, general public and Africa.

Introduction of the Book, deals with Narrative Issues that lead to the Conflict in the first Republic, from the Colonial Master’s plan to Amalgamate the three region in to one. The Amalgamation Issues that brought various Ethnic groups, Differences Religious Communities and Regions together in to one Single entity, without the concerned of the parties involved. The chapter deals with definition of terms, functions of Narratives and theories.

Second, it deals with the parties involved in the Narrative Issues to their predecessors, when Issues are not properly transmitted, the predecessors would inculcate and act negatively by the process of aggressive behaviour, Conflict and Radicalism.

The Book, tried to bring examples from different parts of the world, Western world, Palestine, Africa and Nigeria to serve as an examples, doctrines and analysis to make Peaceful environments to the populace. Narrative is a double-edge Sword; it depends on how you want use it. When there is good change in Narrative Issues from generation to generation there should be Peace to celebrate and enjoy the day of time. There is nothing like PEACE.

  **THE AUTHOR**

 **Anasin Salisu Muhammad**

 **DEDICATION**

This Book is dedicated to Almighty Allah, “May His Peace be often this Nation Nigeria and the world in General” Who with His Grace and intimate mercy gave me the opportunity, time, health and knowledge to write this Book **(ADOLESCENTS AND ISSUES IN NIGERIANS NARRATIVE ON CONFLICTS** under the sponsorship of **TETFUND** that make it visible,more thanks to **Almighty Allah.**

 **CONTENTS:**

Acknowledgement………………………………………………………………………………………………… i

Foreword……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ii

References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 133

Background of narratives……….……………………………………………………………………………. 1

Historical Issues In Nigerian’s Narratives………………………………………………………………. 2

 CHAPTER ONE:

The Location and Narratives…………………………………………………………………………………… 11

Issues In Narratives………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12

Definitions of Terms………………………………………………………………………………………………. 18

Theoretical Perspectives………………………………………………………………………………………… 25

 CHAPTER TWO:

Narrators and Recipients of Narratives…………………………………………………………………. 40

The Narrators of Issues in Nigerian State……………………………………………………………… 42

Recipients of Narratives Issues……………………………………………………………………………… 64

 CHAPTER THREE:

Internalisation of Conflict Narrative by Adolescents………………………………………………. 73

The Jos Crisis…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 83

 CHAPTER FOUR:

Radicalisation of Issues in Narratives……………………………………………………………………… 88

Cultural Drivers; Religion and Narratives………………………………………………………………… 101

 CHAPTER FIVE:

Analytical Changes in Narratives Issues…………………………………………………………………… 108

Critique of findings with Suggestions of Changes and future Inquiry………………………. 127

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….….……………. 132

Recommendation……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 134

**“ADOLESCENTS AND ISSUES IN NIGERIANS NARRATIVES ON CONFLICTS”**

**(AIINNOC)**

**BACKGROUND OF NARRATIVES:**

Life is a Unique element of Nature,” through the process of being created in Pairs, and We have made your sleep for repose, (“verily”, the creation of each one of you was assembled in the Womb of his or her mother for forty days (first stage of its development as Spam), then it becomes cloud of blood as (second stage of development) in the same way, or in a similar way it becomes foetus (final stage of its development as a flesh). There after an Angel is sent to it, who puts “soul” in to it and he or she will be ordered by four words; Writing about his or her means of living (livelihood) and the span of life, his or her actions and whether he or she will be among the condemned or fortunate ones), have made the night as a dress, the day as the time for the live-hood, built above you the Seven magnificent (heavens) and placed a dazzling light and also send down from the dripping clouds abundant water, bring forth thereby Corn and Herbs as well as gardens of luxurious growth” (Qur’an and Hadish). As human being, the world has been a battle place for violent conflicts, due to frustration, aggressiveness and Radicalsation of behaviours, where criminal activities are taking place, destructions of lives, properties have been the working for the days. These are adduced because of world interest, normally scarce resources and power which led to many violents behaviours, around the tribes, Nation states, continents and the globe at large is not left out from those violents phenomenon as conflicts and Radicalsations of Issues in Narratives. Conflicts Narratives, as well as aggressive behaviours are as old as mankind himself. It is a salient feature of the human existences within and outside their Societies.Men must fight even if they do not possesed arms or when tools of violences are not within reach; and as Morgenthau (1948), posits, when there are no arms to fight, even with their bare fists. From birth, a baby begins the journey of conflict by crying, which is a flash of conflict. As he or she grows up, bites with his or her teeth or scratches with the nails on his or her tiny fingers when upset. This presupposes that men will continue to fight as long as they have emotions that have the potential to love or hate; to be happy or sad; to be pleased or angry. So long as man has other men around him, there will be issues of disagreement, because interest differs and do clash, which may lead to disagreement or confrontation, Conflicts and Radicalsation of Issues in Narratives from generation to generation and from Conflicts to Conflicts.

A Community or Society of men thus creates room for explosive attitudes, which determine the organism’s orientation towards his social and physical environment including himself, for a particular attitude towards a specific stimulus motives arc aroused and action is mobilised to approach or avoid the stimulus. Attitudes indicate the tendency to react towards the object of Narratives in certain specific ways, in other words, it is a predisposition to act in a certain manner towards the attitude object which determine Issues in Nigerian Narrative. Attitude and Narrative can be changed depending upon the circumstances, experiences and how information’s can pass through various processes of communication or through direct interaction. This is known by observing the behaviour of an individual, what he says he will do or actually how he behaves, does or reacts in relationship with radicalsation in conflitc. These lead to human memory and Narration are important concept in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Our brain is actively engaged in functions of learning and memorization, which lead to conflict narrative on aggressive behaviour among post crisis Adolescent in Nigeria, especially Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau state. Plateau State is recognised as one of the most diverse state in Nigeria with over 50 different ethnic groups and up to 40 languages. Plateau state with seventeen Local Government Councils, while the Area of the study was one of the three Senatorial Zone in the State, the Northern Senatorial Zone, with six Local Councils, which are Bassa, Jos North, Jos East, Jos South, Riyom and Barikin-Ladi. In many ways it is a microcosm of Nigeria and the conflict in the Plateau reflects wider divisions and tensions across the country. Plateau State in particular, the main city of Jos had experienced several series of outbreaks of violence over the years, which had resulted in at least 7,000 deaths and the displacement of up to a quarter of a million people. The situation in Plateau had implications for ethnic relations across the Communities, state, Country and in this context the work of Search for how to minimize terrible Narratives that led to Aggressive Behaviour among post Crisis Adolescents within the Zone and the state in general, possibly Nigeria where the general Narrative is affecting the Nation.

**HISTORICAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN’S NARRATIVES**

Storytelling or Narrative is one of the oldest methods of interaction and communication in human history. Before the advent of the written word, historical events were transmitted to future generations through the use of compelling stories. A significant approach of human capacity was the ability to preserve its historical heritage using narratives. Every civilization has a historical and cultural heritage which people hold dear (Nduka, 2014), and transmitting history and cultural heritage through the oral tradition of storytelling is a common phenomenon of human practice. This shared way of knowledge not only details life’s events but also preserves the history of people and societies from one generation to another.

As an instructional approach, storytelling has broad applicability in human learning both for children (Amali, 2014) and adults (Tate, 2004). The strong sense of emotional appeal and personal experience that is incorporated into storytelling makes it an appealing method in adult learning and instruction (Rossiter, 2002). Storytelling motivates learners as well as helps them access, express, and retain information and knowledge (Pfahl & Wiessner, 2007). It promotes brain-based learning and reflective thinking (Tate, 2004). Through storytelling, people and societies around the world learn, develop the codes of behaviour, and formulate meaning-making in their lives (Adichie, 2013).

Mbiti (1966) observed: Stories are to a certain extent the mirror of life; they reflect what the people do, what they think, how they live and have lived, their values, their joys and their sorrows. The stories are also a means of articulating man’s [sic] response to his [sic] environment. Storytelling is universal and is popular in many cultures where it became the medium the people used to preserve their beliefs, social values, wisdom, and cultural experiences as well as to transfer them from one generation to another.

In an informal and formal settings, the telling or Narrating of stories in Nigeria is and was used by professional narrators, educators, and parents to teach respect, moral instruction, norms, societal values, and preservation of the historical, cultural customs (Gardner, 1990). In other words, Narrative was used to preserve the identity of the people. Storytelling was also used to promote listening skills among young Nigerians. As Oduolowu and Oluwakemi (2014) stated, in the traditional African environment, specifically Nigeria, young children were told stories in the form of oral narratives by parents, grandparents, uncles and aunts. In this way, the younger offspring were able to learn how to obey instructions from their elders by practicing listening skills and learning about their heritage. For adult listeners, stories were used to depict the wisdom, knowledge, and power of elders.

These stories or narrative sometimes incorporated proverbs, which are short, memorable sayings that express a belief or piece of advice. “These words are words of ‘experts’ from a continuum that stretches from the ancestors to elders in the community” (Avoseh, 2013) In fact, ancestors are considered to have “intellectual ownership of proverbs” (Avoseh, 2013). Proverbs can be used for admonition, to warn of impending danger, or for counseling and encouragement depending on the context.

Adolescents and issues in nigerian’s narratives on conflicts were formed, from the instants of amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 by Lord Luggard, the first High Commissioner of Nigeria from 1900 to 1906. Lugard had created the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900 with headquarters at Lokoja (later moved to Jaba) which was soon abandoned, then to Zungeru, and finally settled at Kaduna. Lugard returned in 1912 as Governor of Northern and Southern Nigeria, eventually carrying out the amalgamation of 1914; and thereafter continued as Governor-General of amalgamated Nigeria from 1914 to 1918 (Geary, 1965). The amalgamation was conceived in the minds of the British with little or no input from the Nigerian people and the leaders of the time. Indeed, many were unaware of what was going on, and the implications for nationhood in the future.

The amalgamation was a process that brought the Northern and Southern Protectorates together under one Administration. The act fused various kingdoms, notably Kanem-Borno, the Fulani/Dan Fodio Empire, Benin Empire, Kingdom of Ife and Oyo Empire. Other city-states of the Niger Delta which had emerged in response to the demand for slaves and later palm oil (Bonny, New Calabar, Okrika, Brass, Warri, etc,), the Igbo polities of the South-East were part of the union, and so were the small ethnic groups of the Plateau and others that were not part of any of these prominent empires (Crowder, 1966). The north had a legacy of Emirate system of Administration, covered a Significant area of the region, albeit with numbers of non-Muslims displaying resistance to the emirate system. Suffice it to add narrative also, that the Islamic North was extremely proud of its Islamic legacy and the part of Christians misunderstanding the history and the meaning of Jihad, along with its gains, triumphs, glory and all it conveyed. “Jihad, can be defined as the process of achieving means or Gold through legal process.” It could be legal feeding, legal earning, legal traveling and legal process to convert some one as non believer to be a believer in an Islam way of religion pracitce, without the use of force. Indirect Rule was therefore, a key psychological and political setback from the point of view of the Christians narrative under the leadership of Sokoto Caliphate after 1900.

The New Nigerian nation came to have a land area of 356,669Sq, miles. So big and so bogus was the amalgamation idea that there was so much doubt about its survival and sustainability. The British architects of the amalgamation and the inhabitants both doubted that Nigeria would survive (Crowder, 1966).

In spite of the amalgamation of 1914, Lugard and successive British administrators maintained the gap and the cultural distinction between the North and the South for two main reasons. The first was the earlier promise by the British to the Northern establishment not to interfere with the religion, culture and customs of the Caliphate. The second factor of narrative was the need to foster a culture of friendship and nurture the emirate system as a basis for succession after independence. Thus, even though Nigeria was amalgamated, a culture and by implication religious and other narratives were the iron curtain that separated the North from the South. Western Education and the Westernised elite, Urbanisation, Christianity, commerce, and other factors were revolutionizing the South and North remained a culturally and religiously conservative terrain committed to preserving Islam and its traditions. Whereas, Christian missionaries worked to transform the traditional society and its ways of life in the parts of Nigeria where they operated, and this included the Middle Belt areas of the historical North, the colonialists using the Indirect Rule system worked with the Emirs to preserve existing traditions instead (Coleman, 1958, Whitaker, 1973). This preservationist orientation of colonialism was responsible for the perpetuation of the dichotomy between North and South on the one hand, and between the Middle Belt groups converted to Christianity and the Muslim North on the other hand, a dichotomy that continued in to independence and has remained prevalent to date. The dichotomy has further helped to weaken the bonds of nationhood.

The 1914 amalgamation was a British innovation and Nigerians were hardly consulted, and did not as such understand the rationale behind it. The reactions to the amalgamation were sharp, swift and of great interest. It is instructive to note that close to a century afterwards, and fifty years after independence, some of the sentiments have remained alive as neither the colonial regime nor post-independence administrations in Nigeria have surmounted the sentiments. The early reactions also introduce us to the issues of narratives as nationhood and the national question faced by Nigeria from the very beginning. The following will suffice:

1. The Nigerian Chronicle of 23 January 1914 described the amalgamation as “a union of names” as opposed to a union of customs, manners and cultures. It added that the amalgamation was already utter dislike and disdain for the Indirect Rule system of the North, based mainly on the Emirate system, especially in the Eastern Region where the Native Authority system was introduced and later rejected in 1914. There was a wide belief in the South that the amalgamation provided the excuse to transplant the infamous conservative and essentially Islamic to the South.
2. In mid-1914, the amalgamation generated a row of anti-Northern sentiments across the South, most of it articulated by the Lagos press. The South was simply suspicious of amalgamation and did not see any compatibility between the North and the south. For instance, the Times of Nigeria newspapers saw the amalgamation as synonymous with the subjugation of southern Nigeria:

……the conquest and subjugation of Southern Nigeria by Northern Nigeria, Northern Nigeria system, Northern Nigerian law as, Northern Nigeria administration must be made to supersede every system in Southern Nigeria (Kirk-Greene, 1968).

1. The North did not come out with a coherent reaction to the amalgamation, mainly because it lacked a developed Western educated elite corps and press to articulate this as the case was in the South. Its viewed were Largely aired by the Northern emirs, including the Sultan of Sokoso, who provided leadership at the time. The Indirect Rule system shielded the North’s institutions from the adverse effects of the amalgamation:

In the North, voices were heard expressing resentment at the way the amalgamation dislocated it from its proud Islamic past, geographically, administratively and culturally 1914 has been criticized and, as an act of folly that has brought little but harm (Kirk-Greene, 1968).

1. Obafemi Awolow, an early nationalist, Yoruba leader, the leader of the AG and former Premier of the Western Region referred to the amalgamation and merger of 1914 as a “mere geographical expression” (Kirk-Greene, 1968). There is nothing to show that Awolowo had any respect for the amalgamation. If he had any difficulties, it must have arisen from the cultural and religious-political incompatibility imposed by the amalgamation, and the supposedly excess baggage of going with the north. Thus, in 1953, Awolowo leading the Yoruba threatened to pull Western Nigeria out of the Nigerian federation if Lagos was cut from the Western Region.
2. The Sardauna of Sokoto and former Premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello saw the amalgamation as “the Mistake of 1914” (Bello, 1962), implying that he and those thinking like him would have preferred the North to remain as it was before the amalgamation. The chief gain would have been a wholesome retention of the proud Islamic past of the Sokoto Caliphate which the British had met on arrival.
3. During the 1950 Constitutional Conference held to review the Richards Constitution, the Emirs of Kano and Katsina demanded 50 percent of the seats in the proposed House of Representatives; and threatened to secede and return to the pre-1914 arrangement if this was not granted, buttressing the fact that the loyalty of the North, decades after the amalgamation, was to Kaduna and not to the national capital in Lagos.
4. By the time of the Constitutional Crisis of 1953, and later the political fracas leading to and emanating from the coup of January 1966, the North had resented the South and blamed the 1914 amalgamation for its woes and for dislocating its proud Islamic past.
5. The Police Report on the official investigation into the coup of 15 January 1966. Major C.K. Nzeogwu of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at Kaduna was appointed by the "inner circle" as the commander of the rebellion in the North. The manner in which this was to be organised appeared to have been left entirely to him.

 The record does not show that any officers, other than Major Nzeogwu, in the North were taken into the confidence of the inner circle. It is, however, probable that some time before the rebellion Major Nzeogwu obtained the co-operation of Major T. Onwatuegwu and Captain G. Ude, both of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC).

 Whereas in the West and in the Lagos area military movements by night were not unusual as a result of the disturbed conditions then prevailing, this was not the case at Kaduna. It was, therefore, necessary that a cover be provided for the proposed rebellious activities, at the same time creating a reason for bringing troops out of barracks by night without alerting the senior officers of 1 Brigade to Nzeogwu's intentions.

It has been established that Military night exercises in the Kaduna area, organized by the NMTC, then under the command of Major Nzeogwu commenced in early December 1965, leading up to Exercise Damissa on 13 and 14 Jan. 1966. By then the population of Kaduna and the Police were accustomed to troop movements after dark.

The master plan of the inner circle made provision for the arrest of a number of leading political personalities who were not to be killed unless they offered resistance. This may well have been true as far as the West, Mid-West and the East were concerned. In view of Major Nzeogwu's activities at the Premier's Lodge in Kaduna, however, it is thought that this officer had no intention of abiding by these decisions but was determined, from the start, to kill the Premier of the North at any cost. This was a leading factor as major indices in the Issues in Nigerian’s Narratives on Conflicts.

The president of Nigeria, [Nnamdi Azikiwe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nnamdi_Azikiwe) left the country in late 1965, first for Europe, then on a cruise to the [Caribbean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caribbean). Under the law, the [Senate president](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_Nigerian_Senate), [Nwafor Orizu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nwafor_Orizu), became acting president during his absence and had all the powers of the president.

Acting President [Nwafor Orizu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nwafor_Orizu) made a nationwide broadcast, after he had briefed President [Nnamdi Azikiwe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nnamdi_Azikiwe) on the phone about the decision of the cabinet, announcing the cabinet's "voluntary" decision to transfer power to the armed forces. Major General [Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnson_Aguiyi-Ironsi) then made his own broadcast, accepting the "invitation". On January 17, Major General Ironsi established the Supreme Military Council in Lagos and effectively suspended the constitution then became the first Military head of state.

With those above Narrative informition, attitudinal Narratives are form, being classified in the following reasoning and expressions, in which an individual **Deem** right.

**(a) Theoretical (b) Economic (c) Aesthetic (d) Social (e) Political (f) Religious.**

####  (a) Theoretical:

Those who always desire to discover the reasons and truth behind everything come under this category. Hearing a beautiful story or Narrative, a mathematician said “Beautiful, but what does it prove?” Scientists, philosophers and scholars are of this type. Their attitude is more theoretically oriented.

**(b) Economic:**

Guided by utility and practical value of an object economic type persons try to find out the benefit and utility of an object. Their attitude towards any object is utility oriented. They are very practicable persons. They judge people on the basis of their earning capacity. If there is a flood or crisis, they will be interested to know how it has economically affected the flood devastated areas or the society.

**(c) Aesthetic:**

People having aesthetic attitudes attempt to discover the beauty of an object. It helps in fulfilment and self realization. They like to imagine beautiful things and get satisfaction out of it. If there is flood they go by the beautiful scenery or miserable scenes.

**(d) Social:**

Persons with social attitude judge the situation from the social standpoint. It involves love for fellowmen and self sacrifice. It is perhaps the most dignified attitude in life. Such people try to help others in distress. Gopabandhu Das was a person with social attitude.

**(e) Political:**

People with political attitude like to dominate and control other people. They are lovers of power. They try to control a situation by self display. Such people want to be leaders and ascent over others for the sake of power. Politicians come under this category.

**(f) Religious:**

The desire to explore the final secret of nature, mystic aspect of life is found among persons with a religious attitude. Such attitude is qualified by faith and belief and emotion and not coloured by reasoning.

People of all other attitudes would try to examine the cause of flood with reason while people with religions attitude will say that Gods’ desire has been implemented and what God has done is for the well being of the people. They will never blame God for anything whatsoever, rather they may say that because of lots of corruption and misdeed, God has become angry on people and penalized them in this way.

**CHAPTER ONE**

**” THE LOCATION AND NARRATIVES”**

**INTRODUCTION:**

Plateau State is located in the highlands of Central Nigeria. It belongs to the Central States of Nigeria, a geo-political term North Central Zone, with a lot of ethno-religious connotations comprising of the states of Benue, Kogi, Kaduna, Niger, Nassarawa, and Plateau. These states have unique characteristics vis-à-vis other states in the federation. A special report by the National Orientation Agency (NOA, 2002) identifies these features to include:

(1) Home to over 50% of ethnic groups in Nigeria; although no ethnic group shares 100% of its culture with other ethnic groups; (2) Christianity, Islam and Traditional African Religion all command considerable influence on the lives of the people. That is, there is deep-seated religious and cultural diversity; (3) Apart from rich mineral resources, the Zone is also endowed with massive land and grazing activities, explaining the massive influx of people from other areas to this Zone; (4) In terms of development, the Zone is one of the least developed in spite of the location of the Federal Capital close to the Zone; (5) The Zone has a very large pool of ex-servicemen, some of who are not gainfully employed; (6) The people of this Zone are known to be hospitable, accommodating and peaceful. It is indeed worrisome that such a people could suddenly be engaged in frequent violent clashes (NOA, 2002). Plateau State especially, has a lot of features, which attract a large population and support various economic activities (Mohammed, 2005). It is the discovery of tin and columbite on the plateau by the British that led to the conscription of labourers from all the provinces of Northern Nigeria to work in the tin mines. The high fertility of the land equally attracted farmers from distant places to engage in the production of various crops. The climatic situation of the plateau, which is near temperate along with the abundant water and pasture led to the flocking of livestock rearers to the area. The absence of diseases which are detrimental to the rearing of flocks led to a heavy concentration of livestock usually reared by the Fulani on the plateau. The temperate climate in Jos, Plateau coupled with its natural tourist’s resources attracted Nigerians and foreigners alike for vacation, permanent settlement or retirement. The location of Jos as a transport node served by an airport and rail link, to the north and south of the country as well as road transport network to different parts of the country, this facilitates commerce and industries. Plateau State, including its capital Jos, is inhabited by both Christians and Muslims.

Over fifty years of Nigerian independence, more than forty years after the Nigerian Civil War and also over hundred (100) years of the Nigerians amalgamation, Nigeria still exhibits some of these historic Narratives, religion and ethnics sentiments provided the bedrock for these Narratives. Those narratives of ethnicity, religious sentiments and regional issues remained largely as Nigerian’s problems that led to aggressive behaviours and conflicts in most of states in the North whereby, there were conflicts, Christians Versus Christians, Muslims Versus Muslim and Christians Versus Muslim, gradually engulf the rest of the nation. Lately, persistent political problems like the one in Jos have metamorphosed from political and ethnic to religious and their scope has moved from the local proliferation of small arms problem to wider global and international spread. Thus, methods and tactics have changed to include bombing and other terrorist approaches as an advance of Narratives issues in Nigeria.

 **ISSUES IN NARRATIVES**

**ISSUES:** It can be view as a great question, in any period of break -up of old historical patterns of which the present is an obvious example is how the issues will shape up in terms of popular decision. Since it is impossible to describe or state a view of the basic issues of human life without taking a position on those issues, we shall not attempt this sort of "objectivity," but will propose the possibilities which seem to us to have the best chance of being real or "true."

First, some background considerations need to be explored. Human beings defined issues according to their ideas of meaning and desirable ends. At root, therefore, all the issues of man's life are philosophical. Even if you say that getting enough to eat and a decent place to live are the main issues, the contentions on how to go about securing these ends turn out to be philosophical, since they amount to judgments about the nature of man and the nature of the world. The so called "ideological" war of the present can be reduced to a conflict between concepts of value and theories of human development. While there may be some justification for claiming that behind the ideological fronts of the East-West struggle, the old rivalries of power continue among the great nation-states, the fact is that what honest heat exists in the cold war comes from earnest human beliefs concerning philosophical issues. Without deep convictions concerning these issues, there could hardly be a serious threat of war. It is fairly plain that the managers of the affairs of modern nations are continually obliged to justify whatever they do in terms of philosophical values. The Communists tell the world they are unselfishly labouring for a world emancipated from imperialism and economic exploitation. The Western nations declare that their policies and actions are the only possible means to secure the conditions of freedom from totalitarian tyranny.

It is fair to say that, in the present, the important issues of human life are characteristically defined in political terms. The focus of interest in politics has at least two explanations. First, politics is the most obvious means to power, and it is generally believed that power is necessary in order to gain the good, or whatever it is that we want to gain.

Second, a strong ethical current in human thought demands that the good that we seek be a general good. Some men may be determined to pursue only a private good, but they know better than to advertise their intentions. Usually, they endorse some program or political theory of the general good which promises to serve their self interest.

Let us examine for a moment the idea of political issues. It should be apparent that when men consider political issues, they do so, on the basis of certain assumptions. They assume, for example, that human beings have the right and the capacity to make political decisions. They have decided that politics represents a region of the external environment over which they have some control. The questions of how to control it and how it ought to be controlled are practical and philosophical questions. Constitutions are statements which defined methods of political control and justify them according to some philosophic declaration of values. If there is a serious disparity between constitutional declarations and the actual practice of governments and political parties, this shows not only the inconsistency or hypocrisy of human beings, but also the power of philosophical ideas about the good, since political agencies feel obliged to give at least lip-service to those ideas in their statements of principle. The point, here, is that the men who want to affect the course of history or the social and economic arrangements of mankind recognize the necessity of relating their political programs to ideas of the general good, if they are to hope to influence human behaviour in behalf of their plans. Recognition of this fact gives a positive cast to our discussion, since it reduces the importance of comments to the effect that history is mainly the work of Machiavellian schemers. Whatever the Machiavellians are able to do, the scope of their activities is limited by prevailing ideas of the good and of means to the good, at any given time. The Machiavellians are parasites who live on the positive moral and philosophical convictions of mankind.

**NARRATIVES:** Simply put, Narrative is the representation of an Events or a series of events. “Events” is the key word here, though some people prefer the word “action.” Without an event or an action, you may have a “description,” an “exposition,” an “argument,” a “lyric,” some combination of these or something else altogether, but you would not have a narrative. “My dog has fleas” is a description of my dog, but it is not a narrative because nothing happens. “My dog was bitten by a flea” is a narrative. It tells of an event. The event is a very small one, the bite of a flea but that is enough to make it a Narrative.

**NARRATIVES:** Narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances as though any material were fit to receive man’s stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting (think of Carpaccio’s Saint Ursula), stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news item, conversation. Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere been people without narrative. All classes, all human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds. Caring nothing for the division between good and bad literature, narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself. (Barthes 1977).

**Narrative Structure:** The Oxford English Dictionary defined narrative as “an account of a series of events, facts, etc., given in order and with the establishing of connections between them.” Central to this definition is the notion of a chain of causally related events. Stories of this form often have a beginning, middle, and end, an introduction to the situation, a series of events often involving tension or conflict, and a resolution.

Since ancient times, people have tried to understand and formalize the elements of storytelling. For example, writers have developed typologies of dramatic situations and identified plot lines common to many narratives, such as the “hero’s journey”. This research typically distinguishes between the content of the story and the form in which it is told. While stories often concern interacting characters, they may also present a sequence of facts and observations linked together by a unifying theme or argument.

Storytelling strategies vary among media and genre. For instance, stories told through writing have access to a different set of formal mechanisms and narrative structures (example, stream of consciousness) than stories told through film (example, split-screen sequences). Blundell describes narrative devices for journalism such as the anecdotal lead an initial story, often involving dialogue and characters that present microcosm of the larger news story and the nut graf a paragraph explicitly describing the news value of an article. These devices are largely unique to journalism, as opposed to literary fiction or film. Visualizations themselves may incorporate a variety of media, including text, images and video, and can also be interactive, enabling stories whose telling relies as much on the reader as on the author.

**THE FUNCTION OF NARRATIVE:** It would seem that we humans are irrevocably locked into a perception of the world encountered as a linear series of experiences. Although we assume these experiences are ‘analogue’ continuously variable and seamless we nonetheless parse them into ‘events’, some of which have their origins in the cyclic nature of the environment (night and day, seasons and years) and some of which are largely cultural constructs (holidays, weekends, lunchtime, lectures, semesters, weddings, etc.). Time may also be divided-up in more personal, outwardly arbitrary ways: **x** amount of time in a certain job, **y** amount of time living at certain address, **z** years married to someone. Narrative is our fundamental means of comprehension and expression for this time-locked condition.

**Oral Narratives:** Walter Ong has written that…despite the oral roots of all verbalization, the scientific and literary study of language and literature has for centuries, until quite recent years, shied away from orality. Texts have clamored for attention so peremptorily that oral creations have tended to be regarded generally as variants of written productions or, if not this, as beneath serious scholarly attention. (Ong 1982).

**Narrative studies are no exception:** the vast bulk of the literature on narrative is derived from an analysis based on ‘texts’, particularly novels, historical writing, and film. However, in 1967 Labov and Waletzky published a seminal paper (reprinted with commentary, 1997) showing there was a common structure embedded in all verbal narratives. This finding was astonishing not least of all because they deliberately set out to analyze narratives of “unsophisticated speakers”:

In the opinion, it will not be possible to make very much progress in the analysis and understanding of these complex [written] narratives until the simplest and most fundamental narrative structures are analyzed in direct connection with their originating functions. With suggesting that such fundamental structures are to be found in oral versions of personal experiences: not the products of expert storytellers that have been retold many times, but the original production of a representative sample of the population. (Labov and Waletzky 1997).

**Narrative, Memory, and Simulation:** Narrative is often implicated in the functioning of memory. In oral cultures myth, poetry, and storytelling all have uses over and above mere entertainment: without writing, they are the store of the culture’s knowledge about itself:

Most, if not all, oral cultures generate quite substantial narratives or series of narratives, such as the story of the Trojan wars among the ancient Greeks, the coyote stories among various Native American populations, the Anansi (spider) stories in Belize and other Caribbean cultures with some African heritage, the Sunjata stories of old Mali, the Mwindo stories among the Nyanga, and so on. Because of their size and complexity of scenes and actions, narratives of this sort are often the roomiest repositories of an oral culture’s lore. (Ong 1982).

In the West this need for cultural memory is now largely served by print and electronic media. In fact, I am tempted to say that these media have amplified the effect of narrative for, as Brooks has said, we are now “immersed” in it (Brooks 1985). From our parents, from our friends, and from strangers; in school, at work, and at home; in newspapers, novels, advertising, film and TV; factual, fictional, or somewhere in between, the number of narratives we are exposed to even in a single year must run into many thousands. As Bruner points out, these narratives provide as they do in oral cultures a set of behavioural models, a set of norms for “conventional” or “canonical” behaviour (Bruner 1990). In this sense, these narratives absorbed and internalised from the culture are an indelible part of our identity.

**On a personal level, we use narrative to describe to ourselves and to other people who we are, where we have been, and where we are going: our life stories (Linde 1997) or life-scripts (Polkinghorne 1988). We may tell and retell the story about how we caught a 10-pounder using only a bent pin and a crust of bread; we may tell and retell the story of a divorce, a great success, a terrible failure. We will tell them different ways in different situations to different people, and over time they will change as we too change.**

**Narrative Identity:** The concept of narrative identity was developed by Paul Ricoeur, among other scholars, and is based on connectivity between narratives and temporality, history and personhood. This concept is supposed to enable the social scientists to empirically study the phenomenological conceptualization of identity since narrative identity can be described as the story we tell ourselves in the present moments about our past, present and future selves and others. “Stories create and give expression to personal and group identity by encoding a body of shared knowledge to which persons are intellectually and emotionally committed”. The narrative theory of identity focuses on the underlying structure of personal histories or life-stories and considers the phenomenon of identity not as part of cognitive structures but as analyzable ingredient of personal histories that include narratives and overarching discourses about others and ourselves. People position themselves while telling stories to particular listeners in particular context and these stories vary due to these relationships.

A further implication is that narratives are products of our own view of history that is influenced by context, macro discourses and the listeners, so we can argue that they are constructs amenable to change and transformation. This is exactly echoed in Mamdani’s article that shows the change in the content of identity given to Tutsi and Hutu categories that range from class to racial distinctions depending on the historical period. Narratives are a mixture of master structural discourses such as discourses of occupation, domination and unity on one hand, and personal stories on the other. This mixture influences not only the development of personhood and identity of individuals and groups but also establishes certain kind of relationship that position those groups and individuals in a particular way. Mahmoud Mamdani’s excellent analysis of Tutsi/Hutu identities shows how these identities changed following the historical change in state structures and institutions pointing to the fact that identities are socially constructed and influenced by context. Liisa Malkki points out that the stories about past atrocities are particularly resilient and can become part of people’s identity as “acutely meaningful theme which are incorporated into the overarching moral order expressed in the mythico-history”. **Stories about historical atrocities contribute to the dehumanization and belittlement of the other (the aggressor) and become part of the identity, moral order and everyday practices, which legitimize violence against the other group.**

 **DEFINAIONS OF TERMS;**

**Defining Behaviour**:When defining behaviour you need to ensure that it is: Observable, Measurable, and Described in concrete terms Example**:** Sally hits her brother with a closed fist.

**Definition of Basic Behaviour:** Behaviour is every action by a person that can be seen or heard. Behaviour must be defined in a way that is both observable and measurable so that everyone working with the child has a good understanding of what the behaviour looks like and sounds like (Alberto and Troutman, 2003).

**Aggression:** Is a malicious behaviour or attitude towards someone or something, usually triggered your feeling when an action has taken place or frustration. *Human aggression* is any behaviour directed toward another individual that is carried out with the *proximate* (immediate) intent to cause harm. In addition, the perpetrator must believe that the behaviour will harm the target, and that the target is motivated to avoid the behaviour (Bushman and Anderson 2001, Baron and Richardson 1994, Berkowitz 1993, Geen 2001).

**Aggression:** Man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love. Martin Luther King Jinior. (1929-1968), there is little doubt that aggression was an adaptive behaviour for many of our ancient ancestors who lived in small groups. Males used aggression to gain access to females, food, shelter, and other resources. Females used aggression to defend their offspring and gain resources for them. Thus, the most aggressive individuals in our evolutionary past were at one time the ones who were most likely to pass on their genes to subsequent generations. As humans became more social, however, aggression toward others in the social group on which one’s survival depended became less adaptive and prosaically genes became common. **Aggression today, in fact, seems maladaptive and destructive. Aggression breeds aggression, and seems to cause more problems than it solves. Even if it works in the short run, it fails in the long run. Most social psychologists today are interested in understanding why people become aggressive, what factors influence aggression, and how to reduce it.**

**Aggression;** and Violence Defined: The scientific study of aggressive behaviour was hampered for years because of different understandings of the word “aggression.” Aggressive toddlers are generally considered bad. However, in sports and in business, the term “aggressive” is frequently given a positive connotation as a trait to be admired. Consequently, one of the first steps scientists had to undertake was to define aggressive behaviour clearly as a negative social behaviour. **In social psychology, the term *aggression* is generally defined as any behaviour that is intended to harm another person who does not want to be harmed** (example, Baron and Richardson, 1994).

 **Aggression;** is an external behaviour that you can see. For example, you can see a person shoot, stab, hit, slap, or curse someone. Aggression is not an emotion that occurs inside a person, such as an angry feeling. Aggression is not a thought inside someone’s brain, such as mentally rehearsing a murder. Note also that aggression is a social behaviour it involves at least two people. In addition, aggression is intended to hurt. Aggression is not accidental, such as when a drunk driver accidentally runs over a child on a tricycle. In addition, not all intentional behaviours that hurt others are aggressive behaviours. For example, a dentist might intentionally give a patient a shot of Novocain (and the shot hurts!), but the goal is to help rather than hurt the patient.

**Human aggression**:Accidental harm is not aggressive because it is not intended. Harm that is an incidental by product of helpful actions is also not aggressive, because the harm doer believes that the target is not motivated to avoid the action (example, pain experienced during a dental procedure). Similarly, the pain administered in sexual masochism is not aggressive because the victim is not motivated to avoid, it indeed, the pain is actively solicited in service of a higher goal (Baumeister 1989).

***Aggressive behaviour as negative outcomes:***Aggressive behaviour seems to be the outcomeof the frustration due to hindrances in goalattainment. In the neurobiologicalperspective, aggression has been linked withhigh levels of testosterone and low levels ofcertain neurotransmitters such as serotonin. Aggression has also been linked togenetics and social learning.Other predisposing factors for aggressioninclude genetic factors, the fetal environment,obstetric complications, the rearingenvironment, biologic factors, and psychiatricdisorders such as substance abuse, psychosis,depression, and personality disorders.Ferguson et al. evidenced that personalityfactors are more critical than environmentalfactors in developing aggressive traits in anindividual. **However, it was argued that thereis no single factor credible enough todetermine the root of aggression. Thecurrent consensus is that aggression is multi determined.**

**Violence:** *Violence* is aggression that has extreme harm as its goal (example, death). All violence is aggression, but many instances of aggression are not violent. For example, one child pushing another off a tricycle is an act of aggression but is not an act of violence.

**CONFLICTS: Meaning of Conflict.**

 (a):  [Fight](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fight), [battle](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/battle), [war](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war) *an armed conflict,*

*(b)* :  Competitive or opposing action of incompatibles; antagonistic state or action (as of divergent ideas, interests, or persons) *a conflict of principles or*  mental struggle resulting from [incompatible](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incompatible) or opposing needs, drives, wishes, or external or internal demands *His conscience was in conflict with his duty.*

*(c)* The opposition of persons or forces that gives rise to the dramatic action in a drama or fiction, *the conflict in the play is between the King and the Archbishop.*

(d) Synonym Discussion of *conflict:*[Discord](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discord), [strife](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strife), [conflict](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflict), [contention](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contention), [dissension](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dissension), [variance](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/variance) mean a state or condition marked by a lack of agreement or harmony. [Discord](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discord) implies an intrinsic or essential lack of harmony producing quarreling, factiousness, or antagonism ((*a political party long racked by discord*)). [Strife](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strife) emphasizes a struggle for superiority rather than the incongruity or incompatibility of the persons or things involved ((*during his brief reign the empire was never free of civil strife*)). [Conflict](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflict) usually stresses the action of forces in opposition but in static applications implies irreconcilability as of duties or desires ((*the conflict of freedom and responsibility*)). [Contention](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contention) applies to strife or competition that shows itself in quarreling, disputing, or controversy ((*several points of contention about the new zoning law*)). [Dissension](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dissension) implies strife or discord and stresses a division into factions ((*religious dissension threatened to split the colony*)). [Variance](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/variance) implies a clash between persons or things owing to a difference in nature, opinion, or interest ((*cultural variances that work against a national identity*)).

**Conflict:** When friction arising from actual or perceived differences or incompatibilities. Conflict is neutral. It could be dangerous (dysfunctional) or it could also present opportunities (functional). The outcome depends on our attitude or responses, Conflict about who is entitled to have what (conflict of interests); conflict about the perception of how things are (conflict of about facts), conflict about how things should be (conflict of values). You cannot solve conflict without getting root courses of the conflict.

**Conflict can be view as;** is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence, however, violent conflict is not inevitable and as such is an anomaly. Conflict is defined as the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups. Armed conflict is the resort to the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and particular interests and goals. The worst forms of armed conflict include mass murder and genocide against unarmed civilians. Conflict takes place in the course of interaction between individuals and groups. Furthermore, it takes place because individuals and groups are seeking to achieve goals and objectives, or to fulfill certain desires which may be scarce and which others are also seeking or are reluctant to share with others. These individuals and groups could vary from religious, ethnic, class, clan, national or other forms of identity. Thus, conflict becomes an inevitable outcome of human interaction. Although conflict is potentiaiiy dangerous, it is also malleable and can respond to positive management and resolution, depending on the willingness of parties to the conflict themselves to find a solution and work towards such solution.

**RADICALISATION:** Can be viewed as a complex interaction of factors that does not necessarily lead to violence. Since the process can evolve in many different directions, including non-violent ones, radicals can engage in nonviolent behaviour without terrorist intent yet still can be considered radical. As such, although not every radical becomes a terrorist, every terrorist has gone through a radicalisation process. This indicates that terrorism is the worst possible outcome of the radicalisation process.

**RADICALISATION:** The European Commission defined radicalisation as a complex phenomenon of individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity, as well as a rising propensity to use means of force to reach political goals that negate and or undermine democracy. Terrorist radicalisation is understood as the complex phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to committing terrorist acts. As stressed by the European Commission, terrorist radicalisation is not confined to one faith or political ideology. The European Commission acknowledges that drivers conducive to radicalisation may include a strong sense of alienation, perceived injustice or humiliation reinforced by social marginalisation, xenophobia and discrimination, limited education or employment possibilities, criminality or psychological problems. Recruiters can exploit these factors and prey on vulnerabilities and grievances through manipulation.

**COMMUNICATION:** The word communication is derived from a Latin word “communicare” meaning “to share” through it a community of purpose and attitude by the sender and the receiver is established (Ogunsaju 1983).Gyang (2009) simply defined communication as the transfer of information or message from one person to another. It is the sending, giving or exchange of information, ideas, facts, opinions or emotions to a receiver. Exchange of ideas is useful only when mutual understanding results. The receiver and the sender may not agree, but communication has occurred when at least both understand what they meant to convey. Folger and Jones (1997) argue that conflict is a reality created and managed by communication. Scram (1964) defined communication as “a tool that makes societies possible and distinguishes humans from other societies”. To him, people in a society need information on their environment and the methods of communicating in order to make choices. Here, the knowledge of an individual exposure, experience, religious or cultural background plays a very important role in communication. (Laca, Alzate, Sanchez, Verdugo and Guzman, 2006). The efficacy of communication to bring about the management and transformation of conflict is dependent on the desire of the parties to solve the problem and on their ability to establish effective communication based on clear speaking and active listening. According to Martins (1980), communication is a transactional symbolic process which allows people to relate and manage their environment by establishing human contact, exchange information, reinforcing human contact, reinforcing the attitudes and behaviours of others”. People communicate in different ways according to their different values, cultural norms, environmental peculiarities, personality traits and the degree of exposure to other people’s cultures.

**Process of Communication:** According to Merriam Webster Dictionary, process is a series of action that produce something or that leads to a particular result. Advanced Learners Dictionary defined process as a particular course of action intended to achieve result. Communication processes are steps taken in order to achieve a successful communication. It is made up of seven key components; these components include sender, ideas, encoding, communication channel, receiver, decoding and feedback while noise is a factor militating communication.

**Communication and Narratives:** The area of communication and narratives has gained prominence given the surge in availability of online extremist content (in particular as produced by the IS), and their increasingly apparent role in all types of radicalisation. Before formulating effective counternarratives, some preparatory work is necessary, and here research plays a major role. From a conceptual point of view, it is evident that significant work needs to be invested in clarifying the following questions:

First, what are narratives and what is their constituent content? It has been noted, for example, that much of the IS propaganda is not about violence, but rather about identity building and positive messages. Additionally, the different workings of counter-narratives vs. alternative narratives should be clarified.

Secnd, similar to other areas of inquiry, we also encounter the specificity problem: why is it that some individuals buy into this narrative and others do not? Why does the IS propaganda not appeal to the majority of the population?

Third, does it make a difference whether these narratives are propagated online or offline? Are they different and is their effect different? What are the differences and the implications of ‘official videos’ vs. the ones which are being produced and distributed by sympathisers?

A further major gap is the lack of control groups - namely studies looking at those who do not become radicalised, although confronted with the same narratives, including online. In one such study of extreme right and jihadi propaganda by Diana Rieger et al., the authors found that young audiences tended to reject the extremist propaganda shown to them. Thus, it is important to understand how different people interpret and consume such material.

**AGENDA:** Is definite as the list of items to be discussed at a meeting or your schedules, plan you have to done or timetable showing the fixed time at which events will happen. Therefore, Agenda Setting theory has held that the media agenda, those items, the media deem important, is directly linked to the public agenda, or what the public deems important. This means that the stories shown by the media will eventually become important stories in the public’s mind as well. Although the media is constantly changing and evolving, the Agenda Setting theory continues to prove in society today that people use the media in order to shape and frame current issues and stories happening all over the world. With the knowledge that the media is capable of shaping and framing the public agenda, it is important that members of society develop media literacy skills in order to remain educated and wise when it comes to the salience of issues found in the media. The power of the press is likely to always have certain powers over the public agenda and the Agenda Setting Theory is an excellent way to conceptualized, experiment and continued to discover new research associated with this fascinating topic of study.

**ADOLESCENTS:** Let us first defined the term adolescents, *“Adolescent is the period of development**between childhood and adulthood”.* A boy or girl enters adolescent as a child and emerges as a man or woman,expected to be ready to assume an adult role in the society. For everybody,the years 11 to 18 in some other writers between 12 to 25 or 35 are the most eventful. During these years there is rapidphysical and sexual growth and maturation.It is very difficult to say exactly when adolescent starts. However, onset ofpuberty is generally accepted as the beginning of adolescent. *What is puberty?* Let us find out. The period around 11 or 12 years of age is the onset of puberty which usually lasts for 2 years. During these years there is a spurt in physical growth and appearance of sex characteristics. The first sign of puberty in girls is menstruation and in boys, nocturnal emission (ejaculation of semen during sleep).

 **THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

**Theorists in Coordinated Management** of Meanings believe that in conversation, people co-create meaning by attaining some coherence and coordination. Coherence occurs when stories are told, and coordination exists when stories are lived. CMM focuses on the relationships between an individual and his or her society. Through a hierarchical structure, individuals come to organize the meaning of literally hundreds of messages received throughout a day as narrative either in conflict and aggressive behaviour or in a normal situation.

Most importantly the Researcher had created useful models of worked and valuable learning process which, were relevant to inter-community relations at all levels. The key drivers of conflict in the Plateau State are complex mix of ethnicity, indigene issue, political power struggles, land disputes, and discrimination, as well as criminality and cattle rustling. The situations are further complicated by the security enforcement, particularly the lack of capacity and poor discipline among sections of the security forces, combined with the strained relationship between the security forces and local communities. At the core of the violence in Plateau State is a struggle for power and control between the two main ethno groups in the area the mainly Christian “indigene” ethnic groups and the Muslim “mostly Hausa-Fulani” ethnic groups. This competition had resulted in regular outbreaks of violence as ethno-Christian and Muslims identity groups vie for control of political, economic, and communal resources within the land and grazing disputes as a focal issue in the rural areas of the state. The nexus between Conflict Narrative on aggressive behaviour with Communication cannot be overemphasis.

Is a style in which individuals express their feelings and opinions and advocated for their needs in a way that violated the rights of others and ethnic groups? Thus, aggressive communicators are verbally or physically abusive. They will often; try to dominate, use humiliation to control, Criticize, blame, or attack and very impulsive, low frustration tolerance, they speak in a loud, demanding, and overbearing voice. They act threateningly and rudely not listen well, interrupt frequently and use “you” statements.

Is a style in which individuals appear passive on the surface but are really acting out anger in a subtle, indirect, or behind-the-scenes way, People who develop a pattern of passive-aggressive communication usually feel powerless, stuck, and resentful in other words they feel incapable of dealing directly with the object of their resentments, instead, they express their anger by subtly undermining the object (real or imagined) of their resentments?

**Passive-Aggressive communicators will often**:

Mutter to themselves rather than confront the person or issues, you find it difficult to acknowledging their anger, they use facial expressions that do not match how they feel that is, smiling when angry and use sarcasm while deny there is a problem. Appear cooperative while purposely doing things to annoy and disrupt their opponent, use subtle sabotage to get even.

The impact of a pattern of passive-aggressive communication is that these individuals:

Become alienated from those around them, remain stuck in a position of powerlessness (like POWs), discharges resentment while real issues are never addressed, so they can not mature.

The passive-aggressive communicator will say, believe, or behave like:

“I’m weak and resentful, so I sabotage, frustrate, and disrupt.” Or “I’m powerless to deal with you head, on so I must use guerilla warfare.” And “I will appear cooperative but I’m not.”

**Theory of communication Accommodation:** This theoretical perspective examines the underlying motivations and consequences of what happens when two speakers shift their communication styles. Communication Accommodation theorists argue that during communication, people will try to accommodate or adjust their style of speaking to others. This is done in two ways: divergence and convergence. Groups with strong ethnic or racial pride often use divergence to highlight group identity. Convergence occurs when there is a strong need for social approval, frequently from powerless individuals in terms of narratives.

**This theory argues that humans are story telling animals.** The Narrative Paradigm proposes a narrative logic to replace the traditional logic of argument. Narrative logic, or the logic of good reasons, suggests that people judge the credibility of speakers by whether their stories hang together clearly (coherence and whether their stories ring true (fidelity). The Narrative Paradigm allows for a democratic judgment of speakers because no one has to be trained in oratory and persuasion to make judgments based on coherence and fidelity. Wrong judgment constitutes aggressive behaviour that led to conflict Narratives, if not properly manage.

**Cultural Approach to Organizations:** The Cultural Approach contends that people are like animals who, are suspended in webs that they created. Theorists in this tradition argue that an organization’s culture is composed of shared symbols of issues and narratives, each of which has a unique meaning. Organizational stories, rituals, and rites of passage are examples of what constitutes the culture of an organization, to same people anything opposite to their culture or organization is consider a topic of discussion, if wrongly interpreted misled to aggressive behaviour and bad narrative issues lead to conflicts.

**Standpoint Theory:** This theory posits that people are situated in specific social standpoints, they occupy different places in the social hierarchy. Because of this, individuals view the social situation from particular vantage points. By necessity, each vantage point provides only a partial understanding of the social whole. Yet, those who occupy the lower rungs of the hierarchy tend to understand the social whole. Yet, those who occupy the lower rungs of the hierarchy tend to understand the social situation more fully than those at the top. Sometimes, standpoint theory is referred to as feminist standpoint theory because of its application to how women’s and men’s standpoint differ in narratives on aggressive behaviour among post crisis adolescent in Nigeria.

**Structuration Theory:** Theorists supporting the structurational perspective argue that groups and organizations create structures, which can be interpreted as an organizational’s rules and resources. These structures, in turn, create social systems in an organization. Structuration theorists posit that groups and organizations achieve a life of their own because of the way their members utilize their structures. Power structures guide the decision making taking place in groups and organizations, most of this structure deny same member of the organization access to achieve same of their goal that led to deprivation frustration aggression which result to conflict narratives.

**Theorists in cultural studies;** maintain that the media represents ideologies of the dominant class in a society. Because media are controlled by corporations, the information presented to the public is necessarily influenced and framed with profit in mind. Cultural Studies theorists, therefore, are concerned with media influenced and framed with profit in mind. Cultural Studies theorists, therefore, are concerned with media influence and how power plays a role in the interpretation of cultural narratives.

**Cultivation Analysis:** This theory argues that television (and other media) plays an extremely important role in how people view their world. According to Cultivation Analysis, in modern Culture most people get much of their information in a mediated fashion rather than through direct experience. Thus, mediated sources can shape people’s sense of reality. This is especially the case with regard to violence, according to the theory. Cultivation Analysis posits that heavy television viewing cultivates a sense of the world that is more violent and scarier than is actually warranted.

**Expectancy Violations Theory:** Expectancy violation theory examines how non-verbal messages are structured. The theory advances that when communicative norms are violated, the violation may be perceived either favourably or unfavourably, depending on the perception that the receiver has of the violator. Violating another’s expectations may be a strategy used over that of conforming to another’s expectations on the narrative.

**Agenda Setting:** is the process whereby the mass media determine what we think and worry about. Walter Lippmann, a journalist first observed this function, in the 1920's. Lippmann then pointed out that the media dominate over the creation of pictures in our head. He believed that the public reacts not to actual events but to the pictures in our head. Therefore, the agenda setting process is used to remodel all the events occurring in our environment, into a simpler model before we deal with it. Researchers Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw have then followed this concept. They as pointed out by Lippmann have best described the agenda setting and point out that there is abundantly collected evidence that editors and broadcasters play an important part as they go through their day to day tasks in deciding and publicizing news. This impact of the mass media, the ability to effect cognitive change among individuals, to structure their thinking- has been labeled the agenda-setting function of mass communication. Here may lie the most important effect of mass communication, its ability to mentally order and organize our world for us. In short, the mass media may not be successful in telling us ''what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about." (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) The agenda-setting functioned as three parts process:

(a) Media Agenda - issues discussed in the media;

(b) Public Agenda - issues discussed and personally relevant to the public;

(c) Policy Agenda - issues that policy makers consider important.

One of the debates between researchers is the questions of causality: Does the media agenda cause the public agenda, or vice-versa? Iyengar and Kinder established causality with an experimental study where they identified that priming, vividness of presentation and position were all determinants of the importance given to a news story. However, the question of whether there is an influence of the public agenda on the media agenda is open to discussion.

**Groupthink:** The groupthink phenomenon occurs when highly cohesive groups fail to consider alternatives that may effectively resolve group dilemmas. Groupthink theorists contend that group members frequently think similarly and are reluctant to share unpopular or dissimilar ideas with others. When this occurs, groups prematurely make decisions, some of which can have lasting consequences.

**Muted Group Theory:** Muted group theory maintains that language serves men better than women (and perhaps European Americans better than African Americans or other groups). This is the case because the varieties of experiences of European American men are named clearly in language, whereas the experiences of other groups (such as women) are not. Due to this problem with language, women appear less articulate than men in public settings. As women have similar experiences, this situation should change.

**Organizational Information Theory:** This theory argues that the main activity of organizations is the process of making sense of equivocal information. Organizational members accomplish this sense-making process through enactment, selection, and retention of information. Organizations are successful to the extent that they are able to reduce equivocality through these means.

**Relational Dialectics Theory:** Relational dialectics suggests that relational life is always in process. People in relationships continually feel the pull-push of conflicting desires. Basically, people wish to have both autonomy, and connection, openness and protectiveness, and novelty and predictability. As people communicate in relationships, they attempt to reconcile these conflicting desires, but they never eliminate their needs for both of the opposing pairs.

**The Rhetoric:** Rhetorical theory is based on the available means of persuasion. That is, a speaker who is interested in persuading his or her audience should consider three rhetorical proofs: **logical, emotional, and ethical.** Audiences are keys to effective persuasion as well. Rhetorical syllogism, requiring audiences to supply missing pieces of a speech, are also used in persuasion.

**Spiral of Silence Theory:** Theorists associated with spiral of silence theory argue that due to their enormous power, the mass media have a lasting effect on public opinion. The theory maintains that mass media work simultaneously with majority public opinion to silence minority beliefs on cultural issues. A fear of isolation prompts those with minority views to examine the beliefs of others. Individuals who fear being socially isolated are prone to conform to what they perceive to be a majority view.

**Symbolic Interaction Theory:** This theory suggests that people are motivated to act based on the meanings they assign to people, things, and events. Further, meaning is created in the language that people use both with others and in private thought. Language allows people to develop a sense of self and to interact with others in communities.

**Uncertainly Reduction Theory:** Uncertainty reduction theory suggests that when strangers meet, their primary focus is on reducing their levels of uncertainty in the situations. Their levels of uncertainty are located in both behavioural and cognitive realms. That is, they may be unsure of how to behave (or how the other person will behave), and they may also be unsure what they think of the other and what the other person thinks of them. Further, people’s uncertainty is both individual level and relational level. People are highly motivated to use communication to reduce their uncertainty according to this theory.

**Frustration–Aggression Theory:** Although space precludes an exhaustive survey of aggression theories, there are several that should be highlighted. The frustration aggression theory emerged from the work of Dollard et al. (1939). The original frustration aggression formulation, postulated that frustration (the blocking of a goal- response) was a necessary antecedent of aggression, and that aggression was an inevitable consequence of frustration (Dollard et al., 1939; Miller, 1941). In essence, frustration’s the deprivation of some expected outcome, and particularly an outcome that the organism anticipates as pleasurable (Berko-witz, 1989). As Miller (1941) and Berkowitz (1989) contend, whether or not frustration produces an aggressive response depends upon several factors, including proximity of goal attainment and the potential for punishment of aggressive behavioural responses.

***Aggressive behaviour as negative outcomes:***Aggressive behaviour seems to be the outcomeof the frustration due to hindrances in goalattainment. In the neurobiologicalperspective, aggression has been linked withhigh levels of testosterone and low levels ofcertain neurotransmitters such as serotonin. Aggression has also been linked togenetics and social learning.Other predisposing factors for aggressioninclude genetic factors, the fetal environment,obstetric complications, the rearingenvironment, biologic factors, and psychiatricdisorders such as substance abuse, psychosis,depression, and personality disorders.Ferguson et al. evidenced that personalityfactors are more critical than environmentalfactors in developing aggressive traits in anindividual. However, it was argued that thereis no single factor credible enough todetermine the root of aggression. Thecurrent consensus is that aggression is multi determined.

**Culture and Adolescents:** This article explores the definition of adolescents situated within a broad consideration of pluralistic contemporary Nigerian’s culture. Adolescents are “simultaneously biological and cultural beings” (Miller, 2002) with culture, defined as a dynamic system of shared activities and meanings (Greenfield et al., 2003; Swanson, et al., 2003), and biology mutually informing the process of development (Greenfield, 2002; Lerner, 1992). The cultural meaning ascribed to physical maturation and the process of social redefinition during adolescent may vary significantly throughout cultural, social, and historical contexts (Steinberg, 2002; Swanson et al., 2003). For example, achievement of “autonomy”, generally considered an essential normative psychosocial task of adolescent, might be operationalized differently between collectivist and individualist cultures (Zimmer-Gembeck and Collins, 2003). In both Nigerian’s societies and globally, adolescent achievement of independence and self-sufficiency is not universally prioritized over conformity to families and cultural identity, expectations and obligations (APA, 2002; Zimmer-Gembeck and Collins, 2003). Although an array of cultures is subsumed within the geographic construct of contemporary Nigerian societies, fostering the potential for discrepancy in the understanding of adolescents, significant international and cross-cultural commonalities do exist to inform the meaning and chronology of adolescent (Arnett and Galambos, 2003). The age of first marriage, closely linked to childbirth statistics, has risen globally, with substantially fewer percentages of women marrying before age 20 (Blum and Nelson-Mmari, 2004; Steinberg, 2014; United Nations, (2009). Also, formal education has been increasing across continents with a narrowing gender discrepancy between educational opportunities for girls and boys (Blum and Nelson-Mmari, 2004). Among developed nations globally, women now consistently outnumber men in post-secondary education, a significant trend reversal since the 1970s (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015; Yale Global online, 2014). This combination of increasingly delayed marriage and childbirth, and prolonged education fosters a suspension of adult roles and responsibilities, or “psychosocial moratorium” as described by Margaret Mead (1961) and Eric Erikson (1968), and therefore an international trend toward the existence and prolongation of “adolescence.”

**Social learning theory:** Is a theory of [learning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning) and [social behaviour](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_behavior) which proposes that new behaviours can be acquired by observing and imitating others. It states that [learning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning) is a [cognitive process](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_process) that takes place in a [social context](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_context) and can occur purely through observation or direct instruction, even in the absence of motor reproduction or direct [reinforcement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinforcement). In addition to the observation of behaviour, learning also occurs through the observation of rewards and punishments, as **a process known as vicarious reinforcement.** When a particular behaviour is rewarded regularly, it will most likely persist; conversely, if a particular behaviour is constantly punished, it will most likely desist. The theory expands on traditional [behavioural theories](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism), in which behaviour is governed solely by reinforcements, by placing emphasis on the important roles of various internal processes in the learning individual.

Social learning theory is based on the hypothesis that aggression is not innate, instinctual but actually learned through the process of socialization. One acquires aggressive attributes by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment in general. Interaction in society helps to focus and trigger stored aggression against economies or societies. This is an important concept, particularly when the conflict is ethno-national or sectarian in nature. Social learning theorists have tried to understand the relationship of the individuals in their environment and how this relates to sectarian aggression. Faleti (2006) looks at the causes of Conflict act in Nigeria through the lens of psycho-cultural perspectives. He contends that psychological, ethnicity and other cultural contradictions are the basis of conflict and that such conflicts are intractably perennial. The influences in terms of solidarity with global fundamentalists in Christianity and Islamic motivate others in to Conflict.

**Social identity theory:** Is an interactionist social psychological theory of the role of self conception and associated cognitive processes and social beliefs in group processes and inter-group relations. Originally introduced in the 1970s primarily as an account of intergroup relations, it was significantly developed at the start of the 1980s as a general account of group processes and the nature of the social group. Since then, social identity theory has been significantly extended through a range of sub-theories that focus on social influence and group norms, leadership within and between groups, self-enhancement and uncertainty reduction motivations, the individuation and collective behaviour, social mobilization and protest, and marginalization and deviance within groups. The theory has also been applied and developed to explain organizational phenomena and the dynamics of language and speech style as identity symbols.

**And another theory of interest is the Social Identity theory;** This was developed by Psychologist Henri Tajfel in 1998 and offers insight into the conflict in Northern Ireland. The basic focus of the theory is that we create our social relations. There is a human need for positive self-esteem and self-worth, which we transfer to our groups. We also order our environment by social comparison between groups. The concept of in-group and out group is important in this analysis. The social identity theory has helped Social Psychologists at least to recognize that individuals are different in groups and that it is this difference which produces recognizable forms of group action. For example, ethnic identities are very strong because of their composition as extended in kinship groups. People in similar conditions, such as: abject poverty, unemployment, social inequalities and marginalized groups can be united together to fight a common enemy. The kinship groups are important in the development of in-groups and out-groups. This is a particularly important concept when dealing with ethnic conflict or social inequality. Therefore, deprivation-frustration-aggression theory, social learning theory and social identity theory as the framework of analysis for the subject matter. The deprivation frustration aggression theory would be the major focus, while social learning and social identity theories would complement it because of the shortcomings of deprivation-frustration-aggression theory. The deprivation-frustration aggression theory argues that aggression is the consequence of deprivation with resultant frustration. Individuals are motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfill certain social expectations, but when these expectations are thwarted, frustration sets in and this leads to some form of aggression. In Nigeria, especially in the Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State, most especially the Jos North Local Council of the State where there was competition of who own the Local Government. The majority of the people are deprived of basic infrastructure; there are pervasive unemployment, abject poverty and basic inequalities. Consequent upon these, frustration and aggression resulted, which often manifest in the form of Conflict and latter Conflict Narrative on aggressive behaviour among post crisis Adolescents in the Zone.

**Hope theory:** Hope has been defined by Snyder (2002) as a learned thinking pattern, a set of beliefs and thoughts, involving two relatively distinct ways of thinking about a goal: Agnatic thinking involves thought related to one’s successful determination about reaching goals example, “I meet the goals that I set for myself”); whereas pathways thinking involves thoughts about one’s effective abilities to pursue different means of obtaining goals (“I can think of many ways to get what I want”). However, hope is also one’s belief in the ability to pursue goals. This belief is postulated to lead directly to corresponding hopeful behaviours that, in turn, strengthen hopeful thought (Shorey, Snyder et al. 2002). There are reciprocal relations between hopeful thinking and achievements in different areas (Shorey, Snyder et al. 2002; Snyder, Lopez et al. 2003).

To engage in such thinking, it is necessary to first establish goals. Second, hopeful thinking requires approaching with effective pathways for reaching the desired goals. Third, we need the motivation to use the pathways that will bring us the goals. Hope theory is different from global romantic wishful thinking. The scientific construct of hope is complex and challenging, creative and sometimes dangerous making the individual more vulnerable through nurturing unreachable hopes (Snyder, Lopez et al. 2003). Hoping can be deeply personal, or interpersonal requiring the assistance of others, and demanding reaching out for help. It may be nurtured in different social contexts such as school or family that may serve as protective factors.

In line with the proposed paradigm shift, resilience refers to the dynamic process of positive adaptation, in the context of significant adversity. Thus, two critical conditions are implicit within this construct:

1. Exposure to a significant threat or severe adversity.

 (b) Individual variations in the responses to adversity.

The dynamic interactions between personal (inner) and environmental (contextual) factors may modify the children’s responses to adversity, predicting their hope for change, their ability to adapt through various developmental paths regardless of major assaults on the developmental processes and expectations for well being (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000). In line with this conceptualization of resilience as dynamic and unpredicted processes, recent genetic studies have added to the complexity of the construct by demonstrating that resilience may be considered partly heritable (Kim-Cohen, Moffitt et al. 2004). This study suggests that protective processes operate through both genetic and environmental factors in the advent of Narrative issues, and the genetic characteristics of the individual predict the nature of the emerging environmental forces. Thus, even though the research interest is focused on processes and potential for changes, it is clear that intervention planning should take into consideration the basic traits that through interacting with environmental factors, will find unique expressions and processes.

**Action–Reaction Theory:** Another perspective is that religion becomes a source of violent conflict when groups engage in competition for adherents, prominence, access, etc. and when the activities of one group engender suspicion and, therefore, a similar reaction from another based on the assumption that the gains of one amount to the losses of the other. This theory departs from the instrumentalist paradigm in the sense that it does not highlight the use of religion by any group for any interest but, instead, spontaneous reaction of one group to the threatening acts of another. In Nigeria, it is common to blame certain groups for ethno-religious violence, or for one group to blame the other. There is the belief that whatever happens on one side of the religious divide will be reacted to on the other. As Christians and Muslims face the state and face one another, they do so in a competitive rather than collaborative way. Those played in the events of Issues in Nigerian’s Narratives on Conflicts.

This theory does not go far in stating the causes of conflict, but contributes to our understanding of violence only from the point of view of competition between different conflict actors and parties. It also sheds light on conflict only at the violent stage and may be seen more in terms of triggering rather than causal factor. It cannot be taken as a cause of violence in itself since competition between regions, ethnic groups and religion is nothing new and nothing makes it particularly peculiar to the Nigerian context. Suffice it to say, however, that the action-reaction perspective feeds on the atmosphere of suspicion and the numerical competition between the two major faith groups in Nigeria. Furthermore, the politicization of faith statistics and its deployment for non religious purposes coheres with the instrumentalist theory.

As the basic concepts and theoretical perspectives explained, it showed that when individuals or groups being deny to achieve their target or interest, as repression increase, there is a marked increase in the rate of decomposition or disarticulation of effective state authority, legitimacy and coercive apparatus of the state becomes terroristic in its actions, rather than playing its expected role as the organ with the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the society. This situation has provoked the intensification of different forms of identity mobilization and consciousness (ethnic, regional, religious, communal, etc.) and even conflagration (Jibrin 2000).

The folktales are stories organized around a particular purpose and theme, either to relate a moral lesson, tell a human truth, describe the adventure of war and tell stories of personality types and figures (Achebe, 1959). This way, the folktales stories kept the history of Nigerian people alive, and people learned significantly from the narratives. According to Amali (2014), the Idoma people of Benue State that occupies part of the western areas of Nigeria, used folktales to demonstrate to people what the society expects of them such as acceptable behaviours. Folktales were also used to educate young children. Through this process, both the young and adults alike were able to learn the messages conveyed by the narrators of folktale stories. In other words, the values of the society were portrayed through folktales.

This oral tradition continued for thousands of years. There is evidence that Nigeria was inhabited at least 13,000 years ago (Shaw and Jameson, 2002). Much of what is known of Nigeria and its indigenous people in the pre-literate times is traced to oral traditions of storytelling (Gardner, 1990). Since then there have been several waves of foreign influence. By the eighth century (C.E.), Arabic influence had come to Nigeria along with the Arabic language and the practice of Islam (Nigeria History, 2012). By the 14th century, written and spoken Arabic were flourishing in northern Nigeria and by the 17th century some stories of the Hausa (members of the largest ethnic group in Africa) were translated into Arabic (Gardner, 1990). Then began a period of contact with Europeans who were driven by missionary zeal and the desire for trade. First came the Portuguese in the late 15th century and they established catholic missions in the early 16th century (Stewart, 2000). By the second half of the 17th century the power of the Portuguese declined as English and Dutch traders became more active in Nigeria. The British captured the Nigerian capital of Lagos in 1851 and began to colonize the country as an imperial power. Missionaries translated the Bible into Yoruba and Igbo languages and spread the Christian religion.

Although Nigeria was the creation of European ambitions and rivalries in West Africa, by the 1930s several African writers (that is, Mohammed Bello and Pita Nwana) began writing stories and novels to debunk Eurocentric narratives. Other writers began reflecting the power and influence of native stories in their work. The literary style was predominately fantasy-based until the late 1940s when a shift to realism occurred (Ajuwon, 1985). The newer work included human characters and dealt with universal themes such as justice, corruption, religion, love and marriages.

  **CONCLUSION:**

It is clear that Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau state, more than any other geopolitical Zone of Nigeria, provides the most suitable laboratory to test the relationship between Narratives Issues on Conflicts. It is the most religious divers, region in the country most especially Jos North and Jos South Local Government Councils and the Zone whereby Islam and Christianity have the keenest competition which often involves the state and Nigeria in general. Historical development and Narratives Issues in the Zone contributes conflict or aggressive behaviours between Christianity and Islam very likely. The theories we have examined in this chapter have their merits and demerits. There is no grand theory that explains the nexus of Narratives Issues on Conflicts either universally or in the Nigerian context. Different perspectives have been alluded to by scholars based on their preferences and academic orientations. The theory of Narratives and Conflict in Nigeria is weakly developed, only when the present Government is trying to prevent Narratives on hate Speeches as source of conflict, before scholars have not paid adequate attention to explaining what is happening and why violence conflict occurs in some locations and not in others. However, the instrumentalist theory stands out in explanatory weight. Mere fundamentalism, poverty, reaction to others etc, cannot on their own sufficiently explain the occurrence of conflict in the Zone or the state and Nigeria in generally, for that matter. Admittedly, some of the conditions can contribute to the escalation of violent confrontation but hardly suffice as causes.

 **CHAPTER TWO**

 **NARRATORS AND RECIPIENTS OF NARRATIVES:**

**INTRODUCTION:**

Experienced policy entrepreneurs know that today’s newspaper headlines may well become tomorrow’s fish wrappings. Anticipating agenda-setting theory, veteran protesters view media coverage not as an end, but as a means to put their claims on the agenda. Cobb and Ross (1997) characterize agenda setting as ‘the politics of selecting issues for active consideration’. But what happens after issues gain agenda status, that is, become part of ‘that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decision makers’ (Cobb and Elder, 1983)? Would it be useful to distinguish strictly between processes that are at work before issues gain agenda status and those that enter the scene afterwards? An expansive view of agenda setting blurs the line between agenda setting and problem definition: ‘Agenda conflicts are not just about what issues government chooses to act on; they are also about competing interpretations of political problems and the alternative worldviews that underlie them’ (Cobb and Ross, 1997). Agenda setting, Birkland similarly suggests (1997), is ‘the result of society acting through political and social institutions to define the meanings of problems and the range of acceptable solutions’. A likewise expansive outlook on problem definition has a similar effect: ‘Problem definition has to do with what we choose to identify as public issues and how we think and talk about these concerns’ (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). In contrast to this blurring of boundary lines, (Weiss 1989), draws a clear distinction between the two: ‘Problem definition is related to, but different from, agenda setting. Problem definition is concerned with the organization of a set of facts, beliefs, and perceptions how people think about circumstances. Agenda setting refers to the process by which some problems come to public attention at given times and places’ (1989). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) likewise recognize that, ‘Raising a problem to the public agenda does not imply any particular solution. The trick for a policy entrepreneur is to ensure that the solution he or she favours is adopted once a given problem has emerged on the national agenda’. Although the way an issue gains agenda status may influence how it is subsequently defined as a policy problem, this is but one conceivable influence whose force is a matter not of definition but of empirical investigation.

To explore the relationship between agenda setting and problem definition, this chapter examines the Narrators of Issues and Recipients of Narratives Issues in agenda setting, such as migration which is the source of phenomenon, is as old as human civilization. Throughout history individuals, families, clans and whole communities have moved from one location to another either temporarily or permanently. The migration of English people to live in America, Australia and Canada is another. So also is the migration of the Dutch to live in South Africa, later, joined by French and British migrants, between 1500 and 1800 A.D., millions of Africans were forcefully transported to Europe and America as slaves. Here in Nigeria, local histories are replete with traditions of origin involving almost every community migrating from one locality to another. These movements are still going on and will continue until human society or history comes to an end. Plateau state, must especially Jos North and Jos South are not exceptions to this trend. The migrant in their new environments are peaceful and study the cultures of their host and ensure they do not engage in activities that would offend their host communities. The host communities would not normally give the migrant their best lands and other resources, the migrants would work extra-harder to earn in addition to what the host communities might have made available to them. But the migrants have advantage over their host communities because of wider connections in terms of retaining their contacts with their original homes. Furthermore, they might possess certain skills and products which the host community does not possess. Because of these reasons and others besides, the migrants stoonds a chance of progressing faster than their hosts, which, in due course, might introduce economic differentiation and inequality along migrants and host. The migrants consciously worked harder and integrate into the norms, values including social, economic and political agenda of their host community, at the same time preserving certain customs and values which they might have cherish. After generation to generation, an average of between 25-35 years, the sixth generation almost 200 years (that is, 30 x 6 years), they have developed a sense of belonging to their new habitat, children, grandchildren, access to land properties and contributed to the development of the community and responsibilities which now they feel justified to question certain age-old community policies and practices which have not been sufficiently open and inclusive. In view of their known contributions, merit of suggestions, have substantial following from amongst both migrants and host, led to Adolescents and issues in nigerian’s narratives on conflicts as a result of discriminations in many aspect of human endeavour’s within the society.

 **THE NARRATORS OF ISSUES IN NIGERIAN STATE**

People are storytellers they tell narratives about their experiences and the meanings that these experiences have for their lives. All cultures and societies also possess their own stories or narratives about their past and their present, and sometimes about their view of the future. These narratives include stories of greatness and heroism, or stories of periods characterized by [victimhood](file:///C%3A%5Cessay%5Cvictimhood) and suffering.

**What Is Public Narrative?**

 The questions of; what am I called to do? What is my community called to do? and what are we called to do now? Are at least as old as Mosses,’ conversation with God at the burning bush. Why me? Ask Mosses, when called to free his people. And, who or what is calling me? Why these people? Who are they anyway? And why here, now, in this place?

Practicing leadership enabling others to achieve purpose in the face of uncertainty require engaging the heart, the head, and the hands: motivation, strategy, and action. Public narrative issues can be used to access the emotional resources needed to respond mindfully by mobilizing hope over fear, empathy over alienation, and self-worth over self-doubt. Leaders learn how to tell a “story of self” that can communicate the values that explain why they have been called to lead; a “story of us” that brings alive values their community shares; and a “story of now” of the urgent challenge to those values that requires action. This articulation of the relationship of self, other, and action is also at the core of our moral traditions. As Rabbi Hillel, the 1st Century Jerusalem sage put it, “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am for myself alone, what am I? If not now, when?” Narrative issue is the discursive process through which individuals, communities, and nations make choices, construct identity, and inspire action. Because we use narrative issues to engage the “head” and the “heart,” it both instructs and inspires teaching us not only how we ought to act, but motivating us to act and thus engaging the “hands” as well.

**Public Narrative: Self, Us and Now:**

Leadership, especially leadership on behalf of social change, often requires telling a new public story, or adapting an old one: a story of self, a story of us, and a story of now. A story of self, communicates the values that are calling you to act. A story of us communicates values shared by those whom you hope to motivate to act. And a story of now communicates the urgent challenge to those values that demands action now. Participating in a social action not only often involves a rearticulating of one’s story of self, us, and now, but marks an entry into a world of uncertainty so daunting that access to sources of hope is essential. To illustrate, I will draw examples from the first seven minutes of Sen. Barack Obama’s speech to the Democratic National Convention in July 2004.

**Story of Self:**

Telling one’s story of self is a way to share the values that defined who you are not as abstract principles, but as lived experience. We construct stories of self around choice points moments when we faced a challenge, made a choice, experienced an outcome, and learned a moral. We communicate values that motivate us by selecting from among those choice points, and recounting what happened. Because story telling is a social transaction, we engage our listener’s memories as well as our own as we learn to adapt our story of self in response to feedback so the communication is successful. Similarly, like the response to the Yiddish riddle that asks who discovered water: “I do not know, but it was not a fish.” The other person often can “connect the dots” that we may not have connected because we are so within our own story that we have not learned to articulate them. We construct our identity, in other words, as our story. What is utterly unique about each of is not a combination of the categories (race, gender, class, profession, marital status) that include us, but rather, our journey, our way through life, our personal text from which each of us can teach. A story is like a poem. It moves not by how long it is, nor how eloquent or complicated. It moves by offering an experience or moment through which we grasp the feeling or insight the poet communicates. The more specific details we choose to recount, the more we can move our listeners, the more powerfully we can articulate our values, what moral philosopher Charles Taylor calls our “moral sources.” Like a poem, a story can open a portal to the transcendent. Telling about a story is different from telling a story. When we tell a story we enable the listener to enter its time and place with us, see what we see, hear what we hear, feel what we feel. An actor friend once told me the key was to speak entirely in the present tense and avoid using the word “and”: I step into the room. It is dark. I hear a sound. Etc. Some of us may think our personal stories do not matter, that others would not care, or that we should talk about ourselves so much. On the contrary, if we do public work we have a responsibility to give a public account of ourselves where we came from, why we do what we do, and where we think we are going. In a role of public leadership, we really do not have a choice about telling our story of self. If we do not author our story, others will and they may tell our story in ways that we may not like. Not because they are malevolent, but because others try to make sense of who by drawing on their experience of people whom they consider to be like us.

**Narrative and time:** Whatever the final word may be regarding the source of this gift for narrative whether from nature or from nurture or from some complex combination of the two, the question remains: what does narrative do for us? And the first answer is that is does many things for us, some of which narrative is the principle way in which species organizes its understanding of time. This would seem to be the fundamental gift of narrative with the greater ranges of benefits. And it certainly makes evolutionary sense. As we are the only species on earth with both language and a conscious awareness of the passage of time, it stands to reason that we would have a mechanism for expressing this awareness.

Of course, there are other ways to organize time and to express it. In our age, the commonest of these is the mechanical timepiece the clock or watch. But mechanical clocks have been around only since the Middle Ages. Before that, the measurement of time was more proximate then exact. Still, there were then (as there are new and always will be) dependable non-narrative ways of organizing time; the passage of the sun, the phases of the moon, the succession of season, and the season cycles that we call years. Like the lock, these modes of organizing time are abstract in the sense that they provide a grid of regular intervals within which we can locate events. Narrative, by contrast, turns this process inside, out, allowing events themselves to create the order of time. “I full down,” cries the child and in so doing gives shape to what in clock time, would be roughly a second. In effect, the child carves out apiece of time, spanning her collapse and fall to the ground. This is the way time, to quote Paul Ricoeur, becomes “human time”: Time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of narrative; narrative, in turn. Is meaningful to the extant that it portrayed the features of temporal existence.

**Contentious Narratives and the Issues of Power:** Following Foucault’s idea about power circulating through discourses, whichlegitimizes knowledge and determines what is considered “truth”, we can look atpower as both a force that can foster social inequality or be an agent of progressive change. In Croatia, for example, the struggle for legitimacy and access to power has shifted from direct violence to the sphere of discourses. Croats and Serbs in Croatia still hold on to their different versions of history and present, which has produced separate socio-cultural entities that exist as binary opposites to each other. The binary opposite meaning systems have become part of their identity, which is evident in their private and public narratives. Those systems have at its core the idea of positive, morally pure and superior «us» and evil, vicious and negative «them». Thus the challenge to enduring human security in Croatia today is that both major ethnic groups, Croats and Serbs, seek legitimation of their own narratives and views of the past and present, through which they would position themselves on the higher moral grounds in relation to the ‘Other’. The narratives about human conditions, security and peace are significantly influenced by power relations, rank and status of groups and individuals. For example, Galtung argues that the very concept of peace in contemporary world is the Roman “pax”, which serves the interest of the powerful to maintain status quo. In case of Croatia, the two major groups have different narratives of peace and human conditions, reflecting significant differences in power relations and status. Serbian version suggests rank disequilibrium, economic and political inequalities and cultural ghethoization stressing the need for expanded view of human security and peace that would encompass cultural and structural emancipation of minorities. Croatian version focuses on a narrower view of human security and peace portraying current absence of interethnic violence and cessation of open hostilities as a success story that implies perpetuation of current power relations and status quo. In this context, one can argue that the narratives can be powerful tools of political activity and distribution of power, which can either open or close the window of opportunities for certain groups.

During the 1990s war in Croatia, we saw how the shifts in power, structurally enforced from the outside in the form of Germany and Vatican’s early recognition of the new state of Croatia, had been subtly instrumentalized through the discourse of freedom and right to self-determination, while the narrative related to the old order of Federal country and sovereign nation state of Yugoslavia had been pushed aside. Shifting order of power legitimizes knowledge and action, and determines what is considered truth and what will be silenced. However, the shifting global order of power does not mean that the local ethnocentric narratives related to past atrocities and war will cease to exist and that their complexity will be subsumed under a common narrative of European integrations. Ethnocentric narratives about victimhood and past glory of all nations in Yugoslavia have persisted side by side of the state promoted unifying narrative and that is why they were so easily mobilized by nationalist leaders in the wake of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.

The Issue of Armenian genocide, is another example of how contentious narratives related to major historical events could be seen as detrimental to human security, as parties struggle for legitimacy, and as shifts in power relationships poses recurrent threats to security. The narratives about the Armenian genocide are a key element of ongoing tensions between Turks and Armenians that have escalated in the wake of Soviet Union disintegration in 1991 Nagorno-Karabakh war. This war can be characterized as a protracted ethnic conflict between Azerbaijan, an ethnically Turkic state, and ethnic majority Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, backed by Armenia, who sought secession from Azerbaijan. The conflict resulted in many atrocities and massive ethnic cleansing by both sides. The peace brokered by the OSCE Minsk Group only stopped the direct violence while arms race, intermittent border clashes and hostile discourses continue to feed negative peace that can very easily escalate in a new open violent conflict. In the meantime, narratives of victimhood in relation to genocide serve to both sides as justifications for perpetuation of hostilities, while the struggle for power shifts and repositioning continues until a change in *status quo* takes place. So also in the Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau state power struggle most especially Jos North Local where indigene verses Migrants competes on who has the majority and own the Area.

**Collective Narrative and Collective Memories:** Collectives are the comprehensive collection of stories, beliefs, aspirations, histories, and current explanations that a group holds about itself and about its surroundings collective narrative are social constructions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current events; they are accounts of a community’s collective experiences, embodied in its belief system and represent the collective’s symbolically constructed shared identity (Bruner, 1990) Based on this conflict narrative on aggressive behaviours among post crisis adolescence depend on what it seems right by the group action.

To be regarded as a collective narrative ought to pertain to the collective: It should offer a community a defined identity in which the individuals and their actions are regarded not as autonomous but as members with particular roles in it (that is, Soldier, Professor, Barber, Nurse; Margolin, 2000). In this capacity, collective narratives are Prime devices for providing the backbone of a groups Sense of shared identity, and thus, to an individual’s Sense of social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

The meaning-providing feature of collective narrative is emphasized by Polking Horne (1988), pointing out that “narrative is a scheme by means of which human beings give meaning to their experience of temporary and personal action”. Barthes (1973) Speak of narratives (calling them “mythologies”) as giving “an historical intention as natural justifications, and contingency appear natural. In passing from historical nature, myth acts economically of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of human essences”.

Collective narratives in conflict narrative on aggressive behaviour among post crisis adolescence do not emerge from nowhere. Their morest important source is the group’s history, that is, the way the group constructs and construes its past.

The importance of the role played by historically rooted collective narratives in a community’s Sense of identity and way of interpreting its surroundings can be seen in the way that emerging nations contrive new narratives or change old ones. For example, Chan (1999) describes how Taiwan’s rulers purposefully constructed a new national narrative, gradually moving from a traditional Chinese-based narrative to a new one based on a “usable past” which is rooted in Taiwanese culture. Similarly, Kit-Wai Ma (1998) describes how Hong Kong had to reinvent a new memory and identity in the process of recinicization”, using film and TV as the major agents of change. The process of small nation-states, such as Israel and Armenia, is not much different, with major societal, cultural, and particularly educational institutions constructing a renewed collective narrative from ancient and recent histories (Tiryakan, 1998).

History not only provides the roots for a group’s collective narrative, but is reciprocally colored by the narrative; Historical events are “made to fit “the narrative, are added or, more excluded from the narrative. Thus, for example, while the Jewish narrative fails to include any reference to the “disappearance” of more than 400 Arab Villages since 1948, the Israeli Palestinian narrative fails to mention the invasion of seven Arab states in to the newly born state of Israel in May of 1948 (example, Sezgin, 2001).

When collective historical memories remain unresolved, they continue to linger underneath the public surface and forcefully fuel the conflict (Cairns and Hewstone, 2002). The Northern Irish conflict or the one between Israeli Jews and Palestinians are cases in point. There examples highlight the grip of historical memories that may last for decades and centuries, manifested in such rituals as the protestant March through Catholic streets, the celebration of a Holocaust memorial day by Israeli Jews, or the Israeli-Palestinian Day of Earth to commemorate the killings by police in 1976. If left unresolved and unacknowledged, collective memories fuel and recreate conflicts; coming to know and to acknowledge the painful memories of the other side may be a way to overcome conflicts, as has been attempted, such as though open discussion in Rwanda (Staub, 2002) and though the sharing of personal histories in Israel (Bar-On, 2002).

Collective narratives appear to play a particularly important role in difficult times. The meaning providing function of collective narratives serves, then, to protect its members from the devastating impact of conflict, disaster, or collective trauma and offers the means to assist the process of healing. It helps to know who we are, what we are suffering for, who are the despised others, and where does all this lead to collective narratives serve to sub-douse aggressive behaviour among post crisis adolescents in this Sense as collective coping mechanisms.

Times of conflict are the days of grandeur for collective narratives. During such time collective memories become a rallying point, mobilizing a group’s hidden energies and reinforcing its Sense of Unity (Wright, 1985). During such times, there is highlighting of beliefs that pertain, for example, to how Justified “our side” is in its goals and actions; how much it is victimized by the other side (Bar-Tal, 1988); how morally imperative “our” actions toward the other side are (Foster, 1999); how moderate “our” dispositions are; and how much “we”, unlike the other side, are willing to sacrifice to end the conflict (Ross & Ward, 1995).

By necessity, the collective narratives of groups in conflict contradict each other and mirror each other, providing interpretations of evens that negate those of the other side. Thus, whereas a group’s collective narrative bolsters the group’s self-identity and justifies its role in the conflict, it, also, invalidates the other side’s collective narrative and its role in the conflicts: If “we” are right, “they” are surely wrong, and if “we” are victims, “they” are obviously the perpetrators.

Here lies the crux of the matter: Conflict narrative on aggressive behaviour among post crisis adolescence, not only do the narratives and underling beliefs mirror on each other, **they also delegitimize each other’s goals, actions, history, humanity and sufferings.** As defined by Bar-Tal (1988), “Delimitation indicates that the characteristics of the delegitimized group, as reflected in its behaviours, attitudes, values, goals, ideology, or trails, are undesirable and negative, and unacceptable according to the norms and values of the delegitimizing group”.

 **NARRATIVE “BRAIDING” AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS**

Once elected or appointed, public officials engage each other and their public through cycles of strategic planning, information sharing, inquiry, facilitation, deliberation, mediation, and decision-making. They use these modes of engagement to organize and respond effectively to the emerging issues in the public, often within the “storyline” (Hajer, 1997; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003) or narrative (Roe, 1994, 1989) that is foundational to their political party, and to the administrative culture of the organizations where they work (Boje, 2001). But given the nature of the “public” and its issues, these practices may either contribute to the development of community itself such that citizens or residents take ownership of the problems, responding to increased inclusivity, and building sustainable solutions, or these practices can exaggerate and deepen the existing fractures within a “community”, sharpening identity-based differences, and even radicalizing marginalized groups (Clegg, 1993; Laclau, 2006; Mumby, 1989; Ranciere, 2006a, 2009). From this perspective, much depends on the ways these practices are themselves enacted and how they work.

Theoretically, these practices should enable public officials to stay connected to the changing needs and interests of the communities for whom and with whom they work. Theoretically, these practices should enable public officials to help citizens negotiate with each other, and with the government, problem-solving in a way that produces timely solutions to the kinds of wicked problems that are at the heart of governing in the globalized context, where sensationalizes divisions that create the “Us” as different from “Them.” Theoretically, these practices should enable public officials to foster a quality of relationships within a community that supports the community to learn about itself, to become an “observing community” (Laws, 2010). However, it is all too often the case that these practices enact the form of engagement only, without significantly altering the nature of relationships or the (his), stories that are the “comet tail” of wicked problems; these are problems which are so complex that they are only defined in and through the application of a given solution where there could be multiple solutions (Ritchey, 2011).

Public meetings occur, information is gathered, planning is done, issues are identified and negotiated, or mediated with the trust and the hope that the form itself will generate the quality of engagement which can reduce divisions in the community (Braithwaite & Dryzek, 2000; Button & Mattson, 1999; Cohen, 2005; J. Cohen, 1997; Fleck, 2007; Knight & Johnson, 1994; Laws, 2001; Orlie, 1994; Pelletier, Kraak, McCullum, & Rich, 1999; Rosenberg, 2007; Ryfe, 2002; Sanders, 1997). But form of engagement itself may not help communities learn together and generate new ways to know themselves through this and that or re-organizing the divisions across the community.

Public officials can convene deliberative processes where stakeholders debate or engage in dialogue, while the divisions in a community can remain, or even strengthen, via what (Conklin, 2005) calls “forces of fragmentation.” Fragmentation, in the context of problem-solving, refers to the way that problem-definitions are all too often broken down into parts, yet they exist in a system that defies the summation of the parts. Fragmentation also refers to the way that social networks impacted by the problem are also cut off from each other ideologically, (as in the case of the NRA and pro-gun control in the United States), or geographically, as in the case of those who are impacted by rising seas, living in coastal areas and the climate skeptics who live in cities. But fragmentation is also a process akin to structural violence, where marginalization of groups reduces their access to speaking and being heard they are interpellated (Law, 2000), responding to a “position call” (Klure, 2010) from the state that identifies them as “less than,” if not altogether expendable.

Consider, for example, the public deliberations associated with the immigration debate in Prince William County, Virginia, in 2007-2008, when the community was deliberating, via town hall meetings, on the passage of the resolution which suspended the probable cause standard, enabling police to stop anyone and ask for documentation of citizenship, in an effort to reduce what one side called “illegal immigration”. This was clearly a “wicked problem” for the community, but it had many faces. For some, the problem was about day-labourers gathered at the local Seven-Eleven. For others, it had to do with significant changes in the ethnic composition of their neighbourhoods. For others, it was about the increase in local gangs. Still others were concerned about schools burdened with English as a Second Language classes. For the immigrants themselves, the problems revolved around, for example, racial and ethnic profiling, the threat of deportation and separation from American-born children, low wages, lacked of access to services such as healthcare. In Jos and its neighbouring Local governments some segments group of people are not given Jobs, even plot is not allocated to them but they would only have through other after been given by the authorities of these Local Governments.

The city council worked to bring “the illegal immigration issue” as the problem frame to a public forum for discussion, a problem frame that reflected only one side in a very complex but highly polarized issue. The public forum itself, however, contributed greatly to polarization, as people harnessed existing, often racist, narratives to make their points, while several hundred undocumented immigrants, unable to enter the building and participate in the public deliberation, demonstrated outside. Not only were the voices of immigrants unheard, but the narratives of citizens speaking in favour of The Resolution were so intense and polarizing, if not violent, that they completely drowned out the voices of those citizens who were opposed to The Resolution. The deliberative process itself was deeply problematic in terms of learning, or effective problem solving, and ironically it was the police chief who brought new, sound, and ethical arguments into the public sphere he argued in favour of the repeal of The Resolution, and it was ultimately repealed after a set of studies reviewed the economic and social costs of its implementation. In this case, the deliberative process contributed to strengthening the fault lines, that is, the divisions that were deployed in the narratives in use within the community. Given that collaboration, as well as violence prevention, requires the fault lines to be addressed by the community itself, public forums for deliberation can fail miserably when they cement, rather than evolve, the way the community makes sense of its problems.

Aware that these fault lines are problematic, municipalities often try to mitigate divisions by providing educational and training programs, promoting conflict resolution training and diversity awareness. While these are important and useful tools for residents and citizens (Zartman, 1995), they find it difficult to reach marginalized communities. Additionally, when a wicked problem emerges, it appears within the network of persons attached to that problem and its related issues and these persons may or may not be attracted to educational and skill building programs. In other words, persons impacted by wicked problems are, at times, not willing or interested in participating in conflict resolution or educational programs for civic engagement. Thus, it can be argued that, regardless of the worth of conflict resolution training programs, municipalities need to engage citizens and residents in a manner better suited to reducing the divisions inherent in the community (Conklin, 2006; Rodriguez, 1998; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2004; Smith, 1996). In other words, conflicts provide opportunities for the community to learn about itself in the course of planning and problem-solving (Laws, 2010). But it remains to be seen how the various modes of engagement available to public officials actually contribute (or don ot contribute) to a quality of engagement that allows citizens to explore divisions within their communities in a way that develops relationships and leads to what Dewey called **“critical intelligence”** (Dewey, 1992). This is the kind of intelligence that supports the community to learn, not only about these issues, but also about itself as a constellation of different perspectives.

The presumption of this chapter is that conflict itself reduces the capacity of the community to do just that. As the conflict escalates, the fractures, materialized and anchored by “attractors” (meaning nodes) in conflict narratives, are cemented (Cobb, 2013). Narratives reflecting and creating those fractures are progressively radicalized, become increasingly simplistic, and “smooth out” details that are contrary to a given storyline. From this perspective, conflict disables a community’s capacity to deliberate, to engage in conversations that enable learning, and to support the evolution of the narrative landscape.

Furthermore, forums for public deliberation are often structured in a manner that leads to further radicalization; public officials presume that Robert’s Rules of Order and turn-taking will ensure that all voices can be heard. For this reason, public forums are “lightly” facilitated and speaking is presumed to be the material evidence that people can participate in the deliberation.

However, we know that speaking is not co-terminous with participation, precisely because the conflict narrative issues landscape functions so as to favour the initial speaker, as subsequent oppositional speakers must affirm, qualify, or deny the narratives issues that were advanced by the first speaker (Cobb and Rifkin, 1991). Additionally, it is often the case that more radical groups eschew public forums, setting themselves outside of the solution space (Cohen, 2005). For these reasons, when speaking is equated with participation, there will be some groups of people who stand outside the process and feel, no matter the volume of their voice, they will not be heard, and the evidence is that their narratives, the storylines they advance, may not be elaborated, particularly when they are too busy responding to the accusations of the “other side,” via denials, justifications, and excuses (Davis, 2005).

As the public conflict hardens in the public space, public officials all too often take sides, as often the conflict is framed in partisan storylines. We saw this clearly in the recent political conflict in the United States which led to the government shutdown of 2013. “So the plateau state government during Jonah Jang Administration from 2007-2014”. The “deliberations” which took place reproduced the deep partisan divisions between Democrats and Republicans, as senators took to the floor and blamed the other side for the failure to reach an agreement which would fund the government. Democrats accused their Republican counterparts of conducting a “jihad” and the Republicans blamed the Democrats for the failure of the negotiations. The American public watched the mudslinging mostly with disdain; and the Congressional leaders, as well as President Obama, captured by their political parties, not only failed to support the learning of Congress, or the general public, but fueled the divisions in Congress and in the country. It is clear, in light of their participation in the conflict, that these leaders believed they had primary responsibility to their party and secondary responsibility to the governance process itself. In other words, they did not see themselves, as leaders, as obliged to care for the nature of the deliberative space itself, rather than just their political agenda. There was no one who positioned themselves as working to foster the quality of conversation that would support collective learning about the issues, neither the President, nor the Speaker of the House. It was not until the United States was on the brink of default that leaders came together to forge an agreement. While there was a sigh of relief across the country, and the world, there was little learning about the complexity of the issues that each party saw as critical to the conflict. Political parties neither elaborated their values or their Others’; there was no construction of the history of the conflict; there was no exploration of the various roles being played, by leaders, by the poor, by the insurance companies, nor was there discussion of the budget in a manner that would clarify exactly why the Republicans hated the Affordable Health Care Act and what they considered appropriate solutions for the 50 million uninsured. This is an excellent example of the failure of leaders to care for, not just the outcome, but for the deliberative processes itself. And of course, the consequences for the American public were drastic even though the country was able to avoid a default, the public ended up with a dimished understanding of the issues at stake and the relational capital has been the real victim of the political brinkmanship that terminated in a government shut do won.

How could we do this better? How could we engage in public policy debates in a manner that would generate the “critical intelligence” that Dewey imagine? The field of deliberative democracy offers both a theory of public deliberation as a process of “reason-giving” that, when coupled with mutual respect, supports the inclusion of multiple perspectives on public issues (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). However, there is also empirical research that addresses the gap between theory, and practice, highlighting the limits of deliberative process to ensure inclusion (Schouten, Leroy, and Glasbergen, 2012), or the capacity of a given democracy for deliberation (Dryzek, 2009). Moreover, Habermas, along with other theorists (Habermas and Rehg, 2001), has worked to provide the theoretical foundation for an emancipatory deliberation that enables people to speak, say what they mean, and not destroy relations with others.

More than any other theorist, Jürgen Habermas is responsible for reviving the idea of deliberation in our time, and giving it a more thoroughly democratic foundation. His deliberative politics is firmly grounded in the idea of popular sovereignty. The fundamental source of legitimacy is the collective judgment of the people. This is to be found not in the expression of an unmediated popular will, but in a disciplined set of practices defined by the deliberative idea. (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004).

However, while Habermas did indeed address the need to be able to make normative claims about the quality of deliberation, he ended up arguing that people will become emancipated as they are able to participate in the ideal speech situation, but he does not make clear the process for creating the ideal speech situation itself. For speech is not just speaking, it is also being heard (Ranciere, 2004); being heard is, in turn, a function of how we are positioned in discourse (Harre and Slocum, 2003), and whether we are positioned by others as moral agents, or not (Nelson, 2001). Particularly in the context of conflict, idealized speech situations are not available to marginalized speakers.

This chapter offers a description of a process, narrative braiding issues, that can be used to ensure that the marginalized can in fact speak and be heard in processes of public deliberation, and their identity can be recognized as mattering, that is how they are positioned and how they position themselves. In so doing, I defined a new role for public officials as responsible not only for the content of the policies they advance, but for the quality of the deliberative processes in which they are discussed and debated in the public Issues.

 **BRAIDING NARRATIVE STRANDS: IDENTITY POLITICS IN PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS**

Each identity group is constituted through the narratives it tells about self or other, as well as the stories told about it by others (du Toit, 2003; Ross, 2001). Each group therefore has a narrative line, a “strand” that anchors their identity, and provides a cognitive and emotional set of guidelines for action, within group, and between groups. This narrative strand is the foundational narrative that a group tells about itself. It could be an origin myth, or it could function as a narrative that describes the current challenges for “our” group. Within this strand, the group will position itself as positive, and, in the context of a conflict, it will position others as negative. These strands thus contain the core evaluations that enable people to make sense of existing circumstances, evaluating the situation, the others, and self.

Narrative strands are, by definition, not idiosyncratic to an individual they are held in and by a group. However, the geography of narrative within an identity group is not uniform every strand will contain sub-strands; these sub-strands share a narrative DNA with the main strand and together they comprise the narrative landscape as a system of narratives (Bernardi, 2012). For example, the Palestinian Territory contains one narrative strand that is a story about the Israelis taking their land and subjecting them to occupation. This narrative strand defined the Palestinians. However, within this strand, there are important sub-strands; the Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, for example, display differences in the way people position self or other. In any case, while there are narrative sub-strands, they “belong” to a narrative family, to the main strand of a given narrative identity. Within the narrative landscape, the local and particular stories that people tell about themselves not only fit the broader narrative strand, but they also contribute to the overall coherence of the narrative system. Thus when a Palestinian woman tells a story about being afraid for her sixteen-year-old son, living in the West Bank, that story strengthens the main strand of the Palestinian narrative of the occupation.

In a conflict process, the narrative strands are condensed, shortened, and simplified (Nelson, 2001). This occurs because the dynamic of interaction between conflicting groups is a process of mutual delegitimation, which leads to defense (positive positioning for self and counter delegitimation for Other). Thus the interaction cannot lead to the development of critical intelligence or even discussions of interests parties to a conflict are working on identity issues (positioning) to establish a context (legitimacy) in which they can reveal and describe their own interests. From this perspective, negotiation processes, which presume parties can trade interests and explore parameters for “mutual gain” are often problematic: either parties reach an agreement (consensus) based on mutual interests, on top of reciprocally delegitimizing narratives or they do not reach agreement, perhaps due to mutual delegitimation.

However, seen from a narrative perspective, it would be imminently possible to use a negotiation process to explore narrative strands, which would be a way to develop a rich account of narrative identity. Benhabib (1996) has argued that conflict provides an opportunity to explore and emerge what she calls the “Concrete Other;” this “Concrete Other” is not just a representation of a given narrative position, she or he is a specific person, textured and nuanced, and is developed as a particularized version of a narrative strand. Negotiation, which emerges the Concrete Other by exploring the texture and complexity of a person’s narrative strand, should function to develop legitimate positions (for and with the Other) that would enable them to focus on the issues at hand, and their interests, specifically. As a narrative practice, a quality negotiation would address the issues of legitimacy either ahead of, or in the course of, the discussion of problem specifics. In this way, the development of a narrative strand is crucial to the discussion of interests in the negotiation process, for it establishes the foundation for legitimacy for one party, by or with the Other.

Narrative strands are developed in conversation through interaction. They contain, as do all narratives: a plot sequence of events with a beginning, a middle, and an end (Booker, 2004); an individual protagonist, and or a collective protagonist who struggles through adversity, with good intention, to surmount difficulties; antagonist(s) who thwart and block the progress of the protagonist or actively seek to harm the protagonist (Greimas & Porter, 1977); and a value system which constitutes the good and the bad (MacIntyre, 1981). Development of the strand involves asking questions, listening, and reflecting with speakers so that new components of the strand appear. Since the narrative strand is the foundation for identity, it will be articulated to any “position” people take in a negotiation process. From this perspective, the development of the narrative strand opens up new dimensions for the elaboration of identity in a negotiation process.

“Positions” in negotiation (not to be confused with positions in narratives) are the stand that persons take about what they want as an outcome to a negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1991; Williams, 1992). It is the solution people are seeking. From a narrative perspective, it is a story about what should happen. And the “should” is, in turn, woven into a narrative strand about who “we” are and what we need or deserve. The development of the narrative strand is, at some level, the conversation that explores the foundation from which interests arise as well, since interests provide the logic (or not) for a given position. A conversation that explores interests is a conversation about what people need or deserve and why it is a narrative strand. For a negotiation to be successful, in the long and short run, interests must be developed interactively, not just reported. This is essentially a process of developing the narrative strand.

Strand development is not necessarily an experience that is easy for any identity group, precisely because this process increases the complexity of the narrative issue the group has about itself. It is what Emerson has called a “provocation” (Emerson, 1903). Given that conflict processes lay down narrative issues pathways in which both legitimacy (of Self) and delegitimacy (of the Other) provide an action or interaction roadmap, changes in the identity narrative issue lead to changes in this roadmap and for a time, people may not know where they are, relationally speaking strand development may create a liminal state in which peoples’ narratives about self are altered, but as yet, strange and new, or untried. A liminal phase is a “between state” where people are no longer who they were and not yet who they will become (Hoffman, 1998; Cobb, 1994; Van Gennep, 1960). In this between states, a narrative of self is elaborated differently, but it has not had time to be enacted across multiple conversations, or in different spaces. As such, people are unhinged from a prior identity, without the consolidation of the new narrative, which requires “road-testing” across multiple contexts. This liminal phase can be experienced by groups as destabilizing, but it is tolerated, if not embraced in play, if their legitimacy is elaborated simultaneously. Winslade and Monk (2008) have described the process of narrative development, documenting the set of practices that are associated. This work is essential not only to the broader field of conflict resolution, but also to the practice of narrative strand development, toward changing the narrative landscape.

Either during, or after the process of strand development, narrative braiding is the process in which conversational partners (public officials, mediators, others parties) elaborate the terms of legitimacy, proposed by a given party, with all parties. For example, if the Moroccan community in Amsterdam values itself for its commitment to family, as a component of its narrative strand, that positive position in their narrative must be woven into the problem description that is under discussion. The terms for the legitimacy of a speaker are most often proposed as a “position call” an implied request for the elaboration of the positioning of self or other offered in the narrative (Winslade and Monk, 2000). Position calls are particularly central in the context of a conflict as the conflict is a struggle over the legitimacy of positions in discourse, in the narrative.

The “braid” comes about when the terms of legitimacy, offered by each party as a “position call” in their narrative strand, is included in the overall generalized description of the problem, where it came from, what the issues are, the nature of the risks and threats, what people did to try and overcome or sidestep it, why it is a problem, and the hopes and aspirations about what could happen should the problem be resolved or addressed appropriately. The “braid” is the story about the problem, told collectively, that includes the terms of legitimacy offered by each of the parties to the conflict. It is the set of narrative strands that are inflected, or articulated to each other. As such, it is very different from “consensus”, as in sameness of meaning, but precisely reflects the real meaning of “consensus” as making sense together. The braid retains the particularity of the narrative strands, yet they are wrapped around each other at junctures where the legitimacy of one party touches the terms of the Other’s legitimacy.

However, braiding is not a conversational process that is typically done by parties in conflict themselves. As noted earlier, conflict typically involves reciprocal delegitimation of other and legitimization of self. Because the conflict dynamic does not support braiding, narrative braiding is an intervention, a disruption of the conflict pattern. As such, it would very likely require either a tightly designed process or a mediator or facilitator. It would also require a two-step process where the strands are developed within a group (intra-party work) and then they are woven together, in the context of a facilitated process, or over time, in a set of sequential conversations. Given that mediators and facilitators are not trained to “braid” (even though a close examination of their process may reveal that they are indeed engaged in a practice like braiding), narrative braiding would require the kinds of training that narrative mediators have today. However, this is not an obstacle to the process, for indeed, public officials should have training needed to support their role as leaders in the transformation of public conflicts.

Public officials, in their role, have the opportunity, if not the responsibility, for narrative braiding; it can be argued that they have responsibility for public discourse, not because they create or control the discourse, but because the quality of the democracy public depends on the quality of deliberation, which, in turn, depends on the way identity groups, narrative strands, interact. Given that conflict processes inevitably shrink the complexity of narrative strands that, in turn, balkanize conflicts, public officials can play an important role in creating the conditions in which narrative strands can be explored and can come into a new relation, an integrated relation, with each other.

The process of strand development can be done by public officials in routine conversations with citizens, relative to their needs and concerns, elaborating with them the terms of their legitimacy. However, given that there are pockets of marginalized communities, within a given district or region, the development of narrative strands may not be part of “routine conversations” as precisely these marginalized groups do not interact with public officials, except so far as they are they object of either “help” or “control or surveillance.” So the first level of activity that public officials may undertake is to seek out the marginalized members of their district or region and engage them in a conversation in which the values they offer, which function to establish their own legitimacy, are elaborated and developed in interaction.

Secondly, as problems or conflicts arise in a region, they will inevitably impact multiple identity groups, multiple narrative strands. As problems arise, officials have the opportunity to begin to interact with all parties, even the marginalized groups, in a manner that elaborates the terms of legitimacy they have offered for themselves, with other groups.

The Tajessdief Caseiii provides an excellent exemplar. This case involves the clash between the Moroccan community in Amsterdam and the white Dutch community. In the shadow of the murder of Theo van Gogh on the streets in Amsterdam in 2004, the Dutch government developed policies and programs intended to integrate the Moroccans living in Amsterdam into Dutch society. However, tensions between these communities remained high. In this context, a Moroccan youth stole a woman’s purse from her car, and she ran him down with her car, pinning him to a tree and killing him.

The Moroccan community was up in arms, framing this as yet another instance of violence against them, while the white Dutch community argued that this was the sad outcome of yet another example of the criminal behaviour of Moroccan youth. As a result of this death, the Moroccan community wanted to protest the death of a Moroccan youth and negotiated with government officials to organize a march. Framed as “protest” narrative, the march would have worked to position the Moroccan youth as a victim, a semiotic marker for the Moroccan community’s narrative of its own marginalization and mistreatment by the Dutch society. The Dutch officials would have been positioned as victimizers, for the marchers’ narrative would have pointed to exclusion, prejudice, and separation.

As the possibility of this narrative of victimization appeared, the broader Dutch population was poised to counter this narrative strand with another: this youth was a criminal, like other Moroccan youth. In this context, the permit to march was denied the public officials wanted to avoid a clash between the Dutch and Moroccan communities on the streets, as indeed there was a potential for violence between what Hajer and Versteeg (2005) refer to as “discourse coalitions.” The march would have instantiated, or institutionalized the Moroccan narrative, something that the Dutch society would have strongly resisted because it positioned the Moroccan community as delegitimate. Had the protest march taken place, it would have allowed the voices of the marginalized to appear, but it also would have cemented and exacerbated the existing divisions in the context. From this perspective, the complexity of allowing the voices of the marginalized to be heard emerges this would always accompany a defensive, if not violent response, from the dominant culture.

The Moroccan community then requested a permit to hold a silent march, as a vigil of mourning for the youth that was killed. This permit was granted and this is fascinating. Clearly a march of mourning in and of itself would have given the Moroccan community an opportunity to speak, so the difference that made a difference in the decision to grant a permit was not the frame of “mourning” but that it would be silent, avoiding any challenge to the Dutch (state) narrative. The march was held, but no Dutch public officials attended. In this way, they enacted their relative disattention to the experiences of the Moroccan community, confirming the Moroccan community narrative. It was not only a missed opportunity, as the officials could have mourned with the Moroccan community, but it contributed to institutionalizing the divisions between the communities, ensuring that the voices of the Moroccan community would not be spoken in a context where they could not have been otherwise ignored.

Alternatively, the Dutch officials could have contributed to the development of the Moroccan narrative strand by elaborating their narrative strand with them. In this process the public officials might have, for example, discovered that the Muslim community had, as core to their narrative identity strand, the value of “traditional family” (where the father is the patriarch and the mother is the caretaker, and the rules of the father are to be obeyed); it would have been possible to begin to define the problem on the basis of those values, in a hypothetical statement such as: “This tragedy is clearly the result of the difficulties the Muslim community has, living in the Netherlands, to create a context where fathers can guide the youth in their development the way that they, the father, would intend.” This statement recognizes the Moroccan community’s aspiration to retain their values is, for them, both a statement of the problem (“we have not been able, in this environment, to live according to our values”) and a statement of the solution (“the Moroccan community has the values that, were we able to live them, we could raise our children so they would not steal”). But as legitimacy of the narrative strand needs to be woven into the collective problem statement, the public officials would have needed to formulate a problem, in public, with the public, toward a narrative that carried the legitimacy of the Moroccan community, for example, through the following hypothetical statement:

This is a tragedy in that the death of any young person is a waste, a loss this young man did not live long enough to learn to live in a manner that his family or his community would have wished for him. And this relates, in turn, to the multiple levels of mourning for the death of this young man is a marker, a sign of the difficulties of families, like his, who have not been able, in the context of the Netherlands, to raise their children the way they would prefer, according to their own values. We can, in time, learn from families like these and work with them, to create the environments in which their children can grow up and become the people their parents hope they can become, because like all parents, from everywhere, we want children to grow up to contribute to their families and communities, a contribution that might benefit all of us. This sympathetic strategist narratives issues, happed with Other groups in Plateau state, whereby some sections of the group were attacked in Edil-Khabir praying ground, killed and hundreds of cars were burned to ashes (2014) in their mother Land Nigeria.

This narrative would braid into the problem statement the terms of legitimacy offered by this imaginary Muslim interlocutor, from their narrative strand. Made public by this imaginary official, perhaps at the opening of the silent march, this strand could then be elaborated in the press and by other identity groups who could affirm the Moroccan community’s intention to raise their children well, like all parents, everywhere. This is an example of the process of narrative braiding that would support all the narrative strands to appear and to enter into relation with each other.

Public officials have an opportunity to engage in narrative braiding in multiple settings, informally and formally; braided summaries, such as the one described above, can be done in informational settings, public meetings of all kinds, administrative planning sessions, as well as media campaigns. These braided narratives can also be the foundation for the development of policies that address all manner of issues, including immigration, the environment, security, housing, homelessness, and so on. In all cases, the statement of the problem, which provides the logic for the policy, should include the terms of legitimacy advanced by all the major narrative strands that comprise the community impacted by that policy. In this way, officials contribute not only to the creation of the narrative strand but also to the reduction of marginalization, since the braiding process itself incorporates the voice of those who have struggled to have their legitimacy adopted and elaborated by Others. In turn, this requires the evolution of narrative from those that produce and reflect conflict dynamics (accusation with denial, excuse, and justification, and counteraccusation) to a story structure that creates a new, more collaborative dynamic, a “better formed” story.

 **RECIPIENTS OF NARRATIVES ISSUES**

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the differences between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself and for this reason man learned from man to benefit or to destroy and also identify who are his friends or enemies and send it donw from generation to generation. So therefore, the adolescents are the recipients of narrative issues in Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State, Plateau State, Nigeria and world in general. In the cognitive domain, adolescents differ substantially in their intellectual skills, the extent to which they think in relatively global or detailed ways, and the accuracy and intactness of their thought processes. Affectively, adolescents vary in the intensity and lability of their affect states, their tendency to experience various affect states, their consciousness of their emotional experience, and the processes they use to regulate their emotions (that is, their conscious coping strategies and unconscious defensive processes). They also vary in their capacity to regulate their impulses, whether motivated by moral concerns or simply by recognition of potential dangers inherent in acting in certain circumstances that lead same to radical activities and issues in conflict situations.

The relationship between media exposure and intergroup outcomes is further played out when it comes to the media’s role in creating commonly held norms and conventions. In order words for intergroup comparisons to operate, the comparative dimension must be recognized by both ingroup and outgroup members (Turner and Reynolds, 2003). In other words, the point of comparison is not merely the group itself (examples, gender, race, etc.), it is the relevant dimension in the immediate context. As such, by promoting certain representations (which feature particular aspects of groups) and ignoring others, the media play a role in creating shared norms and activating the use of these constructs in subsequent evaluations (Harwood and Roy, 2005). In particular, media messages have the potential to

(a) Influence the importance or relevance of, and ability to prime, different group memberships.

(b) Contribute to viewers’ perceptions about the features or dimensions that characterize different groups.

(c) Provide norms of treatment for different groups.

(d) Defined the status and standing of different groups; and ultimately.

(e) Pormalize these notions by suggesting that media representations are consensually accepted.

Another approach relates to what is essentially a conflict-based perspective and radiclsation, in which only identities that form the basis of political demand mobilization and action, or so-called politicized identities, may be regarded as salient and relevant (Rothschild, 1981). While this approach has the merit of focusing attention on active identities, it is mistaken in the exclusion of identities that are not politically active. This is first because by the nature of their invocation, identities tend to be situational, that is salient based on the situation at hand. As it were, the individual has an array of identities that he or she can decide to adopt or play up depending on the perception of the situation, including the identity adopted by competing actors. Although the situationality thesis is more easily observed at the individual level as adolescent, it also exists at the collective level. Thus, members of a group can decide to identify themselves as religious rather than ‘ethnic’ as groups in Northern Nigeria do from time to time depending on the level and scope of conflict. Indeed, as the adherents of the constructivist school of ethnicity have argued, identities are constructed. Second, like volcanoes, identities that are dormant today can become active tomorrow. For example, gender has certainly become an active identity marker in Nigeria today due to several local and global factors, yet three decades ago gender-based identity would have been considered dormant. Finally, identities have a way of being intricately inter-connected and mutually reinforcing, meaning it is unlikely that any one identity can exist in a pure form.

**Social learning,** aggression is acquired by learning them at home, in school and by interaction within their environment. Hence, their interactions with other ethnic groups in other parts of the Country trigger stored aggression against common enemies. The Social identity in the framework attempts to explain the social division among individuals in different groups. The settlement arrangement in Jos Town especially was divided within ethnic groups. Hence, this difference produces group action and aggression against other religious groups and Islamic organizations believed to tolerate other religious bodies in Nigeria. The Research Work Narrative Issues and Conflict on aggressive behaviour among post crisis Adolescent in Nigeria, Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State, therefore, adopts eclectic approach (that is, combination of deprivation-frustration Aggression, social learning and social identity theories) for our analysis. This is justified because of socio-economic, religious, political and cultural identity experienced by citizens in the Zone, especially in the Northern Senatorial Zone of the State whereby adolescents are recipients of issues in Nigerian’s Narrative.

**ADOLESCENTS:** *“Adolescents is the period of development**between childhood and adulthood”.* A boy or girl enters adolescent as a child and emerges as a man or woman,expected to be ready to assume an adult role in the society. For everybody,the years 11 to 18 in some other writers between 12 to 25 or 35 are the most eventful. During these years there is rapidphysical and sexual growth and maturation.It is very difficult to say exactly when adolescent starts. However, onset ofpuberty is generally accepted as the beginning of adolescent. *What is puberty?* Let us find out. The period around 11 or 12 years of age is the onset of puberty which usually lasts for 2 years. During these years there is a spurt in physical growth and appearance of sex characteristics. The first sign of puberty in girls is menstruation and in boys, nocturnal emission (ejaculation of semen during sleeping).

**Cognitive Development during adolescents;** more complex forms of thinking emerge. Three main features characterize the intellectual development of Adolescents: (one) the ability to think about possible occurrences rather than actual ones, (two) systematic problem solving, and (three) the development of hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Bee, 1889). The intellectual development of Adolescents changes their interpretation of the media. Although adolescents have the capacity to evaluate the media environment critically, when persons become habituated to looking at a medium that is as anti-intellectual as television largely is, they develop a non-critical attitude and a disposition to ‘look without seeing’ (Sebald, 1984).

 Consumers and producers may want to believe that Adolescents have sufficient cognitive development to buffer the negative effects of media violence. This belief is mere myth. Ample empirical evidence suggests that adolescents are susceptible to the effects of media violence. Indeed, even adults have difficulty in distinguishing reality from media fantasy. Having more life experience is not a shield against the media’s influence (Potter, 2003). An adherence to this myth abdicates society of its responsibility to monitor adolescent media use.

 **Moral development during adolescents;** is characterized by a concentration on fundamental moral principles such as altruism and respect. Adolescents become more socially conscious; and, their moral principles can transcend conventional notions of right and wrong (Potter, 2003). Adolescents usually marks a shift from judgments based on external consequences and personal gain to judgments based on rules or norms of a group (examples. family, peers, nation) to which they belong. What the chosen reference group defined as right or good is right or good. Generally, the adolescent internalizes these norms (Bee, 2000). The inescapable presence of the media makes it a source for social norms a reference for moral standards. Because media presents a world consumed with violence, we must face the disturbing reality that our Adolescents are consuming and internalizing violent moral standards.

 **Emotional Development;** primary feature of adolescent emotional development is identity formation. During adolescent, youth develop a sense of self that includes their **values, abilities, and hopes for the future.** The emerging sense of self is fragile, impressionable, and remarkably susceptible to the effects of the media Narrative Issues.

 The media provides information on issues such as violence and sex that youth may be relatively unfamiliar with. It is in the area of the unfamiliar, where parents have not yet made clear their own point of view, that TV influences impressionable beliefs and attitudes (Sebald, 1984). Given the pervasiveness of media violence, Adolescents cannot avoid incorporating some aspects of it into their behaviour patterns and identities.

 **Another feature of adolescent emotional development;** is risk-taking behaviour. Adolescents’ view themselves as unique and exceptional; this perspective can support a feeling of invulnerability to negative consequences (Strasburger and Wilson, 2002). Violence in the media is often presented without consequence. Presenting this incomplete relationship reinforces risk taking behaviour. For example, consider the album title of the popular band Tatu: “200 km/H in the Wrong Lane”. Tatu is not writing about the inherent risks of reckless driving or the pain associated with losing a loved one in a car accident. 200km/hr in the Wrong Lane is a song in which recklessness is associated with courage and independence. It presents a scenario in which risk-taking behaviour creates a feeling of superiority, albeit a false one. Adolescents exposed to large amounts of media violence may not have an appreciation for the true physical and emotional consequences of violence.

**POLITICS IDENTITY:** as a political concept refers to the political activity of various ethnic, religious and cultural groupings in demanding greater economic, social and political rights or self-determination. Identity politics claim to represent and seek to advance the interests of particular groups in society, the members of which often share and unite around common experiences of actual or perceived social and economic injustice, relative to the wider society of which they form part and exist in. In this way, the identity of the oppressed group gives rise to a political basis around which they may unite and begin to assert themselves in society (Zweiri and Zahid, 2007). Identity politics means more than the sole recognition of ethnic, religious or cultural identity, in fact identity politics seeks to carry these identities forward, beyond mere self identification, to a political framework based upon that identity. For example, Modern Jewish Zionism was originally secular (and marginalsed) within the Jewish community, but became driven by its own form of identity politics upon the formation of the State of Israel in 1948. Like wise identity politics played a major role in the creation of the Central Asian states in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union.

Nigeria is a plural society per excellence. It is characterized as a deeply divided State in which major political issues are vigorously and violently contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious and regional divisions in the country (Smyth and Robinson, 2001). The issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner take all strategies. These include the control of state power, resource allocation and citizenship. As a consequence, deeply divided states tend to be fragile and unstable because almost by definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus among the constituent groups than are required to effectively mitigate or contain the centrifugal forces that tear the society apart (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). In such societies, disintegration, secession, civil strife, civil war, minority agitation and violent conflicts, all of which would normally be considered aberrant to ‘normal’ state formation, are quite common threats or actual occurrences in divided states. It is not surprising therefore that divided states have devised some of the most innovative and delicate systems of government. Most states practice some variant of the federal solution, with the emphasis on political accommodation and inter segmental balance. This emphasis has made it necessary and expedient to adopt instrumentalities that mitigate the effects of majoritarianism, as well as promote inclusion, equity and distributive justice between the different salient groups.

Despite the precautions taken, divided states remain perennially unstable and many survive on the brink of collapse and disintegration (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972), as the case of Nigeria and other African states show. By virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). From its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced a perennial crisis of territorial or state legitimacy, which has often challenged its efforts at national cohesion, democratization, stability and economic transformation (Kirk-Greene, 1971; Maier, 2000; Melson and Wolpe, 1971; Soyinka, 1997). The high point of the crisis seems to have been the civil war in the late 1960s, which ensued shortly after independence in 1960. However, rather than mellow down, conflicts in Nigeria correlate positively with modernization and have become more or less pervasive and intense in the post civil war period in Nigeria.

**IDENTITY POLITICS:** Identity politics at the plateau has manifested itself in the political calculus between “indigenes” and “migrants”, involving a fierce competition for political posts. In 1994, there were the first signs of violence and attacks on religious institutions following the appointment of a Muslim as sole administrator of Jos North local government area. There were tensions over other public appointments in 1996 and again in 1998. The case, which contributed most directly to the outbreak of hostilities in September 2001, was the appointment of the poverty eradication coordinator in Jos North in August, a few weeks before the crisis. The appointment of Mukhtar Muhammad, a Hausa, was controversial: in December 1998, during the transition to civilian rule, he had been forced to step down as chairman of the newly-elected Jos North local government after he was accused of falsifying his credentials. His subsequent appointment to the coveted post of poverty eradication coordinator was seen by some as a provocation and was strongly opposed by Christian groups. This singular issue became the casus belli for the 2001 crisis that became the scene of mass killing and destruction of property.

The 2008 Jos North Local Government Crisis, even though may not reflect a radical shift from the 2001 crisis, still mirrors the extent and level of struggle for control of political and by extension economic resources in a prebendal, decadent and unproductive African state. In this crisis, what began as an electoral dispute quickly snowballed into an ethnic and religious conflagration with grave consequences for life and property. It stemmed from a longstanding battle for control of political power and economic rivalry between different ethnic groups and between those labeled "indigenous" or "migrants" inhabitants of the area. As grievances built up over time, the adolescents may have learned the appeal to religious sentiments was used by both sides to manipulate popular emotions and eventually to inflame the situation to a level where it could no longer be controlled. Christians and Muslims, “indigenes” and “migrants,” became both perpetrators and victims. The adolescents have learned and identified conflicts issues in narratives which can be transmitted to their youger ones that may even generate to more conflicts and radicalsation in the near future.

 **Conclusions**

 Identity, from a narrative perspective issue, is not a set of static traits or characteristics but a narrative strand that anchors “us” (as protagonists) in relation to “them” (antagonists). This strand is all too often formed in a conflict dynamic defined by reciprocal delegitimacy. This reciprocity does not however imply symmetry, for the delegitimizing done by groups with formal power and authority is institutionalized both culturally organizationally, and legislatively. While the marginalized may continue to delegitimate their Others, (dominan identity groups), they can all too often only materialize their narrative through withdrawal or violence. In either case, their participation in deliberation and democratic processes is delimited by the position they occupy in the narrative of their Others. With one or more identity groups marginalized, dominant groups may attempt to engage the marginalized, or they may attempt to promote their integration through legislation and policy. However, these processes only anchor a relation of helping or control on the part of dominant groups toward the marginal.

Public officials can take on the role of enhancing the participation of all citizens through supporting both the elaboration of each group’s narrative strand, as well as through braiding these strands together. This process requires that the conditions for legitimacy offered by each party about their own identity and social learning group be included in the formulation of the problem statement. Thus, as problems are identified, they are described in terms that legitimize the stakeholders involved. From this perspective, braiding is a process by which the conditions for participation are created whereby the adolescents are agent of misuse by the public officials, same time religions leaders and elders in the Community who were respect by the adolescents and Communities where they belong. The stakeholders Narratives within environments and communities play very important role on the Adolescents pending on the context at the moment in the socaity.

 **CHAPTER THREE**

**INTERNALIZATION OF CONFLICT NARRATIVE**

**INTRODUCTION:**

Our point of departure for the discussion to follow from narrators and recipients of narratives by the process of internalization of conflicts narratives by adolescents will be an a priori distinction between two extremes of social behaviour and radicalsation, corresponding to what we shall call interpersonal versus intergroup behaviour. At one extreme (which most probably is found in its pure form only rarely in real life) is the interaction between two or more individuals that is fully determined by their interpersonal relationships and individual characteristics, and not at all affected by various social groups or categories to which they respectively belong. The other extreme consists of interactions between two or more individuals (or groups of individuals) that are fully determined by their respective memberships in various social groups or categories, and not at all affected by the inter-individual personal relationships between the people involved. Here again, it is probable that pure forms of this extreme are found only infrequently in real social situations. Examples that might normally tend to be near the interpersonal extreme would be the relations between wife and husband or between old friends. Examples that would normally approach the intergroup extreme are the behaviour of soldiers from opposing armies during a battle, or the behaviour at a negotiating table of members representing two parties in an intense intergroup conflict. Some of the theoretical issues concerning this continuum are discussed by Turner (1982, 1984), Brown and Turner (1981), and Stephenson (1981); the main empirical questions concern the conditions that determine the adoption of forms of social behaviour nearing one or the other extreme.

Needless to say, social comparison process often results in stereotype-based comparisons (examples, Turner, 1981; Hogg and Adams, 1988). Brewer (1979, 1999) argues that in-group out-group distinctions typically consist of pro-in-group bias rather than anti-out-group bias, and therefore even when out-group members are perceived positively, in-group members are perceived and treated even more positively. While not highlighted directly here, this assertion suggests that although people often seek out stimuli that leads to more favourable perception of one’s in-group, favourable representations of out-group members can, in fact, promote overall positive attitudes about the group. Thus, while people are motivated to maintain distinctions between their in-group and the out-group that does not necessarily prevent these individuals from developing positive impressions of the out-group. Indeed, findings in the domain of media effects generally support this contention; however, the exact nature of the relationship is unclear. On the one hand, research suggests that exposure to positive media images can improve majority group member’s attitudes about minority out-groups (examples, Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes, 2005) along a variety of outcomes ranging from general support and positive judgments (Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, and Wanke, 1995; Power, Murphy, and Coover, 1996) to sympathy regarding issues of discrimination (Bodenhausen et al., 1995). On the other hand, the findings in this domain additionally indicate that when exposed to affirmative portrayals of minorities (that is, blacks) white consumers report more favourable evaluations of minorities, but attribute these positive outcomes to external or situational factors rather than the internal or personal characteristics of the out-group (Power, Murphy, and Coover, 1996).

Moreover, results from both Coover (2001) and Mastro, Tamborini, and Hullett (2005) suggest that, to a degree, favourable intergroup outcomes based on media exposure are contingent upon the extent to which the media depictions of race or ethnicity (even when positive) accommodate majority group norms and attitudes. Thus, the nature of the relationship between exposure to positive images of out-group members and intergroup outcomes requires further scrutiny. Still, the implication is clear: consuming favourable characterizations of race or ethnicity should produce more favourable racial or ethnic judgments about that group among out-group members. Overall, while media portrayals of out-group models may lead in-group members to perceive these media personas as prototypes for that group, this depersonalization process may actually promote broader favourable impressions of the relevant out-group.

**Narratives Issues are present in every age;** in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there were nowhere has been a people without narrative. All human groups have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds. Caring nothing for the division between good and bad literature, narrative is international, trans- historical, trans- cultural; it is simply there, like life itself. That is why conflict narrative on aggressive behaviour among post crisis adolescence in Nigeria, Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State, would narrate aggressive behaviour among post crisis Adolescents.

 Among the most important assumptions of the behaviourist school are the belief that **the root causes of conflict or war, it lied in human nature and human behaviour and that an important relationship exists between intra-personal conflict and conflict that pervades the external social order.** Among the prevalent micro-theories that the Research would review are: instinct or innate theories of aggression, frustration aggression theory, social learning theory and social identity theory. Early psychologists often postulate that there was an innate instinctual or biological mechanism which would predispose humans towards aggression. This theory combined elements of early psychological studies (Freud’s death instinct) and social Darwinian theories regarding the fight for survival. This theory was subsequently discredited by biologists who did not believe that such mechanism existed. Like most pioneering theories, the innate theories gave way to more sophisticated and scientific hypotheses over time. One important development of this work was the evolution of the frustration Aggression theory. The basic assumption of the frustration Aggression theory is that all aggression, whether intrapersonal or international has its root causes on the frustration of one or more actors’ goal achievement. That is, the unfulfilment of personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an actor’s failure to obtain what it needs.

**Narrative Issues on aggressive Behaviour;** among post crisis adolescents in Nigeria, Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau Stats, is a research intended to find out aggressive behaviours by the Adolescents in post crisis situation through Conflict Narrative issues of why and how?

1. Narrative issue is so much a part of the way we appreherend the world in time, that is, it is virtually built in to the way we see. Filmmaker Brian De Palma put this idea even more strongly: “People do not see the world before their eyes until it is put in a narrative mode. Even when we look at something as static and completely spatial as a picture, narrative consciousness comes in to play. Is it possible, when “looking at the picture” to resist some kind of narrative structuring?

We may not see a full, clear story in abundant detail (a storm arises, a ship founders and runs aground). We see a ship wreck. In other words, included in the present time of the picture is a shadowy sense of time preceding it, and specifically of narrative time-that is, time comprised of a succession of necessary events that leads up to, and accounts for, what we see.

This human tendency to insert narrative issues in to static, immobile scenes seems almost automatic, like a reflex action. We want to know not just what is there, but also what happened. Artists have often capitalized on this tendency. In the renaissance, it was common to depict a moment in a well known story from mythology or the Bible. In the painting, draws on the Old Testament story of Belshazzar’s feast, in the Book of Daniel (chapter 5). Belshazzer, the last king of Babylon, arranged a great feast and ordered that the golden vessels that his father, Nebuchaduezzar, had plundered from the temple in Jerusalem be set out and filled with wine. The height of the feast, when his princes and wives and concubines were drinking from the holy vessels, a divine hand suddenly approached and wrote on the walls mysterious words in Hebrew (“Mene teked upharsin”). Belshazzar was struck with fear. Eventually, Daniel was called for to interpret the words, which he did; “Thou art weighed in the balance, and lucent wanting.” That very might, Babylon fell to Darius, and Belshazzer was slain. In his painting, Rembrandt has caught the climax of the narrative: the moment when Belshazzer, with less than twenty-four houses to live, sees the hand writing on the wall. Everything appears to be in motion, from Belshazzerv’s horrified gaze to the wine pouring from the golden vessels as his concubines also gape at words. We grasp it all in the context of a story in progress.

But even when we do not already know the specific story depicted in the painting, we can still be tempted to look for a story. We have many narrative templates in our minds and, knowing this, an artist can activate one or another. Looking at the painting by Michel Garnier, it is even necessary to prompt ourselves to ask what is happening. It would appear, in fact, that we begin right away, in the act of perception itself, to answer this question. We may never know who is being depicted or what specific story they may be a part of. But we do, nonetheless, have narrative formulas stole in our memory that quickly filled in certain elements of the story so far.

2. Intractable and protracted conflicts resist most of the traditional approaches, which can be seen in the fact that the antagonisms as well as complex dynamics among parties persist long after agreements are signed and direct violence stopped. Agreements imply reduction of hostilities though simplification of conflict complexities on the ground, whereby so-called common and shared interests and goals tend to be extensions of discourses and policies of the powerful intervening parties that often lead to conflict intractability and impede sustainable solutions. It is not rare that such interventions clash with local conditions and understandings, which deem them inefficient and even harmful. To deal with current threats of aggressive behaviour among post crisis adolescence such as intractable conflicts and to prevent their reemergence, we need both theoretical and practical approaches that go beyond agreements, shared paradigms and common interests and embrace complexity on the ground as a departure point for treating deep-rooted causes that persist through generations. In this Book “ADOLESCENTS AND ISSUES IN NIGERIAN’S NARRATIVES ON CONFLICTS”, narrative inquiry is seen as a tool for understanding and dealing with the complexities that challenge human security and provide avenues for transformation and change in today’s conflicts. The particular focus will be narratives generated within the context of conflict with emphasis on “aggressive behaviour aftermath of negative peace” that tends to persist in the aftermath of such conflicts. “Negative peace”, as defined by Galtung, refers to the “absence of direct violence” while other factors such as restoration of relationships and creation of social systems that serve the needs of people are lacking, which significantly affects human security.

Therefore, Conflict Narrative issues and aggressive behaviour are two sides of the some coined, they go hand in hand with each other. Then Conflict can be view as friction arising from actual or perceived difference or incompatibilities. Conflict is neutral, it could be dangerous (dysfunctional) or it could also present opportunities (functional). The outcome depends on attitudes or responses, (Dinshak and Gabo 2015).

In politics, conflict is more explicitly defined. Conflict is said to exist when two or more groups engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rivals (Jeong, 2000). Conflict is a demonstration of cross-purposes of distinct or similar political groups which often ends in political violence, and when contextualized in the Weberian sense, according to Anifowose, in his Violence and Politics in Nigeria (1982), is an acceptable weapon to ventilate anger.

3. The impact of direct, armed violence Conflict on individuals and groups, encompass “freedom from fear and want”, thus emphasizing not only basic human needs but also economic, ecological and political factors that contribute to human insecurity. In this Book, adolescents and aggressive behaviour will be looked at through the process of Narrative definition. I argue that stopping or preventing direct violence conflict and war is a critical step towards peace and human security, but such actions do not necessarily guarantee more secure and humane societies in the long run. Therefore, the approach to aggressive behaviour in this Book, will focus on threats that are the consequence of “negative peace and structural violence” such as lack of structural integration, willing interethnic cooperation and relationship restoration that are expressed through narratives, which will be the main factors for exploration of such threats to human security.

4. Plateau State is currently the main site of ethnic and religious violence in northern Nigeria. The past decade has seen recurrent crises across the state, in urban and rural areas mostly Northern Senatorial Zone with six Local Government Councils Namely, Barikin-ladi, Riyam, Jos South, Jos East, Jos North, and Bassa, where this Conflict Narrative on Aggressive Behaviour is interest in.

5. It is my intention to illuminate possible ways of contentious narratives issues based on the belief that aggressive behaviour can disrupt those dominant master narratives that overwhelm individuals through larger structures invested with power, by renegotiating, deconstructing and externalizing their main premises. Deciphering narratives as socio-historical constructs that incorporate the root causes of conflict can open up the possibilities for acceptance of more complex, and thereby more inclusive narratives, that can subsequently influence change of exclusive identities and pave the way for positive peace.

6. When social scientists approach contentious accounts about past conflicts issues, they are faced with a variety of problems, one of which is the selection bias when dealing with historical facts. Notes that the researcher should compile diverse accounts from which background narratives issues must be constructed which can help prevent serious theoretical and evidentiary errors. Narrative theory overcomes this problem with its assumption that the narratives are considered as subjective interpretations of history, which is an advantage for researchers for whom narratives represent an invaluable source of rich data about person, context, time and history. In narrative workshops, we are not concerned with the validity or truth of the stated historical accounts, but with the creation of complexities, as opposed to contentious binary simplifications, out of which we can build a new narrative, acceptable to all parties. Complexity and diversity of views and subjective realities implies change while simplicity leads to entrenchment of positions and conflict.

According to narrative theory, the past is seen as a continual and complex rather than linear process on both individual and collective levels where time collapse happens following particular turning points. The continuation of history and merging of the past and present is reflected in the stories and narratives issues that evoke past traumas of personal and collective plights that are relived in the present and have equal power over people’s emotions and actions in the present as they did in the past. That is why I argue that narratives issues of the past cannot be disregarded in conflict analysis and resolution and narrative research may be the very tool for addressing that critical relationship between history and present, and how this relates to various aspects of human security. The aspects of human security that narrative research and practice deal with, such as relationships between adversaries, reframing of contentious issues to promote mutual understanding and better grasp of parties’ needs and interests, are central in attaining more equitable distribution of power and resources. This is particularly relevant in the aftermath of armed conflicts and is the key for improvements in overall social and political stability, due to the following issues in nigerian’s narrative on conflicts, those principles need to be apply in our societies as well as Communities most especially Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State of Nigeria where Conflicts Issues are in a greater high.

**Poverty and inequality:** Despite its vast natural resources, Nigeria suffers from substantial social challenges, of which poverty remains one of the most significant. According to the World Bank, in 2013-2014 the proportion the Nigerian population living in poverty was 64.2%, or 48.3% using the adult equivalent approach. In itself problematic, poverty presents additional challenges to security issues because it is perceived to be distributed along regional, ethnic identity and social group lines. The perception of inequalities along social identity lines has been identified by some scholars as an important factor in explaining outbreaks of violence, and forms the core of the concept of horizontal inequalities. In Nigeria, marginalisation is frequently used in the political discourse and it is commonly stated that there is a significant divide regarding socio-economic development between the North and the South and also religious differences. While there are also other major differences within these regions, the underdevelopment of the largely in the Northern Nigeria is commonly seen as one of the root causes of militant in the area most especially Plateau state. The difference between regions can be seen in the poverty rates.

**Corruption:** Corruption is another factor behind the endemic social issues in Nigeria. In fact, Nigeria is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranked 144 of 177 countries with a score of 25 out of 100 by Transparency International. Due to corruption, large parts of the oil revenue disappear and corruption is commonly seen as the main reason why the national poverty rate has gone up despite the oil income, from 36% in 1970 to 64.2% today.

Corruption is widespread in Nigeria and can be seen in many parts of society, including the security forces. In the Afro barometer survey of Nigeria in 2012, 59% of respondents stated that they believed most or all government officials were involved in corruption, while 77% believed that most or all of the police were involved in corruption too. In an earlier survey in 2001, the police and the political parties were also ranked as those perceived to be most corrupt.

Corrupt practices are thus prevalent throughout Nigeria, from the highest political level to local government officials. The police force, Africa’s largest, is one of the institutions most frequently associated with corruption in Nigeria. This corruption extends from the highest level (as when the Inspector General of Police Tafa Adebayo Balogun was charged and convicted for having stolen more than $121 million in 2005) to the ordinary policeman. The police lack resources and their wages are generally very low or non-existent. For the ordinary policeman, corruption is thus often a way to earn a living and civilians often have to pay for every service provided by the police. Extortion and threats by the police are common and superior officers occasionally set monetary targets for subordinates assigned to the most lucrative posts. Police officers are often hired by politicians as personal guards; in 2009 the Inspector General estimated that over 100,000 police officers were involved in such activities.

However, some anti-corruption action is taking place. An Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was founded in 2002 and has challenged the former impunity of politicians. The EFCC has arraigned 30 prominent politicians, including 15 former state governors, but there has been little legal progress in these cases. While $11 billion have been recovered (according to the EFCC), only four convictions have been made, with very short or no prison sentences. In mid-September 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan called for renewed actions against corruption, but it remains to be seen what concrete measures will be taken.

Corruption is an important Issue for Nigerian’s, with impacts throughout the government and state structures. Importantly, it has severe negative consequences for service delivery in the country. This is a major source of discontent, as funds that could have been allocated to the provision of public goods end up enriching the political elite. Overall, corruption reduces the government’s ability to implement policy and tackle the existing Issues. With a political elite dependent on the distribution of oil revenue rather than taxation for funding, it also has less incentive to provide and care for its constituents.

**Security and security forces:** Nigeria faces several security Issues. The country is the scene of widespread violence, criminality and outright insurgency, such as Boko Haram in the North East. The spread of illegal small and light weapons is substantial mostly in Jos, the Plateau state capital. Border control, especially along the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, is severely lacking and makes smuggling of weapons and other goods relatively easy. In this context it can be noted that it is suspected that Libyan weapons have ended up, via Niger, with Boko Haram.

Nigeria’s security apparatus consists most importantly of the Nigeria Police Force, the State Security Service (SSS the intelligence services) and the military, all of which are federal institutions. Both the police and the military play an important role in the maintenance of public order and safety. Overall, it can be said that the security forces have taken a more military approach to the task of maintaining public security, which in some cases has resulted in casualties in response to riots and other disturbances. During many of the incidents in Jos, in Plateau state, more people are reported to have died as a result of the efforts to restore order than during the initial riots. Extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses are also commonly reported, lastly in the region most affected by insurgency and militia violence.

There are also incidents where the security forces have been perceived to take sides in the violence between groups and cases of detained individuals being killed for revenge or other reasons. The security forces are often unable to identify those behind riots and other violent incidents, and speculation concerning political involvement, bribery and corruption is common. 74% of the respondents in the Afro barometer survey of Nigeria claimed they feared becoming a victim of political violence or intimidation.

However, it is also important to recognise the role that the security forces play in maintaining security in Nigeria. While parallel security structures, such as militias, have emerged in some areas, the military has been identified as one of the key components in Nigerian unity. Apart from their role in upholding security, the military have been running a range of initiatives over the last 40 years aiming to strengthen national identity and social cohesion and to create contact between different ethnic and religious groups.

**Divisive political competition:** The corruptive nature of the Nigerian state gives the political competition a distinctly winner-takes-all nature, as those in power have access to the revenue streams. Political patronage is common, as is financial backing of political parties by various economic interests. The prevalence of political patronage and its ties to economic interests contribute to making political appointments one of the most accessible pathways to economic success.

As a result, political competition is associated with the buying and selling of posts, violence and threats. Politicians have been known to sponsor violent groups, and clashes between groups associated with or supporting different parties or individuals are not uncommon. There have even been suspicions of political involvement with, and support of, Boko Haram.

The intense competition for political power and the use of political power to access wealth serves to accentuate inequalities, both between groups and, importantly, between the elite and the general population. This dimension comprises both the manipulation of the population and groups for political purposes, and the vast differences in wealth and access to services between the political elite and the general populace.

**THE JOS CRISIS;**

Jos Crisis, Jos the state capital in Plateau state, Central Nigeria, has been the scene of widespread violence since 2001. Clashes along ethnic and religious lines, mainly between the Christian Berom, Anaguta and Afizere groups (BAA) and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani have resulted in thousands, the numbers being unclear, of deaths and significant displacement. In a recent report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) states that the sectarian violence in Plateau and Kaduna states has left over 3000 dead since 2010, with little response from the government. While the focus in this report is on the situation in Jos, similar dynamics make up a large part of the wider violence. Most observers agree that while often presented as an ethnic or religious conflict, the situation has its roots in political competition and socio-economic factors.

Of central importance is the concept of indigeneity. In Nigeria, those seen as indigenous to an area are often gain preferential access to land, education, public infrastructure and government employment. In Jos, the (BAA) are currently viewed as indigenous and the Hausa-Fulani as migrants, despite the fact that most have lived in Plateau state for several generations. Local political competition is also closely connected to the question of indigeneity. The combination of the state and local government controlling a large part of the country’s resources and local governments and politics being influenced by the notion of indigeneity has given rise to fierce competition in parts of the country. It has even been put as “in practice, one is a Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin.” At the same time, it should be noted that this is not included in the constitution, which guarantees freedom from discrimination and freedom of movement.

 While these circumstances have led to violence in several other states and local government areas (LGA) in Nigeria, Jos is perhaps the most extreme case. The city was known for relatively good relations between communities before the 1990s. The change seems to be connected to an increasing restriction during the 1990s in the distribution of indigene certificates, originally intended to ensure the rights of minority groups. It can also be connected to changing economic conditions. Jos was an important mining town from the beginning of the 1900s, with mostly Hausa being employed in the tin mines. However, these are now closed, and Plateau state’s economy has become reliant on agriculture. With limited economic opportunities, the importance of indigeneity has increased.

**Actors and patterns of violence:** The city of Jos has been a centre of violence issues, attacks and killings have also spread throughout Plateau state, where competition for land is another important source of tension. Although there are no clear groups that can be identified as primary actors in these clashes, organised groups have carried out a number of attacks, primarily on the outskirts of Jos and in rural areas. One example that can be mentioned is Yelwa, where 75 Christians were killed by armed Muslims in 2004, following which Christians surrounded the town and killed some 700 Muslims a few months later. This incident also inspired revenge attacks on Christians in some other part of the country, calling attention to the wider implications and prevalence of the tensions between ethnic and religious groups.

Violence in Jos to date has been closely associated with local elections and matters concerning the local administration, with the violence in 2001, 2004 and 2008 as the primary examples. In 2008 the first local elections since 2002 were held in Jos and more than 700 were killed as the tension escalated into violence and mobs, mostly of young adolescent men, started killings members of the opposing side and destroying property.

On Christmas Eve 2010, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings targeting Christian communities in Jos and also Muslims were attached and killed on the ground of Edil-Khabir praying field and many cars were born in 2014 and also in June, 2015 Muslim were attacked at Yantaya Mosques in Jos about 50 people were killed and several others were injured in the incident as well as Several other bomb attacks have taken place since, and several hundred people have been killed in these attacks and related violence. Since the beginning of 2010, killings of people who have strayed into the ‘wrong’ part of the city have also grown more common. Smaller-scale violence continues, with both sides accusing each other of collecting weapons and mobilising for new attacks. Also on 24 June, 2018; Abuja road was closed by the communities along the road from Bukuru to Forest whereby 86 persons were killed during the weekend, 16 travelers, police ASP killed and over 10 missing, according to Daily Trust, Newspaper of 26 June, 2018.

While ethno-religious identity is among the foremost causes of the violence in the area, its importance should not be dismissed. Identification through ethnicity is common throughout Nigeria and both ethnicity and religion play an important part in politics. Furthermore, ethnic and religious identity has been used as a basis for mobilisation, violence, stereotyping and rhetoric throughout this conflict issues and have thus become strongly polarised. The use of ethnic and religious identity in this way has served to accentuate the tensions between these groups, leading in turn to increased religious rhetoric.

**Response by government and the security forces:** Actions taken to control violence in Jos area have mostly been ineffective. A large number of commissions, at least 16, have been tasked with examining the conflict, but they have had little impact in practice. It appears that local politicians may have used the tensions for personal gain, causing the heads of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs to issue a joint protest. The fact that almost no charges have been brought against the perpetrators or instigators of the violence, that made it seen as a sign of the involvement of politicians and other influential individual within the communities.

The security forces have consistently either overreacted or under-reacted to the incidents, by cracking down harshly in some cases while being entirely absent in others. During the crisis in 2008, which primarily took place on November 28 and 29, the police force was largely inactive on the first day. On the second day, security forces were involved in over 130 arbitrary killings and were suspected to be involved many more, according to HRW. The governor of Plateau state at the time, Jonah Jang, imposed a strict curfew and has been accused of issuing orders to “shoot-on-sight” to the security forces. The International Criminal Court is investigating this and other incidents in Nigeria.

The perception that the security forces are not capable of keeping the peace also results in many communities maintaining vigilante or militia groups for security. However, it should be pointed out that in the context of the 2008 crisis, HRW reported that some witnesses also credited the military with restoring the peace and protecting civilians.

 While the focus in the above was on the situation and violence in and immediately around Jos, reocurrance of violence is also taking place in the rest of Plateau state and the neighbouring state of Kaduna, as well as in large areas of Central Nigeria. One example is the reported killing of 37 people when four villages were attacked simultaneously in the middle of the night on November 26, 2013. Incidents such as this rarely receive international attention, which is currently concentrated on the situation in the North East, concerning Boko Haram, and the Niger Delta. Narrative Issues of those incidents would not be forgetting in the memories of those involved and their next of kings, generations to generations. So also, the Adolescents that took part in 2001 conflicts were not of those who took part in 2008, likewise the 2018 in Jos and the Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State. Infact the whole state, Nigeria and the world in general, that is the power of Narratives Issues from prodecessors to prodecessors, next of king to the next of king.

 **Conclusion**

Conflicts are perpetuated through narratives issues of individuals who committed, facilitated or resisted acts of aggressive behaviours and oppression via their written or oral record, and there exist alongside official discourses. As opposed to narratives that resulted from Communities conflicts, contentious narratives related to historical events and identity conflicts are more difficult to tackle because of their much wider scope, content and emotional load. Based on the literature mentioned in this chapter, it is evident that there is an explicit need for more studies that would look at potential of narratives issues and language for peace. As Nelson says, peace for all requires a different “language that focuses not on capacities but on threat.” Contentious narratives issues as part of a socio-cultural context and understanding of personhood that were repeated through longer periods of time, cannot easily been changed. It would be naïve to think that differences in culture, historical experiences and political disagreement could be bridged simply. The images of the self and enemy identity embedded in narratives issues that persist through time perpetuate power relations of the people in a particular setting. Therefore, Narrative is an edge swards depending on how you used it, if you used it negatively the resulting effort it could be negative but when you using it positively the resulting effort could be positive, no matter what it is, Narrative issues are everywhere.

  **CHAPTER FOUR**

 **RADICALISATION OF NARRATIVES ISSUES.**

**INTRODUCTION:**

In recent times, internalization of conflict narrstive by adolescents and radicalization of issues in narratives are worrisome phenomenon which has assumed global dimension, persistently engaged the attention and concern of governments, civil society, security agencies and institutions; a phenomenon which has been described as radicalisation of ideals. This phenomenon has generated wide-spread concern in terms of how to deal with its twin component, that is, violence conflicts and radicalism. It is evident that the violent aspect of radicalization has greatly decimated populations, maimed innocent citizens and destroyed unquantifiable number of property, where by retarded the socio-economic and political development of affected nations, regions or state. Pathetically, the gladiators in the blood-stained theatre are mainly radicalised young people or adolescents. Since the September 7 in Jos and September 11, 2001 respectively holocaust in New York, radicalization into violent extremism among youngsters has been on the ascendancy, spreading like wild-fire to many parts of the world in different forms and guise. For example, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, etc., they operate under the aegis of Taliban, al-Quaeda; in Somalia, they are known as Shaaba and Nigeria; in Syria and Iraq there is the ISIS (Isamic State of Iraq and Syria), and in Nigeria, we have the Boko Haram (Western education is evil). The Niger Delta has Avenger, IPOB, MASSOB in the Eastern part, OPC in Western part and APC in Northern part of the Country where both Christian and Muslim in the nation state have what is call radical youth or adolescents. All these extremist groups focus on radicalisation of young people with a view to achieving their inordinate ambitions through terrorism. As a global malaise, concerted efforts are being made to understand the processes involved in radicalisation of ideals among young people by religious and political ideologues. This chapter therefore, examines the concept of radicalisation, the processes involved and its components. It also highlights the reasons why young people enlist in terrorist groups, as well as the implications of radicalisation of Adolescents in Nigeria Narratives Issues on Conflict.

The Nexus between Narratives Issues on Conflicts and Radicalism; Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the differences between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself, so that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. **First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory;** the first, make men invade for gain; the second for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of under value, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For WAR consisted not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather therefore, Issues in Narratives on Conflicts and Radicalisation are sides of the same coin and they compliment’s each other.

**Conceptual Clarification**: The term radicalisation is derived from the word “radical”, which relates to or affects the fundamentals of an ideology, belief system, habits and practices with a view to introducing drastic change or reform in society (The New Webster Dictionary of English Language, (2004). It simply means something proceeding from a root or origin marked by considerable departure from the usual traditional ideals, values, and way of life, which tend to introduce extreme and radical change in the existing doctrines, conditions, or institutions. Therefore, a person who holds extreme views on existing ideals is usually stigmatised as a radical, and branded as anti-government, or anti-society. In some cases, radicals are viewed as non-conformists, who in a way could be regarded as agents of change. The social change they advocate and pursue could be positive or negative, depending on the level of radicalisation process that has taken place in the individuals.

**The Concept of Radicalisation:** The term radicalisation seems to be a relatively new concept, which has in the recent past gained unprecedented currency among government officials, media practitioners, scholars, and security agencies, in discourses on terrorism and violent extremism (Onuoha, 2014). He further contends that radicalisation at all levels involves a strong rejection of the status quo by adopting an extreme religious or political ideology as well as employing violence conflicts as an indispensable means of actualising its ideological goals and objectives. Radicalisation of ideals therefore, could be regarded as complete departure from age-long acceptable norms, beliefs and practices within a given system. This may be antithetical to conservativism through narratives issues, which aims at preserving and protecting the ideals of an ideology or system. It is in this connection that radical elements or ideologues latch onto the weaknesses and inadequacies of societal ideals that form a platform for the development of extremist ideals based on grievances, and subsequent demands for change. In pursuance of their extremist ideals and demands, radicalized individuals resort to terrorism. Borum (2011), however observes that radicalisation does not equate with terrorism because most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and that even those who lay claim to a “cause” are not deeply ideological and may not “radicalise” in the traditional sense. Similarly, this could be likened to politicians or office holder who have been brainwashed to jealously uphold their political ideals, but who will not engage in neither electoral fraud nor political violence in any form. In this regard therefore, radicalisation may not be necessarily condemned in its entirely unless it adopts extremist ideals, beliefs and objectives, which may become springboards for immitigated violence. It could be argued that radicalisation does not belong to the domains of religion and politics, but also to the intellectual region. Socrates, for instance, was accused among other things, of corrupting the youths with his teachings (Okoh, 2003; Nwafor, 2010). In the present circumstance, he could be said to have radicalized or indoctrinated the youths. In Plato (1999), Socrates was described as, “this villainous misleader of youth”, “corruptor of the youth”, but “the gadfly, which God has given the state”. This no doubt, was intellectual radicalisation without any political or religious underpinning, which caused Athenian leaders of that time a great concern because the youths, who had been radicalized, had begun to question some ethical ideals.

On the other hand, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), view radicalisation generally as increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict and violence, which is ostensibly driven by changes in behaviours, beliefs and feelings in directions that increasingly justify ingroup violence, and therefore demand sacrifice in defence of the ingroup. The preparation for and the commitment to radicalisation by individuals involves the totality of their being, time and essence. In other words, their allegiance and loyalty to their avowed cause remain unshakeable, and “as constant as the Northern star”. No wonder, most radicalised youths engage in suicide bombing to advance their cause or to achieve their group objectives. It is evident that radicalisation does not occur in an individual by chance, it takes some time before one gets radicalised, and becomes a hardened violent extremist.

**What is radicalisation?** Radicalisation happens when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically. Only small numbers of people radicalise and they can be from a diverse range of ethnic, national, political and religious groups. As a person radicalises they may begin to seek to change significantly the nature of society and government. However, if someone decides that using fear, terror or violence is justified to achieve ideological, political or social change this is violent extremism. Exactly what influences individuals to go down a path of using or supporting violence to seek change can be difficult to determine, but there can be a number of factors. The radicalisation process is unique to each person who undergoes it, and in most cases will not cause serious harm. In exceptional circumstances, however, the decisions made by a person radicalising can result in a serious and lethal act of violent extremism. Those who radicalise and display threatening behaviour, incite hatred or promote the use of violence for their cause require some form of intervention. This may come from family, religious or community leaders or law enforcement.

**This conceptual confusion complicates the task of defining radicalisation**. Allen defined it as, the “process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change.” More specifically, radicalisation refers to:

“a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour.”

Taking these definitional positions into account, this chapter understands radicalisation as the process of personal transformation that an individual goes through in response to contextual grievances. This transformation is marked by a personal crisis issues in search for role and meaning that eventually leads an individual to support the use of violence against state actors and civilians to bring about an ideologically-defined social and political order. A radicalised individual may have not directly engaged in violence, but supports its use for this purpose.

Therefore, this chapter embraces the important distinction between ideology and behaviour by focusing on the transition from radical ideology to violent issues in behaviour. It examines the contextual circumstances that push and pull factors that influence individuals to embrace radical ideology, and why they later make decision to join armed radical groups.

**Radicalisation Models:** The literature on radicalisation is inter-disciplinary by nature, combining scholarship in psychology, social psychology, and Criminology.This has led to a number of competing models that attempt to explain radicalisation, as well as variables within the models. Two themes run through most models: initial individual frustration about socio-political contexts, and the search for a role and achievement.

Wiktorowicz, based on his examination of al-Muhajiroun, a UK-based transnational Islamic movement, has developed a seven-stage model. Within this, he emphasises the notion of ‘cognitive opening’ when an individual who is facing a crisis becomes prone to altering her or his previously held perceptions. Political, economic, or social grievances usually lead to a cognitive opening. But extremist recruiters do not rely on individuals’ identity crises to spread their ideology. They also actively trigger cognitive openings. This happens through different communication strategies that include one-on-one interactions with vulnerable individuals or Adolescents, as well as demonstrations, pictures, and pamphlets that create a ‘moral shock’.

Where religion plays a strong role in an individual’s life, she or he is likely to react to the cognitive opening through ‘religious seeking’ (the search for meaning and purpose through religion). Afterwards, through a process called **‘frame alignment’** the individual examines whether narratives offered by an extremist group align with her or his views and attracts one’s interest. It must be noted that individual experiences and backgrounds influence their assessment on whether the frame makes sense or not. If frame alignment is not achieved, individuals might seek more information or alternatively abandon the process. However, if frame alignment is achieved, the individual undergoes a process of socialisation, whereby she or he becomes a committed member of the armed radical group and adopts its ideology.

While this model is based on one group of radicals only, its value lies in its explanation of individuals as active agents in the radicalisation process, that is, individuals seeking alternatives in response to unsatisfactory conditions and the individual psychological variables that influence radicalisation. This parallels Abu Rumman’s argument that Salafi Jihadis are not resigned introverts but perceive themselves as agents of social transformation. At the same time, it recognises the role and agency of armed radical groups, including through the media frames used to inspire and recruit supporters.

Individual agency is also highlighted in the theory developed by psychologist Borum in 2003. This model, originally developed as a law enforcement training tool, details the process of ideological development in four stages. Radicalisation starts with an individual recognising an unfavourable condition such as poverty, unemployment or governmental restrictions on individual liberties as ‘not right’. This condition is then framed as ‘not fair’ and attributed to a target entity (‘it is your fault’). Finally, the enemy is demonised, which often validates violence.

This model highlights the important role of factors in the immediate social, economic, and political context that lead individuals to develop an awareness of their disadvantaged position in society either through comparison or by changing one’s perceptions and worldview. Borum’s theory falls short in exploring the ideological outlooks through which dehumanising arguments are formulated. Dehumanisation is a key psycho-social factor in explaining violence. It contributes to a process known as “moral disengagement” by which an individual or group develops a moral justification to use violence. This emphasises the significance of exploring the ideologies and discourses that affect the transition from frustration to reaction in Borum’s model.

**Radicalisation Drivers:** The literature on radicalisation often refers to **‘push’ and ‘pull’** factors. Push factors are negative social, political, economic, and cultural root causes that influence individuals to join armed radical groups. Pull factors are defined as “the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organisation that ‘pull’ vulnerable individuals to join. These include the group’s ideology (example, emphasis on changing one’s condition through violence rather than ‘apathetic’ and ‘passive’ democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits.

The following sections, discusses the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural push and pull factors. It illustrates that scholars from different regions examine radicalisation drivers from varying perspectives. Specifically, Western scholars stress the psycho-social factors motivating European Jihadis whereas Middle Eastern scholars focus on political context while ignoring other factors.

**Political Drivers:** While there is a general consensus on the significance of political grievances in radicalism, the causal relation between individual political factors and radicalisation is rarely discussed in the literature from the region. One exception is a perception study of Jordanian students conducted in 2011 and 2015 which positively linked radicalisation to political factors such as lack of freedom of expression and repression (although these factors were deemed less significant than social and religious factors). Another is a study by Hegghammer which found that ideological and political drivers were more significant than socio-economic factors in the al-Qaeda recruits which he studied. Instead, the scholarship concentrates on three predicaments to elucidate the impact of regional developments on radicalisation.

First, the political upheavals in Iraq and Syria provided a favourable political environment for the rise of armed radical groups. In Iraq, the US invasion and strategic mistakes (such as dissolving the Iraqi army) created a ripe environment for the rise of Daesh; in fect Daesh’s original goal was opposing the occupation and dismissed Iraqi generals carried their strategic and military expertise to Daesh. The sectarian politics that followed, particularly those implemented by al-Maliki’s government, facilitated the rise of Sunni armed groups in Iraq that sought to protect Sunni areas and counter the rise of Shia militias in Iraq. At the same time, the political vacuum in northeastern Syria after 2012 offered al-Qaeda in Iraq a safe haven to grow its power and expand its reach. Daesh exploited the isolation and distance of Sunni tribes from central governments in both Iraq and Syria to form alliances.

Second, the crisis in Arab political thought and the diffusion of sectarianism created favourable conditions for the growth of Sunni armed radical groups. The rise of Iran as a powerful and influential regional actor can be seen as showcasing the weakness of Sunni political entities and the political and ideological vacuum of Arab Sunni thought. As a result, al-Sabbagh argues albeit with some exaggeration that Arab Sunni youth feel alienated and struggle between two choices that is, to join armed radical groups or join government CVE efforts. The scope for the latter is limited since fewer youth in the region wholly trust their governments. Along with this alienation, the rise of sectarian hostilities has encouraged armed radical groups to present themselves as the only force capable of countering Shia influence and protecting Sunnis in the region. Daesh and other groups manipulate these sectarian sentiments to present an imposing radicalisation narrative in its media form.

Third, Daesh has offered a political project for immediate implementation. Compared to the more pragmatic Islamic parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and to its extremist mother-organisation al-Qaeda, Daesh audaciously established a Caliphate in north-eastern Syria. This urgency to achieve tangible outcomes appeals to youth who are in search for political expression and power after the failure of Arab Spring revolts. Against this ambition, the Muslim Brotherhood’s, gradualist approach which emphasises Islamising society followed by political participation, no longer appeals to disillusioned youth or Adolescents in the process.

The contribution of Western scholars to this discussion has tended to look at the specific political or security factors that have shaped recruitment pathways and contributed to the manufacturing of radical leaders thus focusing less on regional political context. A particular area of inquiry has been the role of military occupations as a push factor. McCants argues that the military occupation of Iraq by American forces incubated the radicalisation of al-Baghdadi, the so called “Caliph” of Daesh. Wilson’s research suggests that many who later became Daesh fighters were denied their adolescents because of the occupation. In this context, it is important to highlight that the factors that lead young men from Iraq to join radical militant groups such as Daesh may in fact be quite different from the factors leading a Jordanian or a Tunisian to join. Daesh is part of a ‘motley crew’ of groups fighting in a country characterised by increasing fragmentation and massive internal displacement.

Other authors discuss how radicalisation takes place in prisons. It has been argued, for example, that Iraq’s Camp Bucca and other prisons have strongly contributed to the radicalisation of inmates.

“If there was no American prison in Iraq, there would be no [Daesh] now… Bucca was a factory. It made us all. It built our ideology.”

These facilities offered a space where charismatic radicals preached their ideology to former Ba’ath leaders with military expertise, and to young men zealous about fighting the US. The resulting alliances between Ba’ath leaders and radicals offered Daesh unique power compared to other groups in Iraq. Like-wise in neighbouring countries, prisons operated as a fertile recruiting ground where inmates were exposed to radical ideology by those serving terms after their return from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.

A final contribution comes from Central Asian and the Northern Caucaus scholars, in studies that have linked the appeal of Jihadism to an aspiration for political and social change. This broadly includes frustration over limited rights, corruption, poor governance, and human rights violations. Authoritarian political systems in a number of post-Soviet states and accompanying repression against independent Muslim groups have been argued to contribute albeit indirectly to generating fighters from the Northern Caucasus.

**Socio-Economic Drivers:** The evidence on economic drivers and radicalisation is mixed and contradictory. Early studies that linked radicalisation to economic factors such as unemployment and corruption, have been largely debunked by more recent research suggesting that such a correlation is tenuous at best. One study in Jordan found that fighters came from mixed socio-economic backgrounds and that most were employed at the time they left to join armed radical groups. Similarly, the phenomenon of European foreign fighters cannot be explained by their socio-economic profiles.

Evidence from Africa and Central Asia, however, suggests that economics does play a role. One study on Boko Haram found that a desire to obtain a loan before joining the group or hope of obtaining after joining the group, were important factors contributing to the decision to join. Others have argued that the promise of good jobs and financial repatriation “may be the single most important factor for Central Asian recruiting to the Syrian conflict.”

Another theory gaining traction in academia is that it is ‘relative deprivation’, not abject poverty that plays a role in radicalisation. Relative deprivation is the tension that develops from a discrepancy between what one feels entitled to and what one is actually capable of acquiring and maintaining. Advocates of this theory reference youth as a prime example. Here, the intersection of young people’s or Adolescents aspirations and frustrations regarding political, economic and social levels has brought their disadvantaged position to bear, and pushed them towards alternatives to assert their relevance and obtain status. Likewise, in their article, “Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?” Gambetta and Hertog assert that the intersection of ambition and limited opportunity leads to frustration, and could plausibly contribute to engineers’ radicalisation. The theory is also consistent with a study of former al-Shabab members which found that poverty per se was not a contributing factor, but the desire to overcome the low self-esteem and idleness it produced was highly significant.

Other relevant socio-economic factors include the role of sex; Speckhard and Yayla speculate that the availability of sex for Daesh recruits may have enticed some young men to join these groups. The prospect of marriage also appears to be a factor influencing both men and women to join groups. Against critical levels of youth unemployment, the age of marriage is climbing in the Middle East, creating both frustrations and social tensions. One fighter, who went to Syria, was struggling to find a wife in Jordan, but told his mother that he would find one in the afterlife.

**Social Drivers: Identity and Group Dynamics:** Individuals’ membership in radical groups, whether armed or not, is influenced by a wide range of psycho-social and sociological factors. Rambo’s scholars, refers to the influence that identity crises as an individual’s search for meaning and role to play; the New York Police Department model includes self-identification as a stage that precedes indoctrination; and McCauley and Moskalenko directly refer to the search for adventure. An examination of all relevant psycho-social drivers is beyond the scope of this chapter. The discussion below will thus be limited to two distinct but pivotal factors: the prospect of adventure and immediate social networks.

Two quantitative studies targeting university students in Jordan found that social factors are major drivers of radicalism. Variables included dysfunctional families, immorality, peer influence, weak national identity, and domestic violence. The variables and definitions used in the study, however, were vague and subjective, leaving the findings of limited value.

**The Prospect of Adventure:** Scholars including Neumann, Atran, and Victoroff identify the prospect of adventure as a pull factor drawing fighters to groups like Daesh. Specifically, Atran argues that Daesh recruits are inspired mostly by the allure of an exciting cause which will give them personal significance and glory. This theory has parallels with ‘novelty-seeking theory’ in psychological literature. Joining a terrorist group offers the possibility of participating in something thrilling and outside of normal experience. Sensation and novelty seeking is a normal feature of adolescents, perhaps explaining why young people make up a large contingent of radicals: “adolescents like intensity, excitement, and arousal… It is a developmental period when an appetite for adventure, a predilection for risks, and a desire for novelty and thrills seem to reach naturally high levels.” Victoroff supports this thesis: “the normative developmental form of novelty seeking probably does contribute to terrorism.”

**The Network Effect:** A consensus is emerging among scholars on the significant role of family and friends in radicalisation. Sageman, who explores global Salafi Jihadism, highlights networks and peer influence, dismissing socio-economic causes and personal characteristics as factors in identifying what he describes as ‘true terrorists’. In his view, radicalisation occurs in stages beginning with moral outrage at violence or discrimination against Muslims, or more broadly the West’s conflict with Islam. Later, “[each new group became a ‘bunch of guys,’ transforming its members into potential Mujahedin, actively seeking to join the global Jihad].” It is this new formed group identity that facilitates in-group bias and demonising of the out-group. The end point of Sageman’s process is the conviction that the use of violence is permissible. This theory yields support fromthe scholarship on group think, specifically how sanctioning violence in groups reduces individuals’ moral inhibitions against participating in acts of violence.

Like Sageman, Atran and Davis argue that social relationships of “small groups of action-oriented friends” largely influence the process. Young people coalesce through activities such as sport or study groups and “self-mobilize to the tune of a simple, superficial, but broadly appealing ‘takfiri’ message of withdrawal from impure mainstream society and of a need for violent action to cleanse it.” Writing about Daesh fighters, Atran asserts that three quarters of fighters are recruited through friends. The work of Sageman and Atran and Davis further explain the centrality of this peer influence. Supporters move from low level, low risk engagement, as part of a porous network. Later, and due to moral outrage, they move towards the radical core of high-engagement and highrisk terrorist activity.

In his study on Belgian fighters who left for Syria, Risk Coolsaet describes two groups:

“The first group comprises pre-existing kinship and friendship gangs. For them, joining IS [Daesh] is merely a shift to another form of deviant behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking and juvenile delinquency. But it adds a thrilling, larger-than-life dimension to their way of life transforming them from delinquents without a future into Mujahedeen with a cause.”

This theory is corroborated by Roy, who found that half of the European al-Qaeda recruits, he studied followed their friends, frequently through channels of petty crime.

Coolsaet’s second group were loners who did not display deviant behaviour, but instead made reference to having no future, faced personal challenges in their life or lacked a sense of belonging. This suggests that while friendships and peer groups contribute to the radicalisation of some European fighters, this is certainly not the case for all.

Family members also influence radicalisation. Hegghammer notes that a number of the fighters he examined who left for Afghanistan were inspired by a brother or a friend. Mothers have also been found to influence their sons. In one anecdotal account reported by Mercy Corps, a Jordanian mother, whose three sons has joined Daesh, asserted that they learnt about Jihad at home from her. Another fighter narrated how his father encouraged him and bought him a gun to join alShabab. These are due to Narratives Issues that led to aggressive behaviours in advent of Conflicts.

This role of peers and family members can also be understood through broader intergroup dynamics such as Social Identity Theory. Peer influence, for example, is connected to the psychological need to belong to a group, whereby an individual takes pride in this membership and builds bonds with fellow members. In return, the group offers her or him a new role and significance in the group itself, and in one’s perception of her or his role in a broader worldview like that of armed radical groups. The narrative issues of these groups as agents of justice and protectors of Sunni Muslims also provides individuals with a larger and more noble role than their daily lives. Once this family support or peer protection is guaranteed, the risk of joining a group is minimised.

In all cases, role identity, whether in terms of a person’s understanding of who they are or their perception of their role in society, determines individual behaviour. The same applies to radicalised individuals, and may explain the actions of some identity-conflicted Muslims and Christians in Europe as well in Nigeria mostly Plateau State the Northern Senatorial Zone of the state. Khosrokhavar notes that in global European cities such as London, Paris, Leicester, and Rome, cultures may inter-mingle, but they are also “places where new forms of rejection and exclusion are concocted.” As a mother of a Belgian foreign fighter recently stated, “It’s tough for all the youngsters, but if you have got an immigrant background doubly so. He started to say that people saw him as Moroccan while in Morocco they saw him as Belgian and asked me ‘who am I?’” Empirical studies examining why Europeans become foreign fighters found that Francophone countries were more likely to have a higher number of foreign fighters. The authors posited that “Francophone” was a proxy for the distinctive French kind of secularism. This deeply felt dislocation on the part of second or third generation of migrant communities is not examined in the literature on violent radicalisation in the WANA region, but may be highly relevant to countries such as Jordan, which is both home to large refugee populations (predominately Palestinian, Iraqi and Syrian) and is one of the largest regional contributors of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria (more than 2000 in 2015).

**CULTURAL DRIVERS; RELIGION AND NARRATIVES;**

The most important contribution from the literature on the religious drivers of radicalization, that an individual’s knowledge of Islam does not correlate with her or his propensity for radicalisation. Instead, it is an individual’s identification with a persecuted religiously-defined group that leads to radicalisation. The discussion below emphasises the influence of religious identity and religious narratives of victimhood on the radicalisation of Muslims. It also explores how educational curricula and the media can provide a supportive hub for radicalisation narratives. Other factors in al-Harby’s study on Saudi students. Others down-play the role of religion, Wilson, for example, argues that violent radicals are not usually very pious, and know less about Islam than might be expected. al-Ruhaily’s typology of radicals in Saudi Arabia, discussed earlier, supports this, and likewise anecdotes such as the two British foreign fighters hailing from Birmingham who bought books online including ‘Islam for Dummies’ and ‘The Koran for Dummies’ before leaving for Syria. Moreover, one study found that al-Shabab fighters returned and renounced armed radicalism once opportunities presented themselves for a better life. Had ideology been a major part of their decision to join the organisation, the decision to return would have required an ideological shift or justification.

The role of the religious narrative is emphasised by scholars like Jonathan Russell and Haras Rafiq. They argue that Daesh has developed a narrative that is sufficiently malleable to apply to recruits from the West, local populations, and members of existing terrorist groups. This narrative contributes to a worldview that gives an individual a place and role in society, demonises the perpetrator, and justifies violence. For many individuals, religion is useful in constructing that narrative. Religion offers individuals a role to play in the cosmic war of good versus evil. Political groups often use religious texts to justify political violence by connecting self-sacrifice to rewards in the afterlife, or to improved moral status in this life. Religious narratives connect individual behaviour to a larger cause and offer an individual a sense of purpose and pride.

While religious actors undeniably have a role to play in some cases of radicalisation, it is questionable whether their involvement is usually a primary cause. It is more likely that they are a facilitating factor by introducing individuals to radical ideology and justifying radicalism in religious terms as a higher moral order.

“Extremism does not appear because preachers [merely] call for it. It appears because we have young people who search for identity and revolt against the situation.”

In Radical, a personal account of his own radicalisation, Nawaz explains that his experience of racism, combined with online content and sessions by the radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir fuelled his perception of a global war on Muslims. He notes that the videos he watched of the conflicts in the Balkans were a key part of his radicalisation: “Southend, Gaza, Bosnia, Iraq, India: wherever you went in the world, the story was the same Muslims were unprotected and under attack….”

Nawaz’s experience is in no way unique. Neumann’s study of European foreign fighters identified key narratives issues. Among the most compelling, in his assessment, was “fighting against an existential threat” facing Sunnis; here Neumann found pictures depicting Sunnis being tortured, raped, and killed as having a significant impact on the European fighters his team was monitoring on social media. This is consistent with Mercy Corps’ Jordan study which reported that the most common justification for joining the war in Syria was to protect Sunni women and children. Moreover, that the “decision to fight appear[ed] to be less about a particular interpretation of one’s religious obligations, and more an emotional response to injustices perpetrated by an outside group.”

Narratives of victimhood operate in two interconnected ways. First, as highlighted earlier, radicalised individuals, often go through a personal crisis driven by contextual grievances and frustrations. This lead to a personal journey to find a role and meaning in life. In some cases, this stage is followed by converting or returning to Islam, and then joining armed radical groups. Narratives of victimhood accentuate contextual frustrations and motivate individuals to take religiously inspired action to correct injustices.

Such a pathway is common among Central Asian radicals, particularly as religion is deemed as “the only form of politicised expression that is not perceived as a compromise of moral values.” This, coupled with fragmented Muslim establishments, poor Islamic education, and the absence of indigenous civil society measures, have provided ample space for conservative iterations of Islam to establish a solid ideological presence.

The second way that victimhood narratives issues operate is through religious discourse. The narrative of victimhood as established in visual and textual discourses provides a higher moral grounding that justifies violence as a moral act. This is to be understood within Islamic political philosophy that emphasises justice over peace; and the narrative that defensive war (often usually misconstrued as Jihad by Muslims) is permitted in Islam on the grounds of justice. These narratives of victimhood and moral justifications for engaging in violence facilitate moral disengagement. This is compatible with Borum’s model which specifically lists ‘blame attribution’ as a stage in radicalisation.

Importantly, narratives do not evolve in a vacuum. An overall cultural and educational context usually facilitates their acceptance. ‘Martyrs’ weddings’ celebrations held when a fighter is killed in his home town commonly held in Iraq, Syria and even in Jordan are a clear example of a cultural practice that is encouraged by a set of wider factors, including formal education and the media.

In Jordan, a heated public debate has been unfolding on the pages of al-Ghad Daily between experts, analysts and a former Minister of Education on one side, and the Ministry of Education on the other. Calls for curriculum changes emerged after one study found the curriculum to be encouraging intolerance, ignoring Jordan’s non-Muslims minorities, and offering a closed view on world cultures and diversity. Critically, the worldview ingrained in the current curriculum supports the same ideological underpinnings of groups like Daesh and al-Nusra. But reforming education curricula faces considerable obstacles, not the least the perception that the proposed changes undermine Islamic values.

In a related domain, one Saudi study found that the media has spread fatwas (religious ruling) of radical groups or encouraged radical behaviour. This ‘fatwa factor’ is connected to a larger regional ‘fatawisation’ of the public sphere. Religious media channels have created an industry of fatwa programs that work in a competitive commercial cycle. While this phenomenon cannot be directly connected to cases of radicalisation, it has contributed to the production and spread of fatwas by unauthorised personnel, by those with doubtful credentials, and without any mechanism to control the religious content on media platforms.

This debate over religious narratives issues, education and media content has evolved in parallel to calls for Amn fikri (thought or ideological security). Amn fikri is defined as a process that protects individuals from all forms of extremism by encouraging dialogue, independent thinking and objectivity in a way that can protect youth against fanaticism, takfir and the imposition of one’s opinion on others. For proponents of Amn fikri, understanding radicalisation drivers and improving rehabilitation services for detainees is an important pillar in achieving thought security.

In Jordan, concerns about thought security escalated following research suggesting a spread of radical ideology among youth. One quantitative study, conducted in at the University of Jordan, found that 2 percent of students felt that al-Nusra represented them, another 2 percent listing Daesh, 1 percent listing al-Qaeda, and 1 percent listing the Iraqi group asa’eb ahl al haq. This 6 percent (equating to 1094 students) who find their voice in armed radical groups cannot be ignored. Another study conducted in 2013 found that while Jordanian university students generally rejected radical ideology, they adhered to radical views with regards to non-Muslims, the West, and interactions between different sexes. Moreover, alignment with Salafi Jihadism is predicted to be a natural development of the spread of Salafi ideology throughout the region.

**Radical activity in Nigeria:** Boko Haram emerged in the late 1990s4 in north-eastern Nigeria, ostensibly with the motive to enforce religious reforms. Within a decade, the group had been transformed from a machete-wielding sect to one of the world’s deadliest terror groups. Since 2009, Boko Haram is said to have killed over 17,000 individuals and displaced nearly 2.2 million people, mostly in Nigeria’s northeast states. The conflict has devastated thousands of Nigerian communities, and slowed the economy. Fishing markets, animal husbandry and irrigation projects have all been abandoned, particularly in communities around the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram has bombed the facilities of the United Nations in Abuja, and destroyed Mosques and Churches. Ithas targeted a large number of Muslims as well as Christians, irrespective of the ethnicity of their victims. The sect has killed traditional rulers, religious leaders, security forces and politicians. It has abducted girls and women, forcing some into marriage and turning others into suicide bombers. From June 2014 to June 2016, Boko Haram used more than 200 female attackers, killing over 1,000 people across four countries: Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The group has been responsible for more than 95 per cent of female suicide bombings worldwide since 2014.

Although there are no recognised violent extremist groups in Nigeria inspired by Christian doctrine, some extremist groups have emerged in predominantly Christian areas of the south. Such groups include the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Ijaw Youth Council of the Niger Delta, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), and recently, the Niger Delta Avengers. Individual Christians have also been arrested fighting alongside Boko Haram. Understanding the complexity of violent extremism in Nigeria, particularly that extremist violence is committed by both Muslim and Christian groups, was an important element in formulating the radicalisation in Nigeria and Plateau state is left out this ugly- tragedy.

 Political Thought stresses that extremism can be refer to as political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights. The term can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by using any means that showing disregard for life, liberty, and human rights of others”. In Plateau state, Northern Senatorial Zone of the State whereby the Adolescents are used in political campaign and any religious activities as well as the protectors of any ethnic-tribe most especially in term of conflict or misunderstanding between in-group and out-group member in the society, they exhibits’ their radical behaviours, by the process of killing and burning in conflict situations.

 **Conclusion**

Perhaps most importantly, there is broad acceptance that radicalisation is a process, whether linear or non-linear, that starts with grievances or perceived injustices. An individual then becomes alienated from the perceived unjust or unrighteous society. In response, the individual searches for a new identity or outlook on life. Through encountering armed radical groups (either actively sought by the individual or targeted by recruiters), an individual identifies with a radical group. This intensifies gradually leading to the support of and engagement in violent radicalism.

It is also clear that contextual factors play an important role in setting the stage for radicalisation once an individual becomes frustrated with the status quo. Such factors include political, economic, ideological, and psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and role. For example, there is consensus within the Arabic literature that the overall regional political context has pushed youth towards radicalism and provided armed radical groups with compelling narratives issues. Other scholars refer to specific political or security factors that have shaped recruitment pathways and contributed to the manufacturing of radical leaders, including international policy failures, Sunni marginalisation, and conflict contexts.

The evidence on the role of economic factors and poverty in radicalisation, however, is conflicted at best. It appears that relative deprivation plays a more pivotal role than direct economic need, and moreover, that issues such as status, sense of role, and relevance are more influential in an individual’s decision to support violent radicalism than abject poverty.

There is more, consensus surrounding the socio-cultural drivers of radicalisation. Armed radical groups tend to exploit young people’s vulnerabilities and offer them benefits ranging from families like bonds, to the promise of adventure. They also elevate an individual’s status and provide them with positions of influence and responsibility that they would not have had otherwise. Other studies highlight peer and family influence along with in-group belonging and acclaimed superiority. These factors illustrate that psychological and sociological turning points deserve equal attention to that of political and economic factors.

Finally, ideological and religious factors impact the radicalisation process but in different ways than is usually assumed. Religiously-inspired narratives of victimhood, often introduced or reinforced in social media or educational curricula, for example, can influence the series of convictions and psychological process an individual goes through towards justifying violence. But the evidence overall points are to a limited role of religion in radicalisation. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that adhering to radical ideology is closely linked to the identity crisis individuals go through in their search for meaning, once disillusioned with the wider contextual factors around them.

 **CHAPTER FIVE**

 **ANALYTICAL CHANGES IN NARRATIVES ISSUES**

**INTRODUCTION:**

Social innovation is an improvement in both public and scientific discourses herald its effectiveness in dealing with current societal challenges and flatter its ability to bring about desired changes. Former European Union president Barroso, for example, stated that “if encouraged and valued, social innovation can bring immediate solutions to the pressing social issues citizens are confronted with” (Hubert 2012) and the Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA) argues that social innovations provide an effective way to ‘empower people’ and ‘drive societal change’: **“at a time of major budgetary constraints, social innovation is an effective way of responding to social challenges, by mobilising people’s creativity to develop solutions and make better use of scarce resources”** (BEPA 2010). Social innovation initiatives come in innumerable forms and sizes usually tailored to a particular context or fit for a certain issue. These initiatives have their own theories about what is at stake and how change can be brought about. While some, for example, hold the idea that it is **through reconnecting with communities and localities that our world will become a better place,** others focus more on the necessity of institutional change. Further, the explicit reflection on such theories of change may be more or less central to an initiative’s activities. In this analysis, we approach these ideas about transformative change as ‘narratives of change’, broadly defined as sets of ideas, concepts, metaphors, discourses or story-lines about change and innovation. Such narratives of change shared by social innovation initiatives reveal, amongst others, **ideas about why the world has to be change, who has the power to do so and how this can be done.** Such storylines about change may be formal or informal, uniform or inconsistent across participants. More often than not, social innovation initiatives play on the ability of words to convince individuals, unite groups, frame reality and evoke imagination: stories do not simply recount experiences but open up novel ways of looking at things and new possibilities for action. They reflect and at the same time create reality (Davies, 2002) and are “drawn from social, cultural and, perhaps, unconscious imperatives, which [they] at the same time reveal” (Andrews et al. 2003). For these reasons, stories play an instrumental role for many social innovation initiatives in challenging and confronting dominant norms, values and beliefs and in devising alternative futures. By using a narrative approach to study theories of change, we aim to gain insight into the theories of change around which social innovation initiatives organised. As such our main research question is: What are the ideas and stories about how the world changes (“narratives of change”) of social innovation initiatives, how are these narratives conceived, and what is their (perceived) role within societal change processes?

Narratives of change can be considered part and parcel of social innovations, defined as “change in social relations, involving new ways of doing things, organising, framing and/or knowing” (Haxeltine et al. 2015; cf. Moulaert et al. 2013, Howaldt and Knopp 2012) in at least two ways. First, narratives of change convey alternative ways of doing things, organising, framing and/or knowing, and they promote social relations supporting these. Second, they not only how change can be brought about, make for a relevant and interesting object of enquiry en route to a better understanding of transformative change. Many initiatives aspire to contribute to transformative change, and these aspirations inspire actual projects and activities. Gaining insight into how such aspirations are created and shared contributes to our understanding of how social change is driven. As such, unraveling the narratives of change of social innovation initiatives draws us into their understanding of the world and helps questioning and elaborating our own scientific theory of change and innovation which the Nigerian’s, states, Local Governments, societies and communities to adopt as a means of progress and integration of ethnics and religious differences.

**Methods**: Based on a review of relevant literature on narratives and narrative analysis we outline a method that allows to captures ideas about transformative change in narrative terms. Empirically, we draw on interim outcomes of the EU-funded research project entitled “TRANsformative Social Innovation Theory” (TRANSIT; 2014-2017). This project aims to build a theory of transformative social innovation studying the ways in which social innovation initiatives interact with other forms of (transformative) change (Haxeltine et al. 2013, 2015, Avelino et al. 2014, Pel and Bauler 2014). TRANSIT includes the study of social innovation initiatives, namely social innovation networks and their local initiatives which (one) represent transnational networks operating across “(Introducing three social innovation initiatives Innovators for the Public (Ashoka) is a global organisation with operations in 37 countries worldwide. Since 1980, Ashoka is carefully identifying and selecting high-profile social entrepreneurs who become Ashoka fellows and thereby gain access to funding and the Ashoka network. By now there are around 3000 Ashoka fellows in 70 countries. Through continuous innovation in its organization, programs and the playing field, Ashoka currently aims at catalyzing societal change by equipping people with system-changing potential with the required change maker skills, resources & networks.

The Global Ecovillage Network (GEN) is a global grassroots network of more than 500 eco-villages grown out of the eco-movement and increasingly includes traditional villages. Besides the global network, it includes five regional networks (Europe, Africa, Asia/Oceania, North America and Latin America) and several national networks. GEN promotes social, economic and spiritual aspects of sustainable living and encourages local community empowerment for regenerating social and natural environments. Its members meet at annual conferences, interactive internet platforms and educational events.

Founded in 1997, RIPESS (Réseau Intercontinental de Promotion de l'économie Sociale Solidaire) is an intercontinental network set to promote the ‘social solidarity economy’. Aiming for alternative forms of economic relations, the network seeks to empower civil society actors, aims to alter the prevailing relations between governance actors and ‘institutional logics’, and to better meet social needs than is done by present social constellations. It does so through promoting and slightly reinventing alternative yet well-known institutional models (cooperatives, associations, networks). Next to and often complementary to these longer-existing models, there are also new practices and models developed and promoted (example, alternative forms of finance or employment such as sheltered workspaces, various co-financing schemes, and forms of sharing economy). RIPESS aims for structural and worldwide change in the existing economical or developmental system, and starts from the diagnosis that there are systemic imbalances to address (Poirier 2013).).”

 Europe and Latin-America, (two) work on social innovations and (three) have transformative ambitions and potentials, hence allowing for a cross-national and cross-regional empirical analysis of social innovation in relation to transformative change. In this analysis, we focus on three of these networks, namely (one) Ashoka a global network of social entrepreneurs; (two) the Global Eco-village Network a network of ecological intentional communities, and (three) RIPESS a network of networks and political movement for the promotion of solidarity economy across the globe. Our assumption is that these cases show a maximum variation (cf. Flyvberg 2006) in terms of their narratives of change. For these cases, we distinguish between different kinds of narratives of change, namely: first local narratives of change (narratives of change on the level of the local initiative), second network narratives of change (narratives of change on the level of the network) and third societal narratives of change (narratives of change on the level of society, example, social economy). We thus acknowledge that each local initiative has its own narrative and that even within one initiative or network narratives might diverge. The main focus in this analysis is on the master narratives three at the level of networks. For the reconstruction of the narratives of change of these three networks, we relied on data that was gathered through interviews, participant observation and document review as part of the TRANSIT Focus on transformative social innovation.

Even thought the initiative of this Narrative change was founded by the European or American’s in order to induce Africans to accept their social innovation on Africans or any other countries where they were in Conflicts or were on able to negation and make Peace within themselves, especially Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State Nigeria. Hence, it is important to let Nigerian voices speak in both fiction and research. An example, a scholar and scientist Osamuyimen (Uyi) Stewart (2000) who noted earlier that Nigeria had a rich history before European contact and is himself Nigerian. Stewart honors the indigenous way of knowing, rather than stating a positivist perspective that preferences academic research and empirical findings, in his writing about the history of Nigeria, he acknowledged that the “posting is a collection of oral tradition passed down to [him], [his] critical evaluation of folklore, and ideas from a variety of written sources [mostly African]”. The oral tradition, which evolved to include written literature, allows the Nigerian people to ensure the preservation of their history and culture. Nduka noted that even if the younger generation neglects the teachings, they are preserved “so as to ensure that generations yet unborn would have access to them” (2015). In that way indigenous knowledge systems can be restored even if it can be from abnormal Narrative to positive changes which would change the ideology, perspective and knowledge to a positive living as Nigerians.

**Narratives of change a literature review:** Narrative research is a broad interdisciplinary field with a number of schools based on different ontological and epistemological assumptions. For the task at hand, we take a constructivist approach to narrative analysis because it allows tracing the social production and exploring the role of narratives in societal change processes beyond the straightforward analysis of narrative content. The aim of this review section is twofold: first, we review existing literature and second, we establish a method for reconstructing and analyzing narratives of change. We cluster the review along the three parts of our research: one narrative content, two social productions of narratives and three their role in social change processes.

Our working definition of narratives of change as ‘sets of ideas, concepts, metaphors, discourses or story-lines about change and innovation’ subsumes different linguistic devices. Like this, we purposively stay open to other understandings of discourses and narratives. As put by Davies (2002): “the boundary between narrative and other forms of discourse is simply not sharply marked off. Features characteristic of narrative, such as temporal sequencing, change and closure may be found in other discursive forms (a sonnet, for instance, or an essay) and stories may be found that lack key narrative features”. While Davies refers to narratives as a form of discourse, (Hajer 1995), posits that discourses are “a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena. The key function of story-lines is that they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem”. He defined a discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities”. Building on these somewhat contradictory definitions, we consider narratives of change to be a particular discursive form which positions actors in a context and orders events or activities in (temporal) sequence towards a goal or future.

The Narrative literature used in this Adolescents and issues in nigerian’s narrative on conflicts are comparatives literatures from Western and Middle East to give Nigerians a comprehensive analysis and understanding the Natural aspect of Narratives Issues and how to go about it for future usage and analysis.

**The content of narratives of change, context, actors, plot:** We use the concept of narratives of change to get a sense of how social innovation initiatives perceive (changes of) the world and their own role therein. As such, we are interested in the content of their stories about change. Researchers have distinguished different elements of narratives to be considered in a content analysis. By way of example, Fischer (2003, building on Burke 1945) suggests to distinguish agents, act, scene, agency and purpose. Studying these allows us to answer the following questions: Who does what, when and where? How was it done? And why? Altering this for our purposes of analysing narratives of change, we suggest that important elements are: one how is the status-quo and a desired goal or future to-be described (context), two who is considered to be involved in changes (actors) and three how is change occurring (plot).

**Context in narratives:** Context in narratives as suggested above and elsewhere (cf. Benford & Snow 2000), narratives have a role to play in sense making and the construction of meaning. Frames have been presented as ‘simple narratives’ which outline problems, diagnose causes and suggest solutions (Roe 1994). Narratives of change can be considered to contain such simpler narratives, or narratives within narratives, describing undesirable developments in the past, problematic present situations as well as attractive future scenarios. In other words, narratives describe past, current as well as future states and position them in space (where) and time (when). Thereby, the scene it set and justification is delivered for the activities carried out by various actors, including the social innovation initiatives.

**Actors in narratives:** We take actors to be agents that perform acts these can be human or non-human. Analysing actors in narratives allows an understanding of who engages in activities furthering or hindering desired societal change. In narrative analysis, we can distinguish between actors, the roles that are ascribed to them and how they are represented. An analysis of power relations in societal change processes by Avelino and Wittmayer (forthcoming) is based on the following actor categorisation: firstly, actors are clustered according to the following sectors: government, market, community or Third Sector and secondly, actors are considered at different levels of aggregation: sectors (as outlined), individual (examples, social entrepreneur, citizen) or organizational actors (examples, firm, municipality). This distinction proved useful and informs the analysis of actor types occurring in the narratives discussed here.

While actors are referred to in different roles, such as citizen, they also play a particular part in the actual narrative, examples, protagonist, supporter, antagonist, beneficiary, power holder (cf. Greimas narratological model in Basten 2012). Actor roles can also be described in terms of cultural archetypes, such as hero, anti-hero, and underdog. In terms of representation, Basten (2012) suggests to distinguish between round and flat characters, where round characters are represented as complex, with nuances and capable of learning, while flat characters are simple, stereotypical and strictly defined. In addition to actor types, the particular parts they play in the plot is considered in our analysis.

**Plot in narratives:** With plot, we refer to the actual storyline: how do events and activities lead from the current to a future situation, that is, the desired end-goal of actors’ efforts described as a changed context. The plot is thus creating an element of sequencing one of the main criteria of narratives. Generally speaking, “narrative is taken to mean a sequence of events in time” (Berger 1997, quoted in Andrews et al. 2003) and contingency is a “fundamental criterion of narrative” as “stories demand the consequential linking of events or ideas" (Salmon and Riessman 2008). Narratives provide important devices for ordering temporal sequences, which has been argued to be an important source of agency and reflexivity, that is, the capacity of “breaking with the dominance of the past over the future” (Lissandrello & Grin 2011, citing Beck et al. 2003). The plot, in other words, describes how current givens are or can be challenged and transformed including a different set of social relations involving new understandings, practices and institutions. This sequencing of events and activities occurs against the contextual setting (when and where) and explains how this setting is (to be) changed.

**The social production of narratives:** A constructivist approach to narratives implies understanding them as socially produced. It requires paying attention to the socio-cultural context and structural conditions, as well as the actual interaction through which a narrative is produced. In the ‘social interaction approach’ to narrative analysis, narrative accounts are contingent on time, space, interlocutors, previous talk and action. As such they are momentous co-constructions of narrators and audience. Narratives are considered relatively stable and habitual and, at the same time, emergent and situational responses in a given setting. Thus, narratives cannot be abstracted from their context (neither from the immediate social nor from the wider societal) and are always attached to broader discourse activity (De Fina and Georgakopoulou 2008).

The epistemological challenge, then, is that all narrative data is situational and interactional. Ideally, narrative analysis shifts reflexively between the local micro-context and the ‘master narrative’ recurring across a variety of contexts (De Fina and Georgakopoulou 2008b). Following this view, our focus on ‘theories of change’ shared by collaborating social innovation actors requires examining the ‘master narrative’ that we find articulated in various forms (oral, written, or in (moving) images) and at different instances. Although different narrators, settings, media and audiences impact on the content, delivery and reception of stories, overarching storylines emerge that are sufficiently coherent for analysis.

**The role of narratives in social change processes:** Narratives can be understood as stories about and productions of social life (Davies 2002). They draw upon and contribute to a variety of social macro-processes, such as the legitimisation of knowledge or action, “the inclusion or exclusion of social groups, the enactment of institutional routines, the perpetration of social roles, etc.” (De Fina and Georgakopoulou 2008). Broadly speaking, literature distinguishes between three different (albeit related) roles that narratives can play in social change processes: narratives **one trigger imagination,** two are **expressions of (counter) cultures** and three are **resources for empowerment.**

Telling narratives; about the past, means tapping into as well as transforming cultural and individual memory. Most work on narratives focuses on the past (biographical) or present (experience, meaning), with an emerging focus on the future. Such narratives about the future evoke imagination, invite us to think **‘from what is to what if’** (cf. Sools 2012) or ‘what next might happen’ (Shotter & Katz 2004 in Sools 2012) as such they help to open the black box of what we think is possible. Narratives have the capability to extend a given culture, its norms and restrictions and as such are crucial for creative potential and “the most powerful device to subjunctives the world” (Brockmeier 2009). Practicing agency through narrative imagination means probing one’s “action possibilities” and to open up to the “hypothetical, the possible, and the actual”, Narrative imagination is then a fundamentally social enterprise. Drawing on (Iser, Brockmeier 2009) asserts: “The point of narrative fiction in this context is that it articulates the human capability to permanently undermine cultural norms and restrictions. It demonstrates that the mind interprets meanings as possibilities of action that reach beyond its own limits”.

Connecting narratives to the broader context and societal change, (Wilce jr. 2007) argues that “culture shapes the narratives in which the self emerges. Yet culture is a process. Cultures have always been in motion, and narrative facilitates this movement”. Thus the narratives created by social innovation actors about the world that they live in as well as the ways in which these are constructed are deeply informed by the cultural values and assumptions that they at the same time reveal. However, this quote also points to the role that narratives can play in social change processes. Changes in stories at a specific level have consequences for stories at another level. As argued by (Rappaport 1995) “the narrative approach spans levels of analysis. It explicitly recognizes that communities, organizations and individual people have stories, and that there is a mutual influence process between these community, organizational, and personal stories”. By developing and sharing their narratives, social innovation actors connect their work to the broader context and engage in (co-)creating societal narratives. In this vein, Davies (2002) talks about ‘counter-narratives’ as instrument through which social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the structures of meaning and power they convey”. Counter-narratives in this understanding “modify existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold” (idem) as such they also appeal to human imagination.

This imagination can be understood as a “form and practice of human agency” (Brockmeier 2009). Especially, researchers focusing on personal experience and sense making narratives as “ways of expressing and building personal identity and agency” (Squire et al. 2008). According to Hall (1982), movement actors to which social innovators can be counted are deeply involved in “the politics of signification”, that is, the production and maintenance of meaning. Following this, narratives can be viewed as resources and as tools for individual and collective empowerment. As put by Rappaport (1995): “we are led to help people to discover their own stories, create new ones, and develop settings that make such activities possible all activities consistent with the goals of empowerment”. Empowerment is enhanced when personal life stories are sustained by the collective narrative and vice versa (cf. Davies 2002; Riessman 2008, Rappaport 1995).

**A method for reconstructing and analysing narratives:** Our assumption is that through narratives of change of social issues initiatives we gain insights into their ideas about why the world has to change, who has the power to do so and how this can be done. As such, our main interest lays in particular elements of narrative content, namely context described (lending purpose to actors’ activities), actors involved and the plot (how activities unfold). Being aware of the power and performativity of storytelling, we also enquire into the narrative practices, that is, the production of narratives, in the different initiatives and into the role social issues actors themselves accredit to stories they share. Based on the literature review, we suggest a method for reconstructing and analysing narratives innovation of change of social innovation actors including their production and their alleged role in change processes. Not every narrative innovation of change might display all the elements of the method; there is the possibility that only fragments exist. For each element of the method we suggest a number of empirical questions as outlined above.

 **Method for reconstructing and analysing narratives issues of change:**

1. Content of narratives; Context Why? (When?) (Where?) How is the context constructed in the plot, under study? What past and current problems and societal challenges are framed in the plot? What desired future or goal is described, lending purpose to proposed actions? Actors Who? How are actors constructed in the plot under study? - Who are the individual, organisational and sector-level actors driving and/or hindering change? Plot How? How is the social change process said to unfold in the plot under study? What events, experiences or activities lead to the desired future and in what sequence? Which activities by the initiative and other actors are driving and/or hindering change?
2. Role of narratives; how is the role of narratives innovation in general and specifically in social change processes perceived? What role do social innovation actors ascribe to the narrative they share and narratives of others?
3. Production of narratives innovation; how were or are the plots under study produced? What kind of ideas, concepts, metaphors or discourses are included or alluded to in the narrative innovation? (Is the concept of “social innovation” used explicitly?).

 What visual aids are used to support ideas; concepts or metaphors used? What kind of narrative practices does the initiative engage in? How central are narrative practices to the activities of the SI-initiative?

On the basis of the suggested method, we reconstructed the ‘master narratives’ (cf. De Fina and Georgakopoulou 2008b) of the narratives of change of Ashoka, GEN and RIPESS on the network level. We thus focus on the most commonly found narratives across the network and compare these along the main elements of the method.

**The Narratives of Change of Ashoka, Global Eco-village Network and RIPESS**: Using the method, we can analyse the narratives of change of Ashoka, GEN and RIPESS in terms of their content, the role narratives play for the SIinitiative and their production.

**Content of narratives of change: context, actor and plot**: The narratives of change by RIPESS, Ashoka and GEN show a very different understanding of how the world changes. RIPESS’ narrative describes the world as struggle for dominance, where the underdogs (in this case various concepts of a social solidarity economy) have to unite to challenge and overcome the adversary (the neo-liberal economy and world order). This is a political framing, showing a strong favour for collectivism and collective action. The state and governmental actors are seen as powerful actors who can be an ally. Ashoka, on the other hand, perceives the world as constantly changing with increasing speed. Therefore, it sees the need to equip people with skills to deal with this constant change (which is considered neither good nor bad). In this process, solutions are said to emerge for some problems that are well-known and for others that are only beginning to be understood. In their understanding, an individual empowered through the right skills, network and (financial) support can make the world a better place. The market is seen as an ally for the social entrepreneur, while needed systemic changes are part of the realm of the state. For GEN, the change starts with personal change by the individual within a supporting community. There is a strong focus on ‘being the change you want to see in the world’, starting with oneself and one’s community, including daily lifestyle and spiritual growth. The underlying philosophy is an explicitly holistic one, where body and mind, society and planet, are seen as inextricably intertwined, thus making it inherently impossible to ‘heal’ one without ‘healing’ the other as well. As such, the approach to change is one of building new communities from scratch, based on a holistic life philosophy. It is also generally believed that such holistic communities can give rise to alternative markets (based on example, ‘gift economy’) and alternative government structures (based on example, ‘sociocracy’) which could and should alter existing markets and governments.

**Defining contextual problems vs. pointing out activity areas:** RIPESS’ narrative has a quite distinct framing of the current context regarding the detrimental consequences of economic globalization and the neoliberal world order. The narrative by GEN also describes developments that are considered problematic, namely human alienation from nature and overly anonymous, technocratic and system-dominated societies. Ashoka however, refrains from a specific problem framing and focuses on supporting change maker activities in general domains that are considered to require attention, such as education or health. Overall, it appears that Ashoka focuses more on solutions than on problems and offers a more optimistic perspective on current state of affairs.

In any case, contexts described or activity areas defined both justify and lend purpose to the networks’ activities. RIPESS aims levering out the alleged ‘natural laws’ of the current economic system by experimenting with and showcasing liveable alternatives. GEN does not believe in waiting for governmental action and instead promotes the design and implementation of pathways to a sustainable future by empowered individuals and communities. The narrative of change that the GEN is referring to is at the same time their action strategy: to build a network of resilient communities that is not easily affected or hit by negative developments of the macro-systems. They prefer to rely on **‘human-scale’ systems,** because they can overlook, design and influence them. Ashoka focuses on individual change makers that find bold and ingenious solutions to problems that may only be on the verge of shaping up and not clearly defined yet. Although the network establishes problem areas that need addressing, it trusts the intuition and capacity of the individual to find a way to see problems that lead to “out of the box” solutions.

**Primacy of specific actors: the individual vs. the collective:** Ashoka focuses on individuals as social entrepreneurs and change makers. In this narrative issues, other actors (whether individual ones such as experts or advisors or organisations such as universities or foundations) serve as support for the social entrepreneur in finding solutions. The focus is on the achievement of the individual: even after Ashoka changed their narrative to focus on ‘everyone a change maker’ (as opposed to the one-in-a-million individual), this ‘everyone’ is still every individual. The GEN narrative zooms in on the individual and its personal needs and desires that ought to be met sustainably. The narrative issues, pays equal attention to the community that requires commitment and contributions by every individual but also exists to support the individual on its path to inner transformation. RIPESS on the other hand, focuses mainly on (regional, continental, international) networks as uniting different forms and actors of a worldwide social solidarity economy. It also includes collective actors such as groups of citizens, Third, sector organizations and socially responsible government (by exception social entrepreneurs or ethical banking) who practice the solidarity economy. As such, RIPESS is focused much more on collective and institutional actors.

**Plotting the change: getting from “here” to “there”**: The strategies for change that feature in the different narratives follow from the contexts defined and the actors identified. In that sense, the three narratives of change, are coherent and outline approaches that involve proving established systems wrong (RIPESS), practicing alternative habits (GEN) and implementing tailor-made solutions (Ashoka). Therefore, Ashoka’s narrative revolves around building an enabling environment for the social entrepreneur. RIPESS argues for experimenting with a variety of alternative forms of social solidarity economy who unite vis-à-vis the established market order. GEN advocates inner, individual healing and strong communities who collectively and everyday practice sustainable living on the ground.

These diverging change strategies plotted in the three narratives translate to varying dissemination activities which shows how narrative assumptions impact on actual activities: while RIPESS carries its ambition to foster broad political debate into the media and lobbies with international governance institutions, Ashoka aims to showcase and celebrate the successful entrepreneurial change maker by delivering public speeches. GEN stresses that eco-villages cannot be ‘islands’ but need to facilitate change in the social and regional context, mostly by hosting meetings and educational events that enable citizens from across the world to experience eco-village life and to witness first-hand that an alternative community life is possible.

In terms of time frames across which changes are said to unfold, all three narratives focus on the necessity to act now for a desired future. Time and ongoing change processes feature quite differently in the three narratives, however. While Ashoka considers the world to be in constant flux and holds the belief that times of unprecedented change are yet to come, GEN and RIPESS consider current systems to be static, yet leading to undesired environmental changes. For Ashoka the only way to impact on the change that is upon us is training everyone to be a change-maker and to engage in ongoing innovation because social systems are currently too slow to adapt to our changing environment. GEN emphasises the need to start building alternative pathways in the present that, amongst other, incorporate and reinvent past sustainable practices (example handicraft skills), so as to enable a sustainable and radically different future. Intergenerational learning is an important aspect for doing so.

A commonality of all three narratives is the central role of networking in achieving change. This observation has a methodological reason because all three cases include social innovation initiatives that consist of global networks and local manifestations. It is, however, striking how much emphasis is paid to the importance and power of networking. For GEN empowered individuals in intentional Communities profit from global exchange that goes beyond the placebound practices. Ashoka views networked support for the individual social entrepreneur as crucial for success and RIPESS organises congresses for representatives of its various member networks to discuss shared values, principles and assumptions without streamlining these into a singular, shared vision.

**The Production of Narratives of Change:** Looking into the production of narratives, rather than only at their content, allows us to scrutinize how and to what extent the SI-initiatives reproduce and/or challenge the social context which they criticise as part of their narrative of change. Resonating with the literature that emphasizes the context-dependency of narrative practices, the practices around the production of theories of change in the three SI-initiatives follows the recipe of success suggested by the narrative itself. Thereby, the narratives draw from and at the same time create the context matching their activities.

RIPESS, who critiques individualistic and competition and market based economic principles on a number of issues, seeks to replace the hegemonic neoliberal paradigm with a variety of solidarity-based economic forms or variations. In line with this notion, RIPESS welcomes broad experimentation and attempts to involve everyone in the construction of central story lines. This process is particularly challenging because the networks involved in this umbrella network are rather diverse. To date, RIPESS lacks a centrally co-ordinated story and hosts a variety of views or ‘theories of change’. It does, however, try to align or join forces between diverse and divided narratives by working collaboratively towards a shared perspective on alternative economies (cf. RIPESS 2015). The production of such a shared perspective is a joint activity. RIPESS is inclined towards direct democracy and truly shared declarations taking into account that they are to represent a very broad set of networks and organisations, and should not reproduce the exclusive tendencies they criticise.

GEN typically makes use of community-led participatory methods and deliberation for shaping the narratives of the network, involving not only all regional networks, but also each eco-village and each individual who is present at the network event at that time. Besides formalized general assembly meetings, network gatherings are typically characterised by a great deal of small-group discussions, one-on-one conversation, singing, meditation and dancing. These rituals are not only seen as necessary ‘relaxation’, but as intricate part of creating a shared vision and strategy. Core imagery of the GEN vision includes green environments, community life and the planet. The butterfly recurs in GEN’s logos, accompanied by the slogan **"if nothing ever changed, there would be no butterflies"** (GEN website 2015). The transmuted caterpillar captures the notion that change is possible, already occurs and requires collaboration just like the cells of the caterpillar need to cooperate to re-cluster and form the beautiful butterfly.

Ashoka focuses on individual social entrepreneurs with world-changing ideas and its central narrative is also predominantly lead-authored by a single individual, Bill Drayton, the CEO and founder of Ashoka. He developed key elements of the Ashoka narrative of change (such as the social entrepreneur as system changer carried by a network of fellow combatants supporting him in spirit or kind) which are then adopted by country offices worldwide. These central notions even outlived a significant reorientation of Ashoka’s narrative and approach from the ‘one-in-a-million social entrepreneur’ to an ‘everyone a change-maker’ vision. For communicating their vision, they also use images. Other elements such as the notion of an “ecosystem for social innovation” that originated and has become particularly prevalent in Germany are constructed more locally.

In short, the networks’ practices around the production of narrative elements such as concepts, storylines or images are inspired by or even in line with their ideas about how change is to come about: individually orchestrated or collectively performed. Which other actors are considered important for change to occur can be teased out by tracing the engagement strategies and communication outlets the different networks choose to spread and further their ideas.

The Ashoka network produces a wealth of communication materials (examples, reports, presentations, brochures, concept papers and articles), organises conferences and delivers public speeches. All of these efforts are focused on the discursive construction of the need for as well as the identity and role of social entrepreneurs and aim at the mobilisation of actors around this discourse. As outlined in the Ashoka Magazine: “We work on creating more understanding and support for social entrepreneurs in Germany. We do this in the following way: Through the newsletter, presentations and at conferences we propagate the idea of social entrepreneurship and of self determined engagement.” (Ashoka Germany Magazine 2013). Despite initial reactions of disbelief and ridicule, universities were also mobilised as key allies in the legitimization of the emerging social entrepreneurship discourse.

The GEN also provides numerous communication materials (examples, website, videos, books, brochures) and organises or attends meetings to explain its mission and approach. In line with the network’s notion that change needs to be lived and experienced, conferences, summits, festivals, tours and courses are offered. During the latter, much attention is paid to the practice of storytelling, which is often explicitly used as a facilitation method.

RIPESS publishes regular newsletters and charters at four-yearly conferences aimed at facilitating exchange between different, otherwise fragmented, social movements and strengthening the awareness of their members for being part of a broader movement of a social solidarity economy. The political voice directed at the outside world is shaped through their website, contributions to political debates in the media, and scientific publications on the social solidarity-based economy (Hiez and Lavilluniere 2013, Higelé and Lhuillier 2014, Kawano 2013). These publications provide political philosophy, ideological framing, evidence base and argumentations for the various activities implicitly or explicitly undertaken as solidarity-based or social economy.

The narrative practices of the different networks echo their theories of change. Ashoka celebrates the ingenious individual, determined to make a difference. Communication efforts aim to convince others of this notion and at the construction of a benevolent surrounding for social entrepreneurs or ‘change-makers’. The GEN focuses on ’sharing the experience and best practices’, a goal that nicely aligns with the organisation of gatherings and courses or workshops for the curious.

**The Roles of Narratives of Change:** For all three SI-initiatives, narratives play a considerable role in their efforts to influence social change processes. For RIPESS it is a central element of their existence: they provide a narrative on social solidarity economy to align fragmented social movements. Ashoka promotes the narrative on ‘social entrepreneurs’ and Ashoka Germany, which is very involved on the European level, came to understand ‘framework change’, that is, altering how people perceive the world as their main activity. Finally, for GEN, the creation of ‘a new story’ for alternative community living is at the heart of its core mission.

 The three SI-initiatives do however differ in the functions that they ascribe to their narratives. For RIPESS, their narrative is a counter-narrative (cf. Davies 2002) directed to break the hegemony of neoliberal ideology, which is considered the key problem. The lack of solidarity economy, in other words, is attributed partly to discursive structures and dominant beliefs to which political voice and alternative discourses are necessary remedies. As illustrated in their Global Vision: “It is very common for the social economy to be conflated with the solidarity economy. They are not the same thing and the implications of equating them are rather profound. The social economy is commonly understood as part of a “third sector” of the economy, complementing the “first sector” (private or profit-oriented) and the “second sector” (public or planned). The solidarity economy seeks to change the whole social or economic system and puts forth a different paradigm of development that upholds solidarity economy principles.” (RIPESS 2013). It is also the framing in terms of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses that makes political parties like Podemos (Spain) and Syriza (Greece) and various “New Left” political movements interesting allies to RIPESS more than many actors operating under the social innovation banner, which is considered to be at risk of reproducing prevalent entrepreneurial-productivist views on alternative social practices.

For GEN, on the other hand, narratives trigger imagination and open up a new possible future. An illustration of this is the New Story Summit (organised October 2014), focused on creating a new story, as communicated on the website of this event: “As we change our story, we change our world. We humans find our way by story. Our stories shape us, hold us and give meaning to our lives. Every so often it becomes clear that a prevailing story is no longer serving. Now is such a time. If we do not create a positive, realistic picture of the future, we will not live into it. This visibly accelerating disintegration of the story lived since the industrial revolution can feel overwhelming. Caught in this apparent helplessness, contemporary narratives of the future oscillate between blind denial and apocalyptic devastation. Neither will help us live the transformational Great Turning that is still though maybe only just within our grasp” (Findhorn website). Next to an internal role, the narratives also serve to role of motivating the “people on the ground in the single eco-village who might often forget that they are part of a larger movement” and vice versa, the single narratives by different eco-villages are needed to promote solid stories of change, according to GEN president Kosha Joubert at the international GEN conference in 2015.

Finally, for Ashoka narratives are resources for empowerment in that they engage in producing and maintaining certain meanings (cf. Hall 1982). Ashoka claims to directly influence what stories people tell, or assumptions they hold, about how the world works and what the role and power of individuals is in changing it. Very specifically, they empowered the ‘social entrepreneur’ as a change-maker. The construction and invention of the latter identity is key to Ashoka: “Social entrepreneurs have existed throughout history, but the identity is constructed. The historical achievement of Ashoka over thirty years is to have created an identity and a term for something that was happening in our societies, for something that has always been in our societies. You can look back over 100 years to Maria Montessori, for example; but then it happened accidentally”.

The considerable role that the three SI-initiatives attach to narratives and discourses shows in their strategy for system change. All three SI-initiatives relate to broader societal narratives with regard to economic alternatives. They are involved in coining and developing the narratives on social entrepreneurship and the social economy (Ashoka), individual and community transformation and the construction of shadow systems (GEN) and the solidarity economy and economic globalisation (RIPESS). Especially RIPESS and GEN, but also Ashoka refer to general or global developments to provide justification and problem framing: neoliberalism, individualism or capitalism. Contextual macro-processes that narratives of change pick up on include social, cultural, environmental and economic developments. In doing so, justification and meaning is given to proposed change strategies and, at the same time, these grand societal discourses are strengthened. For example, RIPESS addresses relentlessly market failures and ethical implications of the current economic system, thereby challenging another prominent societal narrative, namely the “there is no alternative” story.

 **CRITIQUE OF FINDINGS WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES AND FUTURE INQUIRY;**

The narratives serve as lenses for society members through which they view their world. In this role they play a determinative role on the way society member process information. They lead to selective collection of information, which means that society members tend to search and absorb information that is in line with the narratives and omit contradictory information. But, even when ambiguous or contradictory information is absorbed, it is encoded and cognitively processed to be in accordance with the held beliefs of the narratives through bias, addition and distortion. The new information is assimilated into existing collective schemata. Bias leads to focus on the schema-consistent parts of the absorbed information, disregarding the inconsistent parts, or to interpretation of ambiguous information in line with the held repertoire. Specifically, such processes of assimilation and distortion are carried out in a number of ways.

First, the narratives serve as "anticipatory schemata, providing the basis for certain expectations; they direct the attention to particular types of information and increase sensitivity for information that is congruent with the valence and content of the repertoire. Society members are especially attentive to information that provides validation of their views about the conflict and the rival group. They are selective in their information processing by actively searching for confirmatory information, preferring it, identifying it easily and being less open to alternative information.

 Second, narratives serve as a basis for encoding the incoming information in particular ways and evaluating it. Narratives influence the translation of incoming information coming from the environment. Society members tend to use a theory driven strategy to absorb new information about the conflict, own society and the rival group in line with the narratives. In sum, it should be stressed that while the described narratives that evolve in conflict enable better adaptation to conditions of intractable conflict, they also serve to maintain and prolong the conflict. The narratives become a prism through which society members construe their reality, collect new information, interpret their experiences and then make decisions about their course of action (example, Ross, 1993). That is to say, participation in an intractable conflict tends to "close minds" and facilitate a tunnel vision that precludes the consideration of incongruent information and alternative approaches to the conflict.

Therefore, conflict Narrative issues, with their underlying systems and their roots in historical memories appear to play a central role in conflicts, on a par with the role played by the Families, Community, Media and Peer group aspect. Thus, it stands to reason that Conflict Narrative should be the targets of coexistence programs which subject to change, generation to generation.

It becomes clear that any movement by society members towards any peaceful resolution of the conflict and eventual reconciliation requires changes of the Conflict narrative and the beliefs that accompany it (Bar-Tal, 2000). This requires the adoption of a psychological point of view which serves not only to understand Conflict but to also examine possible avenues for reconciliation and dilemmas associated with these.

It follows from the Researcher preceding discussion that one of the major outcomes of the conflict narratives on Aggressive Behaviour, theoretically speaking, history has proved itself to often hold people's social identities and social learning are very difficult to change. However, research evidence to show that when at least some of the conditions are met, such as intensive interaction (Maoz, 2002) or developing friendships (Bar-Natan, 2004), perceptions change and adversary's narratives become somewhat less delegitimized. Perhaps even more importantly, participation in peace education programs has been found to serve, particularly among Adolescents and even vigilante groups were inform and partnership between communities in both Christian and Muslims Communities and established relationship within themselves.

 A related issue pertains to the role of facing historical memories in a process of reconciliation. Does allowing historical memories to surface facilitate or hinder reconciliation attempts? Devine-Wright (1999) argued that highlighting historical memories is unhelpful as it can easily lead to entrenchment. First, however, history may be unavoidable; it surfaces nevertheless, as Maoz (2000) has shown. As in other cases, while the strong side in the conflict wants to look into the bright future, evading if possible, the past, the weak side usually returns to deal with the past to achieve recognition of the harm done to it. The absence of acknowledgment by the strong group of past harm done by it to the weak group can be a hindrance to any reconciliation process within the communities.

**Theme about Group’s Goals;** important change concerns the narrative regarding the justness of the goals that underlay the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict. Groups involved in conflict construct beliefs about own goals that provide epistemic basis for the conflict. They present these goals as being of supreme importance and provide for them justifications and rationale. Reconciliation requires change of this narrative, in fact, its abolition, or at least indefinite postponement of societal aspirations expressed in (narrative-central) goals, which caused the intergroup conflict. Instead new societal beliefs about goals have to be formed. The new beliefs must present new goals for the society that have been shaped by the conflict resolution agreement and that center on maintaining peaceful relations with the former enemy. In addition, these beliefs have to provide rationalization and justification for the new goals, including new symbols and myths.

**Theme about the Rival Group;** Another determining condition for reconciliation is a change of the images of the adversary group. In times of conflict Narrative, the opposing group is delegitimized in order to explain its aberrant behaviour, the outbreak and continuation of the conflict, and to justify negative actions taken against the adversary (Bar-Tal and Teichman, in preparation). To promote a process of reconciliation, perceptions of the rival group need to be changed. It is important to legitimize and personalize its members: legitimization grants humanity to members of the adversary group after years of its denial. It allows viewing the opponent as belonging to category of acceptable groups, with which it is desired to maintain peaceful relations. Personalization enables to see members of the rival group as humane individuals, who can be trusted and have legitimate needs and goals. The new beliefs should also contain a balanced stereotype consisting of positive and negative characteristics and a differentiating perception of the group that acknowledges its heterogeneous composition. Finally, the new beliefs should permit seeing the other group as a victim of the conflict as well, not only as perpetrator, given that also its members suffered in its course (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman, 1999).

**Theme about one's Own Group.** Reconciliation requires changing the narrative issues about one’s own group. During the conflict, groups tend to view themselves in one sided way with self-glorification and self-praise, ignoring and censoring any information, which may shed negative light on the group. But in the reconciliation process, the group must take responsibility for its involvement in the outbreak of the conflict, if that was the case as well as its contribution to the violence, including immoral acts, and refusal to engage in peaceful resolution of the conflict. Thus, the new societal beliefs, present one's own group in a more “objective” and complex light, more critically, especially regarding its past aggressive behaviour. As pointed out elsewhere (Salomon, 2002), acknowledging the contribution of one's own side to the conflict seems to be a necessary condition for any reconciliation to take place.

**Theme about the Relationship with the Past Opponent;** reconciliation requires formation of new societal beliefs about the relations between the two groups that were engaged in conflict. During conflict, the societal beliefs support confrontation and animosity (Bar-Tal, 1998). To promote reconciliation, these beliefs need to change into beliefs that stress the importance of cooperation and friendly relationships. Of special importance is the stress on equality of relations and mutual sensitivity to each other needs, goals and general well being. These new beliefs about the relationship should also concern the past. As discussed before, the new beliefs should present the past relations within new framework that revises the conflict Narrative issues or memory and forms an outlook on the past that is synchronized with that of the former rival.

**Theme about Peace;** during the intractable conflict the parties yearn for peace but view it in general, amorphic and utopist terms, without specifying its concrete nature and realistic ways to achieve it. Reconciliation requires forming new societal beliefs that describe the multidimensional nature of peace, realistically outline the costs and benefits of achieving it, connote the meaning of living in peace, and specify the conditions and mechanisms for its achievement (for example, negotiation with the rival and compromises), and especially for its maintenance. Of special importance is the recognition that for lasting peace the well being of the two sides is in the interest of both parties and hence peace also requires ongoing sensitivity, attention and care for the needs and goals of the other group.

There is wide agreement that reconciliation requires the formation of a new common outlook of the past a change of Conflict Narrative issues. It is suggested that once there is a shared and acknowledged perception of the past, both parties take a significant step towards achieving reconciliation. Hayner (1999) noted: “Where fundamentally different versions or continued denials about such important and painful events still exist, reconciliation may be only superficial.”

Reconciliation implies that both parties do not only get to know, but truly acknowledge what happened in the past (Asmal et al., 1997; Chirwa, 1997; Gardner Feldman, 1999; Hayes, 1998; Hayner, 1999; Lederach, 1998; Norval, 1998, 1999). Indeed, being recognized and acknowledged is "given urgency by the supposed link between recognition and identity" (C. Taylor, 1994). Acknowledgement of the past implies at least recognizing that there are two (legitimate) narratives of the conflict (Hayner, 1999; Kopstein, 1997; Norval, 1999).). This is an important factor in reconciliation, since the conflict Narrative issues of each party about its own past underpin the continuation of the conflict and obstruct peacemaking. Reconciliation necessitates changing the narratives issues of collective memories and aggressive behaviour by learning about the rival group’s collective memories and admitting one’s own past misdeeds and responsibility for one's contribution to the conflict. Through the process of negotiation, in which the one's own past is critically revised and synchronized with that of the other group, a new narrative can emerge (Asmal et al., 1997; Hayes, 1998; Norval, 1998). With time, this new historical account of events should substitute each side's dominant narrative of collective memory.The research worked was an open door policy, it allowed critique and retesting the experiment to find out the evidence testing which would show that Conflict Narrative was truth testing experiment through scientific mean testing. Conflict Narrative had other areas to experiments, which could be on trauma illness, Media Narrative and also clinical Narrative just to mention fewer Topics.

 **Conclusion:**

In this chapter, we reconstructed and compared the narratives of change of three different Initiatives in terms of content, the processes through which narratives issues are formed or negotiated and their perceived role in social change processes. This analysis led to a number of insights into the theories of change of social innovation initiatives. In the following we highlight three of these insights as well as additional questions and challenges that emerged.

Firstly, the analysis shed light on the wide variety of narratives of change of social innovation networks. This obviously has methodological reasons, as we opted for a maximum variation in our case selection. However, it is also indicative of the highly diverse nature of the field of social innovation and in the ways that context (past developments, current situation and desired future), actors and plot (strategy and activities to arrive at the desired future) are framed. In fact, three ideal-type narratives emerged ranging from “Entrepreneurs will save the world” and “Dominant institutions need to be challenged” to “Communities rely on themselves”. Further empirical analysis could feed these master-narratives back to the social innovation networks and see how they resonate with individuals that are part of the network as well as with other or differently nuanced narratives that are prominent at the local, regional or global level of the network. Other analyses bearing interesting insight could focus on clusters of social innovation narratives. The narrative perspective helped in teasing out details that are easily overlooked when studying initiatives’ mission statements or action plans. For example, their understanding of the world as a “playground for entrepreneurs”, “a power imbalance between dominant and alternative economies” and “a beautiful setting for spiritual and sustainable communities” is revealed by studying how the context is depicted in their stories. In other words, structure and agency manifest themselves in the stories and each narrative recounts a different set of interactions that leads to transformation.

Secondly, a striking commonality has become apparent across the social innovation initiatives, namely the importance they accord to stories. Many of the initiatives are profoundly aware of the power of discourse and make ‘discourse shaping’ and the propagation of counter-narratives or future imaginaries strategically part of their activities. Additional research could tease out how narratives of different social innovation initiatives relate or interact, how notions travel between different scale levels (local, regional global) and how the networks’ alternative narratives of change challenge dominant societal narratives. A central insight of this chapter is that narratives of change disclose the assumptions social innovation initiatives hold about challenges societies are faced with, how the world needs to change and what their role in these transformations can be. A reflection on and systematic comparison with prominent scientific narratives of change, example, transition theories or social innovation concepts, could enrich our theoretical understanding of societal change with insights from people practicing change.

As a last insight, we would like to highlight that narratives of change are not just ‘stories out there’, rather they recount the theories of change which are practiced and acted upon by the very social innovation initiatives which propagate them. That Ashoka is focusing on the social entrepreneur, GEN on communal living and RIPESS on institutional change is part of their theory of change and part of their actual practices. The theories of change are guiding their actions and these actions are informing the theories of change. In that sense, (narrative) practices that help spreading alternative views, ideas and practices are used by the networks to increase their transformative potential also strategically vis-á-vis dominant and institutionalised notions and practices.

In closing this chapter, would explain the high level of aggression among adolescents in the Northern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State, which involved the reconstruction and deconstruction of three narratives of change, the question emerges what the action strategy for research and practice of societal transformation can be. A suggestion is to view this chapter as inspiration for “narrative experimentation”. Related approaches exist in the form of vision building, scenario development and back casting. Story writing and the explicit development of narratives of change may form a creative approach to the imagisnation of alternative futures and new social relations as well as a reflexive tool to rethink implicit and explicit ideas and practices of societal change.

 **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

The Objective of the study on Adolescents and Issues in Nigerian’s Narrative on Conflicts as Aggressive Behaviour among Post Crisis Adolescence in Nigeria, Advocate Conflict Narrative through Communication by the individual, NGO, or Mass Media in order to bring the attention of public and Government, to acknowledge the input in changing Narrative Issues and the damages of Conflict to the Adolescents in term of their lives and Communities futures.

* The Adolescents are the leaders of tomorrow, there could be no any Nation would achieve any meaning full development without the use of its Adolescents in development process, they should be given considerable recognition.
* The Adolescents contributed at least two-third population of any Nation and a Nation with less Adolescents that Nation or Community is about to fail but a Nation or Community with Educated, Health and Respected Adolescents that Naton or Community is going to develop structurally, peacefully and a wealth Nation. In any governmental policies, Adolescents should be involved.
* The Adolescents are the Backbone of any Nation or Community, for that reason the Government and Community leaders or stakeholder, political elites most came to the aid of these Adolescence, in terms of.
	+ 1. Educational assistants at all levels of education should be giving to Adolescents.
		2. Those who lost their parent most look upon and take care of, by the Government and Community where those Adolescents live.
		3. Adolescents should be empowered financially and should be employed by Government and Private Companies.
		4. Those who are educated should be given the opportunities to have a Job. Those who lost their Memory should be taken to Hospital for memory recall.
* Above all, Adolescents should learn how to forgive and resolve any Conflict around them, for peace to take place in the Community, State, Nation and world in General, by obeying the law of the land and the teaching of their religion doctrine.
* The office holder should respect the life of its citizens and respect the law of the land by not using religion as a source of campaigning for political achievement and related issues.

May Allah subahanahu-Wata’ala bless our Nation, States, Loal Governments, Communities and those who are lovers of Peace and tranquility. Thank you for reading me, as Adolescents and Issues in Nigerians Narratives on Conflicts. God bless you.

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